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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the philosophical and theological writings of Saīd Nursi 
(1877–1960) entitled Risāle-i Nur (Epistles of Light), and presents a critical analysis 
of his arguments for the existence of God. Although certain aspects of Nursi’s 
writings have been studied at various academic levels, his ways of arguing for the 
existence of God, and defending his position against the sceptics have not been 
studied at doctoral level. Therefore, the objective of this study is to understand 
Nursi’s arguments, then try locate him among other philosophers and scholars and 
bring out into light his original viewpoints in this context. 
The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 presents the historical background and 
the overview of main theistic arguments from the Christian, Islamic and Jewish points 
of views concerning God’s existence. The theistic arguments analysed are: the 
ontological arguments, the cosmological arguments, including the kalām 
cosmological arguments, the teleological arguments, which are also known as 
arguments to or arguments from apparent design, the arguments from morality and 
conscience, and, finally, the arguments from miracles and religious experience. 
Counter-arguments to the theistic arguments posed by the sceptics are also examined 
such as problem of evil, the problem of Hell, and the poor design arguments. In this 
chapter, we also aim to sum up some of the chief arguments in order to prepare some 
basis for this study. These arguments are analysed from Nursian viewpoint in later 
chapters. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the life and thoughts of Saīd Nursi and explores 
how and why his discourse changed from political activism into that of intellectual 
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and spiritual life. Certain terminologies that have been developed by Nursi are 
discussed here. 
The Ensuing four Chapters, from 3 to 6 analyse four different arguments employed by 
Saīd Nursi’s for the existence and the unity of God (tawḥīd). The first argument, ‘the 
great book of the universe’, which is, in modern philosophy, the equivalent of the 
design argument is discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 examines the second argument 
which Nursi calls the argument from prophethood (nubuwwah), with a particular 
focus on Prophet Muḥammad. Chapter 5 deals with the third argument, i.e. from 
Scriptures (waḥy), with the Qur’ān as the main focus. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses 
Nursi’s fourth argument that is conscience (wijdān) and the primordial human nature 
(fıṭrat-ı bashar).  
In addition, the critics posed specially by the atheist and the sceptics are subjected to 
an evaluation from Nursi’s perspective. Darwinian theory of evolution as an 
alternative to creation, criticisms to the Qur’ān and the Prophet Muḥammad, and 
philosophical issues such as the problem of evil and hell are among the challenges to 
which Nursi responds.  
The thesis concludes that Nursi’s first three arguments i.e. the design argument, the 
argument from prophethood and the argument from scriptures, despite certain 
different interpretations by Nursi, seem to be a continuations of the traditional 
argument. However, Nursi’s originality lays in his moral argument or the argument, 
namely, the argument from primordial human nature. 
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Note on transliteration 
Saīd Nursi lived during the last years of the Ottoman Empire and the first decades of 
modern Turkey. In these two periods, two different alphabets were used. During the 
Ottoman Empire era, the Arabic alphabet was used and terminology was dominantly 
influenced by the Arabic language, whereas the post-1923 era (i.e. the Turkish 
Republic era) sees the introduction of the Latin alphabet and the uses of relatively 
more non-Arabic terminology. Therefore, Risāle-i Nur contains Ottoman Turkish, 
Arabic and modern Turkish terminologies. In this thesis, I try to use the transliteration 
of Arabic and Ottoman Turkish terms and names: al-Fārābī, not Alfarabi, Qur’ān, not 
Koran, Muḥammad, not Muhammad for example. I generally followed the 
transliteration system used in the Unated States Library of Congress. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The recorded history of philosophy goes as far back as the fourth century BC, the era 
of great Ancient Greek philosophers such as Socrates (470–399 BC), Plato (428–347 
BC) and Aristotle (384–322 BC). These philosophers all tried to answer the famous 
age-old question: “Is there a God?” 
Perhaps the unrecorded predecessors of these philosophers had been preoccupied with 
the same question. Let us assume the starting point of philosophy as the fourth 
century BC and travel through time. Along the way, we come across many more 
philosophers who also tackled the same issue of the existence or non-existence of God. 
St Anselm (1033–1109), Roger Bacon (1220–92) and St Thomas Aquinas (1224–74) 
are some of the medieval philosophers of the European Christian tradition who dealt 
with the same matter. It is commonly accepted among academics that modern 
philosophy was born with the work of René Descartes (1596–1650). In his famous 
work Meditations, he introduced the idea of the necessity of God’s existence. In the 
same century and the next, John Locke (1632–1704), Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716), 
George Berkeley (1685–1753) and Voltaire (1694–1778) took part in the debate. 
When we reach eighteenth-century Europe, we find the criticism of the theistic 
argument presented by David Hume (1711–76). Also, the great German philosopher 
Emmanuel Kant appeared with his Critique of Pure Reason. 
Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1899–1951) were two of the 
thinkers who contributed to the argument in the nineteenth century. 
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The debate never cooled down in the twentieth century as A. J. Ayer (1934–), J. L. 
Mackie (1917–81) and Richard Swinburne (1934–) are some of the philosophers who 
have worked in the field. 
Theism, defined by J L Mackie as: 
the doctrine that there is god, and in particular a god conceived in the 
central tradition of the main monotheistic religions, including 
Judaism, Christianity and Islām.1 
is the main topic of this study. Since it is at the centre of all three Abrahamic religions, 
it deserves to be studied from a wider perspective than the mainstream Western 
Christian one. To give it a fair hearing, I shall also examine the Jewish and Muslim 
philosophical worlds. 
Although there are a lot of conflicts among these Abrahamic religions, all three have 
in common the concept of monotheism – the belief in the existence of one God, with 
different names but almost the same qualities in all three religions. All these faith 
groups agree that there is a god who created man and the universe. 
Throughout this study, when I refer to God, I shall adopt Swinburne’s definition of 
the God of monotheism which is commonly agreed upon by all as follows: 
God is a person without a body (i.e. Spirit), present everywhere (i.e. 
Omnipresent), the creator and the sustainer of the universe, a free 
agent, able to do everything (i.e. Omnipotent), knowing all things 
(i.e. Omniscient), perfectly good, a source of moral obligation, 
immutable, eternal, a necessary being, holy, and worthy of worship.2 
                                                      
1 J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism : Arguments for and against the Existence of God 
(Oxford, [Oxfordshire]; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1982) at 1.  
2 Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press, 1977) at 2.  
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Two of the most famous Jewish philosophers we mention in this study are Saadia 
(882–942) and Maimonides (1135–1204), who made their own contribution to theistic 
philosophy, especially to the cosmological argument. 
When we examine the Islamic tradition, we find five remarkable philosophers and/or 
mutakallimūn who massively influenced and shaped the Muslim world. They are al-
Kindī (801–43), al-Fārābī (872–950), Ibn Sīnā, also known as Avicenna (980–1037), 
al-Ghazzālī (1058–1111) and Ibn Rushd (1126–98), also known as Averroes. These 
Muslim theologians and philosophers are remarkable in the sense that they are the 
forefathers of the kalām cosmological argument, which is the version of the 
cosmological argument recently reintroduced in modern philosophy by William L 
Craig.3  
Saīd Nursi said that he had dedicated his life to prove that there is God, the Creator 
and the Sustainer of the universe, and that nothing can come into existence by pure 
chance.4 He tackles the atheist views on the meaning of life and the origin of the 
universe by using several theistic arguments, such as the teleological arguments, the 
moral arguments, the arguments from miracles and the arguments from religious 
experience.  
Aims and objectives 
The overall aim of this study is to explore how the existence of God is argued for and 
against in general, and how Saīd Nursi contributes to these arguments.  
                                                      
3 William L. Craig is widely accepted as the modern philosopher who rediscovered this 
unique version of the Cosmological argument. See William Lane Craig, The Kalam 
Cosmological Argument (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1979).  
4 Risâle-i Nur Külliyatı müellifi Bediüzzaman Said Nursı̂: Tarihçe-i Hayat in Said Nursi, 
Risale-I Nur Külliyati 2 (Istanbul: Nesil, 2004c) at 2109-242. 
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The key objectives of the study are to identify the arguments for the existence of God 
since the times of the Ancient Greeks including Jewish, Christian and Muslim 
scholars and philosophers, to determine what kind of counterarguments have been 
developed to refute these theistic arguments, to review Risāle-i Nur in order to find 
out about Saīd Nursi’s theistic arguments, to identify Nursian defence against the 
atheists’’ and sceptics claims, to locate Nursi among other philosophers and 
theologians, and to identify novel inputs of  Nursi to the debate between theism and 
atheism.  
Research Method 
The method used in this thesis comprises descriptive analysis of existing texts and 
audio-visual materials on theism and atheism in general and comparative analysis of 
existing theistic arguments and counterarguments with Nursi’s arguments in Risāle-i 
Nur. Since the topic of this present study is and has always been controversial, the 
study has discursive nature which, at PhD level, requires objectivity, and maintaining 
an impartial tone. 
An interview with a contemporary scholar who specialised in Risāle-i Nur has been 
conducted. 
Strengths and weaknesses of Nursi’s arguments as well as similarities and differences 
between Nursi and other philosophers have been identified. Novel Nursian points of 
views have been highlighted. 
Originality of the study 
The originality of this study is that it attempts to reveal Saīd Nursi’s arguments for 
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God’s existence, which have not been studied comprehensively at a PhD level 
previously, though popular magazines published articles touching upon this matter. 
Saīd Nursi’s Risāle-i Nur was not written as a work of pure philosophy. Nursi 
considered himself as a student of the Qur’ān, not a student of philosophy.5 He blends 
Qur’anic topical commentary and philosophy harmoniously with a specific emphasis 
on four terms: mʿanà-i ismī (self-referential meaning), mʿanà-i ḥarfī (other-indicative 
meaning), nazar (point of view) and niyyah (intention). Four arguments appear to be 
dominant in Nursi’s writings. These Nursian ways of arguing for the existence of God 
are: apparent design in the universe (kitāb-ı kāināt), the existence of prophets 
(nubuwwah), the existence of scriptures (waḥy) and conscience/primordial human 
nature (wijdān/fıṭrat-ı bashar), which are studied here in separate chapters.  
In his voluminous work of some six thousand pages, Nursi never addresses the 
atheists, materialists or naturalists by their names. He rather puts their arguments on 
the table and tries to refute them using science and reason. His texts were initially 
written for the general Muslim public in the Ottoman Empire and later in Turkey, who 
was under serious attack by the USSR’s aggressive atheism and by negative 
philosophical influences from the West, which became the main tenets of the newly 
established Turkish secular republic in 1923. 
Research Motivation 
‘Does God exist or not exist’ is arguably the oldest and most debated topic in 
philosophy. Questions such as ‘is God’s existence demonstrable? Are the atheists’ 
arguments refutable?’ have always been subject of interests to everybody.  
                                                      
5 Said Nursi, The Rays (İstanbul: Nesil, 2004b) at 313. 
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Although many researches have been conducted on Saīd Nursi’s works in terms of his 
sociological and theological views, not many researchers have considered the 
philosophical aspect of Nursi’s writings at PhD level. Therefore, this study is set to 
understand and analyse objectively how Saīd Nursi argues for the existence of God, 
the strengths and weaknesses of his arguments and his contribution to philosophy of 
religion, and fill a gap in the academic world. 
Outline of the study 
The thesis consists of six chapters, an introduction and a conclusion. 
Chapter 1 is the general historical overview of literature from the Ancients to 
modern-day philosophers. Here, I try to establish how the arguments for the existence 
of a superior deity have developed from pagan communities like that of Ancient 
Greece to the Jewish, Christian and Muslim communities. The main theistic 
arguments explained in this chapter are the ontological arguments, cosmological 
arguments, the teleological arguments, and arguments from miracles, from morality 
and from religious experience. Chapter 1 also highlights the criticisms of these 
theistic arguments with special reference to the problem of evil and suffering, the 
problem of Hell, and theological non-cognitivism. This chapter forms the bedrock of 
the study in terms of laying out what is already out there. The arguments and 
counterarguments set out here are re-examined in the following chapters from Nursian 
point of view. 
Chapter 2 examines Saīd Nursi’s life, which spread over the end of the Islam-ruled 
Ottoman Empire era to the first decades of the secular Republic of Turkey. His 
method of struggle against disbelief (jihād) is also examined here. Certain original 
terminology developed by Nursi is explored here. Concepts such as ‘the book of 
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universe’ (kitāb-ı kāināt), the self or the human ‘I’ (anā), the ‘self-referential’ and the 
‘other-indicative’ (ma’nà-i ismī, and ma’nà-i ḥarfī) are looked at. 
Chapter 3’s focus is on Saīd Nursi’s first and most frequently used argument for the 
existence of God, which is essentially the design argument, even though Nursi calls it 
‘the great book of the universe’ argument (kitāb-ı kabīr-i kāināt). Here, we examine 
Nursi’s attempt to refute the three atheistic assumptions of how things might have 
come into existence. These are: nature as creator (iqtaẓathu al-ṭabīʿah), self-creation 
(tashakkala bi nafsihi) and causes as creator (aʿwjadathu al-asbāb). We also examine 
Nursi’s answers to the Darwinian explanation of existence. 
Chapter 4 examines Nursi’s arguments for the existence of God through prophethood 
(nubuwwah). Here, the criticisms to the arguments from religious experience are 
discussed and Nursi’s approach to the problems is analysed. 
In Chapter 5, we study Nursi’s third argument, the argument from scriptures (waḥy). 
Nursi’s arguments to support the idea that the Qur’ān is the genuine revelation of God 
and, hence, the proof for His existence, are examined. 
And finally, Chapter 6 explores the Nursian and the atheist arguments of morality 
and conscience (wijdān or fıṭrat-ı bashar) and how they could be or could not be the 
proof for the existence of a deity. 
This thesis is not about establishing whether theism or atheism has a stronger case. 
Instead, it attempts to understand the Nursian philosophy and determine whether it 
contains any originality. 
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   16 
Limitations and suggestions for further research 
The scope of this study is fairly wide, which may be one of its main limitations. 
Perhaps each of Nursi’s four ways of arguing for the existence of God should be 
studied separately in greater detail by future academics. Further to the these four 
arguments, research may be done on specific concepts and issues that Nursi touches 
upon such as comparative analysis of biological human ‘senses’ and Nursi’s ten-
senses (latāif-i ‘ashara), analysis of material philosophy according to Nursi, and 
linguistic analysis of the Qur’ān in Risāle-i Nur. 
Also Arabic philosophers’’ arguments may be studies in depth and comparative 
analysis among Arabic philosophers and the philosophers of the western tradition may 
be considered.
Introduction 
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Note on sources 
The Risāle-i Nur Collection has been translated into English and published by several 
publishers. Throughout this thesis, I use Nesil Publication’s twin-volume Risāle-i Nur 
Külliyatı published in 2004 in Turkish. 6  English translations are cited from 
eRisale.com using the actual page numbers from Nesil’s hard-copy books. Therefore, 
the page numbers cited in this thesis might differ from those given on the eRisale.com 
websites. 
Instead of starting the page numbering from one at the beginning of each book, 
Nesil’s version adopts the following page order: 
VOLUME 1: 
The Words (Sözler): 3–318 
The Letters (Mektūbat): 347–570 
The Flashes (Lem’alar): 579–827 
The Rays (Şualar): 831–1,133 
VOLUME 2: 
The Signs of Miraculousness (al-Ishārāt al-I’jāz): 1,115–2,310 
Al-Mathnawī al-Nūriyah: 1,275–1,406 
Other writings: 1,409–2,344 
                                                      
6 See Said Nursi, Risale-I Nur Külliyati 1 (Istanbul: Nesil, 1994).  
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Unless stated otherwise, the citations of the Qur’ān are taken directly from the Sahih 
International English translation of the Qur’ān at www.quran.com. 
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PART ONE 
CHAPTER 1: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1. Introduction 
In the philosophy of religion, five arguments among many stand out as defending the 
existence of God. Before focusing on Saīd Nursi’s philosophy, we begin by setting 
out the existing basis of theism. Although there is no evidence that the monotheism 
existed in Ancient Greece, and we are mainly concerned with the God of monotheism, 
the thoughts of the Ancient Greek philosophers are also studied, owing to their 
philosophical significance. The theistic arguments to be examined in this chapter are: 
the ontological arguments; the cosmological arguments; the teleological arguments; 
the arguments from morality and conscience; and the arguments from miracles and 
religious experience. The main criticisms that may be levelled at each of these 
arguments are also examined. 
1.2. Concept of God 
The ontological meaning of the concept of God – the creator and ruler of the universe 
and source of all moral authority; the Supreme Being with regard to knowledge 
(omniscience), power (omnipotence), and extension (omnipresence) – seems to be 
accepted by all Abrahamic religions. The concepts of God in philosophy and in 
religion are interwoven. Although the existence of a Supreme Being is widely 
accepted in philosophy and religion, there are certainly different versions of God 
throughout history and across religions.  
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i. The Ancient Greeks 
The Ancient Greeks dealt with the concept of God at an early stage of their known 
history. Plato and Aristotle both consider God to be the crafter of the universe and of 
uncreated matter. Plato does not subscribe to the idea of monotheism, that is, one 
Supreme Being. He observes the planetary movements and concludes that there must 
be supreme powers behind all these celestial events. There is clear evidence that Plato 
believed in the existence of gods (hoi theoi) rather than of God (ho theos). To him, 
different gods are responsible for different events. This is also evident in Ancient 
Greek literature, where there are mentions of gods such as Zeus, Prometheus, 
Aphrodite and Athene. 
Aristotle’s description of God as unmoved mover is different from that of Plato. To 
Aristotle, God’s divine existence is apparent through perfection and change in the 
universe. Aristotle perceives God as the detached transcendent demiurge, the highest 
being, the apex of knowledge and uncreated matter – but not necessarily loving. 
Plotinus also accepts the existence of God with different qualities. He claims that God 
is the source of the universe: that is, the universe comes out of God (ex deo) in a 
timeless process.7 He rejects creation, since this would imply consciousness and will, 
which limits God. For Plotinus, God is Most Virtuous and Most Truthful. 
Ashqar makes the criticism that the gods of the Ancient Greeks are like normal people. 
They have gender (e.g. Zeus is male and Aphrodite female), they have weaknesses, 
and they have emotions. He writes: 
                                                      
7 Morley, B. Western Concepts of God, IEP (2005). http://www.iep.utm.edu/god-west/ 
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Zeus was the chief of their gods … Their image of him was closer to 
the image of devil than of a god. He was filled with hatred and 
enmity, preoccupied with his desires for food and love. He cared 
nothing for the affairs of gods or men, unless they could help him to 
maintain his hold on power and persist in his tyranny.8 
Ashqar, therefore, concludes that the Ancient Greek concept of God is fundamentally 
in contradiction with that of monotheism, especially Islām. 
ii. The Jews 
The concept of God in Judaism is very similar to the concept in Islām. Maimonides’ 
thirteen principles of faith describe the Jewish God openly. The essential qualities of 
the Jewish God, according to Maimonides, are as follows. God exists. God is one. 
God is incorporeal (i.e. has no body, is non-physical), God is eternal (i.e. God has no 
beginning or no end. He transcends time). God is omnipresent, omniscient, and 
omnipotent. God will reward good and punish evil.9 Ashqar argues that the Jews 
deviated from the true tawḥīd (Oneness of God), and descended to the level of 
idolatrous concepts like that of the Ancient Greeks.10 
iii. The West 
Western concepts of God have developed around Greek and Islamic philosophy. Like 
the Ancient Greeks, the Christian West has divided opinions about God. Early 
Christians such as Tertullian (160-220) rejected Greek philosophy on the basis that it 
professed a number of unworthy views, whereas American Lutherian Christian 
scholar Martin E. Marty (1928- ) believed that Christianity is compatible with the 
highest in Greek thought. 
                                                      
8 Umar Sulayman Ashqar and Nasiruddin Khattab, Belief in Allah : In the Light of the Qur'an 
and Sunnah (Riyadh: International Islamic Pub. House, 2003) at 430. 
9 For a lengthy discussion of the concept, see Philip Birnbaum, A Book of Jewish Concepts 
(New York: Hebrew Pub. Co., 1964).  
10 Ashqar and Khattab, Belief in Allah : In the Light of the Qur'an and Sunnah  at 432. 
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Augustine of Hippo (354-430) developed a theme similar to that of Plato, Socrates 
and Zeno. His definition of God is: ‘something than which nothing more excellent or 
sublime exists’. He lives in the highest sense, and is the most powerful, most 
righteous, most beautiful, most good, most blessed. According to Augustine, God did 
not have to create, but did so as an act of love. However, Augustine disagrees with 
Socrates as regards whether the greatest being (i.e. God) must be aware only of 
himself. Augustine says that God created men and all creatures, and incarnated in 
Christ in order to be revealed to them.11 
St Anselm (1033-1109) extended the concept of ‘perfect being’ by making it the 
foundation of his ontological argument.12 To Anselm, God is the highest being, under 
which there are lesser and lesser beings. 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) believed that the knowledge of God could be obtained 
through reason and revelations. In this respect, he seems to be in agreement with 
Aristotle and the Christians. Although he accepts the gradation of form and matter, he 
claims that God is non-material, but has pure intelligence and activity. Aquinas’s God 
is a God of Love, and providential. 
During the Enlightenment, Deism, which regards reason as the only source of 
knowledge, emerged as a new form of theism.13 Physicists such as Kepler, Boyle and 
Newton explained the mechanics of the universe within the laws of physics. Newton 
maintained that ‘there is no room for an outside cause in the universe’; hence he 
                                                      
11 See Augustine and Gareth B. Matthews, 'On the Trinity. Books 8-15',   
12 See Chapter 1 for Anselm’s ontological argument. 
13 See Encyclopaedia Britannica at 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/156154/Deism 
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rejected the existence of a First Cause.14 Deists based their argument for Natural 
Religion on Newton’s claims.  
The attribute of ‘benevolence’ has been introduced into the concept of God by René 
Descartes (1596-1650). Descartes believed that God is benevolent, and that therefore 
He cannot mislead us. Descartes claimed that God is the uncaused cause, but He is his 
own cause. John Locke (1632-1704) believed that God could not be known by reason 
alone. Revelation helps us to understand God. Revelations do not violate reason; 
otherwise they cannot be accepted as revelation. Hence reason must judge the 
truthfulness of revelation. In agreement with Descartes, Spinoza suggested that God is 
the source of causality. George Berkeley (1685-1753), the empiricist, argued that God 
is the source of perception. Hume accepted Berkeley’s empiricism, but held the 
sceptical view that the concept of God must be rooted in the emotions and not reason 
alone. 
With Kant (1724-1804), the objective concept of God became subjective. Kant argued 
that knowledge acquired through reason does not offer a way of knowing God. God 
can neither be demonstrated nor disproved. Ultimate reality is unknowable and 
unattainable. According to Kant, God has a regulative value, and is a source of 
morality. While Nietzsche (1844-1900) completely rejected God as a weak and 
untenable concept, Freud (1856-1939) regarded God as a projection of mind, and a 
product of wishful thinking.15 
                                                      
14 For Newton’s views on God, see Isaac Newton, Newton's Philosophy of Nature: Selections 
from His Writings (New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 1953). 
15 Morley, B. Western Concepts of God, IEP (2005) at http://www.iep.utm.edu/god-west/ 
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iv. In Islām and in Risāle-i Nur 
Islām is unique in the sense that it uses the term ‘Allāh’ in reference to God. 
Linguistically, Allāh cannot be male, female, or plural, although the attributes given 
to Allāh are generally masculine. The term ‘Allāh’ comes from Aramaic,16 the 
language of Jesus. The term ‘Allāh’ can only be used to denote the God of Islām. By 
contrast, the term ‘God’ did not mean a specific being for the Ancient Greeks. 
Similarly, the Christian definition of God might be confusing, since the doctrine of 
the Trinity is a very common teaching in the Church. The doctrine of the Trinity,17 
formulated in the fourth century AD, essentially attributes deity to three persons: the 
Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Christian theologians still struggle to justify this 
doctrine, since Christianity is a monotheistic religion. 
Although some Islamic philosophers, such as al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, al-Ghazzālī and Ibn 
Rushd, gave philosophical explanations for God’s nature, the solid description of God 
is always derived from the Qur’ān. In Sūrat al-'Ikhlās (The Sincerity), the Qur’ān 
says: “He is Allāh, [who is] One, the Eternal Refuge. He neither begets nor is born, 
nor is there to Him any equivalent.” Throughout the Qur’ān, tawḥīd (the oneness of 
God) is always the main emphasis. This is due to the context applying at the time of 
the revelation, when the concept of God had been corrupted by inventions such as the 
doctrine of the Trinity, and the idolatrous culture of the Arabs. Before Islām, Arabs 
                                                      
16 The Aramaic language was the international trade language of the ancient Middle East. 
Originating in what is modern-day Syria between 1000 and 600 BCE, it became extremely 
widespread, spoken from the Mediterranean coast to the borders of India. 
17 The concept of the Trinity was formulated at three councils. At the Council of Nicaea (AD 
325) it was claimed that Jesus was of the same substance as God the Father, and therefore he 
was declared divine. At the Council of Constantinople I (AD 381), they confirmed the 
teachings of the council of Nicaea and expanded: the Holy Spirit is also fully divine; thus the 
Trinity has one divine ‘nature’, but three distinct ‘persons’. It was in AD 451, at the Council 
of Chalcedon, that the Trinity was declared authoritative. Debates on the matter were no 
longer tolerated; to speak out against the Trinity was now considered blasphemy. 
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had the religion of the prophets Abraham and Ishmael, who taught tawḥīd (the 
Oneness of God). However, they later deviated from tawḥīd and started worshipping 
stone idols. They had many idols, which were kept inside al- Ka’bah (the Sacred 
House in Mecca), and worshipped them. The practice of the prophet Abraham’s Hajj 
changed, from worshipping God to worshipping idols. Arabs travelled to Mecca and 
circumambulated the Ka’bah. The pre-Islamic period (jāhiliyyah) in the Arabian 
Peninsula saw a great many strange religious practices. People used to carry stones to 
worship; when they had found a better-looking stone, they would throw away the 
stone they were worshipping and begin worshipping the new stone. People used to 
carry four stones on their travels. Three of these were used to rest their cooking pot on, 
and one of them was worshipped. Among the many idols of the pagan Arabs, three 
were particularly famous and are mentioned in the Qur’ān. These were Manāh, Al-Lāt 
and al-Uzzā. On the day of the conquest of Mecca, the prophet Muḥammad was 
reported to have found 360 idols in different shapes and sizes in Ka’bah and to have 
destroyed them.18 
In fighting for the re-establishment of tawḥīd, the Qur’ān frequently mentions the 
Oneness of God and His attributes.19 Sūrat al-Ḥashr (The Exile) describes the God of 
Islām (Allāh). Verses [22–24] read: 
He is Allāh, other than whom there is no deity, Knower of the unseen 
and the witnessed. He is the Entirely Merciful, the Especially 
Merciful. He is Allāh, other than whom there is no deity, the 
Sovereign, the Pure, the Perfection, the Bestower of Faith, the 
Overseer, the Exalted in Might, the Compeller, the Superior. Exalted 
is Allāh above whatever they associate with Him. He is Allāh, the 
Creator, the Inventor, the Fashioner; to Him belong the best names. 
                                                      
18 For a detailed description of the pre-Islamic era in the Arabian Peninsula see Ashqar and 
Khattab, Belief in Allah : In the Light of the Qur'an and Sunnah  at 443-54. 
19 See Appendix 2: The names and Attributes of God in Islām. 
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Whatever is in the heavens and earth is exalting Him. And He is the 
Exalted in Might, the Wise.20 
The Qur’ān also addresses the people of the book (Christians and Jews), correcting 
their false beliefs in God. Sūrat al-Nisā (The Women) [4:171] explains: 
O People of the Scripture, do not commit excess in your religion or 
say about Allāh except the truth. The Messiah, Jesus, the son of 
Mary, was but a messenger of Allāh and His word which He directed 
to Mary and a soul [created at a command] from Him. So believe in 
Allāh and His messengers. And do not say, “Three”; desist – it is 
better for you. Indeed, Allāh is but one God. Exalted is He above 
having a son. To Him belongs whatever is in the heavens and 
whatever is on the earth. And sufficient is Allāh as Disposer of 
affairs.21 
The Qur’ān discusses the position of Christians and Jews in various chapters. It 
announces that those who adhere to the Oneness of God will be saved; however, those 
who deviate from tawḥīd will be punished. In Sūrat al-Mā'idah (The Table Spread) 
[5:73], the Qur’ān says: 
They have certainly disbelieved who say, “Allāh is the third of 
three.” And there is no god except one God. And if they do not desist 
from what they are saying, there will surely afflict the disbelievers 
among them a painful punishment.22 
Nursi, in his Risāle-i Nur, considers the Qur’ān to be the only source of knowledge. It 
aims, he says, to explain four important concepts of Islām. These are tawḥīd (Oneness 
of God), nubuwwah (prophethood), ḥashr (resurrection) and ‘adalah (justice). Nursi 
systematically explores God’s attributes throughout his work. Instead of using the 
term ‘Allāh’, which is mentioned in the Qur’ān 2,806 times, Nursi prefers to use the 
names and attributes of God which are apparent in a particular context. For instance, 
when he explains order in nature, where there is apparent cooperation between 
creatures in terms of supporting each other’s life, Nursi tells us that this is the work of 
                                                      
20 Qur’ān, 59: 22–4. 
21 Qur’ān, 4: 171. 
22 Qur’ān, 5:73. 
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Razzāq al-Karīm (The Generous Sustainer). When he mentions the beautiful work of 
God in nature, he calls God Ṣāni al-Raḥmān (The Compassionate Artist). Some of 
Nursi’s descriptive phrases for God are: Fāṭir-i Ḥakīm (The All-Powerful Creator), 
‘Ādil-al Muṭlaq (The Absolute Just), Wājib al-Wujūd (The Necessarily Existent), 
Wāḥid al-Aḥad (The Single One of Unity), Qādir al-Zuljalāl (The All-Powerful One 
of Glory), Khāliq-i kulli shay (The Creator of All Things), Mudabbir-al Ḥakīm (The 
Lowing Career), Qahhār-i zul-Jalāl (The Compelling One of Glory).23 These are the 
attributes regarding God’s power and wisdom that the human mind can comprehend. 
However, some characteristics of God are said to be incomprehensible, such as His 
Hand, His Face, and Him sitting on His Throne,24 since these are in no way within the 
framework of human intelligence. Nursi criticizes philosophers such as al- Fārābī and 
Ibn-i Sīnā on the basis that they try to attain knowledge mainly through reason. He 
seems to be in alliance with al-Ghazzālī, who rejects joining theology with philosophy 
since mind and senses are subject to error. To al-Ghazzālī, truth must come from 
Divine Grace, not mind and senses. In this sense, al-Fārābī, Ibn-i Sīnā and their like 
could only attain the faith-level of an ordinary Muslim, despite their great level of 
intelligence.25 
1.3. Ontological Arguments 
Although it was mentioned implicitly by Plato and formulated by Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) 
in the eleventh century, the ontological argument was introduced into Western 
                                                      
23 Nursi, The Rays  at 865-72. 
24 The verses such as [55:27], “And there will remain the Face of your Lord, Owner of 
Majesty and Honour” and [38:75], “[Allāh] said, O Iblīs (Devil), what prevented you from 
prostrating to that which I created with My hands? Were you arrogant [then], or were you 
[already] among the haughty?" and [2:225] “… His throne includeth the heavens and the 
earth, and He is never weary of preserving them …” have always been controversial among 
scholars in terms of explaining God’s hand, face or throne. 
25 Said Nursi, The Words (Istanbul: Nesil, 2005) at 245. 
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philosophy for the first time by St Anselm (c.1033–1109), the Archbishop of 
Canterbury. 
After staying dormant for some three hundred years, it was revived by René Descartes 
(1596–1650) in the seventeenth century. In the twentieth century, Alvin Plantinga 
(1932–), Norman Malcolm (1911–90) and Charles Hartshorne (1897–2000) all 
developed new interpretations of the argument.  
Each of these theist philosophers had to face certain kinds of opposition. For instance, 
Monk Gaunilo, a contemporary of St Anselm, Thomas Aquinas (1224–74) and David 
Hume (1711–76) tried to refute St Anselm’s version of the argument. Immanuel Kant 
(1724–1804) produced some serious criticisms of Descartes and Cartesian philosophy. 
Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), Anthony Flew (1923–2010) and Nicholas Everitt have 
been the leading modern critics of the ontological arguments. 
The ontological arguments may be represented in terms of three different versions, 
and these are discussed in turn. 
1.3.1. St Anselm’s version 
The original and the most basic form of the ontological argument came from St 
Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury in 1078. St Anselm explained that if we talk about 
or think about a being than which nothing greater could be conceived, this being must 
exist not only in mind but also in reality. He calls this being ‘God’.26 In his 
Proslogion, St Anselm argues that denial of the existence of God is absurd since, by 
definition, God is a being than which nothing greater could be conceived. Inspired by 
                                                      
26 Anselm, Proslogion (La Plata: Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Facultad de 
Humanidades y Ciencias de la EducaciÛn, Instituto de FilosofÌa, 1950) at Chapter 4.  
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the Psalm,27 St Anselm names his imaginary atheist friend ‘the fool’. The fool says 
‘There is no god’. St Anselm asks him to think about a being than which nothing 
greater can be imagined. The fool understands this and accepts the existence of this 
being in his mind; however, he denies his existence in reality. The case is similar to 
that of a painting which exists in the artist’s mind but not in reality. Here, St Anselm 
remarks that the fool is contradicting himself. If the being existed only in the fool’s 
mind, he could not be the being than which nothing greater could be conceived. 
Surely, the being which exists only in the mind is not the greatest being, as it lacks the 
ultimate quality of existing in reality. Therefore, in his own words, St Anselm 
concludes 
… there is absolutely no doubt that something than-which-nothing-
greater-could-be-thought exists both in mind and in reality.28  
St Anselm received his first criticism from his contemporary, Monk Gaunilo of 
Marmoutiers, another man of God. Gaunilo argued that if Anselm’s theory proves the 
existence of God, it also proves the existence of his imaginary ‘lost island’, which is 
full of every conceivable delight.29 Gaunilo explains that ‘the lost island’ could exist 
in minds but not necessarily in reality. Since both cases are highly parallel, Gaunilo 
believes that Anselm’s ontological argument fails to prove the existence of God. 
However, Plantinga, the twentieth-century ally of St Anselm, disagrees with Gaunilo. 
Plantinga argues that there is no such thing as a ‘perfect island’. The concept of a 
perfect island is impossibilistic.30 Whichever way such an island might be described, 
                                                      
27 Psalms, 53:1: The fool has said in his heart: There is no God. Corrupt are they, and have 
done abominable iniquity: there is none that does good. 
28 Anselm, Proslogion  at 87-88.  
29 Nicholas Everitt, The Non-Existence of God (London; New York: Routledge, 2004) at 34.  
30 Ibid. 
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there could be one better in terms of size, shape, climate, etc., whereas there are no 
contradictions in St Anselm’s definition of the ultimate being. 
During a conference, when challenged by a member of the audience, Craig responded 
similarly, that the perfect conceivable being is possible and is understood in the same 
way by every mind; however, ‘Perfect Island’ could have an infinite number of 
different descriptions.31 
Hume, without mentioning St Anselm’s name or his ontological argument, offered a 
comment on existence which was another blow against St Anselm. According to 
Hume, when we think of something we think of it as existent. This, however, does not 
automatically prove its existence: that is, anyone can think of a unicorn, but this is not 
proof of the existence of the unicorn. 
Two centuries after the first appearance of St Anselm’s version, Aquinas put his 
objection forward. Despite being a theist himself and a powerful advocate of the 
cosmological argument, Aquinas claimed that the existence of God could not be 
proven by defining God. He explained that the self-evidence of something is related 
to the natural knowledge of that thing within individuals. Since we do not know the 
essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us, but needs to be demonstrated 
by things that are better known to us.32 
Norman Malcolm and Charles Hartshorne both agree that there are two versions of St 
Anselm’s ontological argument. The first assumption is that existence in reality is 
greater than existence in mind alone. One of the properties of the greatest being is 
                                                      
31 William Lane Craig’s lectures on the Existence of God lectures can be found in many 
popular video-sharing sites. 
32 John Hick, The Existence of God (New York: Macmillan, 1964) at 32.  
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existence. Since Kant proved that existence is not a property, Malcolm and 
Hartshorne agree that this first version fails. Taking his cue from St Anselm’s reply to 
Gaunilo, Malcolm points out that, in the second version of St Anselm’s argument, the 
concept of existence is treated differently. Existence-as-a-matter-of-necessity is 
perfection. A being that exists in some possible worlds has only contingent existence, 
whereas a being that exists in every possible world has existence-as-a-matter-of-
necessity (i.e. necessary existence). 
1.3.2. René Descartes’ version 
The second version of the ontological argument arose some six hundred years after St 
Anselm. René Descartes’ ontological argument is a mathematics/geometry-based 
piece of reasoning. Descartes believed that the existence of God could be proved 
mathematically. He argued that if the addition of three inner angles gives 180 degrees, 
the shape such angles form can only be that of a triangle. Similarly, the holder of all 
great qualities must have the quality of existence, since this completes the greatness. 
Since God has all the great qualities (i.e. is all-wise, all-knowing, all-good), he also 
must have the quality of existence. Existence belongs to the nature of God, hence he 
exists. 33  Descartes says that though he might be wrong in everything in his 
Meditations he is absolutely sure of one thing, which is the existence of God. 
Everitt attempts to discredit Descartes’ argument outright, since he considers it 
ludicrous and worthless. Everitt goes on to make a reverse argument concerning a 
being called a ‘shunicorn’, which is a supreme unicorn that possesses perfection of 
existence. This argument seems fairly plausible since, to the atheistic mind, both 
unicorn and god are invented beings. 
                                                      
33 Everitt, The Non-Existence of God  at 37.  
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One of the sternest critiques of Descartes is that of Immanuel Kant. Kant constructs a 
fourfold counter-argument. In his first criticism, Kant chooses to deny both subject 
and predicate in Descartes’ statement ‘God is omnipotent’. It is like positing a triangle 
but rejecting it having three angles. If we reject only the predicate of omnipotence, we 
might be seen to posit the concept of God, which is a contradiction. However, if we 
reject both subject and predicate, there is no contradiction. 
In his second criticism, Kant explains that it is unfair to ask someone to enquire open-
mindedly whether God exists or not, while describing God as a being possessing all 
good qualities, including the quality of existence. 
Kant’s third criticism derives from the distinction between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ 
judgements. He asserts that all existential propositions are synthetic. He believes that 
we cannot make any analytic judgements about existential propositions because they 
are synthetic assumptions.  
In his fourth and final criticism, Kant argues that ‘being’ is not a real predicate. In 
‘God is omnipotent’, the subject is ‘God’ and ‘omnipotent’ is the predicate. The word 
‘is’ plays a linking role. This appears to be a linguistic issue, rather than a real 
philosophical contribution to the debate.34 
1.3.3. Alvin Plantinga’s version 
A fresh contribution to the ontological argument was made in the twentieth century by 
Alvin Plantinga. Unlike Anselm and Descartes, Plantinga’s argument draws its 
premises from two new terms, namely: ‘maximal excellence’ and ‘possible worlds’. 
                                                      
34 For Kant’s full discussion, see Immanuel Kant and Norman Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure 
Reason (London; New York: Macmillan; St. Martin's Press, 1956) at 500-07. 
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Plantinga begins his argument by introducing the idea of excellence. A being is 
excellent to the extent to which he is knowledgeable, powerful and morally good35 (i.e. 
maximally excellent in omnipotence, omniscience and moral perfection). This 
excellent being could exist in our world but not necessarily in other possible worlds. 
Plantinga proceeds to strengthen his argument by talking about a being A, who is 
excellent in this world, and a being B who is excellent in all other possible worlds. He 
implies that B is greater than A as its excellence covers wider worlds. Plantinga 
challenges us to prove the impossibility of the following: 
Premise 1: It is possible that something is maximally great. 
Premise 2: In this world there exists a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and 
morally perfect. 
This, therefore, implies that God exists.  
Plantinga’s argument could be challenged on the grounds that the excellent being 
must have necessary existence, having both moral and intellectual qualities. The first 
quality of existence could be met by abstract entities such as numbers, concepts, 
propositions, whereas the second group of qualities could be met only by people. 
Everitt claims that Plantinga’s argument suffers from a question-begging premise of 
doubtful intelligibility.36 
The ontological arguments are arguably the weakest of the theistic arguments in the 
sense that reverse arguments could easily be developed using this line of thinking.  
They have been criticized brutally and have been ridiculed by reverse analogies such 
                                                      
35 Everitt, The Non-Existence of God  at 42.  
36 Ibid. 
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as pink unicorns, perfect islands, etc. Anselm made a genuine attempt to explain to 
‘the fool’ what God is and how he can believe that God really exists without holding 
any strong philosophical ground. His argument still stands as one of the pillars of 
theism today. 
1.4.A. Cosmological Arguments in the West 
The cosmological argument, as the name implies, examines the observable world and 
the cosmos in order to find the First Cause. Thus, it refers to the contingency of the 
world. Craig describes the cosmological argument as a posteriori37 argument for a 
cause or reason for the cosmos.38 The cosmological arguments are always based on 
existentialist premises. If something exists, there should be a reason and a cause for 
its existence. Therefore, the argument is mainly concerned with causality. 
Cosmological arguments are among the oldest of the six arguments (i.e. ontological, 
cosmological including kālām cosmological, teleological, moral, arguments from 
miracles, and argument from religious experience) with which we are concerned. First 
the pagans of Ancient Greece, then (from the ninth century AD) Muslims, and then 
Christians (both Catholic and Protestant), Jews, and even pantheists have contributed 
to them.39 
                                                      
37 Here it might be useful to give the dictionary definition, quoted from IAP: ‘The terms “a 
priori” and “a posteriori” are used primarily to denote the foundations upon which a 
proposition is known. A given proposition is knowable a priori if it can be known 
independently of any experience other than the experience of learning the language in which 
the proposition is expressed, whereas a proposition that is knowable a posteriori is known on 
the basis of experience. For example, the proposition that all bachelors are unmarried is a 
priori, and the proposition that it is raining outside now is a posteriori.’ 
38 William Lane Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz (New York: 
Barnes & Noble Books, 1980) at x.  
39 Ibid., at xi. 
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The cosmological argument is one of the most durable arguments, owing to the fact 
that it has received many eloquent testimonies from some of the greatest philosophers 
of all time. Plato is considered to be the founding father of this argument. Late, 
Aristotle was also an advocate of this argument. 
The argument remained dormant for around eleven centuries, until the second Islamic 
empire of the Abbasids started promoting science and falsafa through the great 
translation movement of the Abbasid caliph in the eighth century.40 It has been 
reported that the caliph offered gold matching the weight of any book translated into 
the Abbasid State language of Arabic. This era saw the greatest leap of Islamic 
science and philosophy. Before the Abbasid era, Arabs were writing only poetry, 
mainly for political purposes.41 The first decades of Islām, during the Prophet 
Muḥammad’s life and afterwards under the four righteous caliphs’ rule, saw the 
establishment and spread of Islām. After this, the Umayyads formed what is 
considered to have been the first Islamic state (661–750). Since it was the first Arab-
Islamic state, the Umayyads were mainly concerned with setting up the organs of 
their state system while spreading Islām further afield. Hence, little or no 
philosophical progress was made during their 89-year rule. The Abbasids ended the 
Umayyads’ reign in 750. They then moved the capital city of the new Islamic State 
from Damascus to Baghdad. The new Islamic State of the Abbasids enjoyed the 
benefits of translation stemming from the Umayyad era. Now, the new Islamic State 
                                                      
40 See Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1970) at 1-33. Chapter 1, The Legacy of Greece, Alexandria, and the Orient, gives very 
detailed information about this period of Islām. 
41 Ibid.  
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was strong, rich and well-established. Majid Fakhry suggests that this was why the 
Abbasids suddenly shifted their attention to science and philosophy.42 
The Abbasids came into very close contact with the Greeks as their empire expanded. 
This brought inevitable interaction with Greek culture. Al-Kindī, Ibn Sīnā, al-Fārābī 
and al-Ghazzālī were chief among the fine philosophers (mutakallimūn) this era 
produced. Ibn Rushd and Ibn Tufayl represent the Western Islamic trend of Muslim 
Spain, which came to life as a rival principality to that of the Abbasids. During the 
bloody end of Umayyad rule in Damascus around 750, the Abbasids killed most 
members of the Umayyad dynasty. The surviving prince of the Umayyads crossed 
Gibraltar into the Iberian Peninsula, where he set up the Al-Andalus Umayyad State. 
The new al-Andalus Umayyads, also, benefited from the previous state’s experience. 
They were quick to develop fantastic Andalus cities; hence, scholars quickly 
flourished under the ruler’s protection. The Muslim theologians made a massive 
contribution to the kalām cosmological argument. 
In time, the Greco-Muslim tradition of philosophy passed to Jews such as Saadia and 
Maimonides, as well as to many Western philosophers such as Anselm, Bonaventura, 
Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Suarez, Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley, Locke and Leibniz. 
Saīd Nursi (1877–1960) was the modern-day scholar who used a version of the 
cosmological argument in his writings, although he heavily criticized some early 
Muslim philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā and Fārābī owing to the Mu’tazilah influence 
on their thinking.43 
                                                      
42 Ibid., at xxi.  
43 See footnote 50 for the schools of theology in Islām. 
Chapter 1: Historical background and literature review 
 
   37 
1.4.A.1. Plato 
Plato (428–348 BC), in introducing natural theology into the subject matter of 
Western philosophy, has rightly been called the creator of philosophical theism.44 In 
Book X of the Laws, Plato established the basis of both the cosmological and the 
teleological arguments.45 According to Plato, there are eight different motions: motion 
round an axis, movement from place to place, movement both from place to place and 
round an axis (i.e. planetary motion), retardation, acceleration, growth, decay and 
destruction. 
At first, this looks like a subject for physics. But then, Plato immediately begins 
analysing these motions. The interaction between the forces is rather clear and easy to 
explain, until it reaches the point of the First Mover or Unmoved Mover. Plato 
concludes that the ultimate cause of the universe in motion must be a living soul, and 
one of a higher order than the human soul. This is the first quality of what is later 
named ‘God’.46 
1.4.A.2. Aristotle 
One of Plato’s students, Aristotle of Stagira (384–322 BC), studied physics, 
metaphysics, poetry, drama, music, logic, rhetoric, politics, government, ethics, 
biology and zoology. At first, Aristotle ascribes intelligence to the cosmic objects: he 
thinks they generate their own movement voluntarily.47 Later, he concludes, like Plato, 
that everything in motion must be moved by something. If something is not self-
moved, it is moved by something else. And nothing can be self-moved. This rebuts 
                                                      
44 Plato, The Laws, ed. Taylor A. E. (London; New York: Dent; Dutton, 1960) at 99. 
45 Hick, The Existence of God  at 71.  
46 Plato, The Laws  at 490. 
47 Marcus Tullius Cicero and Arthur Stanley Pease, De Natura Deorum (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1955) at 2.15.42.  
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his earlier argument of the intelligence of heavenly objects. Rather inaccurate and yet 
brilliant for its time, Aristotle’s cosmology is described by Ross as follows: 
The universe consists of series of concentric spheres. The earth is a 
sphere of no great relative size, at rest at the centre of the universe. 
The outer shell of the universe – the first heaven – is a finite sphere 
containing what we now call the fixed stars. These stars have no 
motion of their own but are carried around by the uniform rotation of 
the first heaven once in 24 hours. With regard to the more complex 
movements of the sun, the moon, and the planet Aristotle adopts with 
a modification the theory of Eudoxus as it had been developed by his 
own friend Callippus. Aristotle thought the movement of the first 
heaven was due to the action of God, operating as the object of love 
and desire. Yet the movement of the sun, the moon and planets is 
explained by the action not of God but separate moving agent of each 
sphere.48 
Owing to the great translation movement during the Umayyad era, Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle had a major impact on Islamic philosophy. 
1.4.B. The Kalām Cosmological Argument  
Probably no chapter in the history of the cosmological argument is as significant – 
and as universally ignored – as that of the Arabic (Muslim) theologians and 
philosophers.49 Influenced by the Ancient Greeks, early Muslim philosophers were 
the first to establish the cosmological argument in medieval (and modern) Western 
philosophy. These Muslim philosophers brought forward the two important versions 
of cosmological argument, namely temporal regress and the argument from 
contingency. ‘Kalām’ and ‘falsafa’ are the two Arabic terms that will be used in the 
following chapters. Falsafa is the Arabic word used to denote philosophy, in the sense 
of Arabic Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic philosophy, while kalām simply means 
‘speech’ in Arabic, and is the philosophy of Islamic doctrinal theology. A scholastic 
theologian or practitioner of kalām is called mutakallim (plural mutakallimūn). 
                                                      
48 W. D. Ross, Aristotle (London: Methuen & Co., 1949) at 181.  
49 Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz  at 48.  
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Initially, one might think that all Muslim mutakallimūn are in total agreement 
regarding the philosophical issues surrounding God’s existence and His qualities. 
However, in reality this has never been the case. There have been serious disputes and 
arguments, which have resulted in extreme accusations, the parties calling each other 
kāfir (infidel). In order to understand Islamic philosophy better, one needs to examine 
the traditions and schools of Islām.  
The first division is between Western and Eastern philosophical traditions. The 
former stem from Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Muḥyiddin ibn Ārābī, Ibn Bajja and Ibn 
Tufayl from Muslim Spain, and the latter from al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), al-
Ghazzālī from the Eastern tradition. This division has had less effect, however, on 
Islamic philosophy than has the division of schools.50  
                                                      
50 There are five very distinct schools of theology in the Islamic philosophical tradition, which 
are: [1] Sunni, within which are [1.a] Ash’ari, [1.b] Athari (Salafi), and [1.c] Maturidi; [2] 
Shia, with the sub-schools of [2.a] Imami and [2.b] Ismaili; [3] Khariji; [4] Mu’tazili; and 
finally [5] Murjiah. 
[1]. Sunni schools: The Sunni school is one of the largest branches of the Islamic faith. The 
word Sunni originates from sunnah, which means the tradition of Islām’s Prophet 
Muḥammad. There are four Sunni schools of law (madhhab), which are Hanafi, Shafi’i, 
Hambali and Maliki. All four schools of law take their creed (aqīdah) from the three schools 
of theology, Ash’ari, Athari and Māturidī. 
[2]. Shiʿa school: It is the second largest Islamic school after the Sunni school. In ʿaqīdah 
they are based on the Imami and Ismaili schools. Among other differences, the main one we 
are concerned with is the interpretation of Islām’s Holy book the Quran, hence the faith itself. 
Shias believe that the true interpreters of Islām are the direct descendants of the Prophet 
Muḥammad’s daughter Fatima and son-in-law Ali, who was also the fourth righteous caliph. 
These descendants are called imāms and they are the only ones to follow. Whereas the Sunni 
school believes that sunnah is narrated by the Companions and that there is no need to have a 
direct blood link with Fatima and Ali in order to interpret Islām. 
[3]. Khariji: Khariji literally means those who went out. Kharijites believed that the act of 
sinning is analogous to kufr (disbelief) and that every grave sinner was regarded as kafir (a 
disbeliever) unless he repented. They considered the Qur’ān to be the source of Islamic 
Jurisprudence (fiqh), but regarding the other two sources (hadīth and ijmā) their concepts 
were different from ordinary Muslims’. 
[4]. Mu’tazili: This school of Islamic theology came into being through controversies 
involving the interpretation (ta’wil) of the Qur’ān in its anthropomorphic description of God 
and the denial of free will. The Mu’tazilites denied literal interpretation of the Qur’anic 
passages and affirmed man’s free will, while the orthodox traditionalists adhered to literalism 
and determinism. 
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1. Al-Kindī  
The first systematic writer, philosopher and theologian in Islām is Abu Yusuf Ya’qub 
b. Ishaq al-Kindī (c.801–c.873), who is also the promoter and the patron of the 
translation movement and a champion of the introduction of Greek and Indian 
writings into the Muslim world.51 Taking his theological stance in the Mu’tazilah 
tradition, Al-Kindī proceeds to develop a philosophy that can best be characterized as 
‘neo-platonized Aristotelian’. Al-Kindī stands historically as the bridge between 
kalām and falsafa, and it was his conviction that revelation and philosophy attain to 
identical truths, albeit in different ways.52 Al-Kindī argued that God’s existence may 
be demonstrated by proving that the universe was created in time.53 Indeed, the most 
important argument for God’s existence in the philosophy of al-Kindī is his argument 
for creation, and he stands apart as the only Muslim peripatetic philosopher not 
believing in the eternity of the universe and matter.54 Despite the influence of 
Aristotle and Plotinus on his thought, he consistently upheld creation ex nihilo: God 
creates the universe out of nothing (al-mubdī), and al-Kindī uses the word ‘ibda’ to 
specifically denote God’s action as creation in time out of nothing.55 He reasons that, 
                                                                                                                                                            
[5]. Murji’ah: As opposed to the Kharijites, Murjites advocated the idea of deferred 
judgement of people’s beliefs. The Murjite doctrine held that only God has the authority to 
judge who is a true Muslim and who is not, and that Muslims should consider all other 
Muslims as part of the community. In another contrast to the Kharijites, who believed that 
committing a grave sin would render a person non-Muslim, Murjites considered genuine 
belief in and submission to God to be more important than acts of piety and good deeds. They 
believed that Muslims committing grave sins would remain Muslim and be eligible for 
Paradise if they remained faithful. 
51 Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy  at 67.  
52 Ahmad Foad El-Ehwany, ‘Al Kindī’ in A History of Muslim Philosophy: at 175. 
53 Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz  at 61.  
54 George N. Atiyeh, Al-Kindi : The Philosopher of the Arabs (Islamabad (Pakistan): Islamic 
Research Instiute, 1967) at 49.  
55 Ibid., at 52. 
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if it may be proved that the universe began to exist a finite number of years ago, the 
existence of a Creator may legitimately be inferred.56 
In his book On First Philosophy, al-Kindī utilizes three arguments for the creation of 
the universe: an argument from space, time and motion; an argument from 
composition; and another argument from time.57 The upshot of al-Kindī’s lengthy first 
argument is that body implies motion and motion implies time; therefore, if time had 
beginning, then motion and a body must have had a beginning as well, for it is 
impossible for body or motion to exist without time. Al-Kindī argues that time must 
be finite. Therefore, the beginning of the universe must be finite as well.58  
Al-Kindī’s second argument may be summarized as follows. Composition involves 
change, since it is a joining and organizing of things. Bodies are composed in two 
ways: (1) they are composed of substance, which is their genus and their three 
dimensions, which make them all differ from one another; and (2) they are composed 
of matter and form. Composition involves motion from a prior composed state. Thus, 
if there were no motion, there could be no composition, and if there were no 
composition, there could be no bodies. Now time is the duration counted by motion. 
Body, motion, and time thus occur simultaneously in being. Therefore, since time is 
finite, motion is finite; and since motion is finite, composition is finite; and since 
composition is finite, bodies are finite, too.59 
                                                      
56 Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz  at 61.  
57 Ya Qub Ibn-Ishaq Al Kindi and Alfred L. Ivry, Al-Kindi's Metaphysics a Transl. Of 
Ya`Qub Ibn-Ishaq Al-Kindi's Treatise "on First Philosophy" (Fi Al-Falsafah Al-Ula) (Albany, 
NY: State Univ. of New York Pr., 1974) at 67.  
58 Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz  at 63.  
59 Kindi and Ivry, Al-Kindi's Metaphysics a Transl. Of Ya`Qub Ibn-Ishaq Al-Kindi's Treatise 
"on First Philosophy" (Fi Al-Falsafah Al-Ula)  at 73-74.  
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The third argument is that it must be the case that before every temporal segment 
there is another segment of time until we reach the beginning of time, that is, a 
temporal segment before which there is no segmented duration. So, past time is finite. 
Since future time consists of adding consecutive, finite times to the time already 
elapsed, it is finite too. We ought to agree that two things quantitatively finite added 
together produce a finite thing. Thus, future time never reaches the actually infinite.60  
Al-Kindī’s position as the first self-described philosopher of the Islamic world makes 
him a transitional figure in several respects. His philosophy is continuous with the 
ancient tradition, even as it begins to respond to a very different intellectual milieu. 
To some extent, al-Kindī’s reception of Greek philosophy set the agenda for falsafa in 
the generations to come; for instance, his treatment of the intellect and the theory of 
creation resonate throughout Islamic philosophy. Above all, the attempt to assimilate 
Greek thought in al-Kindī’s circle proves the wider points that translation is always 
interpretation, and that philosophers can be at their most creative when they take up 
the task of understanding their predecessors.61 
2. Al-Fārābī 
Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Tarkhan al-Fārābī (d. 950), better known in classical 
sources and among the Latins of the Middle Ages as Abū Naṣr (Latin: Abunaser),62 or 
Alpharabius was the founder of Arab Neoplatonism and the first major figure in the 
history of that philosophical movement since Procolus.63 To him one may credit the 
                                                      
60 Ibid., at 74-75.  
61 Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor, The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy 
(Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 48-49.  
62 Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy  at 111.  
63 Ibid., at 132. 
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first exposition of the modern cosmological argument from contingency. Al-Fārābī’s 
distinctive contribution to the cosmological argument is as follows: 
Contingent beings … have had a beginning. Now that which begins 
to exist must owe its existence to the action of a cause. This cause, in 
turn, either is or is not contingent. If it is contingent, it also must 
have received its existence by the action of another cause, and so on. 
But a series of contingent beings, which would produce one another, 
cannot proceed to infinity or move in a circle. Therefore, the series of 
causes and effects must arrive at a cause that holds its existence from 
itself, and this is the first cause (ens primum).64 
Al-Fārābī presents six “principles” (mabādi) of being in a system: (1) the First Cause, 
(2) the Second Cause (i.e. incorporeal intellects), (3) the Active Intellect governing 
the sub-lunar world, (4) Soul, (5) Form and (6) Matter. The First Cause (Al-Fārābī 
says “one should believe that it is God”) is the incorporeal First Mover, in that the 
celestial spheres move out of desire for It.65 It is worth concentrating on a few of al-
Fārābī’s arguments concerning the First Cause (al-sabab al-awwal), since they 
provide us with an interesting insight into the manner in which metaphysics and 
epistemology come to be combined in his thought. In the Principles of the Opinions, 
al-Fārābī tells us: 
The First Cause cannot be divided in speech into the things which 
would constitute Its substance. For it is impossible that each part of 
the statement that would explain the meaning of the First could 
denote each of the parts by which the substance of the first is so 
constituted. If this were the case, the parts which constitutes Its 
substance would be causes of Its existence, in the way that meaning 
denoted by parts of the definition of a thing are causes of the 
existence of the things defined, e.g., in the way that matter and form 
are causes of existence of things composed of them. But this is 
impossible with regard to the First, since It is the First and Its 
existence has no cause whatsoever.66 
                                                      
64 Al-Fārābī, Sources, p.66 (trans. in Hammond, Philosophy, p.21) in Robert Hammond, The 
Philosophy of Alfarabi and Its Influence on Medieval Thought (New York: Hobson Book 
Press, 1947). 
65 Adamson and Taylor, The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy  at 56-57.  
66 Translation from Walzer [77], 67, with modifications and italics. 
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In short, the contingency argument of al-Fārābī posits that God exists since everything 
including the universe that exists contingently has a reason for its existence, and the 
reason of the existence of the universe is, therefore, has to be God. 
3. Ibn Sīnā 
Abū Ali al-Husain ibn Sīnā (980–1037), known in the West as Avicenna, brought 
Fārābī’s Neoplatonism to full bloom, and from that point on ‘Ibn Sīnā’ was 
synonymous with falsafa and became an open target of the mutakallimūn, who readily 
discerned the unorthodox nature of his philosophy. His debt to al-Fārābī is great, as it 
is evident even in his remark that he had read the Metaphysics of Aristotle forty times 
and had never understood it until he came upon al-Fārābī’s commentary.67 
Before Avicenna, falsafa (Arabic Aristotelian and neoplatonic philosophy) and kalām 
(Islamic doctrinal theology) were distinct strands of thought, even though there was a 
good deal of cross-fertilization between them. After Avicenna, by contrast, the two 
strands fused together, and post-Avicennan kalām emerged as the truly Islamic 
philosophy, a synthesis of Avicenna’s metaphysics and Muslim doctrine.68 
Like al-Fārābī, ibn Sīnā employed the essence/existence distinction and the 
necessary/possible distinction in his proof of God’s existence.69  He writes: 
Everything except the One who is by His essence One and Existent 
acquires existence from something else … In itself it deserves 
                                                      
67 Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy  at 147.  
68 Adamson and Taylor, The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy  at 92-93.  
69 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines; Conceptions of 
Nature and Methods Used for Its Study by the Ikhwan Al-Safa, Al-Biruni, and Ibn Sina 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964) at 198.  
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absolute non-existence. Now it is not its matter which deserves non-
existence but totality (of matter and form).70  
The term ‘Necessary Being’ (al-wājib al-wujūd) was ibn Sīnā’s main addition to 
Islamic philosophy. It depends on reasoning similar to that behind al-Fārābī’s First 
Cause (al- sabab al-awwal). Both philosophers argued that for every movement or 
matter there has to be a reason. In modern times, the example of a train is, although it 
is not totally satisfactory, mentioned frequently. In the train example, a bystander asks 
what pulls the last car. The answer is clearly visible – that it is being pulled by the car 
in front. When the locomotive is reached there is seemingly nothing pulling it. Hence 
it may be concluded that the locomotive is self-powered. In the universe the 
locomotive is what al-Fārābī calls the First Cause and what Ibn-i Sīnā calls the 
Necessary Being, which is God. 
4. Al-Ghazzālī  
Abu Hāmed Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazzālī was born in 1058, in Khurasan. 
He was a jurist, a theologian, and, above all, a mystic. He met Al Juwayry, one of the 
leading Ash’arite scholars of the time. Ash’arite theology was designed in opposition 
to the Mu’tazilah. Al-Ghazzālī was a teacher at the Nizām al- Mulk Madrasah of 
Baghdad, which was the medieval equivalent of a modern-day university. These 
madāris (single madrasah) were set up by the Turkish Seljuk vizier of Nizām al- 
Mulk. Since the Seljuk state adapted orthodox (sunnī) Islām, they were in 
disagreement with the Shi’ite Fatimid in Cairo.71 Hence, one of the purposes of these 
                                                      
70 Parviz Morewedge and Avicenna, The Metaphysica of Avicenna (Ibn Sìna); a Critical 
Translation-Commentary and Analysis of the Fundamental Arguments in Avicenna's 
Metaphysica in the Danish Nama-I `Alai (the Book of Scientific Knowledge) (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1973) at 8.5.  
71 Adamson and Taylor, The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy  at 138.  
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madāris was to counteract the Fatimid (Shi’ite) doctrine. From al-Ghazzālī’s time 
onwards we see the increased influence of Ash’arite doctrine on the Islamic world.72 
Al-Ghazzālī excelled in philosophy and in hitting back against the Neo-Platonic 
philosophers, such as al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, with their own weapon. The aim of his 
kalām was to attack heretics in defence of orthodox Islām. In this sense, al-Ghazzālī 
was the first true mutakallim, whereas his predecessors, al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, were 
just philosophers like Plato and Aristotle. One of al-Ghazzālī’s most important works 
of philosophy was ‘The Intentions of Philosophers’ (al Maqāṣid al-falāsifa). The 
Criterion (the standart measure) of Science (Mi’yār al-ʿilm) and The Collapse of the 
Philosopher (Tahāfut) complete his philosophical trilogy. 
 It is important to note that, in his criticisms, al-Ghazzālī does not usually give names, 
but just refers to both al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā as ‘the philosopher’.73 According to al-
Ghazzālī, the Neo-Platonists have failed to prove the existence of God. In their 
argument, the Neo-Platonists could regress to the First Cause or Necessary Being. 
This proof, according to al-Ghazzālī, is invalid since their distinction between the 
necessary-in-itself and the necessary-through-a-cause, upon which their proof rests, is 
unfounded.74 Al-Ghazzālī accuses the Neo-Platonists of denying the divine attributes 
altogether. Such attributes, according to them, are accidents of the essence and, as 
such, involve plurality and contingency in the subject.75 
After reviewing al-Fārābī’s and Ibn Sīnā’s work, al-Ghazzālī concludes that sixteen 
metaphysical and four physical propositions are totally unacceptable according to 
                                                      
72 For instance, the majority of Sunni Muslims in modern Turkey follow the Maturidi, which 
is along the same lines as the Ash’arite. 
73 Adamson and Taylor, The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy  at 144.  
74 Al-Ghazali and Sabih Ahmad Kamali, Al-Ghazali's Tahafut Al-Falasifah : (Incoherence of 
the Philosophers) (Lahore, 1958) at 176. 
75 Ibid. 
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orthodox Islamic norms, and the unguarded public should be warned about them. Al-
Ghazzālī condemns most of these propositions as heresy (bidʿah) and three of them as 
irreligion (kufr),76 and castigates individuals holding these beliefs as deserving to be 
declared renegades (murtad)77 and to be punished accordingly. 
According to al-Ghazzālī, these propositions are: [1] the eternity of the world a parte 
ante, [2] God’s knowledge of universals only, and [3] the denial of the resurrection of 
the body.78 
Craig has summarized al-Ghazzālī’s kalām cosmological argument as follows: 
There are temporal phenomena in the world which are caused by 
other temporal phenomena. The series of temporal phenomena 
cannot regress to infinity. Therefore, the series must stop at eternal. 
The conclusion therefore: the series must stop at the eternal. The 
series of temporal phenomena must have a beginning. Therefore, 
according to the principle of determination, an agent must exist who 
creates the world.79 
It is important to note that this particular philosophical argument resembles that of Al-
Fārābi’s and Ibn Sīnā’s. However, Al-Ghazzālī advocates with the Qur’anic and 
Prophetic teachings to clarify that the principal agent is Allāh. 
5. Ibn Rushd  
Born in 1126 in Muslim Spain (Cordoba), Abū 'l-Walīd Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn 
Rushd, also called Averroes, is one of the few Western Islamic philosophers well-
known in the West. 
                                                      
76 Ibid., at 376. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz  at 101.  
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Thus far, Islamic philosophy had seen two important stages. The first was the Abbasid 
movement for the translation of Greek literature, which resulted in the creation of 
Neo-Platonism in the Islamic world by al-Kindī, al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. In the second 
stage, there was witnessed the victory of kalām over falsafa thanks to Imām al-
Ghazzālī, who attacked Neo-Platonic Islamic philosophy relentlessly. Now, Ibn 
Rushd came onto the stage of history to revitalize Neo Platonism through 
commenting on Aristotle. Ibn Rushd supported the philosophers in arguing for the 
eternity of the world.80 
Unlike al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, who used “contingency” as proof of the existence of 
God, Ibn Rushd used the Qur’anic proofs, which are proofs from [1] providence 
(taqdir Ilāhi) and [2] the wonders of creation (i.e. the teleological argument).81 
Although he used the ‘prime mover’ argument for the motion of spheres82 in his 
Incoherence of Incoherence, Ibn Rushd based his argument on Ibn Sīnā’s redefined 
‘contingency’ theory, but his argument does not rely on the distinction between 
essence and existence. He writes: 
If one wanted to give demonstrative form of the argument used by 
Ibn-i Sīnā one should say: Possible existents must of necessity have 
causes which precede them, and if these causes again are possible it 
follows that they have causes and that there is an infinite regress; and 
if there is an infinite regress there is no cause; and the possible will 
exist without a cause, and this is impossible. Therefore, the series 
must end in a necessary cause or without a cause, and if through a 
cause, this cause must have a cause and so on infinitely; and if we 
have an infinite regress here, it follows that what was assumed to 
have a cause has no cause, and this is impossible. Therefore, the 
series must end in a cause necessary without a cause, i.e. necessary 
                                                      
80 George F Hourani, ‘The Dialogue between Al-Ghazzālī and the Philosophers on the Origin 
of the World’, Muslim World 48 (1958), 183–91. 
81 Samuel Nirenstein, The Problem of the Existence of God in Maimonides Alanus and 
Averroes (Philadelphia, 1924) at 46.  
82 Averroes, Tahafut, 1:34, 237–8. 
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by itself, and this necessarily is the necessary existent. And, when 
these distinctions are indicated the proof becomes valid.83 
Appointed as religious judge (qāḍī) of Seville, Ibn Rushd produced commentary on 
Aristotle’s works, the Republic of Plato and Isogage of Prophecy. It is important to 
note that Ibn Rushd has no recorded disciples or successors. Nevertheless, he 
influenced the Jewish philosopher Maimonides and the medieval European 
philosopher St Thomas Aquinas, who will be discussed in the following chapters. 
Ibn Rushd disagreed with Aristotle regarding the cosmological argument and Ibn-i 
Sīnā’s (as well as the Ash’arite) thesis of ‘contingency’. He claimed that the best 
proof is the argument from invention (creation) and the argument from providence or 
design (dalīl al-‘ināyah). The basis of his argument, as well as of all philosophical 
arguments for God’s unity, is the Qur’anic verses 21:22, 23:91 and 17:44.84  
With the death of Fakr al-din al-Rāzī in 1209, the so-called ‘Golden Age’ of Islamic 
philosophy ended. However, thanks to close contacts with the Abbasid and Islamic 
Spain, Greek and Islamic philosophy continued its influence in the coming centuries 
on Jewish and Christian theology. 
Four leading figures of the Muslim world mentioned above form the foundations of 
the kalām cosmological arguments which is illustrated in Appendix 10 at the end of 
this study. Although al-Ghazzālī differs from the other three in terms of overall 
                                                      
83 Averroes, Tahafut, 1: 165. 
84 Qur’ān, 21:22: Had there been within the heavens and earth gods besides Allāh, they both 
would have been ruined. So exalted is Allāh, Lord of the Throne, above what they describe. 
Qur’ān, 23:91: No son did Allāh beget, nor is there any god along with Him: (if there were 
many gods), behold, each god would have taken away what he had created, and some would 
have lorded it over others! Glory to Allāh. (He is free) from the (sort of) things they attribute 
to Him! 
Qur’ān, 17:44: The seven heavens and the earth, and all beings therein, declare His glory: 
there is not a thing but celebrates His praise; and yet ye understand not how they declare His 
glory! Verily He is Oft-Forbear, Most Forgiving! 
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philosophy, their cosmological arguments display very similar characteristics. All 
four base their arguments on the assumption that infinite regress is not possible, and a 
beginning of creation is required for the existence of the universe. 
6. A Critical Comparison of the Islamic Tradition 
The Islamic philosophy emerged owing to the translation of Greek literature in the 7th 
century. Prior to ‘the translation movement’ there seems to be virtually no Islamic, or 
Arabic for that matter, material available. Islām’s emergence in the 7th century 
successfully established a monotheistic belief system.  The already existing concept 
of God was strengthened by the Qur’ān which argued for God’s existence from the 
cosmos. 
In this section, Nursi’s theology is compared to that of the four most prominent 
scholars of Islamic tradition. 
Al-Kindī is the first leading figure which introduced Aristotelian philosophy into 
Islamic world. He claims that Greek philosophy is to be welcomed as it might assist 
people to attain the knowledge of God. The trend set by al-Kindī continuous with al-
Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. As indicated in Appendix 10, al-Kindī, start off with premises 
that time is a finite entity. That is, creation occurs in time, and time is not infinitive. It 
has to have a beginning. Similarly, al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā theorize around the 
contingency principle. That is, every contingent being has to have an explanation for 
their existence. As the regress cannot go to infinity it has to have a beginning. To Al 
Fārābī, that is ‘The First Cause’, to Ibn Sīnā, that is ‘Necessary Being’. Ibn Rushd, 
though takes the Qur’anic arguments as the primary proof, develops a version of the 
contingency argument of his predecessors. He analyses the movement and concludes 
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that the source of all movements is the Prime Mover. There is quite a parallel between 
Nursi and Ibn Rushd as both scholars used the Qur’anic arguments. Nursi, though not 
use the cosmological arguments as in the sense of his predecessors, builds his theism 
around the teleological argument like Ibn Rushd who argues from the ‘wonder of 
creation’ and ‘providence’. Nursi, however, differs from Ibn Rushd with regards to 
his argument from the miraculousness of the Qur’an. Though he imitates Qur’anic 
arguments, his argument from revelation revolves around the assumption that the 
Qur’ān is not a product of human intelligence; it is the work of the divine, which is an 
automatic proof of the existence of the Divine.  
Meanwhile, al-Ghazzālī, though criticized the philosophers of the Mu’tazili tradition, 
utilizes similar arguments. He explains that everything that exists requires a cause for 
its origin, highlighting the temporal character of the universe. He does not believe the 
efficacy of secondary cause. Since the universe is temporal, it requires a creator upon 
which all possible things have their Ground. Al-Ghazzālī’s other argument is the 
teleological argument. In this respect, al-Ghazzālī and Nursi seem to on the same 
page.  
Although Islamic theism has developed around the kalām version of the cosmological 
argument, Nursi does not appear to follow the trend of his predecessors. There is clear 
evidence that he has a credible knowledge of philosophy and his methods resembles 
that of a philosophy.  
The rivalry among Islamic scholars is a well-documented fact. Especially  
al-Ghazzālī’s attack on Mu’tazili affiliated al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā in Incoherence of 
the Philosophers, and Ibn Rushd defence of the pair in The Incoherence of 
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Incoherence is well known matters. However, one might argue that these differences 
are not due to the disagreement on the theism or the ways to arguing for it. The 
conflict appears to be risen from the technical disputes on other issues such as 
causality, predestination, and free will. Nursi, being in Ash’ari school like al-
Ghazzālī, heavily criticizes Mu’tazili tradition on the aforementioned issues not on 
their cosmology. In fact, there are traces of Mu’tazili cosmology in various pieces of 
Nursi’s writings. Al-Ghazzālī and Nursi agree on the shortcomings of the kalām 
cosmological arguments. The kalām cosmological arguments of the Neo-Platonists, 
unless supported with the Qur’ān and Sunnah, falls short of full knowledge of God. 
They simply demonstrate the impossibility of infinite regress and establish the 
necessity of an Uncaused Cause. 
In short, Nursi’s philosophy shows strong hints of ‘reason and intellect’ similar to the 
ones seen in the Neo-Platonist, yet has clear spiritual elements like that of al- 
Ghazzālī at the same time.  
1.4.C. Jewish Philosophers  
Jewish philosophers of religion are the bridge between Islamic philosophy and 
medieval Western philosophy. Directly influenced by Muslim theologians, they 
adopted the cosmological argument to prove the existence of God, and hence justify 
Judaism. Guttman remarks that Jewish philosophy is the offspring of Muslim kalām.85 
Unlike their Muslim Neo-Platonist and Aristotelian predecessors, who dealt with a 
                                                      
85 Fritz Bamberger, Julius Guttmann, Philosopher of Judaism (London, 1960) at 11.  
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wide range of philosophical issues, Jewish philosophers were mainly concerned with 
the theological aspect of Islamic philosophy and kalām.86 
Among several theistic arguments, the Jewish philosophers only used the 
cosmological argument. Wolfson claims that the causality principle is the main 
argument of the Jewish philosophers.87 
Perhaps one of the strongest evidences of Muslim–Jewish philosophical interaction is 
the fact that most Jewish philosophers wrote in Arabic rather than in their native 
language of Hebrew,88 although most of their work was translated into Hebrew some 
time after their deaths. 
1. Saadia ben Joseph 
Saadia ben Joseph (882–942) was one of the best-known early Jewish philosophers 
who used the Islamic kalām cosmological argument for proof of the existence of God 
and the superiority of Judaism.89 Saadia put forward four arguments for creation. 
These are: [1] the argument from the finitude of the world, [2] the argument from 
composition, [3] the argument from the temporality of accidents, and [4] the argument 
from the finitude of time.90 He argues that the concept of an infinite time is absurd. 
Saadia’s argument from the finitude of time may be summarized as follows: 
It is impossible to regress mentally to reach the beginning of time, 
because infinite cannot be traversed and the time is, ex hypotesi, 
infinite. It is impossible for existence to progress through time to 
                                                      
86 Ibid. 
87 Harry Austryn Wolfson, Notes on Proofs of the Existence of God in Jewish Philosophy 
(Cincinnati, 1924) at 584.  
88 Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument  at 37.  
89 Isaac Husik, A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1916) at 
61.  
90 Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz  at 128.  
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reach the present moment, because existence must traverse exactly 
the same series that our thought traversed. But, the traversal of such a 
series has been shown to be impossible. Therefore, we do not exist, 
which is absurd. Therefore, the time must be finite, because 
otherwise existence could never have traversed it and reach the 
present moment.91 
Here, we instantly see the similarity between al-Ghazzālī’s finitude of time argument 
and Saadia’s.92 By reversing the argument, Saadia claims that since the universe and 
time exist now, they must have come into existence at some point in the past. Since 
nothing can come into existence by itself, they (both the universe and the time) had to 
be created by God.93 
2. Moses Maimonides  
Moses ben Maimon (1135–1204), Ibn Maymūn in Arabic, lived nearly a century after 
Saadia. While Saadia made his mark on history as ‘the first philosopher’, Maimonides 
was considered the ‘most remarkable’ of the Jewish philosophers. 94  The chief 
difference between the two is that Saadia took kalām as the starting point of his 
philosophy, whereas Maimonides took philosophy’s standpoint.95 Strauss claims that 
although kalām’s starting point of ‘arbitrary presuppositions’ was an easier one to use 
to prove the beliefs taught by the laws, Maimonides chose the harder philosophical 
route, with the nature of things as starting point.96 
                                                      
91 Ibid., at 129. 
92 Saadia died in 942, nearly a century prior to al-Ghazzālī, who was born in 1058. It could be 
suggested that al-Ghazzālī might had been influenced by Saadia as he wrote in Arabic and 
lived in the Middle East like al-Ghazzālī himself. 
93 Joseph Sa`Adia Ben and Samuel Rosenblatt, The Book of Beliefs and Opinions (New 
Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1948) at 45.  
94 Husik, A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy  at 236.  
95 Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz  at 131.  
96Leo Strauss, Philosophy and Law : Essays toward the Understanding of Maimonides and 
His Predecessors (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1987) at 39. 
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Starting his argument as a true philosopher rather than as a mutakallim, Maimonides 
presented 26 propositions.97 His first argument is the argument from motion, which 
discusses the nature of motion in the universe at great length. He narrows the possible 
reasons for the motion of the spheres down to four. These are: [1] a corporeal object 
without the sphere, [2] an incorporeal object separate from the sphere, [3] an internal 
force extended throughout the sphere, and [4] an invisible force within the sphere.98 
After disproving the first, third and the fourth possibilities on logical grounds, he 
proclaims: “The Prime Motor of the spheres is God, praise be His name.”99 It is easy 
to see the similarity between Aristotle’s First Cause argument and Maimonides’s 
Prime Motor argument. Maimonides’s second proof is also a simpler version of the 
‘argument from motion’. Craig summarizes this second argument as follows: 
Given a thing composed of two elements, if one of the elements 
exists separately, then the other element does so as well. Because the 
separate existence of one element proves that the two elements are so 
indissolubly united that they cannot exist separately. There are 
objects that are in motion and move others, and objects that are in 
motion but do not move others. Therefore, there must be something 
                                                      
97 Maimonides’ propositions are: [1] An infinite magnitude cannot exist. [2] An infinite 
number of finite magnitudes cannot coexist. [3] An infinite number of causes and effects 
cannot exist. [4] Change may be in substance, quantity, quality, or place. [5] Motion implies 
change and transition from potentiality to actuality. [6] Motion is essential or accidental, the 
former being due to an external force, the latter to its participation in the motion of another 
thing. [7] Changeable things are divisible and, hence, corporeal. [8] A thing moved 
accidentally must come to rest. [9] A thing that moves something else does so by setting itself 
in motion. [10] Anything in a corporeal body is either an accidental or an essential property. 
[11] Some properties of corporeal objects (e.g. colour) are divisible; others (e.g. Soul) are not. 
[12] A force occupying all parts of a corporeal, finite object is finite. [13] Only circular 
locomotion can be continuous change. [14] Locomotion is the most basic motion. [15] Time 
and motion are inseparable. [16] Incorporeal beings cannot be numbered, unless they inhabit 
a corporeal body. [17] Everything in motion is moved by an agent, either internal or external. 
[18] Everything that passes from potentiality to actuality is caused to do so by an external 
agent. [19] A caused being is a possible being. [20] A necessary being has no cause. [21] The 
essence of a composed being does not necessitate existence, since its composition is the cause 
of its existence. [22] Material bodies are composed of substance and form and are subject to 
accidents. [23] Every possible being may at some time be without actual essence. [24] 
Potentiality implies corporeality. [25] Every composed being consists of matter and form and 
requires a cause for its existence. [26] Time and motion are eternal. 
98 Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz  at 132.  
99 Moses Maimonides, Maimonides, the Guide of the Perplexed (Lond.: East and West 
library, 1952) at 2.1.  
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that moves other things but is not itself in motion. This is the Prime 
Mover, God.100 
Perhaps the third argument, which is a version of the cosmological argument, is the 
most important one that Maimonides produced. Maimonides gives three possibilities 
for existence. They are: [1] all things are without beginning or end, [2] all things have 
a beginning and end, and [3] some things have beginning and end. Refuting the first 
and second arguments immediately, Maimonides goes on to argue the existence of an 
eternal, indestructible being whose existence is real, not just possible. This external 
force, therefore, is the absolutely necessary being, the source of existence of all 
things.101 
According to Husik, Maimonides does not bring any new argument into philosophy. 
He merely repeats what is originally Aristotle’s. 102  Husik also claims that the 
argument was introduced into Jewish philosophy by Abraham ibn Daud prior to 
Maimonides.103 
Despite the dispute over the originality of Maimonides’ argument, Riedl suggests that 
it was Maimonides who was the main source of inspiration for Thomas Aquinas’s 
Five Ways a few decades later.104 
Both Maimonides and Saadia act as a bridge between Islamic philosophy and the 
Medieval European philosophy. 
                                                      
100 Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz  at 141.  
101 Ibid., at 143.  
102 Husik, A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy  at 218.  
103 Ibid. 
104 John O. Riedl, Maimonides and Scholasticism (Baltimore, Md., 1936) at 27-28. 
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1.4.D. Thomas Aquinas: The Five Ways 
Thomas Aquinas (1224–74) is one of the first Western Christian philosophers of 
religion. Aquinas, like many other Christian philosophers, was influenced by early 
Christian theologian, Saint Augustine (354-430). Considered a saint, he is the patron 
saint of the Roman Catholic Church.105 Aquinas is one of the first and most prolific 
defenders of the cosmological argument in Christian theology. After his death, the 
philosophers and thinkers who followed his cosmological tradition were called 
‘Thomists’. 
Although Aquinas was a Christian man of God, he used his philosophical arguments 
only to prove the existence of God, rather than going into the more controversial 
‘Trinity’ debate.106 Aquinas believed that the existence of God could be proven 
philosophically by the natural power of reasoning.107 He started off his endeavour 
from an Aristotelian position, as he acknowledged later in his writings. Aquinas 
formulated five theories for the existence of God in his Summa Theologiæ, which are 
widely known as ‘the Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas’. 
Aquinas’s Five Ways are: [1] the argument from motion, [2] the argument from the 
nature of efficient cause’, [3] the argument from possibility and necessity, [4] the 
argument from gradation, and [5] the argument from the governance of the world.108 
It has commonly been agreed in the world of philosophy that the first three ways are 
truly cosmological arguments, and these will be examined in the present chapter. The 
                                                      
105 Hick, The Existence of God  at 80.  
106 Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz  at 159.  
107 Hick, The Existence of God  at 80.  
108 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae : Latin Text and English Translation, Introductions, 
Notes, Appendices, and Glossaries ([Cambridge, England]; New York: Blackfriars ; 
McGraw-Hill, 1964) at 1a.3.  
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fourth way is described by Craig as ‘the most Platonic of Aquinas’s arguments’.109 
The fifth way is clearly a teleological argument, and is the subject of Chapter 3 of this 
study. 
[1] The First Way: Like many early Greek, Muslim and Jewish philosophers, 
Aquinas forms his first proof from the concept of motion. In his Summa Theologiae, 
he proceeds to argue that it is obvious from our senses that whatever is moved is 
moved by something else, for nothing can be moved except if it is in a state of 
potential vis-à-vis that towards which it is moved, whereas a thing moves inasmuch as 
it is in action. Motion is a shift from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be 
shifted from potentiality to actuality except by something which is already in a state 
of actuality. For instance, fire is actually hot, and wood is potentially hot; hence fire 
burns wood and makes it actually hot. In this sense, things cannot be in actuality and 
potentiality simultaneously. Therefore, things cannot be mover and moved at the same 
time. As we regress along the mover—moved chain, we reach the first mover, which 
is in actuality not moved by any other mover. This first mover is understood by 
everyone to be God.110 
[2] The Second Way: Aquinas names Aristotle as the source of this proof in the 
Summa Contra Gentiles.111 The second way is based on the nature of causation. 
Aquinas argues that there is an order for every cause in the observable universe. It is 
impossible to have a final cause without an intermediate cause. We never observe 
                                                      
109 Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz  at 160.  
110 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae : Latin Text and English Translation, Introductions, Notes, 
Appendices, and Glossaries.  
111 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles (Romae: Apud Sedem Commissionis Leoninae, 
1934) at 1.13.  
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anything causing itself. This series of causes must eventually stop at the First Cause, 
to which everyone gives the name ‘God’.112 
In order to show the difference between the first way and the second way, Gilson 
explains that the first way argues from the change in things, while the second way 
argues from the existence of things.113 Aquinas goes on to conclude that while the 
first way brings us to God as the source of cosmic motion, the second way leads us to 
Him as the cause of the very existence of things; hence the second way is the proof 
for God as the creative cause of the universe.114 
[3] The Third Way: The Third Way is the argument from possibility and necessity. 
Remotely sourced from al-Fārābī’s argument from contingency, 115  Aquinas’s 
argument states that it is possible for everything in nature to be or not to be, since 
everything is generated and corrupted. It is impossible for these things to exist at all 
times. Since things which do not exist come into existence by means of something 
already existing, there must be a being who necessarily exists in the first place. 
Therefore, we cannot but admit the existence of some being having of itself its own 
necessity and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. 
This being is what all men refer to as God.116 
Here, a hint of agnosticism can be felt in Aquinas’s proofs, since they eliminate 
reasons leading into a being whose qualities and attributes we do not really know. 
                                                      
112 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae : Latin Text and English Translation, Introductions, Notes, 
Appendices, and Glossaries  at 1a 2:3.  
113 Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. With a Catalog of St. 
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114 Ibid., at 77.  
115 Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz  at 182.  
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In The Existence of God Hicks writes: “The main weakness of the cosmological 
argument, considered as an instrument for demonstrating the existence of God to an 
atheist or an agnostic is that the argument begs the question.”117 
Among many Thomists such as Gilson and Martin, F. C. Copleston (1907–94) wrote 
a detailed commentary on Aquinas’s Five Ways. This he did mainly to clarify it by 
making a distinction between in fieri (pending) causes and in esse (essentially) 
causes118  valid for the twentieth century. In his book Aquinas, Copleston also 
acknowledges the weakness mentioned by Hicks. Copleston admits: “it is not possible 
even to begin to lead a non believer to God by means of this reasoning unless they 
share the cosmological arguer’s basic conviction that the fact that there is a world at 
all is a puzzle which demands an explanation.”119 
Having discussed Aristotle, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and Maimonides in the previous 
paragraphs, we can clearly see that no new contribution was made to the cosmological 
argument by Aquinas. According to Copleston, Aquinas’s denial of the ‘accidentality 
of existence’ was his only original contribution.120 
1.4.E. David Hume and the critique of the cosmological argument 
David Hume (1711–76) is one of the best-known Scottish philosophers, whose chief 
argument is his objection to causality. Although he never openly admitted his atheistic 
position, he is commonly regarded as an atheist. Hume’s method of expressing his 
philosophical opinions came in the form of dialogues between three fictitious 
characters in his 1779 book Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. In the Dialogues, 
                                                      
117 Hick, The Existence of God  at 81.  
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Demea defends the cosmological argument, Cleanthes represents the experimental 
theist who uses the argument for design in the universe, and Philo represents the 
sceptic. According to the common view, Philo is actually Hume himself.121 
We observe events, Hume argues, following other events. We do not actually observe 
any causality. That perception is a result of human habits. Passmore explains Hume’s 
theory by means of a practical example of a young child dropping a ball. The child 
has never experienced a ball drop in his life before; hence he is surprised to observe 
that the ball bounces off the floor, whereas an adult knew even before the child had 
dropped the ball that the ball would bounce. This is simply because the adult had seen 
balls bounce many times prior to this particular event. He simply conjoins the events 
as a result of habit.122 
Back in Part IX of the Dialogues, we find an exchange between Demea and Cleanthes 
on the issue of causality. Demea says: 
Whatever exists must have a cause or reason to its existence, it being 
absolutely impossible for anything to produce itself or to be the cause 
of its own existence…therefore, from effects to cause, we must either 
go on in tracing an infinite succession, without any ultimate cause at 
all, or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause that is 
necessarily existent.123 
This is a clear, brief theory of causality (i.e. the cosmological argument). Although it 
is Philo who usually sounds the atheistic argument, on this occasion Cleanthes jumps 
in and tells Philo that he will not leave this matter to him. Cleanthes proceeds to argue 
in an attempt to refute Demea’s causality theory. Cleanthes says: 
                                                      
121 For a full analysis of Hume’s characters see Mackie, The Miracle of Theism : Arguments 
for and against the Existence of God  at 134-35.  
122 John Arthur Passmore, Hume's Intentions (Cambridge: University Press, 1952) at 39.  
123 From David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. In David Hume and Norman 
Kemp Smith, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Indianapolis [Ind.]: Bobbs-Merrill, 
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I shall begin with observing that there is an evident absurdity in 
pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any 
arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable unless the contrary 
implies a contradiction. Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies 
a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also 
conceive as non-existent. There is no being therefore; whose non-
existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being 
whose existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely 
decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it.124 
In short, Hume rests his objection to the cosmological argument on the fact that it is a 
priori (from what is before). He considers the design argument to be a posteriori 
(from what is after), yet he raises an objection to it as well. 
1.5. The Design Argument 
One of the most popular theistic arguments is the argument from order or argument 
from design in the universe. It is also known as the teleological argument, a term 
derived from the Greek telos, which means aim or purpose. Hence, the term 
‘teleological’ concerns end-purpose. It is considered to be the oldest argument in 
natural theology, with roots going back to Plato and Aristotle in Ancient Greece. Plato 
claims that there are two reasons why men have to believe in God: [1] the existence of 
the soul, and [2] order and motion in the universe, which are essentially the signs that 
there is an intelligent designer at the starting point of it all. Plato’s student Aristotle 
bolstered the design argument in his Metaphysics.125 Aristotle tells the story of a 
caveman who lived under ground all his life. He suddenly comes to the surface as a 
result of an earthquake or something similar. Aristotle asks us to think how this man 
would perceive the earth and the universe. He goes on to explain that, by looking at 
the clouds, the flora, the fauna, mountains, rivers, wind, the sun, the moon and the 
stars and the amazing events taking place all around him, he has to come to the 
                                                      
124 Ibid. 
125 See Aristotle et al., The Metaphysics (London; New York: W. Heinemann ; G.P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1933) at at xiii.  
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conclusion that there is a marvellous, intelligent, eternal, all-good being behind all 
these phenomena. Aristotle calls this being ‘God’. 
Later, in the thirteenth century, Aquinas devised the Five Ways to prove the existence 
of God. The Fifth Way, drawn from the governance of the world, was clearly what we 
now call the design argument. Aquinas argued that things such as natural bodies lack 
knowledge but almost always act for an end, in order to obtain the best result. Just as 
an arrow is pointed by an archer, these mindless bodies are controlled by an 
intelligent agent, which is called God. 
1.5.1. Paley versus Hume 
William Paley (1743–1805), with his watchmaker analogy, produced the plainest 
formulation of the teleological argument. In his Natural Theology,126 Paley takes his 
reader for an imaginary walk on a heath. The walker, when he stumbles on a stone, 
probably does not pay much attention to it. However, if he finds a watch he cannot 
help thinking that it is designed for a purpose by a designer. None of the watch’s 
components, such as springs, cogs, arrows or screws, has a mind. Yet, when they 
come together they serve a very specific purpose. Since there is no way specifically 
designed and built parts can intelligently come together by themselves, there has to be 
an intelligent external agent, who, according to Paley, is God Himself.127 
Today, scientists present another version of the design argument, which is called the 
‘Fine Tuning of the Universe’. With the advance of physics, astronomy and 
mathematics, two elements of fine-tuning became more apparent. These are [1] the 
                                                      
126 See William Paley, Natural Theology, or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the 
Deity Collected from the Appearances of Nature (Albany [N.Y.]: Printed for Daniel & 
Samuel Whiting, 1803). 
127 See the extract of Paley’s Natural Theology in Hick, The Existence of God  at 99-104.  
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constants of nature, and [2] arbitrary quantity in the universe. Scientists argue that 
both these concepts strongly indicate that there has to be an intelligent agent making 
life, Earth and the rest of the universe possible. 
Craig emphasizes the fact that life on earth requires this fine-tuning. In his lengthy 
January 2011 lecture on the subject, he presented some scientific data to back up the 
fine-tuning argument.128 
Hume, surprisingly, had given an answer to the design argument even before Paley 
formulated it. Hume’s objection came in his Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion,129 posthumously published in 1779. Cleanthes asserts the design argument 
to Philo thus: 
Look round the world … You will find it to be nothing but one great 
machine … The curious adapting of means to end, throughout all 
nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the production of 
human contrivance; of human design, thought, wisdom, and 
intelligence. Since therefore effects resemble each other, we are led 
to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble 
each other; and the Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind 
of man though possessed of much larger faculties, proportional to the 
grandeur of the work, which he has executed. By this argument a 
posteriori and by this argument alone, we do prove at once the 
existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and 
intelligence.130 
Philo raises five objections to Cleanthes, which are also the basis of modern-day 
arguments for the non-existence of God. These are: 
[1] The analogy between natural order and artefacts is not really close enough to 
make theism a good explanation of natural order. 
                                                      
128 Craig W. L., Teleological argument for the existence of God, podcast, 03/01/2011, 
www.reasonablefaith.org 
129 See Hume and Smith, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. 
130 For this extract from Hume’s Dialogues, see Mackie, The Miracle of Theism : Arguments 
for and against the Existence of God  at 134.  
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[2] The alternative hypotheses of order in nature, such as generation and 
vegetation, eventually weaken the design argument. 
[3] Even if the argument proves the intelligent designer, the intelligent designer 
himself needs explanation. 
[4] The moral components, such as the existence of evil alongside the good, 
weaken this argument. 
And finally [5], the design argument is useless for explaining life after death, 
and punishment and reward. 
1.5.2. The Problem of Evil 
The problem of evil and suffering in the world, which is closely associated with 
Epicurus, Hume and Mill, is probably the most common question put to theists. As in 
all theistic beliefs, God is always described as omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent, 
etc. The theist assumes that the attributes of God are the necessary condition for His 
existence. In other words, if the atheist can prove that God is not omnipotent, they 
automatically prove that He does not exist. This issue is also known as the Epicurean 
problem since it was first formulated by Epicurus.131 Epicurus (341–270 BC), the 
Greek philosopher whose ideas concerning the ethics of reciprocity influenced the 
French Revolution, and whose idea of egalitarianism influenced the American 
Independence Movement, was the earliest atheist in the history of philosophy. The 
Epicurean argument is as follows: 
                                                      
131 See Konstan, David, ‘Epicurus’, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),  
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/epicurus/>. 
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Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able to? 
Then, he is not omnipotent. 
Is he able but not willing? 
Then he is malevolent. 
Is he both able and willing? 
Then whence cometh evil? 
Is he neither able nor willing? 
Then why do we call him God? 132    
This is the master-weapon in the atheists’ arsenal. Hume, in his fourth objection to the 
design argument, has similar arguments, which were mentioned above.  
John Stuart Mill (1806–73) challenged the theists, especially Christians, head-on in 
his 1874 work The Nature and Utility of Religion.133 He starts with the evil in human 
behaviour such as killing and torture, and moves on to list all the sufferings caused by 
nature. He talks about earthquakes, hurricanes, floods and many other natural 
disasters in great detail. He quotes from the Pope and the Bible to show the 
contradiction between what theists claim and what really happens in nature. Mill then 
asks the question: 
… a Creator assumed to be omnipotent who, if he bends to a 
supposed necessity, himself makes the necessity which he bends to. 
                                                      
132 See Epicurus, Hicks, R. D., Diogenes, L., Infomotions, Inc. and Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University (2001) Principal Doctrines: 350 BC (South Bend, IN: 
Infomotions, Inc); and James A. Haught, 2000 Years of Disbelief : Famous People with the 
Courage to Doubt (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1996) at 19. 
133 See John Stuart Mill, Nature, the Utility of Religion, and Theism (London: Longmans, 
Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1874).  
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If the maker of the world can all that he wills, he wills misery, and 
there is no escape from the conclusion.134 
The theist camp was left with the need to come up with some logical and convincing 
answers regarding the problem of evil and suffering. 
1.5.3. The ‘Poor Design’ Argument 
The ‘poor design’ argument is completely based on recent scientific findings of 
anomalies and non-optimal features in organisms. Darwin’s Origin of Species, in 
which Darwin implies that it is evolution rather than an intelligent design that is the 
cause of nature,135 has inspired many more scientists and philosophers to refute 
creationists like Paley. The argument is associated with the German biologist and 
philosopher Haeckel, who was the main promoter of Darwin’s ideas in Germany.136 
Later, Wise, who introduced the term ‘incompetent design’, worked systematically to 
reveal poor design in the natural world. 
The gist of the poor design argument is thus: 
[1] If God, who is omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent, created living things 
(organisms), they have to be at optimum efficiency. 
[2] Some organisms have characters, which is less than optimal. 
Therefore, [3] either God is not omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent, or God 
did not create organisms. 
                                                      
134 Hick, The Existence of God  at 119.  
135 See Barry G. Gale, Evolution without Evidence : Charles Darwin and the Origin of 
Species (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982).  
136 For the ideas of Haeckel, see Ernst Haeckel, The Evolution of Man: A Popular Exposition 
of the Principal Points of Human Ontogeny and Phylogeny. From the German of Ernst 
Haeckel (New York: D. Appleton and company, 1897).  
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Apologists for the ‘poor design’ argument put forward two categories of inefficiency 
in nature. The first concerns male and female reproductive systems. Here, in 
accordance with recent medical findings, they argue that female pregnancy is 
problematic, especially the labour and the birth part of it. For example, a baby’s skull 
can easily be damaged during birth since the birth canal is seriously obstructed by the 
pelvic bone. Also, the male reproductive system is likely to cause medical conditions 
such as gangrene or prostate cancer. 
The second group of examples is from nature in general. There are signs of poor 
design in certain animals like giraffes and pandas, which cause inherent problems. 
Also, these apologists list other, extremely technical and complex biological 
conditions to back up their theory. 
Dawkins, along with most of the modern-day atheists, articulates these points in most 
of his works.137 However, their level of soundness remains questionable. 
1.6. The Argument from Morality and Consciousness 
The forth most popular argument for the existence of God is the moral argument. It is 
considered to be ‘small but powerful’. The argument takes its premises from the 
universally accepted fact of the existence of moral values and duties, which is not 
rejected even by atheists. The argument asserts that moral values and duties require a 
supreme ‘reference’ who gives these codes. 
                                                      
137 For example see, Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989).  
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1.6.1. Kant and Rashdall 
Immanuel Kant, previously rejecting all three of the above arguments on the grounds 
that pure theoretical reason cannot establish the reality of transcendent entities, 
contends that God exists as a postulate of practical reason.138 Kant is considered to be 
the philosopher who established the moral argument in philosophy. Having a clear 
disagreement with Christianity and the Bible, Kant tried to establish his argument 
outside the sphere of religious belief. The highlight of Kant’s argument is this: 
… summum bonum (the highest good) is possible in the world only 
on the supposition of a Supreme Being having a causality 
corresponding to moral character. Now, a being that is capable of 
acting on the conception of laws is an intelligence, and the causality 
of such a being according to this conception of laws is his will; 
therefore, the supreme cause of nature, which must be presupposed 
as a condition of the summum bonum, is a being which is the cause of 
nature by intelligence and will, consequently its author, that is God 
… It is morally necessary to assume the existence of God.139 
Following Kant’s establishment of the moral argument in modern times, Hastings 
Rashdall (1858–1924) formulated it in a form which is still used by many others 
today. The simple formulation of the moral argument is as follows: 
Premise 1: If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist. 
Premise 2: Objective moral values and duties do exist. 
Premise 3: Therefore, God exists. 
The argument clearly appeals to common belief and common reasoning. It is 
surprising to observe that famous atheists like Dawkins and Hitchens seem to agree 
                                                      
138 Coincidentally, Kant’s work on morality has the same title in Kant, Critique of Practical 
Reason, Book II, Chapter II, Section V, translated by T. K. Abbott. 
139 See Immanuel Kant, ‘God as a postulate of practical reason’ in Hick, The Existence of God  
at 137-43. 
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with the existence of moral values and duties. However, like all atheists, they claim 
that moral values do not necessarily require a rule-maker, namely God. They suggest 
that people would have established these definite codes anyway.140 
1.6.2. The Problem of Hell and Free Will 
The problem of Hell has a premise very similar to that of the problem of evil, which 
was discussed above. Sceptics argue that there is a conflict between the concept of an 
all-loving, all-caring, all-good God and the existence of Hell. How can an omnipotent 
god send his creation into a place for eternal punishment? Jonathan Kvanvig141 and 
Joel Buenting142 have dedicated a whole book to this popular issue in philosophy. 
There are different types of answers to this question. Since the question clearly targets 
monotheistic faiths, Christian, Muslim and Jewish theologians have come up with 
specific answers. From a general philosophical point of view, this argument seems to 
be self-destroying when one considers that God is also all-just. If God is just, He 
clearly has to provide justice, which either happens here in this world or elsewhere. 
This makes the existence of Hell necessary. 
Among many answers, arguably the most reasonable one is the Free Will defence. 
Apologists such as Kvanvig and Hunt suggest that human beings possess the right to 
choose, including the right to choose to act in an evil way, and consequently, free will 
makes the existence of Hell necessary in order to punish them.  
                                                      
140 In God is not great, Hitchens goes one step further and argues that religion is the source of 
all evil, not the source of goodness. See Christopher Hitchens, God Is Not Great : How 
Religion Poisons Everything (New York: Twelve, 2007) at 13. 
141 See Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Problem of Hell (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993).  
142 See Joel Buenting, 'The Problem of Hell a Philosophical Anthology',   
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1.6.3. Moral Nihilism 
The term ‘nihilism’ is derived from the Latin word ‘nihil’, which means nothingness. 
Nihilism is essentially the complete rejection of all values, and exposes the 
meaninglessness of life. The classical view of the creationists puts God at the very 
centre of morality and the meaning of life. God is the essential element of all moral 
values. As Dostoyevsky’s character Ivan Fyodorovitch summed it up, “If there is no 
God, everything is permitted”.143 Nihilists, on the other hand, believe that nothingness 
prevails and that the world is meaningless.144 
The term ‘nihilism’ was used for the first time by Ivan Turgenev in his 1862 book 
Fathers and Sons,145 but as a philosophical theory it is strongly associated with 
Nietzsche. Nietzsche shows his complete rejection of the teleological argument by 
asserting that there is no objective order or structure in the world except for what we 
give it.146 
The positions of atheists and nihilists differ regarding morality. Atheists believe that 
there is no good evidence for believing in a deity. Hence objective values are not 
derived from God; they simply exist objectively. They claim that their values are 
generated from feelings and from relationships with other people. This – in contrast to 
what atheists claim – makes them subjective (i.e. changeable from person to person). 
Yet the atheist point of view is not a denial of the existence of moral values and 
morality, but only of the divinity of their source. To put it in context, atheists say that 
                                                      
143 See Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Constance Garnett, The Brothers Karamazov (New York: 
Modern Library, 1996) at 134-35.  
144 See Helmut Thielicke, Nihilism; Its Origin and Nature, with a Christian Answer (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1969).  
145 See Ivan Sergeevich Turgenev and Constance Garnett, 'Fathers and Sons',  
146 See Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Walter Arnold Kaufmann, and R. J. Hollingdale, The 
Will to Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1968).  
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torturing a small child is wrong not because a deity imposes it on us as wrong, but 
because it is objectively wrong to do so. 
Nihilists, on the other hand, argue that morality does not exist as something inherent 
in objective morality. If it exists it is an artificial construction; therefore, no one 
action is necessarily preferable to another. For example, killing, for any reason, is not 
inherently right or wrong. 
1.7. Arguments from Miracles and Religious Experience 
Both miracles and the religious experience of individuals are used as evidence for the 
existence of God by theologians such as A E Taylor and ordinary believers alike. The 
main standpoint of the argument from miracles is that the known laws of nature are 
broken by extraordinary incidents. Since the laws of nature are implemented by the 
creator and the controller of the universe, i.e. God, these incidents or miracles could 
only be achieved with His permission. Since the miracles exist, God must exist.  
Hume sets out two conditions that must be fulfilled for an incident to be counted as a 
miracle. First, it has to transgress the laws of nature, and, secondly, this act of 
transgression must have been produced by an act and will of God.147 Swinburne, 
however, argues that extraordinary events do not necessarily count as miracles, unless 
they show religious significance.148 For instance, water running uphill defying gravity 
in certain parts of the world is not necessarily a miracle, but Moses’ parting of the sea 
is certainly a miracle, because it has a religious significance. Miracles and personal 
                                                      
147 David Hume, Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge, and P. H. Nidditch, Enquiries Concerning 
Human Understanding, and Concerning the Principles of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon press, 
1975) at 115  
148 Richard Swinburne, Miracles (New York; London: Macmillan ; Collier Macmillan, 1989) 
at 6.  
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experience are not accepted by sceptics as sound proofs for the existence of God. 
Sceptics argue that there are always more comprehensible scientific explanations for 
what is perceived as a miracle. They see incidents which science cannot explain as 
unexplained phenomena rather than as miracles. 
1.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the most common arguments for the existence of God and 
the counter-arguments to refute them. The first argument, i.e. the ontological 
argument, is arguably the least convincing and the most criticized of all. Sceptic 
philosophers develop reverse arguments; using the same method as the advocates of 
the ontological argument such as St Anselm’s to demonstrate the weakness of this 
argument. If Anselm and Descartes could claim the existence of God through a 
definition of God, so the sceptics could claim the existence of a ‘perfect island’ or a 
‘shunicorn’. 
The cosmological arguments, on the other hand, pose more serious challenges to the 
mind. There are three distinctive versions of cosmological argument. The kalām 
version focuses on the principle of determination for a creator in time; the Thomist 
version argues from causality; and the Leibnizian version is based on sufficient reason. 
Theists, who argue from cosmology, claim that since infinite regress is not possible, 
the universe has to have a beginning, an uncaused cause or sufficient cause to have 
brought the universe into existence. There seems to be no dispute between theists and 
atheists as to how the universe came into existence. The Big Bang theory is currently 
the most popular explanation. However, a dispute has emerged about who caused the 
Big Bang. Theists argue that the necessarily existent God created the contingent 
universe out of nothing. Atheists such as Stephen Hawking, on the other hand, claim 
Chapter 1: Historical background and literature review 
 
   74 
that there is no need for a god to explain the Big Bang and the universe coming into 
existence. How it happened can be explained within the laws of quantum physics. 
However, why the universe came into existence at all is yet to be explained. 
The teleological argument, which is possibly the most popular defence of theism, 
suggests that the apparent design and purposefulness of the universe require a 
designer. Proponents of the teleological argument also claim that the orderliness and 
regularities in the universe, and the existence of life permitting fundamental physical 
forces, are the work of a cosmic intelligence. This intelligent designer, according to 
theists, is God. Atheists, on the other hand, argue that non-theistic theories, including 
Darwin’s theory of evolution, are more realistic. The design argument pulls into the 
debate more people from the scientific domain than from the philosophical domain. 
Theists claim that naturalistic explanations for order and design in the universe are 
mathematically highly improbable. However, atheists argue that it is still more 
reasonable to believe in their version rather than in the theists’ version, which is 
unverifiable, untestable and un-provable. 
The moral arguments assert that the existence of objective moral values and duties 
within the human mind and conscience is an indication of the existence of God. They 
argue that moral codes are given by a supreme moral giver; that is God. Atheists 
reject the idea that a god is necessary for people to be good and righteous. They argue 
that human intelligence is well enough equipped to distinguish between right and 
wrong. Good is inherently good and evil is inherently bad. Therefore, for atheists, 
reason alone is enough to establish correct moral codes and morality does not require 
God. 
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Miracles and religious experience are the last two tools used by the apologetic of 
theism. Although most philosophers consider them two separate arguments, they are 
closely connected in the case of prophets and revelations. Followers of the Abrahamic 
religions present the miracles of their prophets and the scriptures given to them as 
solid evidence for the existence of God. There is more history and psychology 
involved in these arguments than pure philosophy. Critics of theism argue that the 
evidence presented for the authenticity of the scriptures is not reliable. All known 
scriptures, they claim, are the work of their bearers, not of a divine entity. Prophets 
may well have existed as influential historical figures, but atheists reject the idea that 
the existence of prophets is a sound proof of the existence of God.  
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PART TWO 
CHAPTER 2: SAĪD NURSI: HIS LIFE AND DISCOURSE 
2.1. Introduction 
Bediüzzaman Saīd Nursi149 (1877–1960) is probably one of the most influential 
intellectuals that Turkey produced in the twentieth century. This chapter examines his 
life via discussion of the historic and political perspectives that shaped his discourse. 
It presents an analysis of Nursi’s intellectual shift from sociological concerns into 
philosophical challenges of materialism, rather than a chronological account of his 
life. This chapter also gives the analysis of certain terminology such as self (anā), 
self-referential meaning, other indicative meaning, book of universe etc. used by 
Nursi. The aim of this chapter, therefore, is not to give the reader a chronological life 
story of Nursi but to recreate the scene in which Nursi developed and introduced his 
ideas to make the reader understand better how and why Nursi took this certain 
discourse. 
Nursi was born in eastern Anatolia150 in 1877.151 At the time, the region where he was 
born was called Kurdistan and was within the borders of the Ottoman Empire. Nursi’s 
life spread over two completely different regimes: first, the Ottoman Empire, which 
was a theocratic monarchy with a parliament, and then the Turkish Republic, a secular 
democracy built on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire in 1923. As the child of Kurdish 
parents, Nursi spoke the local Kurdish language, Ottoman Turkish which was the 
                                                      
149 The conventional English version, ‘Said Nursi’, is commonly used instead of Saīd Nursī.  
150 In order to avoid confusion between the geographic east of the Ottoman Empire and the 
Republic of Turkey, I use the geographical name of Anatolia. 
151 There is a disagreement about Nursi’s exact date of birth, owing to Hijri–Gregorian 
calendar conversion and lack of precise records. Vahide accepts 1877 as more accurate than 
others. See Şükran Vahide and Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, 'Islam in Modern Turkey an Intellectual 
Biography of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi', at 3 
Chapter 2: Saīd Nursi: His life and discourse 
 
   77 
language of the court and the government,152 as well as Arabic, the language of 
science, knowledge and religion.  This rather small detail on Nursi’s ethnicity and 
cultural background is to for the foundation of his solutions to the problem of 
intolerance in the wider world and the problem of Ottoman Education system in 
particular. 
In accordance with these factors, Nursi’s life is conventionally divided into three 
periods. The first is from his birth in 1877 to 1920. Nursi himself calls this 37-year 
part of his life the ‘Old Saīd era. The second period is from 1920 to 1950, when Nursi 
produced his magnum opus, Risāle-i Nur (Epistles of Light). Nursi called this part of 
his life the ‘New Saīd’ era. The last ten years of his life, from 1950 to 1960, are 
known as the ‘Third Saīd’ period. 
2.2. The Old Saīd Period (1877–1920) 
Nursi spent the first thirty years of his life in eastern Anatolia studying various 
disciplines in different madrasas (religious schools). As a gifted student, Nursi 
needed only a short time to complete all the courses he attended. Hence, he managed 
to study almost all the taught-sciences fairly quickly. He read and memorized most of 
the texts, including those that were not even part of the madrasa’s curriculum. He was 
an outstandingly brilliant student. As a result, the nickname Bediüzzaman (Wonder of 
the Age) was given to him by one of his early teachers in Siirt, Mullah Fethullah.153 
                                                      
152 The Rise of the Turks and the Ottoman Empire, [Excerpted from Turkey: A Country 
Study. Paul M. Pitman III, ed. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division of the Library of 
Congress, 1987] available at http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/Turkey2.html, last accessed on 
23 October 2013 
153 Vahide and Abu-Rabi, 'Islam in Modern Turkey an Intellectual Biography of Bediuzzaman 
Said Nursi', at 13 
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The end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century 
represented a challenging period for the 600-year-old Ottoman Empire. It was 
fighting wars on different fronts, and facing economic hardship, rising nationalism 
and many other political problems. 
Nursi quickly awakened to the facts that the Empire was in decline and that there 
were a great many problems to solve. He identified what the main flaws in the 
education system were and formulated his own solution. At the time, the education 
system had two tiers. One was strictly religious education and the other was modern 
sciences (i.e. medicine, engineering, etc.). This caused a chasm between religious 
scholars who possessed little or no knowledge of modern science and scientists who 
had little or no religious knowledge. 
Nursi came up with a project for a university called ‘Madrasat uz-Zahrā’ which 
would bring these two tiers (i.e. traditional religious teaching and modern science) 
together. He suggested that his university should have its central campus in Bitlis, one 
campus in Van and another campus in Diyarbakır. All the Arabic, Turkish and 
Kurdish languages would be used simultaneously. In Munāẓarāt, he writes: 
… in this university the language of Arabic is obligatory, the 
language of Kurdish is acceptable and the language of Turkish is 
necessary …154 
This idea would arguably have been the solution to the Kurdish Problem that remains 
to this day. In order to realize his ambitious project,155 Nursi went to Istanbul, the 
                                                      
154 Said Nursi, Münazarāt (Istanbul: Sözler), at 28. 
155 On Nursi’s education reform project, Şükran Vahide writes, “It might be noted here that 
his ideas about educational reform were far-reaching and radical. Besides the joint teaching of 
the religious education and modern physical sciences, already mentioned, Nursi proposed 
reconciling and bringing together in the Madrasat uz-Zahrā’, the three main educational 
traditions of the time, the medreses or ‘religious schools’, the mektebs or ‘modern secular 
schools’ and the Sufi tekkes, and the disciplines they represent. It would thus heal the rifts 
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capital city of the Empire, in 1907. He met Sultan Abdulhamid II and presented his 
proposal156 to him. This was a very turbulent time in Ottoman history since the 
Second Constitution was about to be proclaimed. After submitting his proposal, Nursi 
did not receive a welcoming treatment. In fact, he was arrested and briefly detained in 
prison on the grounds of being mentally unfit.157  
In 1908, the Constitutional Revolution took place, led by the Young Turks. The fruit 
of the revolution was the reinstatement of Parliament, which had been suspended by 
Sultan Abdulhamid II in 1878. The revolution saw the union of all the opposition 
parties against the Sultan. All nationalists, secularists, reform-minded persons and 
pluralists joined forces. It seemed to be a positive step towards democracy, but it led 
to the events that eventually completely destroyed the Ottoman Empire. Nursi, like 
many other Islamists, supported constitutionalism. Only through freedom and 
constitutional government could the empire be saved, progress achieved and Islamic 
civilization established, he believed.158  
Nursi became a well-known public figure. He gave open public speeches, and wrote 
articles in support of constitutionalism. He became a founder member of Ittihad-i 
Muhammedi Cemiyeti (Muḥammadan Union for Muslim Unity). After the Thirty-First 
                                                                                                                                                            
between them and the resultant division of society … he was also a strong advocate of 
students specializing in subjects for which they had an aptitude, a radical departure from 
established practice.” 
156 In his proposal, Nursi writes: “The religious sciences are the light of the conscience, and 
the modern sciences are the light of the reason. The truth becomes manifest through the 
combining of the two. The students’ endeavor will take flight on these two wings. When they 
are separated it gives rise to bigotry in the one, and wiles and skepticism in the other.” 
157 Necmeddin Şahiner, Bilinmeyen Taraflariyla Bediüzzaman Said Nursi: Kronolojik Hayati 
(Istanbul: Nesil, 1997) at 93. 
158 Safa Mürsel, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi Ve Devlet Felsefesi (Istanbul: Yeni Asya Yayinlari, 
1976) at 223-35.  
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of March Incident159 in 1909, he was arrested, Court Martialled, and acquitted after 
having served 24 days in prison. In 1910, Nursi published his first book, Nutuk 
(Speech), which was a collection of his articles and speeches.160 In 1911, he published 
the defence he had presented to the Court Martial under the same title, Divān-ı Harb-i 
Örfî. It was reprinted the following year.161 
Nursi left Istanbul and headed to the east of Anatolia to live among Kurdish tribes 
again. He defended democracy and constitutionalism as a way forward. His ideas and 
exchanges were later published in two books. Muḥākamāt (Reasoning) addressed the 
ʿulamā (scholars), and Munāẓarāt (Debates) addressed the general public. These two 
works were published in 1911 and 1913 respectively. Nursi impressed both scholars 
and the public with his diagnosis of the three diseases and three cures of the East. The 
three diseases, he said, were ‘ignorance, poverty and internal conflict’, and they had 
to be fought with the three cures of ‘education, industry and unity’. 
He then travelled to Damascus162 in Syria, where he gave his notable Damascus 
Sermon in the Umayyad Mosque to an audience of some ten thousand people, 
including 150 scholars.163 In his sermon in Arabic, Nursi identified six illnesses and 
offered remedies from ‘the pharmacy of the Qur’ān’. He said: 
                                                      
159 The Thirty-first of March Incident was a revolt against Ittihad ve Terakki (The Young 
Turks) who took charge of government after the Second Constitutional Revolution. It 
occurred on 31 March 1325 on the Rumi calendar (13 April 1909), hence called The Thirty-
first of March Incident.  
160 Vahide and Abu-Rabi, 'Islam in Modern Turkey an Intellectual Biography of Bediuzzaman 
Said Nursi', at 59 
161 Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, Islam at the Crossroads : On the Life and Thought of Bediuzzaman 
Said Nursi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003) at xviii. 
162 Syria was part of the Ottoman Empire in 1911. Following World War I Syria separated 
and went under the French Mandate as the Ottoman Empire lost the War. 
163 Nursi himself reports this event in The Rays and gives these figures. See Nursi, The Rays  
at 1148. 
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In the conditions of the present time in these lands, I have learnt a 
lesson in the school of mankind’s social life and I have realized that 
(at the origin of) what has allowed foreigners, Europeans, to fly 
towards the future (with the wings of) progress while it arrested us 
and kept us, in respect of material development, in the Middle Ages, 
are six dire sicknesses. The sicknesses are these: 
Firstly: the rise to life of despair and hopelessness in social life. 
Secondly: the death of truthfulness in social and political life. 
Thirdly: the love of enmity. 
Fourthly: not knowing the luminous bonds that bind the believers to 
one another. 
Fifthly: despotism, which creeps, becoming widespread as though it 
was various contagious diseases. 
Sixthly: restricting endeavour to what is personally beneficial. 
I shall explain, by means of six ‘Words,’ the lesson I have learnt 
from the pharmacy of the Qur’an, which is like a faculty of medicine. 
This lesson constitutes the medicine to cure our social life of those 
six dire sicknesses.164 
At his stage, Nursi still mainly concentrated on the social problems of the Empire. He 
wanted to elucidate the ills and cures of the times’ social problems. His famous 
Damascus Sermon was printed twice in Arabic and later reprinted in Turkish as well. 
Nursi left Damascus and went back to Istanbul to join the new Sultan, Mehmed 
Rashad, on his Balkan Journey. The mission was to gain the support of Balkan 
nations still living under the Ottoman flag. Although the trip was successful in the 
sense that it refreshed the old bonds, the upcoming events of the World War I led 
eventually to the separation of the Balkans from the rest of the Empire. By Nursi’s 
own account, this Balkan trip helped him to secure the funding for Madrasat uz-
Zahrā’ (the Islamic Modern University in the East), the foundations of which were 
eventually laid in Van in 1913. The project was abruptly halted when World War I 
broke out in 1914. Nursi had to join the militia to defend the Eastern provinces with 
his students. Now, his madrasa was both a school and a military base. Accounts by 
                                                      
164 See Hutbe-i Şāmiye (Damascus Sermon) in Nursi, Risale-I Nur Külliyati 2  at 1961-62.  
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visitors to his madrasa describe how books and rifles were hanging on the walls side 
by side.165 
Just before the turn of the 20th Century, the British Secretary for the Colonies, 
Gladstone, openly declared war on the Qur’ān, which, he said, was the main obstacle 
to British imperialist ambitions.166 Despite all the political and social turbulence, 
Nursi had always wanted to refresh the truths of Islām and the Qur’ān, to dispel the 
doubts spread by the enemies of religion, and to repulse the underground fears 
exploited by externalists and extremists.167 He explained his life mission in The 
Words: 
One time I had a dream: I was at the foot of Mount Ararat. The 
mountain suddenly exploded, scattering rocks the size of mountains 
all over the world, shaking it. 
Then a man appeared at my side. He told me: “Expound the aspects 
of the Qur'an's miraculousness you know, concisely and succinctly! 
I thought of the dream's meaning while still dreaming, telling myself: 
the explosion here symbolizes a revolution in mankind. 
As a result of it the guidance of the Criterion of Truth and Falsehood 
will be exalted everywhere, and will rule. And the time will come to 
expound its miraculousness!168 
 
According to Nursi, Qur’anic exegesis (tafsīr) should consist of three main parts: (1) 
the Element of Reality (Haqīqah), (2) the Element of Rhetoric (Balāghah), and (3) the 
Element of Doctrine (ʿAqāid). 
The early writings of Nursi (Munāẓarāt and Muḥākamāt) place great emphasis on the 
element of reality in Islām. Nursi was well aware of the fact that Islām had been 
                                                      
165 Şahiner, Bilinmeyen Taraflariyla Bediüzzaman Said Nursi: Kronolojik Hayati  at 165  
166 The British Secretary for the Colonies, Gladstone, said: So long as the Muslims have the 
Qur'an, we shall be unable to dominate them. We must either take it from them, or make them 
lose their love of it. See Vahide, Biography of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi: 47. 
167 See Şükran Vahide, in Abu-Rabi, Islam at the Crossroads : On the Life and Thought of 
Bediuzzaman Said Nursi  at 8.  
168 See Nursi, The Words  at 336. 
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polluted by Isra’illiyāt (Judaic or Judao-Christian legends in the early Islamic 
literature) and Ancient Greek philosophy. This caused confusion to externalists. He 
tried to explain that modern sciences and the Qur’ān do not conflict at all.169 Some of 
the expressions in the Qur’ān are representational, not factual. 
Nursi started working on al-ʿIshārāt al-I’jāz, which is dedicated to demonstrating the 
Qur’ān’s miraculous eloquence, in 1913. This work was never completed as he 
intended, owing to his capture by the Russian army in 1916. In the two hundred or so 
pages that Nursi managed to write, he commented on the first verses of the Qur’ān 
with a great knowledge of the art of the Arabic language. Vahide relates 
contemporary scholars’ admiration for Nursi’s subtlety in expounding the Qur’ān’s 
word-order (naẓm), subtlety which in places surpasses that of the great masters of the 
past such as Jurjani and Zamakshari.170 After having spent around two years in 
Kostroma on the River Volga as a prisoner of war, Nursi escaped from Russia to 
Istanbul via Warsaw and Austria.171 Since Germany was the ally of the Ottoman 
Empire in the war, Nursi received some help from the Germans and made his way 
back to Istanbul. During the last few years of the Old Saīd period, Nursi produced 
several small books: Sunūḥāt, Lemaāt, Ishārāt and Hutuvat-i Sitte. He was also 
involved in the creation of the Madrasa Teachers’ Association (1919), whose aim was 
to maintain and raise educational standards in the madrasas. To fight the spread of 
alcoholism, Nursi took part in the foundation of the Green Crescent Society (1920). 
                                                      
169 See Said Nursi, Muhakemat (Reasoning). Nursi dedicated almost this entire book for the 
hakikat (reality) of Islam. For example, he explained verses like Qur’ān18:86: Until when he 
reached the place where the sun set, he found it going down into a black sea, and found by it a 
people. We said: O Zulqarnain! either give them a chastisement or do them a benefit, and Q. 
51:48: And the earth, We have made it a wide extent; how well have We then spread (it) out. 
170 See Şükran Vahide, Towards the Intellectual Biography of Said Nursi, in Abu-Rabi, Islam 
at the Crossroads : On the Life and Thought of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi  at 9.  
171 See Şükran  Vahide, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi : The Author of the Risale-I Nur (Cağaloğlu, 
Istanbul: Sözler Publications, 2000) at 129. 
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When World War I ended in 1918, the Ottoman Empire had lost the war and was 
invaded by foreign troops. Nursi worked for the removal of the invaders and for 
independence. He eventually went back to Anatolia and withdrew into solitude. This 
was effectively the end of the Old Saīd era and the beginning of the New Saīd. 
2.3. The New Saīd Period (1920–1950) 
During his solitude, Nursi decided to take the Qur’ān as his only guide and free 
himself from the negative influence of philosophy. He began writing his al-Mathnawī 
al-ʿArabī al-Nūriyah, which was translated into Turkish later. This book was the first 
of the New Saīd’s lifetime struggle to fight atheist and materialist philosophy 
championed by Nietzsche, Darwin, Comte, Büchner, etc. Out of the 6,000 pages of 
Nursi’s work, the Risāle-i Nur Collection, 172 the main body was created after 1920. 
The Words, The Letters, The Flashes, The Rays, as well as al-Mathnawī al-ʿArabī al-
Nūriyah, are the fruit of the New Saīd era. Describing Saīd Nursi’s magnum opus 
Risāle-i Nur, Vahide writes: 
… Risāle-i Nur is Qur’anic interpretation … expounding the 
teachings of Qur’ān on the truth of belief that incorporates the 
traditional Islamic sciences and modern scientific knowledge, and 
while instilling those truths, effectively refutes the basis of 
materialist philosophy … unique way in the Islamic world for the 
renewal of belief.173 
In other words, Risāle-i Nur is a Qur’anic exegesis (tafsīr), or a topical commentary 
on the Qur’ān, with a unique, characteristic approach. It is evident from the textual 
analysis that Nursi dedicated the main body of Risāle-i Nur to proving the four main 
aims of the Qur’ān: (1) the existence of the Single Maker, i.e. God, (2) prophethood, 
(3) the resurrection of the dead, and (4) justice. 
                                                      
172 See Appendix 1: Chronology and the Diagram of Said Nursi’s Risāle-i Nur Collection. 
173 See Şükran Vahide, Towards the Intellectual Biography of Said Nursi in Abu-Rabi, Islam 
at the Crossroads : On the Life and Thought of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi  at 1. 
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It is clear from a historical perspective why Nursi shifted his attention from social 
issues to philosophy, and more specifically to the refutation of materialist philosophy. 
With the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 
a new secular country was born out of a theocratic empire.174 This new regime took 
the Kemalist ideology as its official state philosophy. This ideology was characterized 
by six principles: republicanism, populism, nationalism, revolutionism, secularism 
and statism.175 The progress of the new nation state, according to Atatürk, had to be 
guided by education and science-based progress on the principles of positivism, 
rationalism and enlightenment. The new regime abolished the office of Caliphate in 
1924 and introduced the Latin alphabet to replace the Arabic alphabet, which had 
been in use for several centuries. This had a devastating effect on the public at large. 
The positivist ideas of Auguste Comte and the materialism of Ludwig Büchner and 
others, which had initially become popular among secular schools in the early 1900, 
was now the official ideology of the new republic. 176  Islam was quickly removed 
from public life with the banning of the Arabic call to prayer and the ban on tekkes. 
Materialist philosophy entered schoolbooks together with evolutionary theories, while 
religion was labelled as backwardness. There was a common unpleasant reaction 
against these extreme actions of the new regime. After the Sheikh Saīd177 revolt of 
1925, Nursi was arrested and sent into exile at Burdur, even though he opposed the 
                                                      
174 It is arguable that The Ottoman Empire had better liberal and democratic charecters than 
many so-called democratic countries. However, it has been consdiered as theocratic in the 
sense that Sharia laws based on the Qur’an were in force in running the empire. 
175 Donald Everett Webster, The Turkey of Ataturk : Social Process in the Turkish 
Reformation (1939) at 245. 
176 M. Sükrü Hanioglu, Bir Siyasi Dusunur Olarak Dr Abdullah Cevded Ve Donemi (Istanbul) 
at 370-72.  
177 Saīd Nursi and Sheikh Saīd were both popular Kurdish personalities, but they should not 
be confused. Sheik Saīd led a revolt against the newly formed Turkish Republic in order to 
gain Kurdish independence. The Kurdish rebels (15,000-strong) were crushed by some fifty 
thousand Turkish troops. Sheikh Saīd was captured and executed. 
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rebellion. 178 There he started writing short treaties to answer local people’s questions 
on religion. During the first three years of his exile in Barla, he completed The Words. 
In the following years, his individual treaties were brought together to form two more 
books, The Letters and The Flashes. Since the main aim of these books was to 
revitalize for people the Islamic faith, Nursi quickly became the enemy of the regime. 
The state’s decision to contain him in a remote village of Barla179 did not apparently 
work, since he managed to gather a large audience and spread his treaties, thanks to 
followers copying them by hand. Nursi once again was summoned and relocated to 
another exile in Isparta in 1934. Although his teachings were not political, they 
displeased the Kemalist regime intensely because of their religious contents. The 
unity of the Maker (God), prophethood, resurrection and the miraculousness of the 
Qur’ān – these were subjects the Kemalist regime did not like at all. The Kemalist 
regime was to eradicate Islām and its values from public life and promote a new 
Western, secular and materialist lifestyle in Turkey. In 1935, Nursi and 120 of his 
students were arrested and charged with “opposing the reforms and belonging to a 
secret political organization … exploiting religion for political ends, forming an 
organization that constituted a possible threat to public order and giving instruction in 
Sufism”.180 The court acquitted 97 of his students but sentenced Nursi to eleven 
                                                      
178 Badıllı writes about Nursi’s response to Shaikh Said thus, ‘The struggle you are embarking 
on will cause brother to kill brother and will be fruitless. For the Kurds and Turks are 
brothers. The Turkish nation has acted as the standard-bearer of Islam for centuries. It has 
produced millions of saints and given millions of martyrs. The sword may not be drawn 
against the sons of Islam’s heroic defenders, and I shall not draw mine! 
See Abdulkadir Badıllı, Bediüzzaman Said-I Nursi, Mufassal Tarihçe-I Hayatı (2nd edn.; 
İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 1998). at 1:660; quoted from Selahaddin Çelebi’s biographical 
notes (1946). 
179 Barla, at the time, was a very small isolated village on the other side of the lake Eğirdir. In 
his Tarihçe-i Hayatı (Nursi’s Biography), Nursi reports how a little boat transferred him to 
Barla across the lake, as there was no road access. 
180 See Şükran Vahide, A Chronology of Said Nursi’s Life, in Abu-Rabi, Islam at the 
Crossroads : On the Life and Thought of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi  at xxi. 
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months in prison on the grounds of opposition to dress code.181 Nursi was to be exiled 
in Kastamonu after having served his sentence in Eskișehir. During the Kastamonu 
exile, he wrote The Supreme Sign and some parts of The Rays. He was once again 
arrested along with 126 of his students and sent to Denizli. Charges similar to those 
used in the Eskișehir trial were brought against him, but this time Nursi and his 
students were all acquitted and Risāle-i Nur was cleared. However, during the trial, 
which lasted some nine months, they were kept in harsh conditions in Denizli Prison. 
The Fruits of Belief was written in the prison during this difficult time. Nursi was 
forced to stay in Emirdağ where, by 1947, Risāle-i Nur was completed. Nursi was 
detained once again and sent to Afyon Prison where he served another twenty months, 
on the same charges he had previously faced. Although he and Risāle-i Nur were 
cleared once again, the process was deliberately slow in order to keep him in prison as 
long as possible. Now, Nursi was over seventy years of age, and owing to his periods 
of exile and stays in prison his health was very poor. According to the accounts of his 
students, the regime was deliberately trying to kill him, by means of poisoning and by 
exposing him to extreme cold in his prison cell.182 The new state was run by Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk and his Republican People’s Party (RPP)183 up until 1950. This 27-
year period in the history of modern Turkey, known as the single-party period, is still 
very controversial. For some, it was a brutal dictatorship, for others, it was a 
necessary step towards establishing a new state. It was a period when philosophy-
based ideologies were becoming increasingly influential in political systems and 
                                                      
181 Atatürk introduced the new dress code in 1925, which made the use of the hat obligatory. 
Anyone refusing to put a hat on was punished severely. 
182 See Şahiner, Bilinmeyen Taraflariyla Bediüzzaman Said Nursi: Kronolojik Hayati.  
183 The Republican People’s Party was established by Atatürk on 9 September 1923. It was 
the only party without opposition until the General Election of 1950. The ideology of the 
party is Kemalism and Social Democracy. 
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when Islamic societies underwent the most radical changes in the whole history of 
Islamic civilization.184 
Owing to his enforced exile, Nursi rarely made contact with people outside his close 
circle of students. His main means of communication was through his letters and 
treaties. During the second period of his life (the New Saīd period) he hardly made 
any public speeches other than his court defences. Hence, his only option was to 
promote Risāle-i Nur rather than his own leadership and charisma. On many 
occasions, he called himself ‘a student of Risāle-i Nur’ rather than the author of it. 
From 1926 on, Nursi started building up a large number of followers of his Risāle-i 
Nur, corporately called the Risāle-i Nur Movement, or Nurcus. Although the new 
regime abolished the use of the Arabic alphabet in favour of the Latin, Nursi wrote his 
treaties and letters using the Ottoman alphabet (Arabic), which made them readily 
understandable by the public at large. Here, it is important to note that Risāle-i Nur 
was printed in the modern Latin alphabet only in 1956, after all charges against it by 
the Afyon Court were dropped. Especially after the ban on Sufi tekkes and madrasas, 
the public experienced a vacuum and a lack of guidance. Risāle-i Nur filled this gap 
and it was widely accepted and its text reproduced by people in and around Isparta. 
2.3.1. Risāle-i Nur and Nursi’s terminology 
According to Nursi, Risāle-i Nur inspired directly by the Qur’ān,185 is a genuine 
spiritual commentary on the Qur’ān’s meanings (manevi tafsīr).186 In al-Ishārāt al-
I’jāz, Nursi highlights four main purposes (maqāṣid-i ʿarba’) that the Qur’ān 
                                                      
184 See Ahmet Davutoglu, Bediuzzaman and the Politics of the 20th Century available at 
http://www.nur.org/en/nurcenter/nurlibrary/Bediuzzaman_and_the_Politics_of_the_20th_Cen
tury_198 last accessed on 25 October 2014 
185 Said  Nursi, The Letters (İstanbul: Nesil, 2004e) at 527. 
186 Nursi, Tarihçe-i Hayatı at 2225 
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expounds. These are: the oneness or unity of God (tawḥīd), the nature of and the 
necessity for prophethood (nubuwwah), the resurrection of the dead (ḥashr), and 
justice and worship (‘adalah and ʿibādah). 187  In order to clarify the Qur’ān’s 
exposition of these four elements, Nursi explains certain themes in his writings. 
Turner and Horkuç argue that six of these distinct themes appear in Nursi’s 
writings.188  
i. The book of universe (kitāb-ı kāināt) and the beautiful names of God (al-asmā 
al-husnā)  
Throughout Risāle-i Nur, Nursi meticulously comments on the universe being a book 
written by God. He explains that, just like a mirror, the universe reflects all the 
different beautiful names and attributes189 of its Creator. To Nursi, all beings have 
been created for a purpose and are the signs (āyāt) of their Creator.190 Therefore, the 
purpose of man’s creation is to attain belief in God, which may be achieved by the 
correct interpretation of the cosmic narrative. 
The very first verses of the Qur’ān in Surat al ‘Alaq revealed to Prophet Muḥammad 
ordered him to read in the name of his Lord. At first the verse might look to the 
ordinary reader that he or she needs to learn to read, i.e. become literate. However, 
based on Nursi’s way of thinking one might easily reinterpret this very first Qur’anic 
verse rather differently. The verse might actually mean to read the cosmic book or 
what Nursi calls kitāb-ı kāināt with its true meaning which, according to Nursi, is 
ma’nà-i ḥarfī. This particular interpretation of the Qur’ān also set the foundations of 
                                                      
187 Nursi, Isharat-ul I’caz, at 1167 
188 Colin Turner and Hasan Horkuc, Said Nursi (London, New York: I.B. Tauris 2009) at 53. 
189 Nursi mentions more than the classical 99 beautiful names of God listed in the hadīth. 
190 This particular theme is also Nursi’s first way of arguing for the existence of God, i.e. the 
teleological (design) argument, which is the focal topic of Chapter 3. 
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Nursi’s philosophy. He makes his position very clear in several pieces in his Risāle-i 
Nur, such as the Twelfth Word and the Thirtieth Word. Nursi elucidates that there are 
only two ways of reading the cosmic narrative, one is the way of materialist 
philosophy which only reads the universe with its self referential meaning and the 
other one is the Qur’anic and Prophetic reading which reads it with its other indicative 
meaning, i.e. witnessing God’s names and attributes in every event and in every being. 
ii. The self, or the human ‘I’ (anā) 
According to Nursi, anā is the trust given to man by his Creator. The first function of 
anā is to understand the beautiful names of God. Secondly, anā is a key given to man 
wherewith to unlock the secret of creation. Anā, the human ‘I’, is a comparison tool 
given to man so he can see where God stands in contrast to where he stands. In Anā 
Risālesi, The Thirtieth Word, Nursi writes: 
The All-Wise Maker gave to man as a Trust an ‘I’ which comprises 
indications and samples that show and cause to recognize the truths 
of the attributes and functions of His dominicality, so that the ‘I’ 
might be a unit of measurement and the attributes of dominicality 
and functions of Divinity might be known. However, it is not 
necessary for a unit of measurement to have actual existence; like 
hypothetical lines in geometry, a unit of measurement may be formed 
by hypothesis and supposition. It is not necessary for its actual 
existence to be established by concrete knowledge and proofs.191 
Nursi’s interpretation of self seems to very different from almost everyone else in 
non-Islamic tradition. Materialist philosophy locates self at the centre of the universe, 
while Nursi locates God at the centre of the universe.  Again the Twelfth Word and 
the Thirtieth Word give strong clues on Nursi’s understanding of the purpose of 
Men’s existence. Self in Nursian thinking is an essential tool to understand not only 
the existence of God but is greatness in his attributes. One can start off with faculties 
and capacities in himself or herself, then realises he or she is not fully capable. He or 
                                                      
191 Nursi, The Words  at 241. 
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she then concludes, or at lest this is what Nursi expects, that there has to be a higher 
more capable being, that is God. Unlike what the materials philosophy suggests the 
true purpose of self (anā), according to Nursi, is to understand the nature of God. 
iii. The ‘self-referential’ and the ‘other-indicative’ (ma’nà-i ismī, and ma’nà-i 
ḥarfī) 
To aid understanding of the meaning of life and the nature of the universe, Nursi 
introduced the concepts of mʿanà-i ismī (the significative or self-referential meaning 
of things), and mʿanà-i ḥarfī (other-indicative meaning). He explains that cosmos and 
life can be understood correctly only through the window of mʿanà-i ḥarfī192 (the 
meaning that signifies something other than itself). In The Words, he explains that the 
Qur’ān mentions beings ‘not for themselves, but for another’. That is, it speaks of the 
universe as evidence for Almighty God’s existence, unity and sublimity.193 It is 
apparent from the Tenth Word on Resurrection that Nursi bases his arguments mainly 
on facts such as order in the universe, purpose in all creatures, and the absence of 
waste in the cosmos. These are two well-known theistic arguments in the philosophy 
of religion, the cosmological argument and the teleological argument, also known as 
                                                      
192 Nursi writes in the Addendum of the 26th Word: “According to the apparent meaning of 
things (mʿanà-i ismī), which looks to each thing itself, everything is transitory, lacking, 
accidental, non-existent. But according to the meaning that signifies something other than 
itself (mʿanà-i ḥarfī) and in respect of each thing being a mirror to the All-Glorious Maker's 
Names and charged with various duties, each is a witness, it is witnessed, and it is existent. 
The purification and cleansing of a person at this stage is as follows: 
In his existence he is non-existent, and in his non-existence he has existence. That is to say, if 
he values himself and attributes existence to himself, he is in a darkness of non-existence as 
great as the universe. That is, if he relies on his individual existence and is unmindful of the 
True Giver of Existence, he has an individual light of existence like that of a fire-fly and is 
submerged in an endless darkness of non-existence and separation. But if he gives up egotism 
and sees that he is a mirror of the manifestations of the True Giver of Existence, he gains all 
beings and an infinite existence. For he who finds the Necessary Existent One, the 
manifestation of Whose Names all beings manifest, finds everything.” 
See ibid., at 211. 
193 Ibid., at 282. 
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the argument from design, which will be examined in the following chapters.  
In line with the previous concepts, it can be argued that Nursi systematically tries to 
teach his readers how to use faculties given to them in order to read the universe 
correctly to attain the knowledge of God. Nursi seems to create a mind set in his 
readers mind that continuous creation happening in the universe and by using the 
tools of intellect one can constantly observe the evidences of God’s existence and 
Him being in charge at all times. 
iv. Causality 
Nursi tries vigorously to convince his readers that there is no necessary connection 
between cause and effect independent of God. Scientific materialism, which Nursi 
considers the greatest threat to humankind, claims that the effective cause of what is 
actually happening now is the combined result of the previous causes. For example, 
when a burning match touches dry paper, the paper burns as a result of fire caused by 
the match. Nursi seems to be maintaining Ash’ari’s approach to causality, which was 
also endorsed by al-Ghazzālī. The Ash’ari–al-Ghazzālī line of thought dictates that 
the actual cause for the piece of paper burning is not the match but God’s creating a 
new set of conditions to realize the new effect. God is the creator of all causes 
(musabbib al-asbāb).194 
Nursi explains that people misread nature and natural events in terms of causality. He 
explains that God is the absolute and continuous creator. According to Nursi, there are 
two types of creation. These are ibdā (creation out of nothing) and inshā (gradual 
                                                      
194 Nursi expounds on this issue in his Thirty-Second Word while explaining the Qur’ān 
21:22: Had there been within the heavens and earth gods besides Allāh, they both would have 
been ruined. So exalted is Allāh, Lord of the Throne, above what they describe. See ibid., at 
268-73. 
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building from existing material). In The Flashes, Nursi writes: 
Beings are created in two ways: one is creation from nothing called 
origination and invention; and the other is the giving of existence 
through bringing together existent elements and things, called 
composition and assembling. When in accordance with the 
manifestation of divine singleness and mystery of divine oneness, 
this occurs with an infinite ease, indeed, such ease as to be necessary. 
If not ascribed to divine singleness, it would be infinitely difficult 
and irrational, difficult to the degree of impossibility. However, the 
fact that beings in the universe come into existence with infinite ease 
and facility and no difficulty at all, and in perfect form, self-evidently 
shows the manifestation of divine singleness and proves that 
everything is directly the art of the Single One of Glory.195 
For Nursi, in order to maintain the element of test (sırr-ı teklif), God uses causes to 
veil His actual power and majesty, yet He expects people to understand that He is the 
absolute creator and controller of the events that scientific materialism explains 
otherwise.196 
One can argue that Nursi was trying to establish a new vision or new way of thinking 
against the materialist approach to the natural events. Though he is not the first 
Islamic scholar to expound on the idea of ibdā and inshā, he is surely the one 
reintroducing into the twentieth century people whose minds had been polluted by the 
scientific materialism.  
v: Belief and submission (īmān – Islām) 
According to Nursi, the true salvation of humanity can only be achieved through a 
perfect balance between belief and submission. Thus, man is required to attain true 
belief through investigation and research. Throughout Risāle-i Nur, Nursi tries to 
make his readers move from taklidi īmān (belief through emulation) to tahkiki īmān 
                                                      
195 Said Nursi, The Flashes (İstanbul: Nesil 2004a) at 808. 
196 In The Words, Nursi writes: Yes, dignity and grandeur demand that causes are a veil to the 
hand of power in the view of the mind, while Divine unity and glory demand that causes 
withdraw their hands and have no true effect. See Nursi, The Words  at 122. 
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(belief through investigation, true belief). 197  Aware of the threat of scientific 
materialism, Nursi develops a reverse theme of science and nature being the evidence 
of their Creator. This aspect of Nursi’s writing is highly visible in pieces such as 
Tabiat Risalesi198 and Ayāt al Kübra.199 
It seems that Nursi is not content with people having only taklidi īmān or being in the 
religion if Islām without having genuine faith, i.e. tahkiki īmān. It can be argued that 
one of the main motives of Risāle-i Nur is teaching people how to attain true imān or 
tahkiki īmān.  
vi: Closed doors of creation 
The last theme that Nursi elaborates on is the ‘closed doors of creation’, which is 
closely connected to the second theme of anā (the human ‘I’). In The Words, Nursi 
explains: 
The key to the world is in the hand of man and is attached to his self. 
For while being apparently open, the doors of the universe are in fact 
closed. God Almighty has given to man by way of a Trust, such a 
key, called the ‘I’, that it opens all the doors of the world; He has 
given him an enigmatic ‘I’ with which he may discover the hidden 
treasures of the Creator of the universe. But the ‘I’ is also an 
extremely complicated riddle and a enigma that is difficult to solve. 
When its true nature and the purpose of its creation are known, as it 
is itself solved, so will be the universe.200 
The Nursian view is that the purpose of human existence is to investigate and explore 
life and the universe so as to try to unlock the doors of creation in order to attain true 
belief (tahkiki īmān).201  That is to say one needs to investigate the nature and the 
                                                      
197 See Emirdaǧ Lahikası in Nursi, Risale-I Nur Külliyati 2  at 1681. 
198 See Nursi, The Flashes  at 677-86. 
199 See Nursi, The Rays  at 895-931. 
200 See Nursi, The Words  at 241. 
201 Turner and Horkuc discuss these themes in greater detail. See Turner and Horkuc, Said 
Nursi  at 53-84. 
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universe to attain the knowledge of God, and with the help of the Prophets and the 
Revelations understand the true meaning of the creation.  
vii. Attaining the knowledge of God 
The Third Sign in the Thirty-second Word reveals Nursi’s difference from kalām 
philosophers. He explains that attaining the full knowledge of God has eight steps. 
The first step is simply by observing the universe. One sees artefacts and works (āsār) 
which is certainly the result of an action (fi’il) as every effect must have a cause. 
Intelligence asserts that action necessitates the existence of a doer (fāil). The doer 
must certainly have personal names and titles (ism) as well as traits and attributes 
(siffah). There is clearly perfection in the universe which self-evidently points to the 
perfection of the doer’s functioning essence (shu’ūn), because it is from the 
functioning essence that the attributes proceed. Finally, the perfection of essential 
functions point at the degree of ‘knowledge of certainty’ to the perfection of the 
functioning essence. They point to perfection so worthy that although the light of the 
perfection passes through the veils of functions, attributes, names, actions, and works 
of art, it still demonstrates the goodness, beauty, and perfection to be seen to this great 
extent in the universe.202 
In other words, there is a continuous relation between āsār, fi’il, fail, ism, siffah and 
shu’ūn. Nursi’s philosophy seems to be aimed at attaining the full understanding of 
the true nature of  God (Dhāt) whereas mainstream kalām philosophers especially in 
their kalām cosmological arguments attain the knowledge that a doer is necessary in 
explaining the universe. 
                                                      
202 Nursi, The Words  at 283. 
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In pursuance of attaining the full knowledge of God, Nursi employs four arguments. 
The table below illustrates the chronological development of Nursi’s arguments. 
Book Al-Mathnawī al-‘Arabī al-Nūrī  
 
The Words 
 
Date (circa 1918) (circa 1919) (circa 1928) 
Period The Old Saīd The New Saīd 
Piece Reşhalar Nokta 19th Word 
1 Kitāb-ı kabīr-i kāināt Nubuwwah Kitāb-ı kabīr-i kāināt 
2 Nubuwwah Kitāb-ı kabīr-i kāināt Nubuwwah 
3 Qur’ān Qur’ān Qur’ān 
4  Wijdān  
Table 1: Nursi’s arguments for the existence of God in chronological order 
 
It is evident in the above table that Nursi developed two different sets of arguments. 
In his New Saīd period, he seems to stick to his very first version which appears in 
Reshalar in Al-Mathnaāwi al-Nūrī. Nursi somehow changed the order of his 
arguments in Nokta putting prophethood as the first argument and adding conscience 
as a new addition to the list. Later he dropped the fourth argument which is built 
around conscience and put the book of universe argument as his first. This might be 
due to the fast changing political atmosphere of Anatolia which was now governed by 
secular republic. One can argue that since the kemalist regime based its doctrine on 
the teachings of Büchner’s materialism and Comte’s positivism, Nursi felt obliged to 
develop parallel counter arguments based on reason and intellect. 
2.3.2. Nursi’s Style and Method 
It is evident to any reader that Nursi wrote the treaties in The Words in very simple 
language compared to his other writings. He uses allegories to make the context clear 
to readers who were not highly educated. Then, he reveals the truth via the allegory. 
By way of proof of the Maker, Nursi tells the story of two men travelling through a 
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land. One man is empty-headed and represents the atheist philosophy, and the other is 
wise and represents the theist philosophy. To the empty-headed man rejecting the 
Deity, the wise man replies:  
Every village must have its headman; every needle must have its 
manufacturer and craftsman. And, as you know, every letter must be 
written by someone. How, then, can it be that so extremely well-
ordered a kingdom should have no ruler? And how can so much 
wealth have no owner, when every hour a train arrives filled with 
precious and artful gifts, as if coming from the realm of the unseen? 
And all the announcements and proclamations, all the seals and 
stamps, found on all those goods, all the coins and the flags waving 
in every corner of the kingdom — can they be without an owner? It 
seems you have studied foreign languages a little, and are unable to 
read this Islamic script. In addition, you refuse to ask those who are 
able to read it. Come now; let me read to you the king's supreme 
decree.203 
While the first pieces were written in a fashion which is suitable for an entry-level 
reader, Nursi seems to have increased the level gradually. This becomes evident when 
treaties in the first ten Words and the treaties in The Letters and The Flashes are 
compared. 
In terms of methodology, Nursi’s style resembles that of Plato. In the Laws, Plato uses 
two imaginary characters, Cleinas and the Athenian Stranger, to represent opposing 
ideas. Similarly, Hume, in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, speaks from 
the mouths of Demea, Cleanthes, and Philo to represent the cosmological theist, the 
experimental theist and the sceptic. 
Nursi uses the word philosophy (falsafa) in a deprecatory sense, meaning negative 
philosophy (i.e. materialist, naturalist and atheist). In order to denigrate this 
philosophy, he makes the Qur’ān speak. He never uses the expressions ‘atheist 
philosophy’ or ‘theist philosophy’. He often presents a clash between falsafa 
                                                      
203 Ibid., at 20. 
Chapter 2: Saīd Nursi: His life and discourse 
 
   98 
(philosophy) and the Qur’ān.204 
It is clear in Nursi’s writings that he adopts a Qur’anic method to convey his 
messages. For instance, the Qur’ān tells in various verses that God gives examples so 
that people can understand better. Throughout Risāle-i Nur, it is evident that Nursi 
bases his arguments on three pillars. He speaks to the intelligence of his readers, urges 
them to judge his argument objectively. Once he establishes the logic of his argument 
he invokes the help of the Qur’ān and the hadith. It can be argued that Nursi almost 
always tries to synchronize heart and mind of his readers, in a way this is combining 
mysticism and philosophy. 
In fact, he gives the clues of his method in his early writings such as Muḥakamāt 
where he elaborates on three essential elements of an effective expression. It seems 
that he puts the theoretical knowledge he wrote in his Muḥakamāt into practice in his 
later writings. 
2.4. The Third Saīd Period (1950–1960)  
Perhaps one of the most important events in the history of modern Turkey was its first 
democratic, multi-party elections in 1950, after 27 years of single-party rule by the 
Republican People’s Party (RPP). Now, the opposition Democratic Party (DP) was 
allowed to challenge the RPP and it won the elections with a landslide.205 One of the 
first actions of the DP was to lift the ban on the Arabic call to prayer. This was clearly 
a massive positive step forward in terms of ending anti-religious oppression. 
Although the DP seriously improved democracy in Turkey, public prosecutors, 
                                                      
204 For example, see The Twelveth Word in ibid., at 49-52. And The Thirtiet Word in ibid., at 
241-46. 
205 The results of the 1950 elections were: Democrat Party: 52.68% (415 seats), Republican 
People’s Party: 39.45% (69 seats). 
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brandishing the old Article 163 of the Penal Code,206 were still free to press charges 
against Nursi. Indeed, the charges against Risāle-i Nur and the Nurcus kept coming 
until the removal of Article 163 from the Penal Code in 1991. The shift towards 
democracy and the rise of communist Russia after World War II gave Nursi the 
opportunity to promote Risāle-i Nur so as to fight the imminent threat of communism. 
Nursi saw atheism as the common enemy of the all monotheistic religions. In 1953, 
he met the Greek Orthodox Patriarch and offered his views on uniting forces against 
aggressive atheism.207 
Another important turning point in Nursi’s life was the 1956 court acquittal of Risāle-
i Nur, which was consequently printed and duplicated en masse in the Latin alphabet 
in both Ankara and Istanbul. Nursi called this “The Risāle-i Nur Festival”.208 He said: 
“From now on, there is no need for me to work in the service of Risāle-i Nur. That is 
to say, Risāle-i Nur and its students will perform my duties.”209 
In the last few years of his life, Nursi was a free man; his ideas and books were freely 
available to everyone, and he had followers in thousands. He travelled through the 
places that had marked his life with important memories. In 1960, he arrived in Urfa 
in eastern Turkey where, at the age of 83, he died peacefully of old age in his hotel 
room.  
                                                      
206 Article 163 of the old Turkish Penal Code, which was removed in 1991, outlawed 
politically motivated religious activities and prohibited the establishment of religious 
organizations and political parties aimed at creating an Islamic republic. 
207 On the issue of Nursi’s Muslim–Christian dialogue, see Z. Saritoprak, 'Said Nursi on 
Muslim-Christian Relations Leading to World Peace', ISLAM AND CHRISTIAN MUSLIM 
RELATIONS, 19/1 (2008), 25-37 at 25-37.  
208 See Şükran Vahide, A Chronology of Said Nursi’s Life in Abu-Rabi, Islam at the 
Crossroads : On the Life and Thought of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi  at xxiii  
209 Nursi, The Rays  at 1094. 
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2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the life and discourse of Saīd Nursi in order to put his 
philosophy into a historical perspective and clarify some terminology he developed. 
Nursi lived through three distinctive periods of Turkish history, which affected his 
philosophy of life. During the last few decades of the Ottoman Empire, he was mainly 
concerned with saving the falling Empire. Nicknamed the ‘sick man’, the Ottoman 
Empire had been the target of other imperialist states, which saw it as a major threat 
to their expansion in many parts of the world. This was mainly due to the fact that the 
Ottoman Sultan also held the post of Caliph, the official head of the Muslims. 
Gladstone openly declared war on the Qur’ān as the main obstacle to British 
imperialist ambitions. Nursi’s thoughts took a first turn here. He committed himself to 
acquiring all the knowledge available to understand the Qur’ān and prove its truth. 
The Old Saīd period, which coincides with the last years of the Ottoman Empire, is 
Nursi’s most politically active period. He was advocating a reform of the education 
system that would help stop the collapse of the Empire and in addition solve other 
social issues.  
With the collapse of the Empire, Nursi turned to fight the materialist philosophy that 
became the official ideology of the new Turkish Republic. It is clear in Risāle-i Nur 
that there is a great shift towards a kalām-style refutation of atheism in works like The 
Word, The Letters and The Flashes, which were all written during the first years of 
Kemalist Turkey. Nursi did not object to secularism, since he considered it to be a 
guarantor of freedom of faith; however, he was seriously concerned with materialism 
and its negative effects on a mainly Muslim public. He developed a unique way of 
kalām, where he merged modern science and the traditional Islamic knowledge of the 
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madrasa to address the question of doubts surrounding the Qur’ān. Unlike works such 
as Muḥākamāt, and al-Ishārāt al-I’jāz, which were addressed to scholars, Nursi’s 
writings in the New Said period were mainly aimed at the ordinary public. Nursi 
explained that every reader could benefit from Risāle-i Nur according to his or her 
abilities. Although he did not make any systematic reference to the materialist 
philosophers by name, a large proportion of his work was dedicated to refuting their 
philosophy. In general, he condemned philosophy on the basis that it did not submit to 
revelation. He also criticized famous Muslim philosophers such as Ibn-i Sinā and al-
Fārābi regarding their judgements. Nursi’s position may be seen as more in line with 
the thought of al-Ghazzālī, who was given the honorary title of al ḥujjat-ul Islām, 
which literally means ‘the proof of Islām’. 
Al-Ghazzālī’s criticisms of Ibn-i Sinā and al-Fārābi, and Ibn-i Rushd’s criticism of al-
Ghazzālī, and Nursi’s praise of al-Ghazzālī give us a clue of certain allegiance among 
these scholars. 
Having laid out the foundations of theistic and atheistic arguments, and locating Nursi 
among other thinkers, the study shall now focus on the Nursian arguments and 
attempt to extract novel ideas developed by him. 
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PART THREE 
CHAPTER 3: NURSI ON TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 
3.1. Introduction 
Perhaps one of the clearest arguments that appear in Nursi’s writings is the argument 
from design and order in the universe. The design argument is also known as the 
teleological argument. The term ‘teleological’ derives from the Greek word telos, 
which means ‘goal’ or ‘purpose’, implying that there is an end-purpose in everything 
in the universe. This argument was originally considered a part of the cosmological 
argument in general, since they both try to prove the existence of a Deity from 
evidence found in the cosmos. However, there is a distinction between the 
cosmological argument and the teleological argument, in the sense that the former 
starts off from the bare fact that there are contingently existent beings in the universe 
who require a maker with power to justify their existence, whereas the latter focuses 
on the properties of the end-product and tries to justify the existence of an intelligent 
mind behind the apparent design.210  
The emergence of the teleological argument in Ancient Greek philosophy started with 
Socrates. Socrates argued that forethought in the design of living creatures 
undoubtedly implies that they are the work of choice or design.211 Plato, although he 
rejected the idea of creation out of nothing (ex-nihilo), defended the existence of a 
demiurge who designs the universe and gives order to the chaos in it. For Plato, the 
                                                      
210 See Del Ratzsch, "Teleological Arguments for God’s Existence", in Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (1997). Stanford University and Center for the Study of Language and 
Information (U.S.).  
211 See Xenophon et al., The Memorable Thoughts of Socrates (New York: Kaplan Pub., 
2009). 
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universe has always existed; gods, who act as artificers, only put it in order.212 This 
idea was embraced by many subsequent thinkers.213 
There are clear similarities between Cicero’s, Aquinas’s and Paley’s formulations of 
the design argument, even though they lived centuries apart. In De Natura Deorum, 
Cicero writes: 
When you see a sundial or a water clock, you see that it tells the time 
by design and not by chance. How then can you imagine that the 
universe as a whole is devoid of purpose and intelligence, when it 
embraces everything, including these artefacts themselves and their 
artificers?214 
Aquinas’s fifth way, which is the proof from the governance of the universe, is very 
similar to Cicero’s argument. In Summa Theologiae, St Thomas tells us: 
We see that things, which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act 
for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly 
always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is 
plain that they achieve their end, not fortuitously, but designedly. 
Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot move towards an end, unless 
it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and 
intelligence; as the arrow is directed by the archer. Therefore, some 
intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to 
their end; and this being we call God.215 
The difference between Cicero and Aquinas is that, like most Ancient Greek 
philosophers Cicero believes there is intelligence behind the purposeful design of the 
universe and its content, but this intelligence is not necessarily the God of Paley or 
                                                      
212 See Brickhouse, T; Smith, N D. (April 21, 2005). "Plato", Internet Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy. Retrieved 22.11.2011. 
213 For instance, Hume argues that the artificers work on pre-existing materials. For example, 
the carpenter shapes the pre-existing wood, the watchmaker shapes the pre-existing piece of 
metal and so on. Therefore, the teleological argument actually fails to prove the existence of a 
Deity who creates out of nothing. See Hume, D. and Smith, N. K. (1935). Hume's Dialogues 
concerning Natural Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
214 See Marcus Tullius Cicero and Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Nature of the Gods ; and, on 
Divination (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1997) at Book II, XXIV.  
215 See Aquinas, Summa Theologiae : Latin Text and English Translation, Introductions, 
Notes, Appendices, and Glossaries. Also online text at 
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q2_A3.html 
 
Chapter 3: Nursi on Teleological Argument 
 
   104 
Aquinas. As Ashqar points out, the concepts of God in Ancient Greece and in 
monotheistic religions are completely different.216  
The philosophical dispute between theists and atheists also emerges here. The theist 
position is such that the intelligence and the power behind the apparent design is the 
God of monotheistic religions. However, atheists claim, without rejecting a priori that 
there might be design involved, that it is not God but other elements such as natural 
selection, evolution or bare chance that lie behind the apparent design of things.  
In modern philosophy, William Paley is associated with the teleological argument. 
which was described as ‘ the oldest, clearest and the most accordant with the common 
reason of mankind’ by Kant  in The Critique of Pure Reason.217 Paley’s ‘watch and 
the watchmaker’ analogy puts Cicero’s and Aquinas’s perspectives into context. In 
Natural Theology, Paley writes: 
Suppose I found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired 
how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think … 
that, for anything I knew, the watch might have always been there. 
Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for a 
stone that happened to be lying on the ground? For this reason, and 
for no other; namely, that, if the different parts had been differently 
shaped from what they are, if a different size from what they are, or 
placed after any other manner, or in any order than that in which they 
are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the 
machine, or none which would have answered the use that is now 
served by it.218 
Hume presents some imaginary characters in his Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion, and Nursi uses a similar method in most of his work. He speaks through the 
mouths of two friends, two brothers or two soldiers such as he portrays especially in 
                                                      
216 See Ashqar and Khattab, Belief in Allah : In the Light of the Qur'an and Sunnah  at 431. 
217 Immanuel Kant et al., The Critique of Pure Reason ; the Critique of Practical Reason, and 
Other Ethical Treatises ; the Critique of Judgement (Chicago: EncyclopÊdia Britannica, 
1990) at 520.  
218 See William Paley, Natural Theology; Selections (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963). 
Also online text at http://mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/02-03/01w/readings/paley.html 
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The Words.219 Unlike Hume, Nursi’s characters do not have any names. The first 
usually represents the agnostic or sceptic point of view, as Hume’s Philo does, and the 
other is usually, like Hume’s Cleanthes, the virtuous creationist, who represents 
Nursi’s own point of view.  
Nursi, like many other scholars, uses metaphor in his writings. For instance, in The 
Eight Word220 he tells the story of a man who became scared of a lion and fell into a 
well while running away from it. He then interprets what every object and event 
symbolizes. We find the same story in Tolstoy’s Confessions.221  
This particular technique of Nursi’s reveals what kind of audience he wanted to 
address. He first sets the scene to make the text accessible even to readers with only a 
basic capacity for understanding, and then moves to the real philosophical meaning 
represented in the story. He seems to have been relatively successful in doing this 
judging by the popularity of his writings. One of the most noticeable examples of 
metaphor appears in The Tenth Word,222 which concerns the subject of resurrection 
and the Hereafter. It is also a simple, straightforward version of Nursi’s argument 
from design and order. 
Nursi starts off by telling the story of two men, who reach a village during their 
travels. They realize that the doors of the properties are not locked and that valuables 
are left all over the place. The first man starts to help himself to everything freely 
available, denying the existence of an owner. The second man argues that the two 
have to show respect to the properties, as there must be an owner somewhere. The 
                                                      
219 See Nursi, The Words  at 3-52. 
220 Ibid., at 12-15. 
221 See Leo Tolstoy and Jane Kentish, A Confession and Other Religious Writings 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England; New York, N.Y.: Penguin ; Viking Penguin, 1987). 
or Leo Tolstoy, Itiraflarim (Istanbul: Lacivert Yayinlari, 2008) at 28.  
222 Nursi, The Words  at 19-42. 
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first man insists that there is no owner because he cannot see him. The second, the 
wise man, replies: 
Every village must have its headman; every needle must have its 
manufacturer and craftsman. And, as you know, every letter must be 
written by someone. How, then, can it be that so extremely well-
ordered a kingdom should have no ruler? And how can so much 
wealth have no owner, when every hour a train arrives filled with 
precious and artful gifts, as if coming from the realm of the unseen? 
And all the announcements and proclamations, all the seals and 
stamps, found on all those goods, all the coins and the flags waving 
in every corner of the kingdom — can they be without an owner?223 
Nursi tries to prove not only the existence of God, but also that He possesses names 
and attributes such as al- Wāhid (The One), al-‘Alīm (The Knower of All), al-Ghafur 
(The Forgiver), al-Ghani (The Rich One), al-Fard (The One), al-Samed (The Eternal), 
al-Haiy (The Ever Living), etc.224 It is clear in his writings that he rarely refers to God 
with his most common name Allāh. He rather uses His particular attribute relating to 
the context.  
Nursi argues that it could only be God – All-Knowing, All-Powerful – who makes 
different products from the same ingredients. In nature, there are 114 basic elements, 
but there are thousands of different plants and organisms which are made up of these 
basic elements. For example, Nursi tells us that soil, with the help of air and light, 
makes plants grow (i.e. through the process of photosynthesis). The basic composition 
of plant seeds is almost always the same, that is, the embryo, nutrients and the coat. 
However, when two similar-looking plant seeds are planted in the soil, they might 
grow into completely different plants. Botanists explain that the genetic codes in the 
embryo tell the seeds what kind of plant they should grow into. How, Nursi asks, is it 
possible to create so many different plants out of the same soil and the same chemical 
                                                      
223 Ibid., at 20. 
224 See Appendix 2: Names and Attributes of God in Islām. 
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composition? He concludes that there has to be an intelligent mind behind all these 
biological events. Since the seeds and the soil are unintelligent entities, it could only 
be God who creates endless variety of plants out of these basic elements.225 
Hume came up with a set of objections to the design argument many years prior to 
Paley and Nursi, who both argue that an artefact requires an artificer. In The 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Cleanthes tells Philo: 
… Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to 
infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and 
that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man; 
though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the 
grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument a 
posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the 
existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and 
intelligence.226 
Hume’s first criticism is that this analogy is very poor. He observes that the universe 
is not like a man-made artefact. It is not like a machine, but more like a living 
organism. Secondly, if an analogy is made between man and God, this makes it 
impossible to justify the omnipotence and omniscience of God because the problem 
of evil immediately emerges. However, these two criticisms, according to Ratzch, are 
not regarded as being fatal to the teleological argument.227 Nursi himself sees ‘the 
problem of evil and the existence of pain and suffering, i.e. calamities’ as supporting 
the existence of God. According to Nursi, God’s different attributes require a certain 
physical situation where the function of the particular attribute is fulfilled. In The 
Flashes, Nursi writes: 
                                                      
225 Said Nursi, Al-Mathnawi Al-Nuri (Istanbul: Nesil, 2004d) at 1356. 
226 Hume and Smith, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion  at 47-48.  
227 See Ratzsch, Del, "Teleological Arguments for God's Existence", in Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (1997). Stanford University and Center for the Study of 
Language and Information (U.S.). 
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God Most High has made the garment of the body with which He has 
clothed man a manifestation of His art. He has made man to be a 
model on which He cuts, trims, alters and changes the garment of the 
body, thus displaying the manifestation of various of His Names. Just 
as the Name of Healer makes it necessary that illness should exist, so 
too the Name of Provider requires that hunger should exist. And so 
on …228 
Hume’s third criticism, however, sounds fairly challenging to the theists. Hume 
argues that if we assume an artificer who designs the universe must exist, why should 
he be one god, why not many gods? For example, Nursi tells us that a needle requires 
a needle-maker, and a village requires a village head.229 Hume, on the other hand, 
might accept the idea of a needle-maker for the sake of argument, but not necessarily 
a unique needle-maker; instead of one ruler, why not a committee of village rulers? 
The Humean position could be put in context as follows. Suppose that you see a 
recently built house. Would you assume that it has been built by a single person, or 
would you rather assume that it has been built by a team of people? The answer is 
more likely to be ‘by a team of people’. Nursi and Hume seem to be in complete 
conflict here. Nursi defends the idea that the maker or the ruler has to be one person; 
otherwise, multiple makers or rulers would fall into conflict and spoil the work 
completely. In The Words, in supporting his argument with the Qur’ān 67:3, Nursi 
explains:  
Who other than One possessing boundless power, all-encompassing 
knowledge, and infinite wisdom could interfere in this 
administration, which is wondrous to the utmost degree. For if one 
who cannot administer and raise all together these species and 
nations, which are one within the other, interferes with one of them, 
he will throw the lot into disorder. Whereas according to the meaning 
of Qur’an 67:3 ‘So turn your vision again, do you see any flaw?' 
there is no sign of confusion. That means not so much as a finger can 
interfere.230 
                                                      
228 Nursi, The Flashes  at 581. 
229 Nursi, The Words  at 20. 
230 Ibid., at 300. 
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In contrast to the Nursian view, Hume suggests that it is perfectly feasible to assume 
that the roofer works on the roof, while the plumber fits the bathroom and the 
gardener does the landscape in the garden. Similarly, several gods could work in 
harmony to design the universe.231 
Hume’s third argument is much in line with that of the Ancient Greeks. Most atheists, 
like most of the polytheistic Ancient Greeks, acknowledge the fact that there is 
apparent design in the universe. They, unlike theists, argue that it is not necessarily 
the God of Judaism, Christianity or Islam who is behind the universe. Atheists 
attribute some intelligence to nature in the guise of natural selection and evolution.232 
Natural selection and evolution could explain order and apparent design. The Ancient 
Greeks explain them by the existence of many gods in charge of certain aspects of the 
universe, such as Aether, the god of air and atmosphere, Thalassa, god of seas, etc.  
Hume’s other criticism of the theists is that the god of Christianity must be very 
amateurish, since there are design deficiencies in the universe.233 This idea was later 
developed by other scientists and embraced by atheists to defend their point of 
view.234  
Nursi, however, claims that materialist philosophy fails to understand the meaning of 
life and the universe, since it only sees them through their apparent meaning. Here, 
we find two original terms introduced by Nursi into philosophical thinking about the 
universe. The first is mʿanà-i ismī, which is the apparent or direct meaning of things, 
                                                      
231 See Hume and Smith, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion  at Part II-VIII and Part 
XII.  
232 See Ashqar and Khattab, Belief in Allah : In the Light of the Qur'an and Sunnah  at 130.  
233 See Hume and Smith, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion  at Part II-VIII.  
234 For instance, Dawkins argues that the poor designs in mammals such as the retina in the 
eye which faces backward, and the long route of the tube from testes to penis, are strong 
evidence of evolution and the absence of an intelligent designer. See Dawkins, Interview on 
tvo at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aUFOlyt7ErE at 19:00. 
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or the nominal meaning, and the second is mʿanà-i ḥarfī, which is the signifying or 
indirect meaning of things, or the other-indicative meaning. For example, when 
someone looks at a flower he can see its beauty. If he says “This is a beautiful flower”, 
he is seeing the apparent beauty through the nominal meaning (i.e. mʿanà-i ismī), 
whereas if he says “This flower has been made beautifully”, thus acknowledging the 
work of the Artificer, he is seeing it through its significative meaning (i.e. mʿanà-i 
ḥarfī). Nursi criticizes mainstream philosophy as examining nature and the universe 
through the glasses of mʿanà-i ismī.235 That is to say, falsafa (philosophy) sees 
everything in its literal meaning only, whereas Nursi sees the universe through the 
glass of mʿanà-i ḥarfī (i.e. in the sense that it is the reflection of the Maker’s art).236 
These two different viewpoints, according to Nursi, constitute the main difference 
between the teaching of falsafa (philosophy) and the Qur’ān. 
3.2. Nursi’s view of the teleological argument and his challenge to atheism 
Leaving the scientific details to the scientists, Nursi points out the apparent order and 
harmony in the universe to the ordinary reader.237 Rather than making a direct attempt 
to prove the existence of a Maker, Nursi takes the indirect route, which is refutation of 
the opposite claims. He targets, without naming them, materialist philosophers such 
as Epicurus, Democritus, Marx and Darwin, and naturalists such as Bacon and 
Voltaire. 
In his landmark work The Twenty-Third Flash – On Nature, Nursi first identifies what 
he believes are three false claims by the above-mentioned non-creationists. He writes: 
                                                      
235 Nursi compares the wisdom of the Qur’ān with the wisdom of philosophy and science in 
The Twelfth Word. For the full argument, see Nursi, The Words  at 49-52. 
236 Nursi, Al-Mathnawi Al-Nuri  at 1364. 
237 Unlike modern scientist-philosophers such as Dembsky, Behe or Dawkins, Nursi does not 
go into the scientific details of the universe and its content. He simply tries to explain what 
might be the cause behind the visible universe. 
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You should be aware that there are certain phrases, which are 
commonly used and imply unbelief. The believers also use them, but 
without realizing their implications. We shall explain three of the 
most important of them. 
The First: “Causes create this.” 
The Second: “It forms itself; it comes into existence and later ceases 
to exist.”  
The Third: “It is natural; nature necessitates and creates it.”238 
 
As the fourth possibility, Nursi tells us that the universe is created through the 
power of One All-Powerful and All-Glorious God. Since the refutation of the first 
three postulations implies the truth of the fourth one, Nursi proceeds to produce 
three arguments for each of these three postulations in order to invalidate them. 
3.3. The First Postulate: Causes create this thing (aʿwjadathu al-asbāb) 
The first postulation to explain creation is that of ‘causes being the creator’. In other 
words, things come into existence as a result of the collaboration between certain 
causes. For example, the existence of a flower, according to this view, is the result of 
teamwork between sufficient light, warmth and water. The atomists, such as 
Leucippus and his pupil Democritus, defended the notion that there is always a 
scientific or mechanical explanation for every event in the universe, as opposed to 
cosmologists like Plato and Aristotle who sought explanation through a Prime Mover, 
First Cause or Purpose.239 Democritus rejects the role of a demiurge and insists that 
nature is a result of pure chance.240 Nursi argues that this theory is flawed, and in 
three steps attempts to explain why.  
                                                      
238 Nursi, The Flashes  at 677. 
239 For a detailed study of Ancient Greek atomism, see Leucippus, Democritus, and C. C. W. 
Taylor, The Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus : Fragments : A Text and Translation with a 
Commentary (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). 
240 For the detailed views of Democritus, see Paul Cartledge, Democritus (New York: 
Routledge, 1999) at 9-20. 
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3.3.1. The First Impossibility 
Nursi tells his readers that it is mathematically fallacious to accept that the excellent 
order and design in nature occurs as the result of some unintelligent chance. 
Following the classical design argument method, he asks the reader if he would 
accept that the medicines in a pharmacy came into existence by pure chance. 
Although the common-sense answer to this assumption is always ‘no’, since all the 
medicines are the products of physical and chemical combinations of certain 
substances in certain proportions, the atheist philosophy maintains the possibility of 
creation as the result of pure chance. Atheists claim that there might have been 
billions of unsuccessful events until one in a billion happened and gave us the 
current result. They do not deny that it is extremely difficult to bring all the 
necessary conditions and elements together to create a certain product by chance, 
yet they argue that it is still possible and that that is how life on earth came into 
existence. Dawkins, for instance, admits that it would have been very hard for the 
initial conditions to come into existence. However, once life has started, evolution 
through natural selection takes charge and makes life on earth evolve into life as we 
know it now.241  
As a counter-argument, the contemporary Risāle-i Nur authority Abdullah Aymaz 
points out that chemical reactions require not only the random mix of substances 
but also require certain conditions such as temperature and pressure, which doubles 
or trebles the impossibility of existence by chance. 242  Nursi summarizes his 
argument as follows:  
                                                      
241 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2006) at 113-19. 
242 Abdullah Aymaz, Interview, 11 January 2011, Frankfurt. 
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The vital substances in this vast pharmacy of the universe, which are 
measured on the scales of Divine Determining and Decree of the All-
Wise and Pre-Eternal One, can only come into existence through 
boundless wisdom, infinite knowledge and all-encompassing will. 
The unfortunate person who declares that they are the work of blind, 
deaf and innumerable elements and causes and natures, which stream 
like floods; and the foolish, delirious person who claims that that 
wondrous remedy poured itself out when the phials were knocked 
over and formed itself, are certainly unreasonable and nonsensical. 
Indeed, such denial and unbelief is a senseless absurdity.243 
Nursi clearly tries to expose how irrational to accept a theory whereby all wondrous 
creations come into existence by blind chance. 
 3.3.2. The Second Impossibility  
Nursi turns our attention to minute organisms such as a mosquito fly. It is utterly false, 
he claims, to assume that nature and most of its elements and causes, which are 
naturally hostile to each other, come together intentionally and intelligently to make 
this fly. For example, the organisms consist of elements such as magnesium, iron, 
oxygen and hydrogen,244 some of which are reactive with each other. Technically 
speaking, bringing these elements together normally results in a violent chemical 
reactions such as burning or explosion. Yet, they exist in organisms side by side 
without any trouble. One of the best examples of this is the chemical formation of 
water. Water molecules consist of Hydrogen and Oxygen, which occur in nature in 
the gaseous state. Hydrogen is a highly flammable gas which is used as fuel, and 
Oxygen is the essential gas for burning – NASA uses liquid Hydrogen and liquid 
Oxygen to create a combustion reaction to launch rockets into space – but in the 
formation of water molecules these two reactive substances can stay together to form 
a new substance, which demonstrates a complete set of different properties. Nursi 
suggests that an intelligent creator interferes and overruns certain properties of basic 
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244 See Appendix 3: Elements in the Human Body. 
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elements in order to create a new substance. Furthermore, continuous design patterns 
on artefacts, according to Nursi, imply the possible source of them. For example, 
when we see the same branded watches, we assume that they were all made in the 
same factory. Otherwise, we should accept the suggestion that each watch was made 
in a different factory, which requires the existence of as many factories as watches. In 
the former assumption, the existence of a single watch-factory reasonably explains 
how all these watches came into existence. In the latter case, since it is impossible that 
there should be as many watch-factories as there are watches to be made, we have to 
accept the theory that each and every watch is the product of a single watch-factory. 
Similarly, in the observable universe, we see things coming into existence such as the 
growth of a plant or the birth of a baby. There is a chain of scientific explanations for 
how events lead to each other. The Nursian viewpoint is that all these products came 
out of the hands of the same producer: God.245 The opposing view (i.e. that of 
naturalist philosophy) claims that the collaboration of sufficient causes as a result of 
chance is the reason behind the existence of beings in the universe. In other words, 
naturalists assume that nature and its constituents are within every organism (i.e. each 
and every organism is the maker or creator of itself). This is an idea which, Nursi 
claims, is utterly absurd. Hence, Nursi concludes, “Everything has to be attributed to 
the All-Powerful and All-Glorious One, Who is the Single One of Unity”.246 
3.3.3. The Third Impossibility  
Nursi’s third argument comes in two parts. The first part is the argument of unity and 
continuity in organisms. If random reasons in nature created the organisms, they 
would come in various shapes with completely different properties. However, we 
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246 Ibid. 
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observe consistency in organisms. For example, every species in nature always has 
the same biochemical and physical characteristics. The example of a painter is a very 
good analogy with which to explain this argument. Imagine different artists are asked 
to paint the same object. On the basis of their ability, expertise and artistic sense, they 
would paint differently. Likewise, if we see very similar paintings, we conclude that 
they have all been painted by the same artist. Nursi then suggests that without an 
Intelligent Artist, the universe would have to be completely messy and chaotic, the 
completely opposite of how it is now. This, for Nursi, is an indication of the same 
Intelligent Maker, not the product of random causes of nature. Nursi sums up his 
argument in his supplication to God in The Rays thus: 
… I have understood that just as the heavens, atmosphere, earth, seas 
and mountains, together with their creatures and all they contain, 
recognize You and make You known; so too do all the trees and 
plants, together with all their leaves and flowers and fruits. All their 
leaves, with their ecstatic movements and recitations; all their 
flowers, which describe through their decoration the Names of their 
Maker; and all their fruits, which smile with their agreeableness and 
the manifestation of Your compassion, testify —through the order 
within their wondrous art, which is utterly impossible to ascribe to 
chance, and the balance within the order, and the adornment within 
the balance, and the embroideries within the adornment, and the fine 
and various scents within the embroideries, and the varying tastes of 
the fruits within the scents— so clearly as to be self-evident to the 
necessary existence of an infinitely Compassionate and Munificent 
Maker. At the same time, their similarity and mutual resemblance 
throughout the earth, and their bearing the same stamps on their 
creation, and their being related in their administration and 
organization, and the coincidence of the creative acts and dominical 
Names connected with them, and the innumerable members of their 
one hundred thousand species being raised one within the other 
without confusion, form a testimony through them as a whole to the 
unity and oneness of their Necessarily Existent Maker.”247 
The second part of the third argument is the argument of the internal complexity of 
organisms. Here, Nursi explains that the random causes of nature ought to affect the 
exterior of organisms through direct contact or touch. However, there is more 
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technical complexity inside the organisms where the material causes of nature cannot 
reach. 248  Evolutionary biologists object to this on the grounds that nature can 
manipulate the exterior of organisms as well as the interior. Nursi might have meant 
that the molecular structures, or the genetic DNA structures, could not successfully be 
mutated from the outside by nature. 
Nursi’s internal complexity argument was corroborated by biochemists a few decades 
after he put it forward as the ‘Irreducible Complexity Argument’ and the ‘Fine Tuning 
Argument’. In his 1996 book, ‘Darwin’s Black Box’, Michael Behe defines his term 
‘irreducible complexity’ as follows: 
A single system which is composed of several interacting parts that 
contribute to the basic function, and where the removal of any one of 
the parts causes the system to effectively cease functioning.249 
Behe maintains Nursi’s position that, should the most basic component of an 
organism change, the whole system would cease to function. There is no dispute 
about the fact that physical and chemical causes affect and change the character of 
organisms. Both Nursi and Behe argue that, should this happen, it would most 
probably cause disease or death rather than more complicated and successful forms of 
life. In the mousetrap analogy, Behe explains that if one of the five basic components 
of a mousetrap – spring, base, bar, catch or hammer – were removed, this would only 
cause the device to malfunction or to cease functioning completely; it would certainly 
not improve it. The mousetrap analogy was quickly criticized by Miller. In his book 
Only a Theory, Miller argues, against Behe’s theory that a broken mousetrap could 
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249 Michael J. Behe, Darwin's Black Box : The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (New 
York: Free Press, 1996) at 39. 
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actually function as something completely different. For example, its spring fixed on 
a baseboard could make a very good catapult.250  
Here, Behe presents the modern-day teleological argument in the form of Intelligent 
Design (ID)251 and argues that everything is designed (by an Intelligent Designer) in 
such a way that the removal of even the most minute component would cause a 
catastrophe, as in the mousetrap analogy. Intelligent design apologists support their 
theory with further examples, such as the eye, the immune system and bacterial 
flagella. Indeed, to this day, scientists still cannot come up with any satisfactory 
alternatives to ID’s claims. Dawkins thinks science must keep working towards 
explanations. Ignorance, according to Dawkins, cannot be the answer. He accuses 
creationists of taking a short cut. In The God Delusion, Dawkins writes: 
… If you [the theists] don't understand how something works, never 
mind: just give up and say God did it.252 
The apparent weakness of Nursi’s argument is that he only seems to consider the 
external factors as ‘manipulants’. In The Flashes, Nursi writes: 
If we leave this impossibility aside and assume that material causes 
have effects, these effects can only occur through direct contact and 
touch. However, the contact of natural causes is with the exteriors of 
living beings. And yet we see that the interiors of such beings, where 
the hands of material causes can neither reach nor touch, are ten 
times more delicate, well-ordered and perfect as regards art than their 
exteriors. Therefore, although tiny animate creatures, on which the 
hands and organs of material causes can in no way be situated, 
indeed they cannot touch the creatures’ exteriors all at once even, are 
more strange and wonderful as regards their art and creation than the 
largest creatures, to attribute them to those lifeless, unknowing, 
crude, distant, vast, conflicting, deaf and blind causes can result only 
                                                      
250 For the evolutionist objection to the Intelligent Design, and Irreducible Complexity 
Arguments, See Kenneth R. Miller, Only a Theory : Evolution and the Battle for America's 
Soul (New York: Viking Penguin, 2008). 
251 Behe’s ‘Darwin’s Black Box’ has the subheading of ‘Biochemical Challenge to Evolution’ 
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molecules. See, ibid. 
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from a deafness and blindness compounded to the number of animate 
beings.253 
The evolutionists could give an unforgiving reception to Nursi’s argument, since it is 
scientifically accepted that natural conditions such as temperature, pressure, moisture, 
etc. cannot only affect the physical exterior, but also affect the chemical, biological or 
genetic interior of organisms. 
3.4. The second postulate: Things create themselves (tashakkala bi nafsihi) 
The second postulation proposes the self-creation of things. In other words, the 
second postulation suggests that the minute elements of an organism take decisions 
independently and intelligently to produce a successful result. The idea might have 
developed from the observation of cell division. Scientists have successfully 
explained that there are two types of cell division common to most organisms. If we 
focus on fertilization, birth and the growth of mammals, two crucial cell cycles 
become apparent. The parents’ bodies produce gametes, that is, sex cells (sperm and 
egg), as a result of meiosis cell division, which produces four cells with half the 
chromosomes of the parents’ cells. The opposite sex cells fuse as a result of 
fertilisation, which takes 23 chromosomes from each of the parents; therefore the 
offspring display similar yet not identical characters to the parents. The growth of the 
newly fertilized body is the result of another type of cell division, called mitosis. In 
mitosis, each cell divides into two identical cells which function exactly as the parent 
cell. Although this explanation is highly accurate in terms of biochemical events 
taking place within the cell, Nursi would no doubt argue that it does not tell us 
anything about the decision-making process. It is hardly logical to suggest that the 
organs of a cell (i.e. nucleus, membrane, chromatin, etc.) have their own mind with 
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which they decide how to function and to start the cell-division process. Biologists are 
widely agreed that these organs are pre-programmed and act on this programme. Yet, 
Nursi would have argued that science is unable to explain where the programmes 
come from and who installed them there. Now, the scientific issue turns into a 
philosophical question. What, or who, is responsible for this entire, highly complex 
biochemical event? Is it the organism, or is it God? 
Nursi’s strategy here is very clear. He objects to Darwin and Wallace’s idea of 
evolution through natural selection in his three-step argument in order to strengthen 
his theistic position. 
3.4.1. The First Impossibility 
The first fallacy that Nursi detects in the postulate ‘things create themselves’ is 
brought into light by use of logic. If one does not accept the authority of the 
Programme Maker, i.e. God, one has to accept the logically unsound assumption that 
each and every part of an organism has all the knowledge necessary to act 
intelligently in order to operate the amazing body machine. Nursi asserts that: 
You would have to ascribe to each particle an intelligence equivalent 
to that of a hundred geniuses, sufficient to know and recognize all 
your past and your future, and your forbears and descendants, the 
origins of all the elements of your being, and the sources of all your 
sustenance. To attribute the knowledge and consciousness of a 
thousand Plato’s to a single particle of one such as you who does not 
possess even a particle’s worth of intelligence in matters of this kind 
is a crazy superstition a thousand times over!254 
Here, Nursi clearly attempts to ridicule the suggestion that the constituent particles of 
a matter have got intelligence to take their own decision. 
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3.4.2. The Second Impossibility 
What Nursi also defends is essentially the argument from lack of conflict within 
organisms. In this argument, Nursi refers to the competitive nature of living things. 
For example, two identical trees planted in a limited space with limited sunlight tend 
to run against each other to make the most of the available resources. It is also valid in 
the animal kingdom. Two sibling cubs from the same pack fight each other to get the 
largest share of the kill. This could be taken as a general rule of nature. Nursi then 
shifts our attention to the human body, which he describes as a “thousand-domed 
wondrous palace in which the stones stand together in suspension and without 
support”.255 In this analogy, the stones represent the building blocks of the body (i.e. 
the cells). Because of the theory of competition,256 these cells are supposed to struggle 
with each other. The cells forming the feet should fight the cells forming the head 
since it is much harder to be the feet than the head. Similarly, the tissues of muscles, 
which are part of some unpleasant organs, should fight to get a better location, as the 
theory requires. However, unlike what is the common occurrence in nature, this 
struggle does not happen in the body. Every cell and tissue seems to have been 
subdued into staying where it had been appointed to work. This only means, 
according to Nursi, that they are ordered by a “Necessarily Existent Controller”.257 
                                                      
255 Ibid. 
256 The term ‘survival of the fittest’, i.e. competition-based life, was introduced by Herbert 
Spencer in 1864, and was used by Charles Darwin later to describe natural selection. For 
Darwin’s use of the term, see Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural 
Selection ; or, the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (London: Watts, 
1950). 
Kropotkin, though being an atheist, objected to the theory of competition. He argues 
extensively for the cooperation in nature rather than competition in his book Mutual Aid: A 
Factor of Evolution. See Petr Alekseevich Kropotkin, Mutual Aid : A Factor of Evolution / 
Peter Kropotkin (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 2006). 
257 Capitalized descriptive nouns are Nursi’s trademark preference to refer to God. There are 
countless examples of these names throughout Nursi’s writings. 
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3.4.3. The Third Impossibility 
Nursi’s third argument against material/naturalist philosophy is the argument from 
ease in nature. Here, Nursi contends that if a letter is written by a pen whose holder 
has got power and intelligence, it is very easy to produce this perfect letter. However, 
if we do not accept this first proposition, and claim that it is writing itself or that 
nature is writing the letter, then the writing process for this letter will be extremely 
difficult. The second proposition requires an incredible amount of knowledge and 
hardware. For every character in the letter, there has to be one iron letter as in the old-
fashioned printing machines, and for every word there has to be a printing-block 
consisting of several iron letters. These conditions are impossibly difficult to put 
together, as opposed to one Intelligent Hand with a pen writing a letter effortlessly.258 
3.5. The third postulate: Nature creates things (iqtaẓathu al-ṭabīʿah) 
The third postulate is nature as a creator. Thales was the first scientist-philosopher of 
Ancient Greece who tried to explain nature and natural events without referring to 
mythology, 259  thus introducing the idea of naturalism. According to naturalist 
philosophy, everything arises from natural properties and causes, and supernatural or 
spiritual explanations are excluded or discounted. 260  During the Enlightenment, 
naturalist philosophical viewpoints became popular among the secular scientists of 
Europe. Laplace, for instance, insisted that there is no room for the supernatural when 
                                                      
258 Nursi, The Flashes  at 679. 
259 For the origin of naturalism, seePatricia F. O'grady, Thales of Miletus : The Beginnings of 
Western Science and Philosophy (Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
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explaining celestial mechanics. 261  Later, in the twentieth century, naturalist 
philosophers such as Kurtz argued that, rather than a supernatural being; it was nature 
and its laws that were the causes in the universe.262 Nursi takes the idea of naturalism 
and tries to falsify it in three steps by demonstrating three impossibilities in their 
postulates.  
3.5.1. The First Impossibility  
Nursi attempts to refute the idea that nature is self-intelligent. Imagine, he asks, 
hundreds of droplets of water and pieces of glass scattered on the ground. You see 
that the light is being reflected on them. Would you say:  
i. It is one light source, i.e. the sun, whose light is being reflected on these 
shiny objects or, 
ii. Each of these mindless, soulless, dead objects has got extremely 
complicated mechanical systems inside and they generate light, or 
                                                      
261 Rouse Ball writes Laplace-Napeleon dialoge as follows: Laplace went to Napoleon to 
present a copy of his work, and the following account of the interview is well authenticated, 
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Creator.' Laplace, who, though the most supple of politicians, was as stiff as a martyr on 
every point of his philosophy, drew himself up and answered bluntly, Je n'avais pas besoin de 
cette hypothèse-là. ("I had no need of that hypothesis.") Napoleon, greatly amused, told this 
reply to Lagrange, who exclaimed, Ah! c'est une belle hypothèse; ça explique beaucoup de 
choses. ("Ah, it is a fine hypothesis; it explains many things.") 
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iii. There are as many light sources up in the sky as the number of reflections 
on the ground?263 
To Nursi, the obvious answer is the first one. Consequently, ascribing all power and 
will to nature is irrational as this would imply that every particle, atom, cell, and/or 
organism, let alone non-living beings such as stars, planets and rocks, ought to have 
their own mind, will and power in order to act for an end-purpose. Therefore, 
according to Nursi, logic tells us that there has to be an Intelligent Creator of nature 
and the universe. 
3.5.2. The Second Impossibility  
Nursi again attacks what he believes is the absurdity of the naturalist idea of creation. 
He starts out with the basic constituents of all plant seeds. All seeds consist of an 
orderless, formless, paste-like mixture of oxygen, hydrogen, carbon and nitrogen. We 
plant different seeds in the same flowerpot, which holds a small amount of soil. After 
providing some essential conditions (i.e. light, warmth and moisture), we observe that 
all these different seeds germinate into certain plants. How do we rationally explain 
this? Is it that this small amount of soil has got the intelligence of a thousand 
biologists, chemists and botanists with the incredible high-tech machinery of a 
sophisticated factory? Or is it that an Intelligent Creator programmes the seeds and 
instructs the soil, air, water and light to work as they are ordered? Here, Nursi says, 
any reasonable mind would reject the first proposition, as it would be clearly illogical 
to accept it.264 In Conclusion, Nursi writes: “To attribute all beings to the Necessarily 
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Existent One is so easy as to be necessary. While to attribute their creation to Nature 
is so difficult as to be impossible and outside the realm of reason.”265 
3.5.3. The Third Impossibility  
In the third impossibility, Nursi tackles the naturalist idea of nature as creator with 
two examples. The first example is the metaphor of an ignorant, savage caveman. 
This man comes across a palace in the middle of a desert. He walks into it and, to his 
fascination, he witnesses some fantastic piece of architecture, the perfect design and 
functionality of the palace. He starts looking round in search of the builder. Yet to his 
disappointment, he cannot find any intelligent builder. He turns his attention to the 
inside of the palace and looks for a possible maker. Then, he finds a book where the 
statistics, plans and rules of the palace are written. He concludes that the book seems 
to be the most intelligent thing there; therefore it has to be the designer, maker and 
maintainer of this palace. Nursi then dismisses the naturalist idea. Naturalists claim 
that the most seemingly intelligent thing within the universe is nature. Since they do 
not accept the possibility of a Deity as creator, they conclude, like the caveman in the 
palace, that nature has to be the cause of everything. Nursi then directly addresses 
naturalists by pretending to speak to one of them: 
O you mistaken unfortunate! Your foolishness exceeds anything 
imaginable! Lift your head out of the swamp of Nature and look 
beyond yourself! See an All-Glorious Maker to Whom all beings 
from particles to planets testify with their different tongues and 
Whom they indicate with their fingers! Behold the manifestation of 
the Pre-Eternal Inscriber, Who fashions the palace and Who writes its 
programme in the notebook.266 
The second example tackles the ideas of nature being the order-giver where, again, 
Nursi tells the story of the same ignorant man who goes into an army training ground. 
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He observes that a certain number of soldiers come together to form certain units (i.e. 
platoons, battalions, regiments). They are moving in perfect harmony, firing exactly 
simultaneously as a single body at the command, etc. This ignorant man thinks that all 
these soldiers are tied up to each other with a thread; as a result, they do the same 
thing at the same time. What actually happens is that there is a commander who forms 
the small units of the army, gives them commands and controls them. Nursi explains 
that, contrary to what atheists believe as a result of the misguidance of materialism 
and naturalism, nature is like a giant army, which is controlled by a Commander. 
Nature, Nursi exclaims, can at the very most be a work of art; it cannot be the Artist! 
It is embroidery and cannot be the Embroiderer. It is a set of decrees; it cannot be the 
Issuer of the decrees. It is a body of the laws of creation and cannot be the Lawgiver. 
It is but a created screen to the dignity of God and cannot be the Creator. It is passive 
and created, Nursi continues, and cannot be a Creative Maker. It is a law, not a power, 
and cannot possess power. It is the recipient and cannot be the source.267 
The refutation of these three assumptions, therefore, leaves one final possibility, 
which is not only the existence but also the eternal presence and eternal activity of a 
Creator. 
Although Nursi considered that naturalist philosophy was defeated by his Treatise on 
Nature,268 naturalist philosophers hold the opposite view.  
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3.6. In defence of naturalism 
Ever since the introduction of Thales’ idea of Naturalism, philosophers at both ends 
of the scale have always focused on nature and science to justify the existence or non-
existence of a Deity. The theists, especially from the Christian tradition, see nature as 
the secondary cause. In other words, God is always the first cause, using nature as the 
secondary cause.269 One of the most remarkable Christian scientists, Galileo, who is 
considered to be the father of observatory astronomy,270 explains that the universe 
never violates the orders given to her by God,271 the complete opposite of Laplace’s 
idea. 
Francis Bacon was one of the leading figures of Enlightenment naturalism. He 
objected to the teleological arguments on the grounds that they are inductive 
arguments made by simple enumeration and likely to lead to the wrong conclusion. In 
his parable, he tells the story of a census officer who was to record all the inhabitants 
of a Welsh village. He records the inhabitant of the first house as William Williams. 
The inhabitant of the second house is also called William Williams and so are those in 
the third, the fourth and the next houses. Soon, he concludes that all inhabitants are 
called William Williams and he gives up his quest and simply records all inhabitants 
as William Williams. But in fact, one of the inhabitants was actually called John 
Jones. 272  The census officer had drawn the wrong conclusion. Bacon despised 
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syllogism; he called it “blind rule”.273 Therefore he was hostile to Aristotle, but 
thought very highly of Democritus. To him, everything ought to be explained 
necessarily from efficient cause. In the investigation of a phenomenon, writes Bacon, 
we should neither be like a spider which spins things out of its own bowels, nor like 
an ant which simply collects. We should be like a bee, which collects and arranges. In 
order to avoid a quarrel with the authorities, Bacon never openly rejected God, but 
insisted that scientific enquiry and revelation have to go hand in hand; revelation 
alone is not sufficient to reach a solid conclusion. 
Voltaire, on the other hand, maintained a more hard-line opposition to religion. Rather 
than making a philosophical point, he openly criticized the Church because of its poor 
treatment of people. He had equally hostile views regarding all religions. Despite his 
hostility to religions, he seemed to have a fair belief in the existence of a deity. To 
Voltaire, Newtonian mechanics was of great importance when it came to explaining 
and understanding the universe. For Voltaire, the universe is governed through the 
universal laws of physics. As a deist, he defended the clockwork universe theory, 
which states that God created the universe and stepped aside, but set it like a clock so 
that it runs itself automatically.274 
Kurtz argues that there is no purpose in the universe. He rejects the supernatural. To 
him, nature and natural phenomena are best explained by reference to material 
principles (i.e. mass, energy, and other scientifically accepted physical and chemical 
properties). In his article ‘Why are we afraid of naturalism?’ Kurtz writes: 
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To introduce a supernatural or transcendental cause within science is 
to depart from naturalistic explanations. On this ground, to invoke an 
intelligent designer or creator is inadmissible.275 
According to Kurtz and other naturalists, everything has to be explained within the 
boundaries of the known natural sciences. Quinn argues that science is the highest 
tribunal. There is absolutely nothing higher than science with which to judge or to 
reach the absolute truth.276  
Plantinga, however, objects to the methodology of the naturalists. The weakness of 
naturalist philosophy, according to Plantinga, is that it limits itself to empirical 
involvement. In Science and Technology News, he explains: 
If you exclude the supernatural from science, then if the world or 
some phenomena within it are supernaturally caused – as most of the 
world's people believe – you won't be able to reach that truth 
scientifically.277 
Plantinga and Nursi hold parallel thoughts as regards involving the supernatural 
alongside the natural in order to reach the truth. They argue that every available tool 
has to be used in order to reach the truth. Indeed, having two torches rather than one 
makes more sense while searching for an item in the dark.278  
Nursi’s point of view on nature as a secondary cause is clearly seen in The Rays, 
where he writes: 
Yes, dignity and grandeur demand that in the view of the mind 
causes are veils to the hand of power. While unity and oneness 
demand that causes abstain from having any real effect.279 
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In other words, Nursi acknowledges the fact that causes are everywhere in nature, and 
an ordinary observer could mistake them for primary causes. However, to Nursi, they 
are in reality just the veils hiding the real Actor, that is, God. 
3.7. Analysis of Nursi’s Substantiations for Defending Theism 
There are two independent, conspicuous pieces of writing by Nursi in which teleology 
is the focal subject. In The Flashes, Nursi mainly tries to rebut the atheist argument by 
attacking materialist and naturalist philosophy, as was discussed above. In The Words, 
he systematically formulates his teleological argument, to which we now turn. 
The Twenty-Second Word in The Words in Risāle-i Nur is completely dedicated to 
demonstrating the existence of God from order and design (i.e. the teleological 
argument). At the beginning of this treatise, Nursi sets out two common views of 
nature and the universe in philosophy. The first is the theist or creationist point of 
view. The second is the point of view of the atheists. The second viewpoint equally 
represents the materialist, naturalist, and agnostic position. Here, Nursi sets the scene 
with the metaphor of two friends who find themselves in a strange town in the middle 
of nowhere. They look around and observe an extremely orderly settlement. They see 
strange creatures carrying out intelligent tasks and communicating in a language that 
they cannot understand. The first friend is an intelligent man and represents the 
theistic view, which is also Nursi’s own understanding of the universe. The second 
friend is a foolish man and represents the atheist view. 
The first, intelligent man, being fascinated by the design and order of the town and its 
contents, interprets it as follows: 
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This strange world must have someone to regulate it, and this orderly 
country must have a lord, and this fine town, an owner, and this 
finely made palace, a master builder. We must try to know him, for it 
is understood that the one who brought us here was he. If we do not 
recognize him, who will help us? What can we await from these 
impotent creatures whose language we do not know and who do not 
heed us? Moreover, surely one who makes a vast world in the form 
of a country, town, and palace, and fills it from top to bottom with 
wonderful things, and embellishes it with every sort of adornment, 
and decks it out with instructive miracles wants something from us 
and from those that come here. We must get to know him and find 
out what he wants.280 
What the intelligent man suggests obviously requires the fulfilment of duties and 
responsibilities. Finding out the ruler of the land means accepting his authority and 
abiding by his rules. However, denying the existence of the ruler and his authority 
means not obeying his rules. This second position, i.e. not obeying the rules, looks 
fairly easy and reasonable. We shall be analysing it in greater detail in Chapter 6, 
which focuses on morality and consciousness. To return to Nursi’s story, the 
intelligent man declares that denying a ruler is irrational and dangerous as it might put 
the friends in a very unpleasant situation with the law enforcement authorities of the 
land. The foolish man says: “Either prove to me decisively that this large country has 
a single lord and a single maker, or leave me alone.”281 Nursi, through the mouth of 
the intelligent man, determines the following arguments to argue for the existence of 
God. He calls each of his arguments ‘the proof’. 
The First Proof: This is based on basic observation of plants in nature. For example, 
a tiny seed grows into a massive pear tree, which yields fruit a thousand times heavier 
than the original seed. Also, vine trees climb onto other stronger trees, since they 
cannot support their own body weight. All these and many other examples in nature, 
according to Nursi, are clear evidence of a Hidden Hand of God. Otherwise, Nursi 
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suggests, we have to believe that it is a miracle of nature, which is just groundless 
superstition.282 
The Second Proof: Here, Nursi points out the fact that The Maker has got his signs 
on everything in nature. For instance, a tiny seed grows into a fantastic work of art, as 
shown in the shape, pattern and colour in its leaves and flowers. It produces a taste 
sweeter than any man-made sweet, and tastier than any man-made food.283 
The Third Proof: This is the extreme similarity between the universe and humans 
and animals. Every human or animal body is a miniature universe. It contains all the 
elements of the universe. Therefore, Nursi contends, the Maker of the whole universe 
and the Maker of every creature has to be the same person.284 
The Fourth Proof: The fourth proof is the communication and cooperation between 
plants and animals. Nursi tries to demonstrate this by describing the cooperation 
between an egg-laying fly and a tree. When the fly lays eggs on the leaf of a tree, the 
tree gives food and protection to the eggs in order to facilitate their hatching into baby 
flies. There are two possible explanations for this biological event. It is either the fly 
and the tree communicating and agreeing on cooperation, or the Hidden Ruler 
ordering the tree to look after the fly’s egg. Assume, Nursi says, that the first 
proposition is correct. Although it might work on one single occasion, there would be 
complete overall chaos in nature in the wider perspective if vegetables and animals 
had to take the initiative to cooperate. If there were no unity in command, every 
organism would act randomly, causing a complete mess. As Nursi explained earlier, 
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harmony requires unity in command. Because of the present harmonious appearance 
of nature, he says, we can only conclude that there is only one Commander.285 
The Fifth Proof: Here, Nursi attracts our attention to the art and design in nature, 
which, he notes, exceeds all artificial art and design. The best painting of a skilful 
painter can never match the beauty of the real object. In order to explain the existence 
of better artwork in nature, atheists have to resort to the nonsensical idea that 
unconscious causes, blind coincidence and deaf nature have got more intelligence and 
talent than a painter. Every piece of artificial art refers to its artist. Hence, Nursi 
asserts, all the art in nature refers to its Artist.286 
The Sixth Proof: The sixth proof is the proof from orderliness in nature. Although 
there is continuous change in nature, there is never any mistake in the order of events. 
For example, similar types of plants follow the exact same routine every spring. That 
is to say, they first grow green leaves, then flowers and fruit. There is never any 
maverick tree that decides to skip one of the stages and do things its own way. 
According to the naturalists, however, nature has its own mind.287 If we put ten people 
in one room, they would move around according to their own will; they would never 
follow the same pattern of action unless they worked towards it intelligently. How 
then, Nursi asks, do billions of individual plants and animals follow the same pattern 
every spring?288 
The Seventh Proof: Here, Nursi shows us the cooperation and interconnectedness in 
nature. For example, plants produce more lush leaves and fruit than they themselves 
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need; the surplus is not for their own benefit but for the animals that feed off them. 
Animals help out their offspring and the other animals in terms of the food chain, and 
the sun provides all living things with light and warmth. All these different elements 
are cooperative, and they are all interconnected. Therefore, since they cannot decide 
by themselves, Nursi claims that there has to be an Unseen hand setting up this 
brilliant cooperation between these different elements.289 
The Eight Proof: In this proof, Nursi explains the Oneness of the Maker. If we see 
some identical products with the same label, he says, we understand that they are 
produced in the same factory by the same machine. Similarly, in nature, all the art of 
beings indicates the Oneness of their Creator. In order to dress up a soldier, a clothing 
factory needs to be set up to manufacture soldier’s clothes. If there is one factory and 
a million soldiers, it is not hard to fabricate a million clothes. If there is no oneness, 
there needs to be a million different factories to manufacture each piece of clothing. If 
the unbeliever does not accept the Oneness of the Maker, he needs to defend the idea 
of billions of complicated factories and machineries creating each and every thing in 
nature. This claim, he asserts, is obviously illogical, and insupportable.290 
The Ninth Proof: This is essentially the continuation of the previous proof. Nursi 
argues that it is easier to recognize the existence of one Maker than to refuse His 
existence. Imagine, he says, an apple tree with a thousand fruits on it. If we recognize 
that all the fruits are connected to one tree trunk, it is easy and coherent to understand 
that they all come from the same origin. Otherwise, we have to defend the opposite 
idea, which is the existence of a thousand trunks, each of them supporting one fruit.291 
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Nursi’s eighth and ninth proofs are in line with the ‘Ockham’s Razor’ principle, 
which asserts that, in explaining a thing, no more assumptions should be made than 
are necessary.292 Swinburne also argues in line with Nursi. He writes:  
… the simplest hypothesis proposed as an explanation of phenomena 
is more likely to be the true one than is any other available 
hypothesis, that its predictions are more likely to be true than those 
of any other available hypothesis, and that it is an ultimate a priori 
epistemic principle that simplicity is evidence for truth.293 
The Tenth Proof: The tenth proof is perhaps the most striking argument among the 
twelve. Nursi’s argument is this: 
For the causes of things disappear along with them. Whereas, the 
things which we attribute to them, which follow on after them, are 
repeated. That means those works are not theirs, but the works of one 
who does not perish. Just as it is understood from the bubbles on the 
surface of a river disappearing and the bubbles which follow on after 
them sparkling in the same way that what makes them sparkle is a 
constant and elevated possessor of light, in the same way, the speedy 
changing of things and the things that follow on after them assuming 
the same colours shows that they are the manifestations, inscriptions, 
mirrors, and works of art of one who is perpetual, undying, and 
single.294 
In other words, when a set of causes, which the atheists claim to be the creator, dies, a 
new set of causes comes along. The result of this new set of causes ought to be totally 
different from the result of the previous set. However, there is a continuity in species 
over millions of years. This argument gives a stronger hand to the theists. 
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Although there is no evidence that they directed their criticisms at Nursi, it is clear 
that Flew, Mackie and Everitt follow the Humean tradition of objecting to the Nursian 
proofs.  
3.8. Design versus Evolution 
For centuries, creationists have been defending the position of what the Holy Books, 
i.e. the Torah, the Gospels, and the Qur’ān, claimed, that is, creation out of nothing, 
creatio ex nihilo. The creation theory states that God created every species 
independently out of nothing. Christian creationists, especially, take Genesis, that 
describes the creation of the first man and woman as well as of all plants and animals 
in the Garden of Eden, literally.295 The common ground of all monotheistic religions 
is the belief that no species has developed from any other.296 As a theist, Nursi also 
believes that it is God who created the universe and everything in it. However, he 
does not agree with the concept of creation from absolute nothingness. He suggests 
that absolute nothingness contradicts the attributes of God. The creation of things, 
according to Nursi, is effectively a transfer from the universe of relative absence into 
the universe of visible bodies. In other words, things have always existed in another 
universe, of God; they are simply given physical and visible bodies and transferred 
into this universe.297 
The Aristotle–Aquinas–Paley line of thought (i.e. the teleological argument) had been 
the dominant explanation for the existence of the universe until the nineteenth century, 
                                                      
295 Genesis, Chapter 1, verses 24–25 reads: And God said, “Let the land produce living 
creatures according to their kinds: the livestock, the creatures that move along the ground, and 
the wild animals, each according to its kind. And it was so. God made the wild animals 
according to their kinds, the livestock according to their kinds, and all the creatures that move 
along the ground according to their kinds. And God saw that it was good.”  
296 Everitt, The Non-Existence of God  at 101. 
297 For the detail of Nursi’s argument of creation from relative nothingness, see Nursi, The 
Rays  at 857. 
Chapter 3: Nursi on Teleological Argument 
 
   136 
when Darwin and Wallace came up with an alternative theory, which is the theory of 
evolution through natural selection. Many philosophers and scientists believe that the 
mark of design, the detailed structure of plants and animal bodies and their adaptation 
to the conditions they live in, can be better explained by the Darwinian theory of 
evolution through natural selection.298 Shortly after Paley’s watch and watchmaker 
analogy, Darwin’s voyages to the Galapagos Islands prompted him to produce a 
countering theory, in which he tries to explain where different species might have 
came from. In The Origin of Species, Darwin linked most animals to each other to 
explain the parallels between them. He defended the idea that they might have had the 
same root in history (i.e. species might have developed from one another).299 
In his 1887 book The Descent of Man, Darwin took one step further in his theory of 
evolution and suggested that ‘humans and other currently existing species such as 
chimpanzees both developed from a single earlier species of primates’. In the 
concluding chapters, he writes: 
… I believe that animals have descended from at most only four or 
five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser number.300 
Darwin’s theory of evolution suddenly became the most powerful tool for the atheists. 
Dawkins believes that it is a fatal blow to the design argument.301 Although it was 
initially meant to be a piece of research in biology and botany, it suddenly fell into the 
field of philosophy, and more precisely into the field of theology. It has been argued 
for and against by thousands of thinkers to date. Darwin’s core idea is the rejection of 
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creationism and the existence of a Maker. Darwin’s ideas about evolution can be 
simplified in the following three ways. 
Assume we are trying to justify the origins of the long necks of giraffes. One possible 
explanation could be that God intervened in each succeeding generation of short-
necked herbivores, making the neck of the following generation slightly longer until 
the full giraffe form was reached. 
The second explanation is what Lamarck calls ‘the theory of acquired 
characteristics’,302 which is this: each generation of originally short-necked herbivores 
kept stretching their necks to suit the purpose. Then, these acquired characteristics 
passed on to the next generation, which repeats the same process until they achieve 
the desired length. 
The third possible explanation is Darwin’s choice of preference. It is probably the 
best-known theory: the theory of natural selection. This is the key element of the 
theory of evolution. The gist of the theory of natural selection is this. Imagine that an 
animal produces two offspring. At birth, they are equal. But in time, one of them gets 
stronger, hence more competitive in hunting, running away from danger, food-finding 
and, inevitably, in mating. Since the offspring with stronger characteristics keeps 
mating, he can pass his good-quality characteristics to the next generation, eliminating 
the weak offspring. Therefore, only the strongest survives.303 
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Almost all well-known modern atheist thinkers, such as Mackie,304 Flew305 and 
Everitt,306 endorse Darwin’s theory. They regard the theory of evolution as a more 
plausible theory than that of the theists.  
There are three main criticisms that may be made against Darwin. The first is that 
evolution through natural selection makes seeming design a matter of ‘blind chance’. 
In defence of the ‘blind chance’ criticism, Everitt claims that the term ‘blind’ is a 
hostile expression and systematically used by theists in order to imply absurdity to the 
Darwinian theory. Everitt defends Darwin, arguing that the apparent design in the 
universe is a product of ‘chance’ in the sense that it was not pre-planned. For instance, 
two people go to a meeting independently from each other. Their meeting at the venue 
can be considered a chance one since it was not pre-planned. Everitt concludes that: 
that is true in one sense of ‘chance’, just as most things that happen 
are a matter of chance. But it is false in the other sense of ‘chance’, 
since natural selection says that there is a perfectly good explanation 
of how and why the seeming design in nature appears and is 
maintained.307 
The second criticism of Darwin is that the theory of evolution does not disprove the 
existence of God. 
Darwin would arguably have been surprised to find out how many people genuinely 
took his theory as a fact, although it is only a theory. A theory, by definition, is ‘a 
supposition or a system of ideas intended to explain something, especially one based 
on general principles independent of the thing to be explained’.308 There have been 
                                                      
304 Mackie, The Miracle of Theism : Arguments for and against the Existence of God  at 133, 
38,40, 41, 45, 46, 96. 
305 Antony Flew, God & Philosophy (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966) at 60, 61, 
62, 73. 
306 Everitt, The Non-Existence of God  at 104, 05. 
307 Ibid., at 105. 
308 See Simpson, Weiner, and Oxford University, The Oxford English Dictionary. 
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many attempts of debunking Darwin’s theory of evolution on scientific grounds,309 
some of them are considered to be quite successful and convincing.  
Now, let us turn our attention back to Nursi and find out what his thinking is 
regarding the theory of evolution and natural selection. 
There is no mention of Darwin or his theory of evolution in Risāle-i Nur, although 
Nursi tackles the issue indirectly in various treatises. One of the first negations of 
Darwin’s theory comes as the ‘power–hardship relationship’ in nature. Nursi talks 
about extremely able animals, like lions, cheetahs, sharks and eagles, very clever 
animals, like foxes, ravens and rats, and very weak animals, like fruit worms. Here, he 
argues that the Maker designed nature and the animals in such a way that every 
animal has to work, in order to get fed, in proportion with its capacity. For example, 
the success ratio of big cats in hunting is roughly 4 out of 10. This means that they 
have to work really hard to hunt prey in order to survive. In complete contrast, 
extremely weak animals like apple worms have to make very little effort to reach their 
food. The Creator put them right at the centre of their food. Clever animals, like foxes, 
need to work much harder for their survival. Nursi tells us that abundance of food and 
the ability to obtain it are inversely proportional. The stronger the animal, the harder it 
is for it to get food. The weaker the animal, the easier it is for it to get food. 
Throughout Risāle-i Nur, we see that Nursi’s obvious vantage point on nature is 
through mʿanà-i ḥarfī. In every being in nature, he sees the signs of what he calls the 
                                                      
309 See Harun Yahya (2006). Fossils have discredited evolution: this documentary film based 
on the works of Harun Yahya. S.l: s.n. 
See Geoffrey S. Simmons, What Darwin Didn't Know (Eugene, Or.: Harvest House, 2004). 
See Lee M. Spetner, Not by Chance! : Shattering the Modern Theory of Evolution (Brooklyn, 
N.Y.: Judaica Press, 1997). 
 
 
Chapter 3: Nursi on Teleological Argument 
 
   140 
Magnificent, All-Powerful Creator.  
There are some inconsistencies in Everitt’s argument from scale,310 which is meant to 
refute theism. What it actually does is to falsify the atheist position, as it appears in 
Dawkins’ Climbing Mount Improbable.311 The gist of Dawkins’ argument is that the 
universe is so old that the current changes in organisms might have had a very, very 
long time to evolve through time. In other words, rather than jumping upward to the 
sheer top of the cliff, evolution climbs up the steady slope of the hill on the other side 
of the mountain.312 What Everitt defends as being the possible scientific life of 
mankind (which is about 100,000 years, as opposed to some 16 billion years of the 
Earth) automatically refutes Dawkins’ argument. In other words, although the earth 
has existed for billions of years, mankind only walked the earth some 100,000 years 
ago, which is a fairly short time for a complex organism such as man to evolve to his 
current form.  
One of the most conspicuous arguments in Nursi’s writings is the mathematical 
impossibility of existence by chance, which is surprisingly in line with the argument 
of an atheist philosopher. Hoyle’s Fallacy argues the impossibility of a hurricane’s 
creating a Boeing 747 by sweeping across a scrapyard.313 Developing Hume’s ‘Who 
created the creator?’ thesis, Dawkins proposes his ‘Ultimate Boeing 747 Gambit’, 
which claims that designing a super-complex designer requires even more complex 
intelligence. Therefore, according to Dawkins, evolution through natural selection is 
                                                      
310 See Everitt, The Non-Existence of God  at 213-25. 
311 See Richard Dawkins, Climbing Mount Improbable (New York: Norton, 1996). 
312 In an interview at the Edinburgh International Book Festival on Monday, 11 August 2008 
conducted by Paula Kirby, Dawkins used the analogy of an escalator to explain how organic 
life has evolved over billions of years, as opposed to the invisible, unexplainable hand of 
God, as in the representation of a skyhook. 
313 See Alan H. Dawe, The God Franchise : A Theory of Everything (Auckland, N.Z.: Life 
Magic Pub., 2012) at 299. 
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more feasible than positing an ultra-complex designer.314  The Ockham’s Razor 
principle is used by both parties, each claiming that their way of explanation is 
simpler, hence more plausible. 
Recent, more scientific explanations of the existence of God look more appealing to 
scientifically oriented minds. Equally, Dennett’s ‘skyhook and cranes’ analogy, which 
is used by Dawkins, appeals to the same audience as well. 
Nursi acknowledges the apparent fact that the causes seem to be the reason behind the 
wonders in the universe. However, he maintains the position that natural and 
materialist causes cannot intelligently act for a purpose. To him, they could only be 
the executive officers of the Ruler of the land. 
Although, given the current evidence, the atheist position seems to be less plausible 
than the Nursian view, it is still premature to draw conclusions such as ‘Evolution is a 
blow to God’,315 or ‘this (meaning Risāle-i Nur) breaks the backbone of disbelief’.316 
                                                      
314 See Dawkins, The God Delusion  at 113. 
315 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203440104574405030643556324 
Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker. 
316 It has been reported that Nursi used this phrase upon the completion of The Tenth Word on 
Resurrection in Barla in the late 1926. 
Chapter 3: Nursi on Teleological Argument 
 
 
 
 
3.9. Conclusion 
This chapter has extended the arguments introduced in Chapter 1 and gone into the 
analysis of Nursi’s teleological argument. Like most theologians, Nursi takes his 
stand on the apparent design and purpose in the universe in order to demonstrate the 
existence of God. The teleological argument is the first of four arguments he puts 
forward. Owing to the ever-changing landscape of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, materialist and naturalist philosophy and the advance of 
Darwinism, Nursi appears to ascribe great importance to the design argument in his 
works. He briefly touches on the argument in his very early work Al-Mathnawī al-
Nūriyah and gradually developed the argument from there on. For example, he clearly 
sets out his teleological proof in The Words, and he carefully handles objections to it 
in The Flashes and later in The Rays.  In this regard, he seems to be elaborating 
around ‘Why it is God’ theme in his early writings and ‘Why it is not others’ theme in 
his later writing. This particular method of making a case first and tackling the 
challenges later, one could argue, is evident throughout Risāle-i Nur. It is also quite 
airtight in terms of holding a philosophical stand. 
The teleological argument seems throughout time to have been of interest not only to 
philosophers and theologians, but also to scientists. All parties have equally been 
involved in the defence or rebuttal of this argument. Recently, both the critics and the 
defenders of the argument have mainly been scientists, like Dawkins and Behe.  
In the historical perspective, the teleological argument seems to have enjoyed a long-
lasting monopoly without any major criticism until Hume’s Dialogues Concerning 
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Natural Religion of 1779. Hume’s approach is apparently a philosophical one. 
However, Darwin came up with a greater challenge to the theists with his 1859 work 
On the Origin of Species, where his alternative argument against the traditional idea 
of creation is purely a scientific one. Hence, creation versus evolution through natural 
selection is still a fresh battleground for theists and atheists today.  
Although embraced by most atheists as their main defence, the first plausible 
alternative to creation, i.e. evolution through natural selection, has its own weaknesses. 
As the fiercest of defenders of evolution through natural selection, Dawkins admits 
that the theory needs a starting point, i.e. a water-borne microorganism which has to 
come into existence by chance in order to progress gradually. Plantinga argues that 
the theory of natural selection does not necessarily refute the existence of God. He 
defends that God might well have chosen natural selection as a biological process. 
Nursi, like many other Islamic scholars such as al-Ghazzālī and Ibn-i Rushd, suggests 
that the species were created in their current shape and form. He and they acutely 
reject the theory of evolution from the outset. Here, Nursi is in conflict with another 
theologian, Plantinga, who believes that the Darwinian explanation might be partly 
true. 
Two strands of Nursian way of arguing in favour of the teleological argument have 
been analysed. The first one is essentially an attempt to refute three materialist 
postulates namely; causes being the creator, self-creation and the nature being the 
creator.  The second strand is to argue for the validity of the teleological arguments 
from bottom to top. 
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The chapter concludes that Nursi’s most frequently used arguments to demonstrate 
the existence of God in his works is the teleological argument. Nursi simply resonates 
and elaborates on what has already been out there. Most of his arguments have roots 
in Ancient and modern philosophy. What Nursi does is simply to make the existing 
arguments accessible to ordinary public to strengthen their faith. 
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CHAPTER 4: NURSI ON PROPHETHOOD (NUBUWWAH) 
4.1 Introduction 
Historically speaking, there have been people who have claimed to be the messengers 
of God, and whose job it is to guide people according to God’s orders given to them 
via revelations from God himself. These people (i.e. the prophets) argued for the 
existence and the oneness of God. Therefore, the argument for the existence of God 
always goes hand in hand with the argument from Revelation (waḥy) and the 
argument from Prophethood (nubuwwah). There is hardly any theist who stands for 
the existence of God yet rejects the Divine Revelations or the prophets.317 The 
Nursian proof of the existence of Divine Revelations, i.e. the Holy Books such as the 
Torah, the Gospels and the Qur’ān, is the subject of Chapter 5 of this thesis, where the 
matter is discussed at length.  
This chapter, however, focuses on the Nursian interpretation of prophethood and 
discusses the philosophical and social issues surrounding it. Issues such as ‘Do people 
need prophets?’ and ‘Is it provable whether the prophets are genuine messengers of 
God?’ are explored from a Nursian perspective.  
The chapter begins [section 4.2] with an assessment of the Argument from Religious 
Experience, and of how it has been developed as a tool to argue for the existence of 
God. The second section [4.3] focuses on the characteristics of prophets in general, 
                                                      
317 Although there are disagreements among the monotheistic religions about the prophets, 
there is almost total recognition of each other’s prophets. For example, despite the historical 
rejection of the Islamic Prophet, Christians generally recognize the prophethood of 
Muḥammad.  
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and the Prophet Muḥammad318 in particular. It examines his life before and during his 
prophethood, his personal qualities, his teachings, and the serious social 
transformation he brought to nomadic Arab tribes. 
Then, in section 4.4, Nursi’s argument for the Prophet Muḥammad’s prophethood is 
analysed. Nursi argues that the apparent design in the universe requires a Designer,319 
who then requires prophets in order to communicate with His creations. For Nursi, 
therefore, the existence of God necessitates the existence of prophets, which 
reciprocally prove each other.  
Nursi develops his thesis of Muḥammad being a genuine prophet around four themes. 
The first theme is that the Religious Experience of Muḥammad is veridical since 
Muḥammad’s personal characteristics before and after his claim of prophethood 
match those described by philosophers and scholars. Nursi’s second theme is that 
miracles support his prophethood. The third theme concerns Nursi’s own 
interpretations of some verses of the Bible and Torah which, for Nursi, indicate 
Muḥammad’s arrival and his being the last prophet. The fourth theme Nursi employs 
is that the social transformation that Muḥammad brought about within twenty years 
could only strengthen further his claim to be a genuine prophet of God. 
In section 4.5, philosophical criticisms to the Argument from Religious Experience in 
general are discussed. Section 4.6 focuses on the criticisms of the Prophet 
Muḥammad made by people such as Gautier de Compiegne, Ramón Marti, Andrea 
Biglia, Theodore Bibliander and Humphrey Prideaux. The Nursian stance on popular 
                                                      
318 It is a compulsory practice in Islamic culture to say ‘Peace be upon him’ when the Prophet 
Muḥammad’s name is mentioned. However, I shall not indicate ‘p.b.u.h.’ each time mention 
the prophet’s name is mentioned, leaving it to the reader to acknowledge it. 
319 See Chapter 3: Nursi on the Design Argument. 
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issues such as the Prophet’s marriages, his battles, and his miracles, such as the 
Splitting of the Moon and the Night Journey (Isrā wa al-Mi’rāj), are considered. 
4.2. Outline of the Argument from Religious Experience 
One of the most frequent arguments for the existence of God from the theistic point of 
view is the Argument from Religious Experience, or the ARE. Although, strictly 
speaking, it is not a theistic proof per se,320 or a piece of reasoning for the existence of 
God, the ARE always appears as a supporting pillar to the other more philosophical 
arguments, such as the teleological and moral arguments. Everitt explains that for an 
atheist or agnostic to convert to theism on the basis of religious experience is hardly 
common. However, he goes on, the Argument does offer additional confirmatory 
evidence to those who already accept the existence of God.321 
The main tenet of the ARE is the God-signalling interpretation of certain events and 
occurrences by religious or religiously inclined individuals. The doctrine of all 
monotheistic religions is based on their prophets’ religious experiences, that is, their 
speaking to God, or experiencing His presence or the presence of other certain spirits 
such as angels, and thus receiving messages from God (revelations). For instance, the 
Bible narrates Moses’ encounter with God as follows: 
Now Moses was tending the flock of Jethro his father-in-law, the 
priest of Midian, and he led the flock to the far side of the wilderness 
and came to Horeb, the mountain of God. There the angel of 
the LORD appeared to him in flames of fire from within a 
bush. Moses saw that though the bush was on fire it did not burn 
up. So Moses thought, “I will go over and see this strange sight—
why the bush does not burn up.” 
                                                      
320 In Stephen T. Davis, 'God, Reason and Theistic Proofs', at 121, Davis explains that in 
order for an argument to be considered a philosophically accepted theistic proof, its 
conclusion must be ‘God exists’. 
321 See Everitt, The Non-Existence of God  at 150. 
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When the LORD saw that he had gone over to look, God called to him 
from within the bush, “Moses! Moses!” 
And Moses said, “Here I am.” 
“Do not come any closer,” God said. “Take off your sandals, for the 
place where you are standing is holy ground.” Then he said, “I am 
the God of your father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the 
God of Jacob.” At this, Moses hid his face, because he was afraid to 
look at God. 
The LORD said, “I have indeed seen the misery of my people in 
Egypt. I have heard them crying out because of their slave drivers, 
and I am concerned about their suffering. So I have come down to 
rescue them from the hand of the Egyptians and to bring them up out 
of that land into a good and spacious land, a land flowing with milk 
and honey —the home of the Canaanites, Hittites, Amorites, 
Perizzites, Hivites and Jebusites. And now the cry of the Israelites 
has reached me, and I have seen the way the Egyptians are 
oppressing them. So now, go. I am sending you to Pharaoh to bring 
my people the Israelites out of Egypt.”322 
In the Gospels, Isaiah, who is also considered to be one of the prophets of God, 
describes his encounter with God as follows: 
In the year that King Uzziah died, I saw the Lord, high and 
exalted, seated on a throne; and the train of his robe filled the 
temple. Above him were seraphim, each with six wings: With two 
wings they covered their faces, with two they covered their feet, and 
with two they were flying. And they were calling to one another: 
“Holy, holy, holy is the LORD Almighty; the whole earth is full of his 
glory.” 
At the sound of their voices the doorposts and thresholds shook and 
the temple was filled with smoke. 
“Woe to me!” I cried. “I am ruined! For I am a man of unclean 
lips, and I live among a people of unclean lips, and my eyes have 
seen the King, the LORD Almighty.”323 
The Prophet Muḥammad’s religious experience, on the other hand, takes place mainly 
through the arbitrating Angel Gabriel, except for the final leg of the Night Journey 
and Descent (Isrā wa al-Mi’rāj). The first encounter reportedly occurred in Hira Cave 
in Mecca, where Muḥammad was secluded for the purposes of self-mediation. One of 
Muḥammad’s wives, Aisha, explains this experience in full detail,324 relating how 
                                                      
322 Exodus 3: 1–7. 
323 Isaiah 6: 1–6. 
324 See Muhammad Ibn Isma Il Bukhari and Muhammad Muhsin Khan, Sahih Al-Bukhari : 
The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih Al-Bukhari : Arabic-English (Riyadh-Saudi Arabia: 
Darussalam Pub. & Distr., 1997) at vol 1. Book,1:1. 
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Gabriel asked Muḥammad to read, and how Muḥammad replied that he was illiterate, 
whereupon Gabriel shook him violently and revealed the first three verses of the 
Qur’ān, which are:  
Recite in the name of your Lord (al-Rabb) who created man from a 
clinging substance. Recite, and your Lord is the most Generous.325 
In the second encounter, the same angel brings to Muḥammad God’s message and 
orders, which read: 
O you who covers himself [with a garment], Arise and warn. And 
your Lord glorify. And your clothing purify. And uncleanliness 
avoid.326 
In The Varieties of Religious Experience, psychologist and philosopher William 
James reports similar personal experiences whereby the presence of God or of some 
exalted spirit is felt by many religious people.327 
There are two distinctive characteristics of such religious experience which are 
apparent in almost all such encounters. These are: [1] they are always private (i.e. 
experienced by only one person, even though other people are present), such as the 
experience of a 17-year old boy in church328 reported in James’ book, and Isaiah’s and 
Muḥammad’s experiences; and [2], there is always a strong sense of God’s or the 
angel’s greatness, and of one’s own inadequacy or smallness, which is the case in 
almost every prophetic encounter. 
                                                      
325 Qur’ān 96:1–3. 
326 Qur’ān 74:1–5. 
327 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience : A Study in Human Nature (New 
York: Modern Library, 1994) at Lecture III, Reality of the Unseen. 55-77. 
328 In Varieties of Religious Experience, p.71, William James reports an anonymous 17-year-
old boy: Sometimes as I go to church, I sit down, join in the service, and before I go out I feel 
as if God was with me, right side of me, singing and reading the Psalms with me … And then 
again I feel as if I could sit beside him, and put my arms around him, kiss him, etc. When I 
am taking Holy Communion at the altar, I try to get with him and generally feel his presence. 
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According to the theist philosopher Richard Swinburne, there are several different 
types of religious experience, which all strengthen the arguments for the existence of 
God. In the first type, Swinburne explains, the divine reality or the presence of God 
may be experienced in a normal public setting. For instance, as in Nursi’s case, 
someone might look at the sunset, or a flower, and see it as a powerful revelation of 
God, or as mediating God’s presence.329 
The second type consists of experiencing the presence of God through unusual 
(miraculous) events, such as Moses seeing a bush on fire but not consumed, or the 
Ascension of Jesus, or the experience of the Virgin Mary. 
In the third type, Swinburne explains, the experience is mediated through a private 
object such as visions, dreams or voices. The fourth type is personal experience that 
cannot be described in ordinary sensory language. For instance, someone might feel 
the presence of God or Jesus near him, but not be able to explain or defend the feeling. 
The fifth type, according to Swinburne, consists of experiencing God such that the 
experience does not seem to be mediated by anything sensory at all.330 
Stephen Davis classifies these religious experiences into two main groups. The first 
group Davis calls ‘religious experience’, where the strong presence, power and 
holiness of God is felt through one’s ontological distinctness from God. The second 
group, ‘mystical experience’, on the other hand, involves a strong sense of ontological 
unity with God. This second kind of experience, which is also called monistic (God is 
                                                      
329 Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford 
University Press, 1979) at 250. 
330 Ibid., at 251. 
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the only reality) or unitive mystical experience, includes the disappearance of oneself 
as a thing distinct from God.331 
The ARE may be briefly formulated as follows: 
Premise 1: Throughout human history, and in very many human societies and 
cultures, people claim to have experiences of God or some godlike being. 
Premise 2: The claim that those experiences are veridical is more probable than 
the claim that they are delusive. 
Premise 3: Therefore, probably, God or some godlike being exists.332 
Apologists for the ARE stress the fact that the characteristics of the person who 
experiences the presence of God has the utmost importance. Therefore, these need to 
be scrutinized closely. 
4.3. Characteristics of prophets 
The authenticity of the mission of any prophet depends upon his personal 
characteristics, such as trustworthiness and truthfulness. Sceptics always scrutinize 
the personal qualities of an individual who claims to be a prophet. Theists claim that 
prophets are chosen people whose job it is to teach mankind faith, knowledge, morals 
and laws. Therefore, prophets ought to hold the high ground in terms of having 
supreme moral qualities. 
The Qur’ān highlights five essential qualities that all prophets must have. These are as 
follows: 
                                                      
331 Davis, 'God, Reason and Theistic Proofs',  at 125 
332 Ibid., at 128. 
Chapter 4: Nursi on Prophethood 
 
   152 
[1] Truthfulness (ṣidq). If a person is known to have lied in the past, he cannot 
be a prophet since he might be accused of lying again. This is also the first test 
with which to question whether the personal experience of an individual is 
genuine. 
[2] Trustworthiness (amānah). If a person is known to have cheated in the past, 
he cannot be a prophet. Therefore, this is the second essential test to reveal 
whether the person is a genuine prophet. 
[3] Manifesting Faith (tablīgh). If a person practises his faith in solitude, he 
cannot be a prophet. Prophets always call their people openly to God's unity. 
[4] High Intelligence (faṭānah). If a person is weak, uncertain or unintelligent, 
he cannot be a prophet. Since prophethood requires strong intelligence, people 
must consider the prophet to be strong and intelligent and look up to him. 
[5] Moral Perfection (‘iṣmah). If a person is to known to have committed crime, 
or to have displayed low moral behaviour, he cannot be a prophet. All prophets 
are pure and innocent.333 
Since all the prophets were humans, not angels, they have had certain shortcomings in 
their personal judgements, which were, however, not deliberate acts of evil. For 
instance, Jonah refused to undertake the task assigned by God for a while and left his 
                                                      
333 See Appendix 5: The names and the characteristics of the prophets mentioned in the 
Qur’ān. 
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tribe, hence his troubles at sea and his return to his tribe.334 Then there is Moses’ 
fighting and killing the Egyptian,335 and Adam’s eating the forbidden fruit,336 etc. 
The Qur’ān tells more about the prophets and their characteristics. The first 
distinction the Qur’ān makes between the prophets is that some of them are rasūl and 
some of them nabī.337 Those who had a Book are called rasūl, and those who did not 
have a Book, but carried on the messages of previous prophets, are called nabī. 
The Qur’ān points out that all the prophets had the qualities of sincerity, compassion, 
honesty, trustworthiness, purity, piety, patience and righteousness. We learn the 
stories and the qualities of the prophets from the Qur’ān and the Prophet 
Muḥammad’s tradition (ḥadīth). The Qur’ān, for example, tells us about the encounter 
of the prophet Moses with God on Mount Sīnāi, and describes Moses’ two prophetic 
quality of penitence and faithfulness, at the end of the verse which reads: 
And when Moses arrived at Our appointed time and his Lord spoke 
to him, he said, "My Lord, show me [Yourself] that I may look at 
You." [Allah] said, "You will not see Me, but look at the mountain; if 
it should remain in place, then you will see Me." But when his Lord 
appeared to the mountain, He rendered it level, and Moses fell 
unconscious. And when he awoke, he said, "Exalted are You! I have 
repented to You, and I am the first of the believers."338 
Regarding the righteousness of the prophet Abraham, the Qur’ān reports: 
                                                      
334 Qur’ān, 10:1–109. 
335 Qur’ān, 28:15: And he entered the city at a time of inattention by its people and found 
therein two men fighting: one from his faction and one from among his enemy. And the one 
from his faction called for help to him against the one from his enemy, so Moses struck him 
and [unintentionally] killed him. [Moses] said, "This is from the work of Satan. Indeed, he is 
a manifest, misleading enemy."  
336 Qur’ān, 7:22: So he made them fall, through deception. And when they tasted of the tree, 
their private parts became apparent to them, and they began to fasten together over 
themselves from the leaves of Paradise. And their Lord called to them, "Did I not forbid you 
from that tree and tell you that Satan is to you a clear enemy?" 
337 Qur’ān, 6:13, 22:75, 29:27, 81:19  
338 Qur’ān: 7:143. 
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And We gave to Him [Abraham] Isaac and Jacob and placed in his 
descendants prophethood and scripture. And We gave him his reward 
in this world, and indeed, he is in the Hereafter among the 
righteous.339 
In the Qur’ān, Jesus is described as a prophet who: is righteous,340 is held in honour in 
the world and in the Hereafter,341 taught the book and wisdom by God,342 and is 
pure,343 kind344 and close to God.345 
There are many accounts of the Prophet Muḥammad’s characteristics in the works of 
Bukhārī, Muslim, Tirmidhī, Abū Dawūd and Qadī Iyāz, and in other Islamic literature. 
One of the best and the shortest description of his character is contained in the answer 
his wife Aisha gave when she was asked about the Prophet’s character. Aisha replied: 
Don't you read the Qur’ān? The character of the Messenger of 
Allah was the Qur’ān.346 
The Prophet Muḥammad himself explained that he was the living, practical face of 
the religion of God (i.e. Islām). He said: 
Allāh has sent me as an apostle so that I may demonstrate perfection 
of character, refinement of manners and loftiness of deportment.347 
The Prophet Muḥammad, along with all his predecessors, was reported to be a kind, 
gentle, softly spoken person. This might be due to the physiological fact that people in 
                                                      
339 Qur’ān: 29:27. 
340 Qur’ān, 3:45–46 Sūrat 'Āli `Imrān (Family of Imran): “[And mention] when the angels 
said, "O Mary, indeed Allāh gives you good tidings of a word from Him, whose name will be 
the Messiah, Jesus, the son of Mary – distinguished in this world and the Hereafter and 
among those brought near [to Allāh]. He will speak to the people in the cradle and in maturity 
and will be of the righteous." 
341 Ibid. 
342 Qur’ān, 3:48 Sūrat 'Āli `Imrān (Family of Imran): “And He will teach him writing and 
wisdom and the Torah and the Gospel.” 
343 Qur’ān,19:19 Sūrat Maryam (Mary): “He said, “I am only the messenger of your Lord to 
give you [news of] a pure boy.” 
344 Qur’ān, 19:32 Sūrat Maryam (Mary): “And [made me] dutiful to my mother, and He has 
not made me a wretched tyrant.” 
345 Qur’ān, 3:55 Sūrat 'Āli `Imrān (Family of Imran):“[Mention] when Allāh said, “O Jesus, 
indeed I will take you and raise you to Myself and purify you from those who disbelieve and 
make those who follow you [in submission to Allāh alone] superior to those who disbelieve 
until the Day of Resurrection. Then to Me is your return, and I will judge between you 
concerning that in which you used to differ.” 
346 Muslim, I.-H. -Q., and Ṣiddīqī, A.-H. (1984). Ṣaḥīḥ: Being traditions of the sayings and 
doings of the Prophet Muḥammad as narrated by his companions and comp. under the title 
“Al-jami'-uṣ-ṣaḥīḥ. New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan. ḥadīth no. 1,623. 
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general are likely to refuse the message if the messenger is rude or harsh. The Qur’ān 
approves Muḥammad’s excellent manners in spreading God’s messages. Sūrat 'Āli 
`Imrān (Family of Imran) in the Qur’ān reads: 
So by mercy from Allāh, [O Muḥammad], you were lenient with 
them. And if you had been rude [in speech] and harsh in heart, they 
would have disbanded from about you. So pardon them and ask 
forgiveness for them and consult them in the matter. And when you 
have decided, then rely upon Allāh. Indeed, Allāh loves those who 
rely [upon Him].348 
The Prophet Muḥammad is considered to be the perfect man (insān-i kāmil), and the 
perfect servant of God whom every Muslim has to work towards in attaining his 
qualities. The Qur’ān reveals his excellent qualities of being submissive to God,349 his 
total devotion,350 and his fear of God.351 God puts him in charge of guiding the entire 
human race rather than his tribe or nation. This is revealed in Sūrat al-Anbiyā' (The 
Prophets) [21:107], where God says: “And We have not sent you, [O Muḥammad], 
except as a mercy to the worlds.”352 
Nursi claims that Muḥammad was the last of prophets appointed by God to guide 
humanity. He not only relies on Qur’anic evidence, but also builds up his own theory 
of Muḥammad’s prophethood. 
                                                      
348 Qur’ān, 3:159. 
349 Qur’ān, 3:20: So if they argue with you, say, “I have submitted myself to Allāh [in Islām], 
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those with him are forceful against the disbelievers, merciful among themselves. You see 
them bowing and prostrating [in prayer], seeking bounty from Allāh and [His] pleasure. Their 
mark is on their faces from the trace of prostration. That is their description in the Torah. And 
their description in the Gospel is as a plant which produces its offshoots and strengthens them 
so they grow firm and stand upon their stalks, delighting the sowers – so that Allāh may 
enrage by them the disbelievers. Allāh has promised those who believe and do righteous 
deeds among them forgiveness and a great reward. 
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evidences, those who do not expect the meeting with Us say, “Bring us a Qur’ān other than 
this or change it.” Say, [O Muḥammad], “It is not for me to change it on my own accord. I 
only follow what is revealed to me. Indeed I fear, if I should disobey my Lord, the 
punishment of a tremendous Day.” 
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4.4. Nursi’s arguments for Muḥammad’s prophethood 
According to Nursi, the universe has been created by God in an extremely 
complicated manner.353 Nursi claims that the purpose of the creation of the universe is 
that God desired to be known through the eyes and mind of people. He argues that the 
existence of a powerful and intelligent God naturally requires him to communicate 
with His subjects (i.e. the human race).354 This communication, for Nursi, had to be 
conducted through the most perfect member of humankind (i.e. the Prophet 
Muḥammad).355 
Nursi claims that the prophethood of Muḥammad could be proved beyond question. 
Proving Muḥammad’s prophethood also spontaneously verifies the authenticity of all 
the previous prophets, since they are all interconnected and lean against one 
another.356 Nursi, then, develops an elaborate web of arguments in order to validate 
his point.357 
4.4.1. Muḥammad reporting the future [Ikhbār-i ghaybī] 
As his first line of defence, Nursi presents some of the Prophet Muḥammad’s reports 
of future events which have been proven historically. For instance, pointing to his 
grandchild Hasan b. Ali, Muḥammad explained that this little child would settle a 
great dispute between two Muslim armies.358 Indeed, history tells us that some forty 
                                                      
353 See Chapter 3: Nursi on teleological argument, for Nursi’s arguments for the existence of 
God from the apparent design in the universe. 
354 Nursi, The Letters  at 387. 
355 Ibid. 
356 Nursi, Al-Mathnawi Al-Nuri  at 1224. 
357 For the schematic illustration of Nursi’s arguments, see Appendix 9. 
358 See Bukhari and Khan, Sahih Al-Bukhari : The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih Al-
Bukhari : Arabic-English  at Fitan 20.  
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years later, Hasan b. Ali prevented a war between Muslims by signing a peace treaty 
with Muawiya b. Abū Sufyan.359 
On another occasion, the Prophet Muḥammad warned his son-in-law, ʿAli b. Abū 
Ṭālib, that someone would stain his beard with his blood, implying that he would be 
murdered.360 This person, indeed, was ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muljam the Kharijite. In 
more general, better-known historical events, the Prophet Muḥammad reported the 
capture of Cyprus and Constantinople by Muslims, and the fall of the Roman and 
Persian empires, which all became reality.361 
Nursi, therefore, claims that the Prophet Muḥammad was an ordinary man, not a 
soothsayer. However, his prophethood was reinforced by God, who inspired him with 
some of His eternal knowledge.362 This, Nursi asserts, is a clear indication that 
Muḥammad was God’s genuine messenger. 
4.4.2. Miracles regarding food and water 
Among many alleged miracles of the Prophet Muḥammad, Nursi gives a few 
examples regarding food and water. Nursi reminds the reader that the Arabian 
Peninsula is naturally very dry and that there is usually a shortage of food and water. 
Therefore, according to Nursi, the miracles regarding food and water not only provide 
sustenance to a large number of companions but also strengthen their faith. One of 
Nursi’s examples is the incident reported by Jabir al-Ansari, who reported that during 
the Aḥzab (confederates) expedition on the celebrated day of Khandaq (Battle of 
                                                      
359 Nursi, The Letters  at 392. 
360 Muqbil Ibn Hadi WāDiʻī, Rijal Al-Hakim Fi Al-Mustadrak (al-Qahirah: Dar al-Haramayn, 
1998) at 113. 
361 For the Prophet Muḥammad’s miracles regarding the reporting the future events, see 
Nursi, The Letters  at 392. 
362 Ibid., at 400. 
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Trenches), about a thousand people ate from four handfuls of rye bread and a young 
cooked goat, yet food was still left over.363 
Regarding the water miracles, Nursi mentions an incident reported by Abdullah al-
Ansari, who said:  
We were one thousand five hundred men on the Hudaybiyya 
expedition, and we were thirsty. The Noble Messenger performed the 
ablutions from a leather water-bag called a qirba, then he dipped his 
hand into it. I saw that water was flowing from his fingers like a 
spring. The one thousand five hundred men drank from it and filled 
their water-bags.364 
Further to these particular miracles, which involved only limited numbers of people, 
Nursi advances to his next argument, which involves many million people, as well as 
whole societies and their way of life, in terms of social transformation for the better 
owing to the Prophet Muḥammad’s teachings. 
4.4.3. Social transformation argument 
Arguably, the Prophet Muḥammad’s arrival and the introduction by him of Islām has 
been one of the greatest events in human history in terms of changes and 
advancements in human civilization. Nursi explains that the pre-Islamic era of 
ignorance (jāhiliyyah) was a time when almost every ill practice of humanity was at 
its peak. Practices that many civilized individuals despise were considered acceptable. 
Charging interest on loans (ribā), adultery (zinā), believing in omens (tayattur), 
                                                      
363 Bukhari and Khan, Sahih Al-Bukhari : The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih Al-
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astrology (tanjīm), seeking blessing from objects (tabarruk), and soothsaying 
(kahānah) were some of the customs of jāhiliyyah.365 
In his ambassadorial address, Ja’far Ibn Abī Ṭālib described the lifestyle of pre-
Islamic Arabia to the Negus of Abyssinia upon their arrival in his country in order to 
seek refuge from the oppression of polytheists of Mecca. He explained: “We were 
people of Jāhiliyyah, worshipping idols, eating the flesh of dead animals, 366 
committing abominations, neglecting our relatives, doing evil to our neighbours and 
the strong among us would oppress the weak …”367 
During Jāhiliyyah, some 40 per cent of baby girls used to be buried alive, since the 
common belief was that they bring embarrassment to their fathers. The Qur’ān 
mentions this brutal scene in Sūrat al-Takwīr (The Overthrowing), ‘when the girl 
[who was] buried alive is asked, for what sin she was killed’.368 
According to Nursi, the transformation of Arab society from the verge of savagery to 
the high moral ground thanks to the Prophet Muḥammad’s teachings could be 
considered one of his greatest achievements, one owing to the divine origins of his 
teachings. In The Letters, he writes: 
You know that a small habit like cigarette smoking among a small 
nation can be removed permanently only by a powerful ruler with 
great effort. But look! This Being (the Prophet Muḥammad) removed 
numerous ingrained habits from intractable, fanatical large nations 
with slight outward power and little effort in a short period of time, 
                                                      
365 For the general history of pre-Islamic Arabia, see De Lacy O'leary, Arabia before 
Muhammad (London; New York: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.; E.P. Dutton & Co., 1927). 
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and in their place he so established exalted qualities that they became 
as firm as if they had mingled with their very blood. He achieved 
very many extraordinary feats like this. Thus, we present the Arabian 
Peninsula as a challenge to those who refuse to see the testimony of 
the blessed age of the Prophet. Let them each take a hundred 
philosophers, go there, and strive for a hundred years, I wonder if 
they would be able to carry out in that time one hundredth of what he 
achieved in a year?369 
The philosophical value of Nursi’s particular argument here is open to debate. Sceptic 
philosophers, as well as sociologists, might argue that the transformation of a society 
does not necessarily entail the conclusion that the forces creating change actually hold 
right values. For instance, Hitler achieved a certain transformation of German society, 
and so did Stalin in Soviet Russia. 
Nursi, however, would have opposed this suggestion, and argued that the social 
changes occurred in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia were due to the brutal forces of 
the regimes. By contrast, the Prophet Muḥammad’s transformation has been on the 
basis of voluntary acceptance, at least in most cases. 
We now return to particular incidents that occurred during the Prophet Muḥammad’s 
life, the ‘era of bliss’ that Nursi considers as offering miracles and supportive 
evidence of Muḥammad’s prophethood. 
4.4.4. Miscellaneous Miracles 
In The Letters, Nursi details the Prophet Muḥammad’s miracles at great length,370 
using well-known miracles in order to support his argument. One of the most popular 
miracles of prophet Muḥammad was the moaning of the trunk incident. This miracle, 
according to Nursi, became more popular than the miracles concerning food and 
water since it was witnessed by many people within the mosque of the Prophet in 
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Medina. It was mainly aimed at strengthening the faith of new Muslims. Miracles 
concerning food and water, by contrast, to Nursi, were more of a matter of survival, 
and hence became less well-known.371 
The moaning of the trunk incident took place in the Prophet’s mosque in Medina. The 
tree trunk against which the Prophet used to lean to give his sermon became 
redundant upon the construction of a new pulpit. During a Friday sermon, the 
congregation in the mosque all witnessed the cry of the trunk owing to the Prophet’s 
not using it any longer.372 
Nursi exposes further miracles of Muḥammad in The Letters. He relates examples of 
miracles regarding stones talking, trees obeying the Prophet’s instructions and moving 
around, miracles of Muḥammad healing the sick and wounded and miracles of the 
animals talking to him in order to argue that Muḥammad was a genuine messenger of 
God. 
4.5. Nursi on Muḥammad according to Judaism and Christianity 
According to Nursi, Prophet Muḥammad was the last of the chain of prophets 
(khatama annabiyyeena) starting from the first man and the first prophet, Adam. Here, 
Nursi holds onto a classical theist position, which assumes that the first man was 
created by God complete in terms of anatomy and intelligence, as opposed to the 
atheist, or Darwinian view whereby the human form is alleged to have evolved from a 
less complicated common ancestor of mammals.373 
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Having acknowledged the truthfulness of all previous scriptures and the prophets, 
Nursi claims that the prophethood of Muḥammad has been mentioned by the previous 
Abrahamic religions. For him, this proves the authenticity of the previous Books and 
the prophets, even though, he claims, their messages have been corrupted.  
In The Letters, Nursi writes: 
Indeed, since those Books (i.e. the Torah, the Bible, the Psalms of 
David) are revealed scriptures and those who brought them were 
prophets, it is necessary and certain that they should have mentioned 
the one who would supersede their religions, change the shape of the 
universe, and illuminate half the earth with the light he brought. Is it 
possible that those scriptures, which foretold insignificant events, 
would not speak of the most important phenomenon of humanity, the 
prophethood of Muḥammad (UWBP)? Yes, since they would 
certainly speak of it, they would either denounce it as a falsehood and 
so save their religions from destruction and their books from 
abrogation, or they would affirm it, and through that man of truth, 
save their religions from superstition and corruption. Now, both 
friend and foe agree that there is no sign of any such denouncement 
in the scriptures, in which case there must be affirmation. And since 
there is certain affirmation, and since there is a definite reason and 
fundamental cause for such affirmation, we too shall demonstrate 
through three categorical proofs the existence of this affirmation.374 
Nursi presents his case that the Prophet Muḥammad was already affirmed in the 
Torah, and that the Qur’ān clearly challenges the Jews to affirm that Muḥammad is a 
genuine prophet who was reported in the Torah. Regarding the Jews’ rejection of 
Muḥammad’s prophethood, the Qur’ān announces: 
… Say, [O Muḥammad], "So bring the Torah and recite it, if you 
should be truthful375 
and 
Then whoever argues with you about it after [this] knowledge has 
come to you – say, "Come, let us call our sons and your sons, our 
women and your women, ourselves and yourselves, then supplicate 
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earnestly [together] and invoke the curse of Allāh upon the liars 
[among us]376 
Nursi maintains that the Prophet Muḥammad and the Qur’ān openly challenged the 
Jews to refute the fact of Muḥammad’s prophethood with evidence from their own 
Holy Book. Since they failed to disprove Muḥammad, they chose the hard way, 
namely killing or being killed on the battlefield. According to Nursi, the Jews’ act of 
war was actually another evidence of Muḥammad’s prophethood being genuine. 
Otherwise, they would have chosen the easier way, showing evidence from the Torah. 
Nursi claims that most Jewish and Christian scholars admitted that their Holy Books 
mention the upcoming prophets of the Arabs.377 He narrates an incident before 
Muḥammad became a prophet in which Monk Bakhira called the uncle of 
Muḥammad during their journey from Damascus, warned Abu Tālib that little 
Muḥammad was the prophet who was reported in the Torah, and asked him to take 
extra care in protecting him in case the Jews might want to harm him out of 
jealousy.378 
Nursi interprets some verses from the previous scriptures in which, he claims; Prophet 
Muḥammad’s arrival had already been mentioned. In the King James Version of the 
Gospel of John, 
Took branches of palm trees, and went forth to meet him, and cried, 
Hosanna: Blessed is the King of Israel that cometh in the name of the 
Lord379 
and 
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Hereafter I will not talk much with you: for the prince of this world 
cometh, and hath nothing in me380 
and  
Nevertheless I tell you the truth; It is expedient for you that I go 
away: for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but 
if I depart, I will send him unto you. 
And when he is come, he will reprove the world of sin, and of 
righteousness, and of judgment: 
Of sin, because they believe not on me; 
Of righteousness, because I go to my Father, and ye see me no more; 
Of judgment, because the prince of this world is judged381 
and 
who also, as Luke says, descended at the day of Pentecost upon the 
disciples after the Lord’s ascension, having power to admit all 
nations to the entrance of life, and to the opening of the new 
covenant; from whence also, with one accord in all languages, they 
uttered praise to God, the Spirit bringing distant tribes to unity, and 
offering to the Father the first-fruits of all nations. Wherefore also the 
Lord promised to send the Comforter, 
they are manifested by the Holy Ghost, who was sent; "that is the 
Paraclete, of whom the Lord said, "If I go not away, He will not 
come. And, "If I go not away, that Advocate shall not come to you; 
but if I go away, I will send Him to you.382 
Nursi argues that terms in the Bible such as Paraclete or Faraqlit refer to the person 
who distinguishes truth from falsehood. It is therefore the name of one who in the 
future will lead people to the truth. This person, Nursi interprets, could only be the 
Prophet Muḥammad.383 In Genesis we read: 
Verily God told Abraham that Hagar – the mother of Isma‘il – will 
bear children. There will emerge from her sons one whose hand will 
be above all, and the hands of all will be opened to him in 
reverence384 
And in Deuteronomy: 
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And He said to Moses: “O Moses, verily I shall send them a prophet 
like you, from the sons of their brothers [the children of Isma‘il]; I 
shall place My word in his mouth, and shall punish whoever does not 
accept the words of the one who will speak in My name385 
And in Isaiah: 
Here is my servant, whom I uphold, my chosen one in whom I 
delight; 
I will put my Spirit on him, and he will bring justice to the nations. 
He will not shout or cry out, or raise his voice in the streets. 
A bruised reed he will not break, and a smouldering wick he will not 
snuff out. In faithfulness he will bring forth justice; He will not falter 
or be discouraged till he establishes justice on earth. In his 
teaching the islands will put their hope.386 
In short, Nursi asserts that verses like these, and tales from the pre-prophetic era, 
represent strong evidence that Muḥammad was a genuine messenger of God. This, 
according to Nursi, also proves that all the previous scriptures and prophets are 
interrelated and that they are all combined proof of the existence of God, who clearly 
chose to speak to His subjects.387 
Although Nursi, along with many Muslim theologians, argues that these verses 
provide evidence of the Prophet Muḥammad’s arrival, not everyone in non-Muslim 
circles agrees with this claim.388 Furthermore, interpretations of these verses might 
differ from person to person. Arguably, this could be considered a weakness in 
Nursi’s argument for Muḥammad’s prophethood from previous monotheistic 
scriptures. 
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4.6. Objections to Nursi’s Argument from Prophethood 
Sceptic philosophers do not accept the theistic argument for the existence of God 
through prophets. Their objections take two forms. The first is the criticism of the 
argument from miracles. The second is the criticism of the argument from religious 
experience. Since the objection to the argument from miracles is dealt with in section 
5.6, we will focus in the following section on the argument from religious 
experience.389 
4.6.1. Philosophical objections to the Argument from Religious Experience 
Although the argument from religious experience or the ARE became more popular 
from the twentieth century onwards, it would not be wrong to assume that Nursi’s 
argument from prophethood as being part of the ARE. The ARE usually favours 
theism, in the sense that the receiving people associate the experience with ‘the 
presence of God’.390 Davis rejects this argument outright on the grounds that it 
contradicts the definition of a theistic proof. For Davis, theistic proof has to be an 
argument whose conclusion is ‘God exists’.391 The ARE is held to be an argument for 
the rationality of theism, not a theistic argument. In Perceiving God, Alston makes 
this point clear.392 Swinburne, on the other hand, argues that the ARE needs to be 
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considered as a theistic proof, not necessarily on its own but as a complementary part 
of other theistic arguments.393 
Davis acknowledges the existence of extraordinary personal experience of hard-to-
explain events. However, he disagrees with theists like Nursi that such experience 
absolutely proves the existence of God. In some cases, people claim to have 
encountered some god among other gods such as Thor or Zeus, or some impersonal 
Absolute like Brahman, or the Dharmakaya, or Absolute Emptiness.394  
Dawkins brings a completely scientific approach to the ARE. He argues that the 
human brain runs first-class simulation software, which makes people believe in 
whatever they wish to believe.395 In this sense, what Nursi claimed to have happened 
to the Prophet Muḥammad, according to Dawkins, was not necessarily God (through 
the mouth of Gabriel) speaking to him, but was more likely his brain playing a 
simulation to him. In other words, Dawkins rejects the validity of the ARE in general 
and the prophethood in particular.  
Freud, some time before Dawkins, tried to give a psychological explanation of the 
ARE, in which he claimed that religious experience is the result of psychological need, 
for example the desire to project a father image onto the universe. Freud went on to 
explain that, at some stage of life, all children come to recognize that their father, 
whom they once viewed as infallible and omnipotent, is fallible, human, and finite; 
but people subconsciously retain the inner need for a father figure who will care for 
and protect them in this life and the next, and so they project the need onto the 
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universe. Thus they come to believe in an all-powerful and perfectly good God, a 
cosmic father. To Freud it is a myth: of course no such God exists.396 
Here, Freud seems to challenge the Nursian view. Nursi claims that the Prophet 
Muḥammad was the messenger of God and that his prophethood proves the existence 
of God. By contrast, Freud implies that the personal experience of the Prophet 
Muḥammad was the result of his psychological needs resulting from his being an 
orphan, and did not prove the existence of any gods. Davis, therefore, establishes his 
first objection to the ARE, and indirectly to the Nursian argument from prophethood: 
that plausible naturalistic explanations of religious experience, such as those of Freud 
and Dawkins, are available. 
Davis’ second objection to the ARE is based on the fact that religious experience is 
not like ordinary perception. He argues that the perceptions of religious experience 
yield little information about God. Therefore, no scientific comparison between the 
descriptions of God through religious experience is possible. The critics of the ARE 
protest about the lack of descriptive clarity, and explain that nobody wants to say that 
God is red, or tall, or soft; the idea, rather, is that God has non-sensory properties such 
as goodness, power and knowledge. 397  Matson adds to this that publicity and 
corroboration tests are notoriously not met in reports of religious experience. Thus, 
unless there is an independent reason for us to believe in the existence of God (in 
which case we might sensibly expect to have experience of God), no report of a 
religious experience can ever count as a good reason to believe in His existence.398  
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Furthermore, Clark argues that, in cases of religious experience, there is no 
objectively specifiable set of circumstances such that, should a normal human being 
find himself in those circumstances, he would have the religious experience in 
question, were the experience genuine. As a consequence of this, the sort of 
philosophical treatment that is appropriate for assessing the evidential value of 
experience, such as seeing colours and feeling pain under normal circumstances, is 
not appropriate regarding religious experience.399 
Next, some specific criticisms of Swinburne’s position will be examined. 
4.6.2. Objections to Swinburne’s Principle of Credulity 
Swinburne argued that, in the absence of special considerations, if it seems 
(epistemicly) to a subject that X is present, then probably X is present: what one 
seems to perceive is probably so.400 Swinburne further clarifies that the subject has to 
be a reliable person (i.e. someone who is known for not telling lies in he past, or 
taking hallucinogenic drugs). This approach to the ARE is parallel to the Nursian way 
of defending the authenticity of the Prophet Muḥammad’s experience. Nursi 
repeatedly argues that Muḥammad was a very honest and well-trusted man long 
before his prophethood. Indeed, Muḥammad’s nickname was ‘al-amīn’ (the 
trustworthy). Nursi also suggests that Muḥammad never used intoxicating drinks or 
drugs, and that his mental condition was very healthy. Therefore, with the 
philosophical support of Swinburne, Nursi believes that Muḥammad’s experience was 
genuine. 
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One of the critiques of the principle of credulity is that made by Gary Gutting. 
Gutting explains that religious experiences purportedly of God give prima facie 
evidence of the existence of God, but that further support (rather than merely the 
absence of reasons to be sceptical) is needed before the prima facie evidence can be 
regarded as convincing evidence.401 
To discredit the theists’ claims, such as that Mother Teresa experienced the presence 
of Jesus, or that Muḥammad experienced the presence of the Archangel Gabriel, 
Gutting gives a counter-example. He tells us that he walks into his office and sees his 
dead aunt. This fulfils all the conditions set by Swinburne (i.e. he has not proved 
unreliable, he is not under the influence of alcohol or drugs); and the lighting is good. 
Therefore, he claims that he experiences the existence of his dead aunt. In fact, 
Gutting says, even though none of the defeating conditions recognized by Swinburne 
applies, it is obvious that he is not rationally entitled, in the absence of other evidence, 
to believe that he has seen his aunt.402 
Although Gutting’s arguments seem to weaken the ARE, as Swinburne explained, a 
healthy conclusion could only be drawn on the basis of cumulative proofs. Swinburne 
makes it clear that the ARE on its own could not be a sufficient proof, could only be a 
supporting argument. Similarly, Nursi does not simply construct his argument 
regarding Muḥammad’s prophethood (and hence, indirectly, of the existence of God) 
on the basis of the ARE. He builds up a web of arguments, only a small part of which 
is the ARE. 
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4.6.3. Whose experience is veridical? 
One of the problems regarding the ARE is that the followers of certain faiths claim to 
encounter the certain supreme being of their particular faith. For instance, Catholics 
tend to experience the Virgin Mary, Vedantic Hindus Brahman. The question is, 
‘What do we do with non-theistic experiences?’ or ‘What do we do with religious 
experiences which contradict theism?’ Gutting tells us that if religious experience is 
veridical, it can only defeat naturalism, and show that something else besides physical 
reality exists.403 Davis, on the other hand, is not as generous to the ARE as Gutting is. 
He explains that religious experiences are so diverse, with many of them not being 
theistic at all, that they could not possibly be a proof of theism. He writes: 
People who are already theists can certainly use theistic religious 
experience as a way of corroborating their beliefs; convinced theists 
as they are, they can simply say that non-theistic religious experience 
is mistaken, or is an experience of God that is misinterpreted. Or 
perhaps they can make use of other theistic proofs, or other sorts of 
arguments from natural theology, to show that Ultimate Reality, or 
the object of religious experience, is personal rather than impersonal 
in nature.404 
In short, sceptic philosophers argue that the faith of an individual directly affects his 
or her religious experience. Therefore, the ARE is not a satisfactory argument for the 
existence of God.  
4.7. Nursi on the Criticisms of Muḥammad 
Beyond the philosophical criticisms of the Argument from Religious Experience set 
out in section 4.6.1, and of the Argument from Miracles set out in 5.6, Nursi had to 
tackle specific criticisms pointed at the Prophet Muḥammad. Current critiques of the 
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Prophet Muḥammad can be traced back in history. John Tolan states that almost all of 
them are sourced from the early writings of hostile historic characters.405 
The first learned encounter with Islām and the Prophet Muḥammad in the Christian 
West, Tolan writes, occurred through the Risālat al-Kindī (Letter of al-Kindī), the 
writings of an anonymous Iraqi Christian in the twelfth century.406 In his book, Al-
Kindī wrote an imaginary dialogue between a Muslim and a Christian in which the 
Muslim tries to convert the Christian to Islām, and a debate develops between them. 
Although some reliable and more accurate sources were available in the West in the 
ninth century, such as the work of Theophanes’ Chronographia,407 Tolan explains 
that almost all early knowledge, or rather myths, about Muḥammad was derived from 
the rather biased Risālat al-Kindī.408 Owing to on-going hostility because of the 
Crusades, Europeans chose to portray the Prophet Muḥammad as representing an 
offshoot of Christianity, and as a fake prophet and an imposter.  
Armed with knowledge from the aforementioned texts, Gautier de Compiegne wrote 
his Otia de Machometi409 in 1090. His work consisted of poetry in Latin. Gautier’s 
disparaging work later inspired many more Europeans such as Alexandre du Pont,410 
Adelphus, Embrico of Mainz and Guibert of Nogent.411 Other Westerners, such as 
Ramon Marti, took another route to inform fellow Christians so that they could argue 
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the falsehood of Islām and its prophet. Marti’s book De seta machometi,412 written 
before 1257, examined Biblical evidence in order to refute the idea of Muḥammad’s 
prophethood. The hostile tradition of portraying Muḥammad as a fake prophet and an 
evil man continued into the fifteenth century. Andrea Biglia described Muḥammad as 
‘a horrible beast from hell’, and Favio Bionde depicts Muḥammad as someone who 
seduced and deceived Arabs with his miracles.413 The European discourse on Islām 
was dominated by evil tales from Muḥammad’s life well into the eighteenth century. 
Works such as Dominican Riccoldo da Montecroce’s Contra legem Saracenorum or 
Nicholas of Cusa’s Cribratio Alcorani dominated this era.414 
In Early Modern Europe, two sets of works became very prominent. First, Theoder 
Bibliander published a serious of works on Islām and the Prophet Muḥammad in 
Basel in 1543. These were Robert of Ketton’s twelfth-century translation of the 
Qur’ān, the Latin translation of the Risālat al-Kindī, and works by Riccoldo da 
Montecroce, Nicolas of Cusa, and others.415 The second set was the works of 
Humphrey Prideaux, an Anglican minister and Oxford-educated doctor of theology. 
Prideaux published a book called The True Nature of The Imposture Fully Display’d 
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in the Life of Mahomet in 1697.416 Prideaux’s book, and the others mentioned above, 
offered a list of criticisms of Islām, and its Prophet, Muḥammad. In his Risāle-i Nur, 
Nursi not only argues for the authenticity of Muḥammad’s prophethood, but also tries 
to fend off the criticisms posed by the sceptics, such as Gautier, Marti, Prideaux, and 
many others.  
4.7.1. Muḥammad’s Marriages 
Muḥammad’s marriages head the list of criticisms directed at him. These criticisms 
centre on numbers, age gaps, and appropriateness. Muḥammad was married for the 
first time, at the age of 25, to Khadījah, who was 40 at the time of marriage in 610 
CE. 417  This alleged mismatch, according to Christian polemicists, indicates 
Muḥammad trying to gain power and influence over Khadījah’s tribe, who did not 
really know the real indication of a prophet.418 His marriage to Khadījah lasted 25 
years until her death. Muḥammad was 50 when his first wife died, and he afterwards 
did not marry for two or three years. He then married Sawdā bint Zam’a, a 53-year-
old widow whose husband had died in battle. Sawdā was his only partner for around 
three years. He then married ʿĀisha bint Abū Bakr, whose age has been, and still is, a 
great source of debate. Polemicists argue that she was seven at the time of the 
marriage; other sources suggest she was 17.419 ‘Aisha was the youngest of all 
Muḥammad’s wives, and she was the only virgin (i.e. this was her first and only 
marriage). She reported more than 200 ḥadīth (Prophet’s sayings); in this sense, she 
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was the guide and the teacher of Muslim women. All Muḥammad’s remaining 
marriages occurred in the last nine years of his life, after the age of 54. Considering 
the fact that his generation carried on through his children from his first marriage with 
Khadījah,420 one can assume that he had a regular family life with his first wife for 25 
years from the age of 25 till 50. He had a son, Ibrahim, by Maria al-Qibṭiyya. But 
Ibrahim died during his infancy. Therefore, according to Nursi, his marriages were 
not sexually motivated; there were certain reasons behind them. Nursi writes: 
… Such vile doubts cannot be harboured against that lofty one! The 
Messenger (UWBP) was such that from the age of fifteen to forty 
when the blood is fiery and exuberant and the passions of the soul 
enflamed, with complete chastity and purity he sufficed and was 
content with a single older woman, Khadija the Great (May God be 
pleased with her) – as is agreed by friend and foe alike. His having 
numerous wives after the age of forty, that is, when bodily heat 
subsides and the passions are quietened, is decisive, self-evident 
proof for those who are even a little fair-minded that such marriages 
were not to satisfy the carnal appetites, but were for other important 
reasons and instances of wisdom.421 
For Nursi, then, the reason behind his marriages was the fact that his family life had 
to be witnessed and reported to Muslim men and women so that they could learn true 
religion through the example of the Prophet. Nursi also argues that the female-related 
part of religion constitutes half of the entire religion. In this respect, the Prophet 
married several women so that they could learn from him and act as teachers of other 
women.422 
Unlike many other contemporary Muslim scholars, such as Gülen, Nursi keeps his 
argument fairly concise. For instance, he does not defend the Prophet’s marriages on 
the grounds of politics. Gülen, on the other hand, argues that politics was one of the 
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factors behind some of the marriages. The Prophet wanted to befriend certain tribes 
by marrying a woman from them. Another reason, according to Gülen, was to give a 
social message to the men, to encourage them to marry the widows of martyrs and 
look after them.423 
As regards his marriage with Zaynab bint Jaḥsh, who was initially married to the 
Prophet’s adopted son but was later separated, Nursi claims that the Prophet entered 
into it purely on the orders of divine determining.424 The focal point of Nursi’s 
argument is the Qur’anic verse which reads: 
And [remember, O Muḥammad], when you said to the one on whom 
Allāh bestowed favour and you bestowed favour, "Keep your wife 
and fear Allāh," while you concealed within yourself that which 
Allāh is to disclose. And you feared the people, while Allāh has more 
right that you fear Him. So when Zayd had no longer any need for 
her, We married her to you in order that there not be upon the 
believers any discomfort concerning the wives of their adopted sons 
when they no longer have need of them. And ever is the command of 
Allāh accomplished.425 
Furthermore, Nursi explains that the Prophet was trying to teach Muslims that, 
contrary to the common view at the time, Islām allows the marriage of an adopted 
child’s ex-spouse. In other words, adopted children do not have all the characteristics 
of biological children. This justification, however, does not necessarily satisfy critics 
such as Nasrin, who claims that the Prophet made up these verses for his own 
advantage.426 
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4.7.2. Alleged Miracles of the Splitting of the Moon 
The ‘Splitting the Moon’ miracle of the Prophet was allegedly witnessed and reported 
by many of his companions, such as ibn ‘Abbas, Anas ibn Mālik and Abdullah ibn 
Mas‘ūd. Chapter 54, Sūrat Al-Qamar (The Moon), in the Qur’ān reports the incident 
as follows: 
The Hour has come near, and the moon has split [in two]. And if they 
see a miracle, they turn away and say, "Passing magic."427 
The most common criticism made for this particular incident is the fact that it has not 
been reported anywhere else. Nursi argues that the main reason this incident does not 
appear in any popular history-book is its time, location and duration. It took place in 
the middle of the night, in the sparsely populated part of Arabia, for a very brief 
period of time. Therefore, Nursi explains, the Eastern and Western worlds did not 
witness the event since they were in different time zones (i.e. early morning or early 
evening), and the sky might have been overcast to stop others seeing it.428 
Moreover, Nursi clarifies that it was a brief incident, not a lengthy one, so that 
individuals who witnessed it had to decide about it for themselves. He writes: 
Miracles are for proving claims to prophethood and for convincing 
those who deny those claims; they are not for compelling people to 
believe.429 
Nursi argues that the people who witnessed the event are the only ones whose 
opinions are to be taken into account. None of them rejected it, but, as Qur’ān 
indicates, some claimed it to be a ‘passing magic’. 
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4.7.3. Alleged Night Journey and Ascension [Isrā wa al-Mi’rāj] 
One of the most controversial claims about the Prophet Muḥammad concerns his 
night journey from his home in Medina to Jerusalem430 and his ascent to the Heavens 
to speak with God. This is a peak example of Muḥammad’s religious experience. The 
incident took place in 621 CE, and was rejected not only by his tribe at the time, but 
also by critics throughout history. The incident is reported in Chapter 17 of the Qur’ān, 
in Sūrah Al-'Isrā' (The Night Journey), as follows: 
Exalted is He who took His Servant by night from al-Masjid al-
Haram to al-Masjid al- Aqsa, whose surroundings We have blessed, 
to show him of Our signs. Indeed, He is the Hearing, the Seeing.431 
Nursi faces a challenge from the sceptics to defend the authenticity of this claim. He 
admits outright that it is impossible to prove this incident on the grounds of science 
and reason. He believes that non-believers need to be convinced firstly of the 
existence and unity of God, and then convinced that Muḥammad was his true 
messenger.432 However, he attempts to convince sceptical believers of the necessity, 
nature, virtues and benefits of Isrā wa al-Mi’rāj. 
Nursi expounds that it was necessary for God to lift his messenger to the Heavens so 
as to communicate with him. In The Words, he writes: 
Now we say to the atheist who is in the position of listener: “Since 
the universe resembles a most orderly country, magnificent city, and 
adorned palace, it surely must have a ruler, owner, and builder. And 
since there is such a magnificent, All-Glorious Owner, All-Perfect 
Ruler, and All-Beauteous Maker; and since there was a human being 
whose view was universal and who demonstrated a relationship with 
the entire world, country, city, and palace and was connected to all of 
them through his senses and faculties of perception; certainly, the 
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Magnificent Maker would have an elevated relationship to the fullest 
degree with that human being, whose view was universal and 
consciousness comprehensive, and would favour him with an exalted 
and sacred address. 
Among those who manifested this relationship from the time of 
Adam (Peace be upon him) up to now, Muhammad the Arabian 
(Peace and blessings be upon him) demonstrated it at the very fullest 
degree according to the testimony of his achievements, that is, his 
having taken half the globe and a fifth of mankind under this 
direction and control and having transformed and illuminated the 
spiritual shape of the universe. This being so, the Ascension, which 
comprised the very fullest degree of that relationship, is most worthy 
and suitable for him.433 
Nursi, once again, tries to establish a link between the order and design in the 
universe and an Orderer and Designer (i.e. God). He explains that God requires 
someone to convey His messages to humankind; this person (i.e. the prophet) is 
Muḥammad. Therefore, for Nursi, it is completely feasible that God caused his 
messenger to ascend to the Heavens so that he could talk to him and show him what 
most people cannot see but are expected to believe, such as the existence of angels, 
spirits, Hell and Paradise. 
When faced with the scientific implausibility of such long-distance travel in such a 
short period of time, Nursi claims that God is so great and so powerful that nothing is 
beyond his power. Besides, he exclaims, within the limits of science such high-speed 
travels are possible. He asks: 
According to your science, in its annual rotation a heavy body like 
the earth cuts a distance of approximately one hundred and eighty-
eight hours in one minute. In one year it covers a distance of 
approximately twenty-five thousand years. Should an All-Powerful 
and Glorious One, then, Who causes its regular motion and revolves 
it like a stone in a sling be unable to convey a human being to His 
Throne? Should a wisdom that causes the body of the earth, which is 
extremely heavy, to travel around the sun through a dominical law 
known the sun’s gravity like a Mawlawi dervish be unable to raise a 
human body to the Throne of the All-Merciful One like lightning 
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through the gravity of that All-Merciful One’s mercy and the 
attraction of the Pre-Eternal Sun’s love?434 
As a final line of defence, Nursi cites the ḥadīth reported in Bukhāri, in which the 
Prophet explained how he faced a challenge from his own tribe, who asked him to 
describe the mosque in Jerusalem where he claimed to have been. The vision of the 
mosque, the Prophet said, “has been brought in front of my eyes. I looked at it and 
reported the most minute details of it to my tribe, and those who had seen the mosque 
confirmed my description of it.”435 
4.7.4. Nursi on alleged discrepancies in ḥadīth 
Critics of the Prophet have tried to discredit him by showing some discrepancies in 
his sayings (ḥadīth). They claim that some of his sayings do not make any sense when 
judged by science and reality. Perhaps the most criticized ḥadīth in this respect is that 
in which the Prophet responded to a question about what the earth rests upon. The 
Prophet stated that ‘the earth rests upon a bull and fish’.436 Nursi argues that this 
ḥadīth, and those similar to it, are not necessarily scientifically implausible. One 
possible reason for this, according to Nursi, is that the Prophet might have used 
analogies so that ordinary people could understand better.437 Nursi explains that the 
bull in this ḥadīth might actually mean farming and agriculture, and the fish sea-
related activities such as fishing and shipping, since the earth consists of one-third 
land and two-thirds water.438  
Nursi further tries to strengthen his position by reference to another incident, in which 
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the Prophet explained, upon hearing a big bang, that it was the sound of a stone which 
had been rolling downhill for seventy years and had just hit the bottom of Hell.439 
This explanation at first sounded very unrealistic, until a companion arrived at the 
scene and reported the death of a seventy-year-old hypocrite (munāfiq). In fact, the 
Prophet portrayed the scene using a metaphor which was not meant to be taken 
literally. However, some analogies might have changed over time so that they have 
been taken literally. For instance, the analogy of the earth resting upon a bull and a 
fish has been understood as a literal explanation. Nursi also indicates that the Prophet 
once said that the earth rests on a bull and, on another occasion he said that it rests 
upon a fish, meaning that the Earth is within the constellation of Taurus and Pisces. 
Nursi, then, writes: 
… he (The Prophet) indicated a truly profound truth that would be 
understood only many centuries later, and said in the miraculous 
prophetic tongue: “On the Bull,” because at that time the earth was in 
the likeness of the constellation Taurus. And on being asked a month 
later, he replied: “On the Fish,” for then the earth was in the shadow 
of the constellation of Pisces.440 
In other words, the so-called inconsistencies in the Prophet’s sayings, according to 
Nursi, are due to misinterpretations of metaphors used by the Prophet. 
4.7.5. Muḥammad’s defeat in the Battle of Uḥud 
Nursi had to defend the Prophet when he was questioned as to whether Muḥammad 
was a genuine messenger of God after his defeats in certain battles. The argument, 
reformulated as a syllogism, goes like this: 
If Muḥammad had been a genuine prophet, God would have given him 
miracles.  
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The miracles ought to have given him power to see the future. 
He did not see the upcoming manoeuvre of the enemy in the Battle of Uhud, 
and his army was defeated. 
Therefore, the authenticity of his prophethood is doubtful. 
Indeed, it is historically recorded that the Prophet had seen defeats and retreats in 
certain battles. However, Nursi considers these defeats as natural for a human prophet, 
rather than as a weakness. If the Prophet had continuously lived his life on the plane 
of extraordinary miracles, he could not have fulfilled his duty of being ‘absolute imām’ 
and ‘greatest guide’.441  
The second reason God permitted these defeats, according to Nursi, was to let people 
choose freely between the way of the Prophet and the way of the Devil. If the Prophet 
continuously used miraculous powers and defeat the enemy, everyone would be 
forced into believing his message without using their intelligence. This, to Nursi, is 
against the nature of religion and free will. In The Words, Nursi writes: 
Religion is an examination, a test, which distinguishes elevated 
spirits from base ones. It therefore speaks of matters that everyone 
shall see with their eyes in the future in such a way that they remain 
neither altogether unknown, nor self-evident so that everyone would 
be compelled to confirm them. They open the door to the reason but 
do not take the will from the hand.442 
Famous characters such as Khālid ibn al-Walīd fought in the enemy army, and later 
converted to Islām. Nursi argues that these conversions were based purely on 
intelligence and free will. No one could devalue these conversions and argue that 
these people chose Islām out of fear.443 
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4.7.6. Demanding privilege to his family 
Critics of the Qur’ān and the Prophet Muḥammad contend that there are 
inconsistencies in verses such as: 
Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allāh is the most 
righteous of you …444 
and 
Say, [O Muḥammad], "I do not ask you for this message any 
payment [but] only good will through kinship." And whoever 
commits a good deed – We will increase for him good therein …445 
Although the first verse clearly states that virtue is in righteousness, the second 
advises believers to show respect for the Prophet’s family, implying that there is 
virtue in doing so. Therefore, it has been argued that the Prophet demanded privileges 
for his family, which is clearly a contradiction of the institution of prophethood. 
According to Nursi, this behaviour might be justified by two arguments. The first is 
that the Prophet foresaw that there were going to be great personalities among his 
descendants who would become light-giving trees in the world of Islām, in terms of 
providing a true representation of Islām and true guidance to Muslims.446 Secondly, 
with his clairvoyance, he foresaw that his family would multiply and reach a great 
number. Since family kinship requires great partiality, submission and partisanship, 
the Prophet knew that the members of his family would always embrace Islām and 
protect it at any cost, even though some of them were less knowledgeable than other 
Muslims.447 
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4.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has looked into the argument from religious experience, Prophet 
Muḥammad in particular. It has outlined the argument from religious experience and 
counterarguments as to that the ARE is not acceptable as a philosophical argument. It 
has followed by Nursi’s case for Prophet Muhammad’s prophethood mainly based on 
the reported wonders he displayed as in the existing literature. In the last section, it 
has analysed Nursian defence to particular attacks to Prophet Muḥammad. 
It is apparent in Nursi’s writings that he tries to establish a logical link between order 
in the universe and an Orderer of the universe, as was discussed in the previous 
chapter. In this chapter, we have seen how Nursi moves from the existence of God to 
the necessity of God having prophets. Nursi argues that the existence of prophets, 
Prophet Muḥammad in particular, is an evidence for the existence of God. He claims 
that the universe teleologically proves that it has got a Master and a Maker who must 
communicate with His subjects on Earth. Since communication with a group requires 
a representative, this person ought to be the most credible, intelligent, consistent and 
honest among them. Therefore, Nursi asserts, God chooses persons possessing these 
qualities, i.e. the prophets, in order to talk to them and put them in charge of 
spreading His message among people. 
Like many of his predecessors, Nursi then sets out to argue that the Prophet 
Muḥammad displays all the necessary characteristics of being a most perfect human, 
thereby qualifying for prophethood. Starting with Muḥammad’s early life, Nursi 
relates a list of unusual events (irhāṣāt), such as the disappearance of Lake Sivah, the 
toppling of the idols in Ka’ba and the dying of the sacred fire of the Zoroastrians 
(majūsis), and claims that Muḥammad’s prophethood had already been indicated via 
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these signs. He then moves on to the Prophet Muḥammad’s life after his prophethood, 
and reports some examples of his miracles, his leadership, and his personal life. He 
then attempts to develop a theme whereby he claims that the Prophet Muḥammad was 
a man among men, not a supernatural being, in order to set an example to humanity of 
the way of life prescribed by God in the Qur’ān.  
Nursi also elaborates on the Prophet Muḥammad’s leadership during his short reign in 
the city-state of Medina. He demonstrates how Muḥammad transformed a fairly 
uncivilized society into a one which is admired by many. This social transformation is 
believed by Nursi to be due to the divine source of Muḥammad’s teachings 
Nursi implies that the personal experience of the Prophet Muḥammad had to be 
accepted as genuine, since Muḥammad, as an individual, clearly passes the tests set to 
validate or invalidade one’s personal religious experience. Considering Muḥammad’s 
truthfulness, trustworthiness and personal integrity, Nursi believes, there is no room 
to doubt about his encounters with the angel Gabriel and God. 
For Nursi, the combined strength of Muhammad’s religious experience and miracles 
are the evidence of him being an authentic prophet of God which in turn proves the 
existence of God. 
The chapter concludes that a careful analysis of Risāle-i Nur reveals that Nursi leans 
his arguments on the existing literature about the miracles of Prophet Muḥammad 
which has been the tradition in the Islamic world for centuries. In this respect, it can 
be argued that there is almost no new material other than Nursi’s social 
transformation argument, against which counterarguments have already been 
developed. 
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With regard to defending Prophet Muḥammad against criticisms Nursi invokes the 
help of the Qur’ān as well as simple logic and common sense. Hence, other than 
making a passionate case for the excellence of Prophet Muḥammad’s character and 
virtues in his actions Nursi does not seem to bring out any new arguments.
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CHAPTER 5: NURSI ON REVELATIONS [WAḤY] 
5.1. Introduction 
The third of Saīd Nursi’s four ways of arguing for the existence of God is his 
argument from scriptures (kutub) or revelations (waḥy). Nursi explains how his 
discourse of life changed upon reading, in 1898, a newspaper article in which the 
British Secretary for the Colonies was reported as saying: 
So long as the Muslims have the Qur’ān, we shall be unable to 
dominate them. We must either take it from them, or make them lose 
their love of it.448 
Up until that time, Nursi, who was in his early twenties, was mainly interested in 
science and other theoretical knowledge taught at madrasas, not theology or 
philosophy. He considered this Western attempt to devalue the Qur’ān a greater threat, 
and declared:  
I shall prove and demonstrate to the world that the Qur’ān is an 
undying, inextinguishable Sun!449 
In other words, Nursi, in turning his attention to theology, set out to argue that the 
Qur’ān is a genuine scripture revealed by God to his final Messenger, Muḥammad. 
Nursi’s intellectual transformation into a scholar of natural theology, especially 
concerning the origins and the meanings of life and the universe, begins here. He 
outlines four arguments to prove the existence of God with all His attributes,450 
                                                      
448 Nursi writes in his biography that he read this newspaper article in Van in 1898, where 
William Ewart Gladstone, British Secretary for Colonies was reported to say these particular 
words.  
See Vahide and Abu-Rabi, 'Islam in Modern Turkey an Intellectual Biography of 
Bediuzzaman Said Nursi', at 30 
449 For Nursi’s transformation, see his own narration in Nursi, ‘Tarihçe-i Hayatı’, at 2131 
450 What makes Nursi distinct from many other mutakallimūn such as Ibn-i Sinā, and al-
Fārābi is that Nursi is not only concerned with proving the existence of a Deity, but also 
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arguments which, he believes, would help mankind to understand the meaning of the 
cosmos and human existence. These are: [1] The proof from the universe (kitāb-ı 
kabīr-i kāināt) (i.e. the design argument, which was discussed in Chapter 3); [2] The 
proof from prophethood (nubuwwah), which was discussed in Chapter 4; [4] the proof 
from the scriptures (waḥy), which is the subject of this chapter; and [4] the proof from 
human conscience (wijdān), which will be discussed in Chapter 6.451  
In the previous chapters, Nursi’s arguments from the universe and the prophethood 
have been discussed. In this chapter, the details of his argument from revelations, and 
from the Qur’ān in particular, will be examined. In philosophy, the argument from 
miracles deals with the prophethood and the Divine Scriptures together. Therefore, 
this chapter focuses on the argument from miracles. Also, Nursi contends that the 
prophets and the scriptures are inseparable. To his mind, the Qur’ān and Muḥammad 
are inextricably interconnected, and they prove the truthfulness each other 
reciprocally. Since the criticisms of the sceptics are pointed at the prophethood and 
the scriptures simultaneously, Nursi tries to defend his theistic position and to refute 
these criticisms. In this respect, Chapters 4 and 5 are closely connected. 
5.2. The Qur’ān as the genuine revelation 
Abrahamic monotheism accepts three main bodies of texts (suhuf) as being 
revelations from God: the Torah (at-Tawrāt), the Gospels (az-Zabūr and al-Injīl), and 
the Qur’ān, as well as other unknown suhuf mentioned in the Qur’ān. The Islamic 
creed commands followers of the Qur’ān to believe equally in all the previous 
                                                                                                                                                            
interested in His attributes. He believes that philosophy could only achieve proof of the 
existence of a Supreme Being, whereas his Risāle-i Nur explains what kind of Supreme Being 
He is and what he expects from humankind. 
451 There are mentions of this set of proofs in several different books of Nursi. For instance; 
see Nursi, The Words  at 91. And Nursi, Al-Mathnawi Al-Nuri. at 1283 and 1368 
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revelations and the messengers.452 If someone denies the truthfulness of Jesus or the 
Bible or any other prophet in this sense, he falls into disbelief (kufr).453 Nursi touches 
on this matter lightly, since his main concern is the last Prophet and his Book. He 
bases his argument on the assumption that if the truthfulness of revelation and the 
prophethood is proven, the content of their message has to be taken as fact. He takes 
this argument through the root of Islām; therefore, he focuses on the book of Islām 
(i.e. the Qur’ān), and the Prophet of Islām (i.e. Muḥammad). The basis of Nursi’s 
argument is the miraculousness of the Prophet Muḥammad and the Qur’ān. In the 
following, once Nursi’s point of view regarding the scripture and the Prophet has 
been established, the historical and traditional Humean objection, which in recent 
times has been endorsed by Mackie, Flew and Everitt, will be examined. Nursi asserts 
that if one succeeds in convincing the rationalist mind that the Qur’ān is a genuine 
scripture, this automatically entails the existence of God as a genuine fact, not an 
assumption. 
Throughout Risāle-i Nur, Nursi systematically refers to the cosmos (kaināt), the 
Prophet and the Qur’ān to present the case for his theism. In The Words, The Twenty-
fifth Word,454 which concerns the miraculousness of the Qur’ān, is Nursi’s focal 
writing in defence of the Qur’ān’s divine origins. In this work, Nursi presents his case 
using a highly systematic structure.455 It may be said that this treatise on the Qur’ān is  
one of the most elaborate, well-structured and detailed pieces of work Nursi ever 
                                                      
452 Qur’ān, 3:84: Say, “We have believed in Allāh and in what was revealed to us and what 
was revealed to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, and the Descendants, and in what was given 
to Moses and Jesus and to the prophets from their Lord. We make no distinction between any 
of them, and we are Muslims [submitting] to Him." 
453 Qur’ān, 4:136: O you who have believed, believe in Allāh and His Messenger and the 
Book that He sent down upon His Messenger and the Scripture which He sent down before. 
And whoever disbelieves in Allāh, His angels, His books, His messengers, and the Last Day 
has certainly gone far astray. 
454 See Nursi, The Words  at 160-204. 
455 See Appendix 7: Map of Nursi’s Twenty-fifth Word: Miraculousness of the Qur’ān. 
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produced. One can easily realise upon a close study of Risāle-i Nur that Nursi, 
contrary to many other scholars, presents his expositions in a fairly systematic 
manners. This is also highly visible in The Nineteenth Letter on the Miracles of 
Muḥammad. 
In order to demonstrate that the Qur’ān is not an ordinary book but a Divine Scripture 
revealed by God to the Prophet Muḥammad, Nursi produces three sets of arguments. 
In the first set, he explains what he claims are three unique characteristics of the 
Qur’ān: its eloquence (balāghah), its comprehensiveness (jāmi‘iyyah), and its 
reporting of the unseen (ikhbār-ı ghaybī). In the second set, he demonstrates the 
Qur’ān’s features of fluency or clarity (fasaha) and conciseness (ījāz) and finally, in 
the third set of arguments he argues for the miraculousness (i’jāz) of the Qur’ān, its 
superiority over materialistic philosophy, and its superiority over human reason.  
5.3. Nursi’s exposition 
One of the most common criticisms of the Qur’ān concerns it being allegedly the 
poetic writings of the Prophet Muḥammad.456 It is widely argued that the Qur’ān is 
very different from any other book ever written before or after. Clearly, a better 
appreciation and understanding of the Qur’ān’s poetic aspect requires some basic 
knowledge of the Arabic language. Therefore, we shall give meanings and 
transliterations in order to make the language more understandable to non-Arabic-
speaking people.  
                                                      
456 For the arguments for the authenticity, see Maurice Bucaille, The Bible, the Quran and 
Science : The Holy Scriptures Examined in the Light of Modern Knowledge (Indianapolis: 
American Trust Publications, 1978). 
For the criticism, see Patricia Crone and M. A. Cook, Hagarism : The Making of the Islamic 
World (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
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i. The eloquence (balāghah) 
The poetic aspect of the Qur’ān is probably the most apparent of its characteristics. 
This is mainly because of the nature of the oral culture of the people of the Arabian 
Peninsula in the seventh century AD. Poetry was at its peak, and poets were the most 
respected people in the community. Poetry was so powerful that it could start or end 
wars between tribes. Nursi reports that, owing to common illiteracy among people, 
historical events, praising and scorning, as well as moral values, used to be related in 
the form of poems.457 This, naturally, makes them easy to memorize and remember. It 
is also a widespread technique for memorizing important information today. As soon 
as the Prophet spoke the first five verses of Chapter 96,458 The Clot (Sūrat al-
‘Alaq),459 people were astonished by its eloquence. This rhythmical aspect of verses 
that end with a rhyme is more or less continuous throughout the Qur’ān. Although the 
                                                      
457 Nursi, The Words  at 162. 
458 The first five verses of the Chapter 96 were the first verses revealed to the Prophet. It is 
important to note that the chronological revelation order and the text order of the verses in the 
Qur’ān are different. 
459 In the first five verses of Chapter 96: The Clot, verses 1 and 2 rhyme; similarly verses 3, 4 
and 5 rhyme between themselves. 
The Original: 
) ََﻖﻠَﺧ %ِﺬﱠﻟ* َﻚﱢﺑ.َ ِﻢْﺳِﺎﺑ 3َْﺮْﻗ*1(  
) ٍَﻖﻠَﻋ ْﻦِﻣ *َﺎَﺴﻧِﻹ/ ََﻖﻠَﺧ2(  
) "َُﺮَْﻛﻷ( َﻚﱡﺑ,َ-َ .َْﺮْﻗ(3(  
) َِﻢَﻠﻘْﻟِﺎﺑ َﻢﱠﻠَﻋ ,ِﺬﱠﻟ.4(  
 ) َْﻢﻠَْﻌ& َْﻢﻟ ﺎَﻣ *َﺎَﺴﻧِﻹ/ َﻢﱠﻠَﻋ5(  
English phonetic readings: 
1. Iqra bi-ismi rabbika allathee khalaq 
2. Khalaqa al-insana min AAalaq 
3. Iqra warabbuka al-akram 
4. Allathee AAallama bialqalam 
5. AAallama al-insana ma lam yaAAlam 
The Meaning: 
1. Proclaim! (or Read!) In the name of thy Lord and Cherisher, Who created 
2. Created man, out of a (mere) clot of congealed blood 
3. Proclaim! And thy Lord is Most Bountiful 
4. He Who taught (The use of) the pen 
5. Taught man that which he knew not 
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poetic aspect of the Qur’ān is arguably the most visible, Nursi does not elaborate upon 
this aspect of the Qur’ān. 
Nursi points out that despite the Qur’ān’s open challenge in 2:23,460 no one has ever 
succeeded in imitating its eloquence.461 The Signs of Miraculousness (al-Ishārāt al-
I’jāz) is Nursi’s first attempt to write a full commentary on the Qur’ān. This work had 
to be left incomplete owing to the outbreak of the First World War and Nursi’s exile 
to Russia as a prisoner of war. However, the existing work examines specific 
fascinating features of the Qur’ān. Although Nursi intended to interpret all the verses 
of the Qur’ān, he only managed to comment on the opening chapter and the first 33 
verses of the second chapter.462  
Further to the Qur’ān’s poetic features, Nursi elaborates on the eloquence of the 
Qur’ān, highlighting some of its apparent aspects. These are: its word-order (naẓm), 
its meaning (ma’nà), its literary style (uslūb), its use of letters and words (lafẓ), and 
its manner of exposition (bayān). 
The Qur’ān’s word-order (naẓm) 
Regarding the word-order of the Qur’ān (naẓm), Nursi likens the Qur’ān to a clock 
and explains: 
The way the second, minute, and hour hands of a clock each 
complete the order of the others, that is the way the entire work 
explains the order in each sentence and passage of the All-Wise 
                                                      
460 Qur’ān, 2:23: And if you are in doubt about what We have sent down upon Our Servant 
[Muḥammad], then produce a surah the like thereof and call upon your witnesses other than 
Allāh, if you should be truthful. 
461 Nursi, Al-Mathnawi Al-Nuri  at 1368. 
462 See Nursi’s Signs of Miraculousness in Nursi, Risale-I Nur Külliyati 2  at 1155-274. 
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Qur’an, and in each of its words, and in the order in the relationships 
between the sentences.463 
In a fairly complex manner, he breaks down the components of the verses such as 
‘But if a breath of your Sustainer's punishment touches them’464 and ‘And spend [in 
God's way] out of what We have bestowed on them as sustenance’.465 He tries to 
demonstrate how each letter and word has an extraordinary role in conveying a very 
efficient message in a very short sentence. Nursi seems to direct his argument to the 
minds of Arabic grammarians more than to that of an ordinary reader. Nonetheless, 
the average reader may also appreciate the general line of Nursi’s argument. 
The Qur’ān’s meaning (ma’nà) 
As regards the meanings of the Qur’ān (ma’nà), Nursi explains that verses such as 
‘All that is in the heavens and on the earth extols and glorifies God, for He is the 
Tremendous, the Wise’466 give life and consciousness to apparently dead and soulless 
cosmic objects, and make them extol and glorify God. The Qur’ān, in his thinking, 
transforms the darkness of ignorance into a domain of light. Chaos gives way to order, 
and futility is replaced by meaningfulness.467 
The Qur’ān’s style (uslūb) 
As regards the style of the Qur’ān (uslūb), Nursi asserts that it is unique and that there 
has never been anything similar before or after it. One aspect of this uniqueness is the 
fact that there are opening expressions in some chapters which consist of letters but 
                                                      
463 Nursi, The Words  at 163. 
464 Qur’ān, 21:46. 
465 Qur’ān, 2:3. 
466 Qur’ān, 57:1. 
467 Nursi, The Words  at 165. 
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do not form a meaningful word.468 Nursi had a great personal interest in the secret 
meanings of these code letters. In al-Ishārāt al-I’jāz, he studies the possible meanings 
of these unique symbols, and concludes that they cannot be the intellectual product of 
any human mind.469 To Nursi, the Qur’ān does not imitate anything and nothing could 
ever imitate it. He believes that the Qur’ān’s style is strange, original, awe-inspiring, 
superior, majestic, beautiful, and ever-young.470  
To demonstrate the beauty of the Qur’ān’s style, Nursi gives the example of the verse 
‘Say, “O Allah, Owner of Sovereignty, You give sovereignty to whom You will and 
You take sovereignty away from whom You will. You honour whom You will and 
You humble whom You will. In Your hand is [all] good. Indeed, You are over all 
things competent.”’471  
Nursi points out what he calls the majestic style of the Qur’ān. For example, Chapter 
11 (Sūrat al-Hūd) narrates the story of the prophet Noah. The verse, which tells of the 
end of the storm and the massive flood, goes as follows: 
And it was said, “O earth, swallow your water, and O sky, withhold 
[your rain].” And the water subsided, and the matter was 
accomplished, and the ship came to rest on the [mountain of] Judiyy. 
And it was said, “Away with the wrongdoing people.”472 
                                                      
468 Some examples are: Qur’ān [2:1]: Alif, Lam, Meem. And Qur’ān [19:1]: Kaf, Ha, Ya, 
'Ayn, Sad. 
469 Nursi, The Words  at 165. 
470 Ibid., at 168. 
471 It is inevitable that most of Nursi’s Qur’anic presentations will be lost in translation.  
The original verse of Qur’ān, 3:26: 
 ْﻠُﻤْﻟ& 'ُِﺰَﻨﺗ-َ ُءﺎََﺸﺗ ﻦَﻣ َﻚْﻠُﻤْﻟ& ﻲِﺗُْﺆﺗ ِﻚْﻠُﻤْﻟ& َﻚِﻟﺎَﻣ ﱠُﻢ8ﱠﻠﻟ& ُِﻞﻗ ُءﺎََﺸﺗ ﻦَﻣ ﱡﺰُِﻌﺗ-َ ُءﺎََﺸﺗ ﻦﱠﻤِﻣ َﻚ
 ٌﺮ#َِﺪﻗ ٍءْﻲَﺷ ﱢﻞُﻛ َٰﻰﻠَﻋ َﻚﱠِﻧ8 ۖ ُﺮ:َْﺨْﻟ= >ََِﺪ:ِﺑ ۖ ُءﺎََﺸﺗ ﻦَﻣ ﱡFُِﺬﺗHَ  
Meaning: Say, "O Allāh, Owner of Sovereignty, You give sovereignty to whom You will and 
You take sovereignty away from whom You will. You honour whom You will and You 
humble whom You will. In Your hand is [all] good. Indeed, You are over all things 
competent. 
472 Qur’ān, 11:44. 
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This, according to Nursi, is a clear example of a distinctive style of the Qur’ān, which 
not only narrates a past event but also stresses the great control of God over earthly 
incidents. Similarly, in the opening verses of Chapter 84 (Sūrat al-'Inshiqāq),473 the 
Qur’ān not only reports an event in the future (i.e. the Judgement Day), but also 
demonstrates God’s absolute control over the entire universe. 
The Speech of the Qur’ān (lafẓ) 
Nursi claims that the Qur’ān is extraordinarily eloquent in terms of naẓm, ma’nà and 
uslūb yet outstandingly easy to read, listen to or memorize. This, in his mind, is 
further clear evidence of the Qur’ān’s divine origins. He notes that human nature is 
such that repetition causes boredom after a while. If the same text is read repeatedly, 
it becomes dull and uninteresting. However, the Qur’ān has been read and memorized 
by millions of people over the years, unlike any man-made texts, but it still feels 
exciting and fresh. Even very young children can easily memorize it thanks to the 
wonderful, fluent eloquence of its wording. Nursi exclaims that the Qur’ān is the truth 
and the reality and truthfulness and guidance and wonderfully eloquent; that it does 
not cause weariness, but preserves its freshness and agreeableness as though 
preserving a perpetual youth.474 
To Nursi, then, its freshness, unweariness and perpetual youth is another miraculous 
aspect of the Qur’ān.  
Manner of exposition (bayān) 
                                                      
473 Qur’ān, 84:1-5: When the sky has split [open]. And has responded to its Lord and was 
obligated [to do so]. And when the earth has been extended. And has cast out that within it 
and relinquished [it]. And has responded to its Lord and was obligated [to do so].  
474 Nursi, The Words  at 168. 
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On the excellence of the Qur’ān’s manner of exposition (bayān), Nursi claims that it 
has a superiority, conciseness and grandeur that set it over all other discourse.475 He 
then goes on to give examples of verses where there are special modes of expositions 
of praise, deterring, threatening, censure, restraint, proof, and demonstration.476 
For Nursi, the grandeur and majesty of verses such as ‘Has there reached you the 
report of the Overwhelming [event]?’477 and ‘It (the earth) almost bursts with rage’,478 
and ‘Qaf. By the honoured the Qur’ān …’,479 are a clear indication that the Qur’ān is 
by no means the word of a human being.  
ii. The comprehensiveness (jāmi’iyya) 
This aspect of the Qur’ān, according to Nursi, is essentially its characteristic of 
offering distinctive messages to every level of intelligence. Nursi argues that a fairly 
short verse such as “And the mountains as stakes?”480 could offer different meanings 
to different people, such as an ordinary person, a poet, a geographer and a scientist. 
Furthermore, Nursi goes on to explain that an ordinary person would understand this 
verse literally, in terms of the mountains being pegged on the earth and giving 
benefits to people. A poet would see the mountains as pillars, which hold the massive 
tent of the sky. A geographer would perceive the mountains as the masts of a boat, 
                                                      
475 Ibid. 
476 For threatening, see Qur’ān, 88:1: Has there reached you the report of the Overwhelming 
[event]? 
For disapproval, see Qur’ān, 49:12: O you, who have believed, avoid much [negative] 
assumption. Indeed, some assumption is sin. And do not spy or backbite each other. Would 
one of you like to eat the flesh of his brother when dead? You would detest it. And fear Allāh; 
indeed, Allāh is Accepting of repentance and Merciful. 
For proof, see Qur’ān, 30:50: So observe the effects of the mercy of Allāh - how He gives life 
to the earth after its lifelessness. Indeed, that [same one] will give life to the dead, and He is 
over all things competent. 
477 Qur’ān, 88:1. 
478 Qur’ān, 67:8. 
479 Qur’ān, 50:1. 
480 Qur’ān, 78:7. 
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which play essential roles in balancing and stabilizing the Earth. A scientist would 
read this verse in terms of the benefits of the mountains, which are the main source of 
water and air-cleansing. A natural philosopher would deduce a meaning whereby the 
Earth is the safety-valve on the internal tension of the Earth.481  
Another verse Nursi cites is, “Have those who disbelieved not considered that the 
heavens and the earth were a joined entity, and We separated them and made from 
water every living thing? Then will they not believe?”482 A scholar, Nursi claims, 
would read this verse as meaning that the Earth and the mountains are the artwork of 
a Glorious Maker. A modern philosopher understands how the Earth and the solar 
system are formed for a purpose by an all-knowing Creator.483 
Also, Nursi argues that the verse “And the sun runs [on course] toward its stopping 
point. That is the determination of the Exalted in Might, the Knowing”484 speaks to a 
scholar, an astronomer, a philosopher and a poet differently. 
Having indicated numerous examples of the Qur’ān’s extraordinary 
comprehensiveness in terms of meaning, knowledge, the subject it puts forward, and 
concision, Nursi exclaims: 
Indeed, if the Qur’ān's verses are considered carefully and fairly, it 
will be seen that they do not resemble a gradual chain of thought, 
following one or two aims, like other books. Rather, the Qur’ān's 
manner is sudden and instantaneous; it is inspired on the moment; it 
has the mark that all its aspects which arrive together come 
independently from somewhere distant, a most serious and important 
discourse which comes singly and concisely.485 
                                                      
481 Nursi, The Words  at 174-75. 
482 Qur’ān, 21:30. 
483 Nursi, The Words  at 165. 
484 Qur’ān, 36:38. 
485 Nursi, The Words  at 165. 
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Nursi then moves on to his next argument regarding the Qur’ān’s miraculousness, that 
is, its reporting of future events. 
iii. Reporting the unseen (ikhbār-i ghaybī) 
Any objective reader of the Qur’ān can easily recognize that it reports the past and 
foretells future events. It informs its readers about the attributes of God, cosmic 
phenomena, the nature of Judgement Day, and life after death. Nursi considers the 
fact that the Prophet was an illiterate man, that there was little written culture and 
limited contact with the outside world. Yet, the Prophet reports many unseen matters 
with a great accuracy which is hard to explain.486 The Qur’ān mentions the names of 
and stories about some twenty-five previous messengers of God;487 including Adam, 
who is believed to be the first man and the first prophet to have existed on earth. 
Some of the narrations are similar to, but not identical with, those in the Bible and the 
Torah. Nursi suggests that this kind of accurate reporting could only be the work of 
someone who has witnessed these events, which is impossible, since no one can live 
so long, or of someone who oversees and relates to everything. That could only be 
The Knower of the Unknown God.488 
Regarding the news about the future in the Qur’ān, Nursi notes few examples. It is 
therefore fairly easy to examine whether these represent just some remote guesses or 
whether they concern events that have actually happened. 
                                                      
486 Nursi, The Letters  at 392-96. 
487 See Appendix 5: Twenty-five prophets mentioned in Qur’ān by name. 
488 Nursi, The Words  at 181. 
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Example 1: The Qur’ān [30:1-2] tells us, “Alīf, Lām, Mīm. The Byzantines have been 
defeated.”489 Chapter 30 in the Qur’ān is Sūrat Al-Rūm (The Romans), which was 
revealed in Mecca before 622. Two of the superpowers at the time were the Roman 
Empire in the West and the Persian (Sassanid) Empire in the East. There were seven 
century-long wars between them from 92 BC to AD 628. Although frontiers remained 
the same, it was a continuous conflict taking place over a long period of time. In AD 
623, the Persians conquered Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Rhodes, and entered Anatolia 
only a few years after the revelation of Sūrat Al-Rūm. What is more extraordinary is 
that, immediately after these verses, the Qur’ān tells us: “In the nearest land. But they, 
after their defeat, will overcome. Within three to nine years. To Allāh belongs the 
command before and after. And that day the believers will rejoice.”490 In fact, the 
Persian victory was short-lived. In AD 627, the Roman commander Heraclius 
defeated the Persian army at Nineveh, and restored the True Cross to Jerusalem, after 
the Persians agreed to withdraw from all occupied territories.491 
Example 2: Qur’ān, 48:27–28:  
Certainly has Allāh showed to His Messenger the vision in truth. You 
will surely enter al-Masjid al-Ḥarām, if Allāh wills, in safety, with 
your heads shaved and [hair] shortened, not fearing [anyone]. He 
knew what you did not know and has arranged before that a conquest 
near [at hand]. 
For Nursi, this appears to be a classic example of ikhbār-i ghaybī (news of the 
unknown). Indeed, when one looks more closely at the history of early Islām, one can 
clearly observe that, only few years after the revelation of this verse, the Prophet 
                                                      
489 This verse is given in the Sahih International English translation. The Yusuf Ali translation 
uses ‘The Roman Empire’ rather than ‘The Byzantine Empire’. Historically, the latter is 
accepted as being the continuation of the former, hence there is no contradiction. 
490 Qur’ān, 30:1–2. 
491 Warwick Ball, Rome in the East : The Transformation of an Empire (London [etc.]: 
Routledge, 2000) at 106-14. 
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conquered the city of Mecca and the Sacred Mosque (al-Masjid al-Ḥarām).492 The 
Qur’ān, 5:67 also tells the Prophet, “O Messenger, announce that which has been 
revealed to you from your Lord, and if you do not, then you have not conveyed His 
message. And Allāh will protect you from the people. Indeed, Allāh does not guide 
the disbelieving people.” In the latter part of this verse, there is a clear indication that 
the Prophet will not receive any harm from people. As a matter of fact, during his 
lifetime he escaped an assassination attempt in Mecca, fought one of the hardest 
battles in history in Badr and was wounded in the battle of Uḥud, yet no one could 
ever manage to do him any harm. He died in 632 in Medina in his bed, as a result of 
high fever.493 
So far, we have seen some examples that Nursi cites of the Qur’ān’s news from the 
past and the future. The third type of information that the Qur’ān imparts concerns 
what Nursi calls divine truths, cosmic truths, and matters of the Hereafter.494 Nursi 
suggests that these represent the most important type of knowledge concerning the 
unseen; since no one could possible know about them. The pattern that emerges from 
Nursi’s presentation is such that he tries to demonstrate that the Qur’ān is very 
accurate in its reporting of past and future unseen events. Therefore, Nursi implies 
                                                      
492 Some important dates of the Prophet’s life: 
570/1: He was born in Mecca. 
610: He declared his prophethood. 
622: He emigrated to Medina. 
630: He conquered Mecca. 
632: He died in Medina. 
Also see, Appendix 8: Chronology of the Prophet Muḥammad 
493 Lings, Muhammad : His Life Based on the Earliest Sources  at 345-46. 
494 For instance, the Qur’ān reports about The Day of Judgement in [21:47]: And We place 
the scales of justice for the Day of Resurrection, so no soul will be treated unjustly at all. And 
if there is [even] the weight of a mustard seed, We will bring it forth. And sufficient are We 
as accountant. 
And life after death in [4:13]: These are the limits [set by] Allāh, and whoever obeys Allāh 
and His Messenger will be admitted by Him to gardens [in Paradise] under which rivers flow, 
abiding eternally therein; and that is the great attainment. And [3:12]: Say to those who 
disbelieve, “You will be overcome and gathered together to Hell, and wretched is the resting 
place.” 
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that the Qur’ān’s report of Divine truths and the nature of the Hereafter, though these 
could not be seen by naked eye, ought to be taken literally. In The Words, Nursi 
writes: 
The Qur’ān’s expositions of the Divine truths, and its explanations of 
the cosmos, which solve the talisman of the universe and riddle of 
creation, are the most important of its disclosures about the Unseen. 
For it is not reasonable to expect the human reason to discover those 
truths about the Unseen and follow them without deviating amid 
innumerable ways of misguidance. It is well-known that the most 
brilliant philosophers of mankind have been unable to solve the most 
insignificant of those matters by use of the reason.495 
These examples of the first two types of reporting of the unseen (i.e. from the past and 
the future) to Nursi are very clear and verifiable, and the objective reader ought to be 
convinced about the truthfulness of the Qur’ān. Nursi continues: 
For it is not reasonable to expect the human reason to discover those 
truths about the Unseen and follow them without deviating amid 
innumerable ways of misguidance. It is well known that the most 
brilliant philosophers of mankind have been unable to reach the most 
insignificant of those matters by use of the reason. Furthermore, it is 
after the Qur’ān has explained those Divine truths and cosmic truths, 
which it points out, and after the heart has been cleansed and the soul 
purified, and after the spirit has advanced and the mind been 
perfected that the human mind affirms and accepts those truths.496 
Nursi argues that the Qur’ān speaks to its reader as if it is just being revealed now. In 
every century, its messages sound young and fresh. The Qur’ān’s orders and rules are 
always solid and permanent. They never change. But times, lifestyles, and the 
practices of mankind are ever-changing. In order to build a functional society, the 
Qur’ān asserts two rules, which, according to Nursi, have never been invalidated.497 
These rules are established in the Qur’ān, 2:43 and 2:275. 
                                                      
495 Nursi, The Words  at 182. 
496 Ibid. 
497 Ibid., at 183. 
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The Qur’ān, 2:43 orders: “And establish prayer and give zakat and bow with those 
who bow [in worship and obedience].” And the Qur’ān, 2:275 gives clear instructions 
about how to conduct business and trade, and explains: 
Those who consume interest cannot stand [on the Day of 
Resurrection] except as one stands who is being beaten by Satan into 
insanity. That is because they say, "Trade is [just] like interest." But 
Allāh has permitted trade and has forbidden interest. So whoever has 
received an admonition from his Lord and desists may have what is 
past, and his affair rests with Allāh. But whoever returns to [dealing 
in interest or usury] - those are the companions of the Fire; they will 
abide eternally therein.498 
Here, we need to concentrate on the concepts of zakāt499 (charity) and ribā500 
(charging interest, or usury). The absence of zakāt and the widespread practice of ribā 
are argued to be the root cause of almost every social problem in human history.501 
The Qur’ān does not suggest complete, socialist-style equality between individuals. 
Instead, it encourages free trade and wealth-building. However, in order to stabilize 
society, even the poorest must have their essential needs met. This, according to the 
Qur’ān, has to be achieved by zakāt. Zakāt is essentially 2.5 per cent of one’s annual 
wealth, which is meant to be transferred to the poor of the community. If this were 
given, Nursi argues, the poor would show respect to the rich, not hatred as a result of 
jealousy. Moreover, the rich would not look down on the poor, since it would be their 
responsibility to share a certain amount of their wealth with them.502 Nursi explains 
that, because of the lack of zakāt, the financial gap between the rich and poor widened 
to breaking point, which resulted in social clashes, wars and, eventually, revolutions 
                                                      
498 Qur’ān, 2:275. 
499 Zakāt is obligatory payment made annually under Islamic law on certain kinds of property 
about 2.5% and used for charitable and religious purposes. It is translated into English as 
‘charity’, which does not accurately represent the actual meaning. 
500 Ribā is what we now call bank interest, which is the money paid regularly at a particular 
rate for the use of money lent, or for delaying the repayment of a debt. 
501See Calvin Elliott, Usury; a Scriptural, Ethical and Economic View (Millersburg, Ohio: 
Anti-Usury League, 1902). 
502 Nursi, The Words  at 163-64. 
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in their extreme form.503 One example of this is the communist revolution in Russia in 
the early twentieth century. The Communist regime took the extreme measure of 
confiscating all personal property and distributing all the wealth generated equally. 
This eventually caused the collapse of the regime, since people did not have any 
personal motivation for productivity.504 While this was the scene in Communist 
countries, the West took a complete opposite route, into capitalism. Capitalism 
effectively encouraged individuals to earn an unlimited amount of money and wealth. 
States had to set up unreasonable taxes505 on these earnings, and largely failed to 
collect them. Unless taxes are collected forcibly, human nature is such that people 
would not share their money voluntarily if they had not got a strong faith in the cause. 
Similarly, ribā (usury) causes a great many social and financial problems in 
society.506 These issues will be discussed in the next chapter, which focuses on 
‘Morality and Conscience’. 
iv. The Qur’ān’s fluency, coherence and harmony 
Many linguists and experts in semantics have studied these characteristics of the 
Qur’ān over the centuries.507 Muslim scholars argue that there is a very clear 
coherence throughout the entire Qur’ān considering the fact that it took some twenty 
                                                      
503 Ibid., at 324. 
504 Wade V. Lewis, One Planet, Many Worlds (Boston: Christopher Pub. House, 1949) at 45. 
505 For instance, the basic income tax in the UK in 2011 is 20%, higher income tax is 40% and 
the additional income tax is 50%. Value Added Tax (VAT) is 20% on most services and 
products.  
506 For the lengthy argument, see Jeremiah O'callaghan, Usury, or Interest : Proved to Be 
Repugnanat to the Divine and Ecclesiastical Laws, and Destructive to Civil Society (New 
York: The author, 1824). 
507 For instance, Al-Jurjānī (d.1078) produced a list of books dedicated to demonstrating the 
linguistics and semantics of Qur’ān. Some of his works are 'I'jaz al-Qur’ān (The inimitability 
of the Qur’ān), Kitab 'Aroud (Poetic Structure), Al-'Awamel al-Mi'ah (The Hundred 
Elements), Al–Miftāḥ (The Key), Shar'ḥ al-Fātiḥa fī Mujallad (Explaining Al-Fātiḥa in a 
Volume), Al-Jumal (Sentences), Asrar al-Balaghah (The Secrets of Elucidation), and Dalā'il 
al-I'jāz (Intimations of Inimitability). 
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years to complete its revelation.508 In particular, most chapters were formed after 
separate groups of verses, which had been revealed on different occasions in order to 
deal with different matters.509 Nursi claims that the fluency, coherence and harmony 
of the Qur’ān represent further clear evidence of its divine source.510 Nursi tries to 
demonstrate these aspects of the Qur’ān in his al-Ishārāt-ul I’jāz (Signs of 
Miraculousness). The true appreciation of these aspects of the Qur’ān, therefore, 
requires the full-length reading of the whole book, preferably in the original language, 
Arabic, since most of its beauty is easily lost in translation. 
v. The Qur’anic summations (faḍlaka) and the Divine names of God 
For Nursi, the summations, which appear at the end of some verses of the Qur’ān 
mentioning certain attributes of God, are also evidence of the uniqueness of the 
revelation. In these verses, the Qur’ān presents to its readers certain reasonable and 
observable facts and challenges them to come up with an explanation should they 
deny the True Cause of the universe and everything it contains. Before we look at 
examples, it is worthwhile to highlight the themes of the Qur’ān. According to Nursi, 
the Qur’ān is set to prove tawḥīd (Oneness of God), nubuwwah (the prophethood), 
ḥashr (resurrection) and ‘adālah (justice). Similarly, Mawdūdī (1903–79) categorizes 
the themes into seven groups, as follows: [1] belief and conduct, [2] moral directives, 
[3] legal prescriptions, [4] exhortation and admonition, [5] censure and condemnation 
of evildoers, [6] warning to deniers, and [7] consolation and good cheer to those who 
                                                      
508 For instance, see Salwa M. S. El-Awa, Textual Relations in the Quran : Relevance, 
Coherence and Structure (London: Routledge, 2006). 
509 For instance, Sūrah al-‘Alaq (The Clot) is Chapter 96 of the Qur’ān, which has 19 verses 
in total and is located near the end of the Book. The first five verses of this chapter are 
actually the first-ever revelation to the Prophet. The remaining 14 verses were revealed some 
time later, yet there is a perfect coherence within the whole chapter. 
510 Nursi, The Words  at 187-97. 
Chapter 5: Nursi on Revelations (Waḥy) 
 
   205 
suffer for God.511 Now, let us see some examples that Nursi cites to demonstrate the 
context–attribute relations in the Qur’ān, which in turn clarifies the attributes and 
characteristic of God, who is not simply the Creator, but possesses many other 
qualities such as being the Sustainer, the Judge, the Forbearer.512 
Qur’ān 2:29: “It is He who created for you all of that which is on the earth. Then He 
directed Himself to the heaven [His being above all creation], and made them seven 
heavens, and He is Knowing of all things.” 
Here, the Qur’ān briefly tells us about the creation of the Earth and its contents and 
the creation of the atmosphere, other space, and all that there is in the universe. This 
requires immense knowledge and power. In the concluding phrase, instead of telling 
us ‘It is God who created everything’, the passage tells us ‘He knows everything’, 
which refers to his name ‘al-'Alīm’ (The Knower of All). This verse is also a good 
example of the first of the four purposes of the Qur’ān. 
Nursi’s second example comes in his analysis of verse 10:31, which reads: 
 Say, "Who provides for you from the heaven and the earth? Or who 
controls hearing and sight and who brings the living out of the dead 
and brings the dead out of the living and who arranges [every] 
matter?" They will say, " Allāh," so say, "Then will you not fear 
Him?513 
Nursi’s argues that there are four elements in this verse. The first element is the fact 
that the Earth and its natural events are acting in such a fashion that they are in 
excellent harmony and partnership in order to sustain life on Earth. The second 
element reminds the reader that there are certain organs (i.e. eyes, ears and hands, 
                                                      
511 See Syed Abul Ala Maudoodi and Zafar Ishaq Ansari, Towards Understanding the Quran 
(Leicester [Leicestershire]: Islamic Foundation, 1988).  
512 See Appendix 2: Names and Attributes of God in Islām. 
513 Qur’ān, 10:31. 
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etc.) and senses (sight, sound, touch, taste, etc.) given to the organisms, especially 
human beings, to ensure that they can benefit from the Earth with maximum 
efficiency. In the third element, the fact of life and death is pointed out to the reader. 
The fourth element of this verse comes in the form of a question, which asks who 
could possibly manage all these interconnected and complicated affairs. Nursi, then, 
concludes that the first and the fourth elements entail Allāh (God), the second element 
entails al-Rab (The Sustaining Lord), and the third element entails al-Ḥaqq (The 
Truth).514 Indeed, this verse is followed by “For that is Allāh, your Lord, the Truth. 
And what can be beyond truth except error? So how are you averted?”.515 
The Qur’ān tells us the story of the prophet Joseph in Chapter 12. Revealed in Mecca, 
it consists of 111 verses which, for Nursi, display clear examples of the four themes 
mentioned above. Nursi takes the sixth verse to demonstrate the context–attribute 
relation of the Qur’ān. The verse reads: 
 And thus will your Lord choose you and teach you the interpretation 
of narratives and complete His favour upon you and upon the family 
of Jacob, as He completed it upon your fathers before, Abraham and 
Isaac. Indeed, your Lord is Knowing and Wise.516 
For Nursi, this particular verse encompasses ‘the news of the unseen’. First, it 
explains what had happened before the prophet Joseph, and then it tells what was 
going to happen (i.e. God should complete his favour to Joseph). The aspect of this 
verse which mentions all the favours of God to Joseph and his ancestors (i.e. 
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob) entails the name of al-Rab (The Sustaining Lord); the 
mention of the ‘interpretation of narratives’ which is knowledge in general entails the 
name al-ʿAlīm (The Knower of All); and God’s completion of His favours, which 
                                                      
514 Nursi, The Words  at 188. 
515 Qur’ān, 10:32. 
516 Qur’ān, 12:6. 
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includes Joseph’s being King of Egypt, entails the name al-Ḥakīm (The Perfectly 
Wise). A similar example is the Qur’anic verses 2:30–32,517 which recount the story 
of the creation of Adam and the dialogue between God and the angels. After having 
taught Adam the names,518 God turns to the angels and asks them to tell the names. In 
complete submission, the angels reply that they do not know anything other than what 
God teaches them. They admit and say, ‘You are al-ʿAlīm and al-Ḥakīm’ (Knowing 
and Wise).’519 
Also, Nursi points out some verses of Sūrat al-Nūr520 in which the Qur’ān talks about 
particular meteorological events and the origins of the living creatures. The verse 
concludes with the expression that God, who is the sole, powerful One above 
everything in the universe, is the cause behind all the phenomena mentioned. 
                                                      
517 Qur’ān, 2:30: And [mention, O Muḥammad], when your Lord said to the angels, “Indeed, I 
will make upon the earth a successive authority.” They said, “Will You place upon it one who 
causes corruption therein and sheds blood, while we declare Your praise and sanctify You?” 
Allāh said, “Indeed, I know that which you do not know.” 
Qur’ān, 2:31: And He taught Adam the names – all of them. Then He showed them to the 
angels and said, “Inform Me of the names of these, if you are truthful.” 
Qur’ān, 2:32: They said, “Exalted are You; we have no knowledge except what You have 
taught us. Indeed, it is You who is the Knowing, the Wise.” 
518 Here, the word ‘names’ implies ‘knowledge’. 
519 Qur’ān, 23:12–14: And certainly did We create man from an extract of clay. Then We 
placed him as a sperm-drop in a firm lodging. Then We made the sperm-drop into a clinging 
clot, and We made the clot into a lump [of flesh], and We made [from] the lump, bones, and 
We covered the bones with flesh; then We developed him into another creation. So blessed is 
Allāh, the best of creators. 
Qur’ān, 7:54: Indeed, your Lord is Allāh, who created the heavens and earth in six days and 
then established Himself above the Throne. He covers the night with the day, [another night] 
chasing it rapidly; and [He created] the sun, the moon, and the stars, subjected by His 
command. Unquestionably, His is the creation and the command; blessed is Allāh, Lord of 
the worlds. 
520 Qur’ān, 24:43: Do you not see that Allāh drives clouds? Then He brings them together, 
then He makes them into a mass, and you see the rain emerge from within it. And He sends 
down from the sky, mountains [of clouds] within which is hail, and He strikes with it whom 
He wills and averts it from whom He wills. The flash of its lightening almost takes away the 
eyesight. 
Qur’ān, 24:44: Allāh alternates the night and the day. Indeed in that is a lesson for those who 
have vision. 
Qur’ān, 24:45: Allāh has created every [living] creature from water. And of them are those 
that move on their bellies, and of them are those that walk on two legs, and of them are those 
that walk on four. Allāh creates what He wills. Indeed, Allāh is over all things competent. 
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The names al-Ḥalīm (The Forbearing) and al-Ghafūr (The Forgiver) represent the 
summary of Sūrat al-'Isrā'. The Qur’ān [17:44] declares: “The seven heavens and the 
earth and whatever is in them exalt Him. And there is not a thing except that it exalts 
[Allāh] by His praise, but you do not understand their [way of] exalting. Indeed, He is 
ever Forbearing and Forgiving.” Prior to this particular verse, the Qur’ān speaks about 
believers and deniers. It mentions the severe punishment awaiting disbelievers. At a 
point where hopes of salvation are about to be lost, the Qur’ān tells us that God is 
Compassionate and Merciful; therefore, people should not despair but should work 
towards pleasing God by obeying His rules. 
After a lengthy discussion and a long list of examples, Nursi remarks: 
… in the summaries at the conclusions of verses are numerous 
sprinklings of guidance and flashes of miraculousness. The greatest 
geniuses among the scholars of rhetoric have bitten their fingers in 
absolute wonder and admiration at these unique styles, and declared: 
‘this is not the word of man’.521 
Considering the fact that the Prophet was allegedly an illiterate man who had never 
read any books in his life,522  the Qur’ān, for Nursi, clearly appears to be an 
outstanding book in every respect. In Nursi’s opinion, the book has been ‘ever-young’ 
since it first appeared in the seventh century AD. Nursi contends that the effective 
result the Qur’ān has had in human social history over the last fourteen centuries is 
evidence of its miraculous nature.523 
                                                      
521 Nursi, The Words  at 189. 
522 To support this fact, Qur’ān in Surat Al-`Ankabūt (The Spider) [29:48] reads: “And you 
did not recite before it any scripture, nor did you inscribe one with your right hand. Otherwise 
the falsifiers would have had [cause for] doubt.” 
523 Nursi, The Words  at 197. 
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5.4. Philosophy versus Qur’anic Wisdom 
Throughout Risāle-i Nur, it is clear that Nursi is a fierce critic of materialist 
philosophy and of ‘ilm al-kalām equally.524 According to Nursi, philosophy and the 
wisdom of the Qur’ān differ in terms of their main points of view. To Nursi, 
philosophy fails spectacularly when faced with the wisdom of the Qur’ān. Both 
philosophy and the Qur’ān work towards explaining the nature and aim of the 
universe. According to Nursi, philosophy looks at the universe from a fixed point of 
view and sees the universe through its self-referential’ meaning (manā-yi ismī).525 
In an analogy, Nursi likens philosophy to a person who looks at the letters and words 
of a book without paying any attention to its meaning.526 The account of philosophy is 
similar to the account of a person who looks into a garden through a peephole. Thus, 
his comprehension of that garden is limited to what the little hole allows him to see. 
The philosopher perceives the universe as a giant, mindless, lifeless entity where 
nature causes random creations, and planets, stars and heavenly bodies move about 
arbitrarily and mindlessly. If there is any apparent order in the universe, they believe 
that it is the product of pure chance.527 When they see something beautiful, they say 
                                                      
524 Here, it is important to note that Nursi mainly refers to the atheist philosophy, which tries 
to justify the universe without God. See Nursi, The Flashes, p. 643. Similarly, Nursi aims his 
criticisms at the mutakallimūn (the Muslim scholastics and philosophers) who accept the 
existence of God, but fail to understand and appreciate His attributes fully. 
525 Two essential concepts define Nursi’s philosophical standpoint. These are mʿanà-i ismī 
(the apparent or direct meaning of things, self-referential meaning) and mʿanà-i ḥarfī (the 
signifying or indirect meaning of things, other indicative meaning). These two original 
concepts can be explained with the following example. A tree is producing fruit. A person 
ascribing the qualities and production of the fruit to the tree is looking with mʿanà-i ismī or 
the apparent or direct meaning of the fruit. A thinking person looking with mʿanà-i ḥarfī will 
see that the fruit indicates there is something else causing the qualities and production of the 
fruit because the tree is so simple and the fruit is so complex and miraculous. Therefore, the 
first person sees only the mechanical cause–effect relationship in the nature, but the second 
person sees the effective work of the Creator on every object and every event. See Nursi, Al-
Mathnawi Al-Nuri  at 1297. And Nursi, The Words  at 50, 211. 
526 Nursi, The Words  at 50. 
527 See Chapter 3, for Nursi’s arguments against the materialist and naturalist philosophy. 
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‘How beautiful it is?’ instead of appreciating it as an artwork of a Maker by saying 
‘How beautifully it has been made?’528 
In a total contrast, the Qur’ān shows the Other-indicative’ meaning (mʿanà-i 
ḥarfī)529 of the universe. To Nursi, the Qur’ān is the true expounder and interpreter of 
the universe. Unlike philosophy, which sees the letters and the words of a book 
without paying attention to their meaning, the Qur’ān reads and explains the meaning 
of the text which those letters and words form. Philosophy without religion, Nursi 
writes, ‘is a sophistry divorced from reality and an insult to the universe’.530 
Nursi also compares philosophy with the wisdom of the Qur’ān from the perspective 
of morality. He compares and contrasts the moral teachings of philosophy and those 
of the Qur’ān. He argues that the Qur’ān establishes a list of very high moral codes 
thanks to its divine origin, whereas philosophy with its very limited insight fails to 
achieve the happiness of humankind. A person who takes the teachings of godless 
philosophy as a point of reference develops negative characteristics. Nursi calls such a 
person ‘a pharaoh’ in the sense that he is known for his terrible qualities. These 
individuals became very stubborn since they were not open to listening to and 
understanding the truth revealed by God. They worship matter and wealth. For a little 
pleasure, they readily put up with great disgrace. They are usually very cruel and 
                                                      
528 Nursi, The Words  at 49. 
529 Turner and Horkuç explain that Nursi’s this particular twin concept of ‘self-referential’ 
and ‘other-indicative’ meanings represent the two diametrically opposite hermeneutical 
positions to man as ‘reader’ of the cosmic narrative. See Turner and Horkuc, Said Nursi  at 
67-71. 
530 Nursi, The Words  at 50. 
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selfish. As opposed to the Qur’ān, which teaches the worship and praise of the 
Creator, they worship Satan.531  
Although these characteristics of godless philosophy are open to discussion and not 
fully verifiable, this is a common convention used in the Divine Texts.532 Nursi’s 
wording of his description of the unbelievers is similar to that of the Qur’ān. Although 
it is the title given to Ancient Egyptian rulers, the word ‘pharaoh’ later became a 
synonym for disbeliever, since the pharaoh opposed the prophet Joseph. In addition to 
the Qur’anic inspirations, Nursi clearly refers to the experience people went through 
in the USSR, which was established on the basis of the philosophical teachings of 
Marx and Engels.533 
In total contrast, Nursi cites all the positive qualities of the genuine followers of the 
Qur’ān’s teachings. They are humble, as they acknowledge the Most Powerful; and 
they are strong, as they take their strength from the Strongest. They do not worship 
matter or wealth; they worship the The Rich One (al-Ghanī) instead. They act only 
for the sake of their Lord.534 
Nursi also condemns the teachings of what he terms ‘godless philosophy’ on social 
matters in capitalist societies. For example, he explains that this philosophy 
encourages the gaining of wealth and power. This, inevitably, results in greed and in 
people acting unfairly for their own advantage. Competition and struggle become the 
purpose of life. Nursi writes: 
                                                      
531 Ibid. 
532 The Bible refers to the atheist as ‘the fool’. In a recent discussion in defence of atheism, 
the atheist complained about the tone of Bible, calling those who do not believe in God 
‘fools’. Similarly, the Qur’ān describes unbelievers as ignorant and cruel. 
533 Nursi, The Words  at 50. 
534 Ibid. 
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Philosophy accepts ‘force’ as its point of support in the life of 
society. It considers its aim to be ‘benefits’. The principle of its life it 
recognizes to be ‘conflict’. It holds the bond between communities to 
be ‘racialism and negative nationalism’. Its fruits are ‘gratifying the 
appetites of the soul and increasing human needs’. However, the 
mark of force is ‘aggression’. The mark of benefit – since they are 
insufficient for every desire – is ‘jostling and tussling’. While the 
mark of conflict is ‘strife’. And the mark of racialism –since it is 
nourished by devouring others– is ‘aggression’. It is for these reasons 
that it has negated the happiness of mankind.535 
The Qur’ān, on the other hand, promotes sharing, cooperation and virtuous behaviour 
for the sake of God.536 Nursi explains his Qur’anic position as follows: 
As for the Qur’anic wisdom, its point of support is ‘truth’ instead of 
force. It takes ‘virtue and God’s pleasure’ as its aims in place of 
benefits. It takes the principle of ‘mutual assistance’ as the principle 
of life in place of the principle of conflict. And it takes ‘the ties of 
religion, class, and country’ to be the ties bonding communities. Its 
aim is to form a barrier against the lusts of the soul, urge the spirit to 
sublime matters, satisfy the high emotions, and urging man to the 
human perfections, make him a true human being. And the mark of 
‘the truth’ is accord. The mark of virtue is ‘solidarity’. The mark of 
mutual assistance is ‘hastening to assist one another’. The mark of 
religion is ‘brotherhood’ and ‘attraction’. And the mark of reining in 
and tethering the soul and leaving the spirit free and urging it towards 
perfections is ‘happiness in this world and the next’.537 
Nursi claims that racialism and destructive nationalism are another damaging result of 
godless philosophy. Nursi believes that these two are abused by selfish people and 
nations for their own benefit.538 Here, there is a clear reference to the imperialist 
expansions of Western countries in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as 
the USSR. These big and powerful nations swallowed, colonized, and assimilated 
smaller, less powerful nations all over the world. When a conflict of interest emerged, 
they fought among themselves. During their imperialist struggles, history recorded 
                                                      
535 Ibid. 
536 Qur’ān, [9:71]: The believing men and believing women are allies of one another. They 
enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong and establish prayer and give zakat and obey 
Allāh and His Messenger. Those – Allāh will have mercy upon them. Indeed, Allāh is Exalted 
in Might and Wise. 
Qur’ān, [28:54]: Those will be given their reward twice for what they patiently endured and 
[because] they avert evil through good, and from what We have provided them they spend. 
537 Nursi, The Words  at 50. 
538 Ibid. 
Chapter 5: Nursi on Revelations (Waḥy) 
 
   213 
many cruel brutalities.539 The Qur’ān, however, endorses solidarity between people on 
the basis that they live on the same land and believe in the same God. It declares: 
O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and 
made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, 
the most noble of you in the sight of Allāh is the most righteous of 
you. Indeed, Allāh is Knowing and Acquainted.540 
What Nursi seems to be doing here is simply rewording and rephrasing the Qur’anic 
teachings on solidarity, comradeship, and fraternity. Although certain readers agree 
this particular view of materilast philosophy, the materialist philosophers think the 
opposite. They might easily claim that it is religion which causes bloodshed and terror. 
Putting aside these differences, what Nursi seems to try to achieve is that the Qur’ān 
teaches higher values than any human intelligence could possibly achieve. Therefore, 
this particular scripture ought to have a divine origin, which itself is the proof of the 
existence of God. In order to strengthen his position on the Qur’ān’s being a divine 
scripture, Nursi turns to previously reveald scriptures, i.e. the Torah and the Gospels 
in abticipation of pulling further evidence. 
5.5. Nursi on the Qur’ān, the Gospels and the Torah 
Like all Muslim scholars, Nursi believes that the Bible and the Torah were genuine 
revelations, but that their messages have become partly corrupted over time and hence 
have lost their truthfulness. The Qur’ān, according to Nursi, agrees with the preserved 
truths of the Torah and Bible, and corrects their corrupted points. He explains: 
Indeed, the All-Wise Qur’ān mentions through the tongue of one 
whom everyone agreed was both unlettered and trustworthy the 
important events and significant facts concerning the prophets from 
                                                      
539 American–Indian Wars (1622–1918). French–Indian Wars (1754–63), Inter-colonial wars 
involving the French, Spanish and Dutch, the Portuguese Colonial War (1961–74), and the 
British Indian Mutiny (1857–8) are just a few examples of colonial struggles. 
540 Qur’ān, 49:13. 
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the time of Adam till the Era of Bliss (time of Prophet Muḥammad) 
in a way which, confirmed by scriptures like the Torah and the Bible, 
tells of them with the greatest power and seriousness. It concurs with 
the points on which the former Books were agreed, and decides 
between them on the points over which they differed, pointing out 
the truth of the matter.541 
 The Torah is accepted by Christianity as part of the Bible, comprising the first five 
books of the Old Testament.542 Therefore, it is not inaccurate to make comparison 
between the Qur’ān and the Bible/Torah combined. The Islamic creed asserts that all 
previous messengers and scripts were sent down to particular nations. For instance, 
the prophet Moses, the prophet Aaron and the prophet David were the guides of the 
children of Israel, prophethood was sent to a nation corresponding to modern Yemen, 
and the prophet Lūt was sent to the people of Samūd in modern Palestine. However, it 
is claimed that the Prophet Muḥammed and the Qur’ān were sent for the whole of 
humankind, and that therefore their message ought to be universal. There are two 
verses in the Qur’ān which are cited as evidence for this assumption. Sūrat al-
'Anbiyā' (The Prophets) reads: “And We have not sent you, [O Muḥammad], except 
as a mercy to the worlds.” 543 And Sūrat al-Saba' (Sheba) tells: “And We have not 
sent you except comprehensively to mankind as a bringer of good tidings and a 
warner. But most of the people do not know.”544 Also, Islamic doctrine claims that the 
line of prophethood ended with the Prophet Muḥammed, who is called ‘khatama 
annabiyyeena’ (the last of the prophets). Sūrat al-'Aḥzāb (The Combined Forces) 
[33:40] declares: “Muḥammad is not the father of [any] one of your men, but [he is] 
the Messenger of Allāh and last of the prophets. And ever is Allāh, of all things, 
                                                      
541 Nursi, The Words  at 181. 
542 R. J. Coggins, 'Introducing the Old Testament',  
543 Qur’ān, 21:107. 
544 Qur’ān, 21:107. 
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Knowing.”545 Therefore, the Prophet and the Qur’ān have a very special position in 
the history of faiths. 
The main Islamic justification for the revelation of the Qur’ān is that parts of all 
previous messages sent by God had been altered by people.546 Hence, the Qur’ān 
states that God sent a newer, more correct version of his messages.547 Among many 
messengers and their nations, perhaps Jesus and Moses are the best-known ones. It 
has been believed that Jesus was a Jew since the dominant religion at the time of his 
birth was Judaism.548 Since Judaism had been diverted from its original teaching, 
Jesus was sent to renew the faith. Similarly, he was replaced by the Prophet 
Muḥammad some six centuries later. Although the essential tenets of monotheism 
remain the same, a great many inventions (bid‘ah) entered into the Bible; hence, God 
send another messenger to correct the distorted, wrong teachings of Christianity.549 
Islām and Christianity differ on several key points. For example, Christianity believes 
that Jesus was the Son of God, whereas Islām counters that He was a prophet only,550 
                                                      
545 Qur’ān, 33:40. 
546 Qur’ān, 3:71: O People of the Scripture, why do you confuse the truth with falsehood and 
conceal the truth while you know [it]? 
Qur’ān, 3:78: And indeed, there is among them a party who alter the Scripture with their 
tongues so you may think it is from the Scripture, but it is not from the Scripture. And they 
say, “This is from Allāh,” but it is not from Allāh. And they speak untruth about Allāh while 
they know. 
547 Qur’ān, 5:48: And We have revealed to you, [O Muḥammad], the Book in truth, 
confirming that which preceded it of the Scripture and as a criterion over it. So judge between 
them by what Allāh has revealed and do not follow their inclinations away from what has 
come to you of the truth. To each of you We prescribed a law and a method. Had Allāh 
willed, He would have made you one nation [united in religion], but [He intended] to test you 
in what He has given you; so race to [all that is] good. To Allāh is your return all together, 
and He will [then] inform you concerning that over which you used to differ. 
548 Raymond Edward Brown, The Death of the Messiah : From Gethsemane to the Grave : A 
Commentary on the Passion Narratives in the Four Gospels. Vol. 1 (New York [etc.]: 
Doubleday, 1994) at 964. 
549 Qur’ān, 18:4–5: And to warn those who say, “Allāh has taken a son.” They have no 
knowledge of it, nor had their fathers. Grave is the word that comes out of their mouths; they 
speak not except a lie. 
550 Qur’ān, 5:39: “Indeed, the example of Jesus to Allāh is like that of Adam. He created Him 
from dust; then He said to him, “Be,” and he was.” 
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and strongly condemns those who claim Jesus to be the Son of God.551 Also, the 
Qur’ān explains that Jesus did not die on the cross, but was lifted into Heaven,552 and 
that one of his disciples who resembled Jesus was killed instead of him. 553 
Furthermore, Muslims believe that Jesus will return to the Earth to defeat the false 
messiah (al-Masīḥ al-Dajjāl), join forces with Islām, and then die.554 
Nursi interprets the text of the ḥadīth (prophetic traditions and sayings) which reports 
“At the end of time, Jesus will come and act in accordance with the Sharia of the 
Prophet Muḥammad”555 as requiring to be understood non-literally. He tells us that 
rather than Jesus coming back to life as a person and fulfilling what the above ḥadīth 
implies, his collective personality (i.e. the true teachings of Christianity) will 
cooperate with Islām to attack irreligion and atheism.556 
Nursi moves on to compare the Books of the previous Messengers and the Qur’ān. He 
claims that the Qur’ān has the highest ranking among all the revelations since it 
                                                      
551 Qur’ān, 5:17: “They have certainly disbelieved who say that Allāh is Christ, the son of 
Mary. Say, “Then who could prevent Allāh at all if He had intended to destroy Christ, the son 
of Mary, or his mother or everyone on the earth?” And to Allāh belongs the dominion of the 
heavens and the earth and whatever is between them. He creates what He wills, and Allāh is 
over all things competent.” 
552 Qur’ān, [3:55]: ‘[Mention] when Allāh said, “O Jesus, indeed I will take you and raise you 
to Myself and purify you from those who disbelieve and make those who follow you [in 
submission to Allāh alone] superior to those who disbelieve until the Day of Resurrection. 
Then to Me is your return, and I will judge between you concerning that in which you used to 
differ.” 
553 Qur’ān, 4:157: And [for] their saying, “Indeed, we have killed the Messiah, Jesus, the son 
of Mary, the messenger of Allāh." And they did not kill him, nor did they crucify him; but 
[another] was made to resemble him to them. And indeed, those who differ over it are in 
doubt about it. They have no knowledge of it except the following of assumption. And they 
did not kill him, for certain. 
554 Muslims believe these assumptions on the bases of the Prophet Muḥammad’s sayings 
(ḥadīth) in Bukhārī, Maẓālim:31; Buyū’:102, Muslim, Imān:242. 343 and Ibn-i Majah, Fitan: 
33. 
555 Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī. (2004). Maẓālim: 31, Gardners Books. 
556 Nursi, The Letters  at 347. 
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reflects all the supreme attributes (ism al-‘āẓām)557 of God; hence it is called the 
Word of God (kalām Allāh), whereas all the other books are speeches, which have 
become evident through a particular regard, a minor title, through the partial 
manifestation of a particular Name, through a particular Dominicality, special 
sovereignty, or private mercy.558  
5.6. Objections to the Arguments from Miracles 
As we have seen, theologians, such as Nursi argue that the existence of prophets and 
the scriptures are proofs of the existence of a Deity. This is what constitutes the basis 
of ‘the argument from miracles’ in philosophy. The theist position is that God sends 
messengers to spread His word. He sometimes changes the course of nature in an 
extraordinary fashion (i.e. via miracles) in order to support His messengers. Some of 
the best-known miracles in theology are the prophet Moses parting the Red Sea and 
walking across to safety with the Israelites, Jesus healing the sick and raising people 
from the dead, and the Prophet Muḥammad splitting the moon with his finger and 
making water run through his fingers.559 The bedrock of Nursi’s theism, therefore, is 
partly the argument from miracles, as well as the teleological and moral arguments.560 
The main objection to this popular argument for the existence of God comes in the 
form of the scrutinizing of its credibility. Atheist philosophy tries to discredit the 
                                                      
557 Ism al-‘azam literally means the greatest name of God. It is the name which contains the 
meanings of the entirety of the Most Beautiful Names (attributes) of Allāh. The Greatest 
Name means the most comprehensive Name among the Divine Names, which comprises the 
entirety of the Names. It is not known for sure which Name is the Greatest Name. The 
wisdom of keeping this Name secret is to encourage the remembrance of all Names with the 
probability that they might be the Greatest Name. According to Nursi the most possible six 
Names are al-Fard (The Single), Al- Ḥayy (Ever-Living), Al-Qayyūm (Self-Subsistent), al-
Ḥakīm (Sapient), al-‘Adl (All-Just), and al-Quddūs (Most Holy). 
558 Nursi, The Words  at 51. 
559 Qur’ān, 54:1: The Hour has come near, and the moon has split [in two]. 
And Bukhârî, Tefsir, Sûretu'l-Kamer, 1; Müslim, Kiyame, 44, and Bukhârî, Vudu, 32:46. 
560 Although Nursi devotes separate arguments to prophethood and revelation, they are in fact 
part of the Argument from Miracle. 
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existence of miracles in order to disprove the existence of Deity. Arguments against 
miracles come in several broad categories.  
5.6.1. Ontological objections to violation miracles 
The first category argues that violation miracles are impossible. The second category 
argues that miracles could never rationally be believed. Spinoza sets out to argue that 
miracles are impossible. He explains that the will of God is identical with the laws of 
nature. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature. God's will is inviolable, and 
therefore miracles cannot happen. 561  Voltaire produces his own version of the 
rejection of miracles. In his Philosophical Dictionary, he writes: 
It is impossible a being infinitely wise (meaning God) can have made 
laws to violate them. He could not … derange the machine but with a 
view of making it work better; but it is evident that God, all-wise and 
omnipotent, originally made this immense machine, the universe, as 
good and perfect as He was able; if He saw that some imperfections 
would arise from the nature of matter, He provided for that in the 
beginning; and, accordingly, He will never change anything in it.562 
Hume’s ideas about miracles set the foundations of almost all atheist arguments. 
Hume does not try to prove that miracles do not happen or never could have happened. 
Instead, he tries to demonstrate that we have no good reason to believe that they 
happened. He rejects the concept of miracle. A miracle, by definition, is a violation of 
a law of nature, which is, by definition, a regularity about what happens, about how 
the universe functions. Consequently, if some events actually occur, no regularity 
which its occurrence infringes can really be a law of nature. So this event, however 
                                                      
561 Benedictus De Spinoza and A. G. Wernham, The Political Works: The Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus in Part, and the Tracatatus Politicus in Full (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1958) at 123-28. 
562 See Voltaire, A Philosophical Dictionary (Paris; [etc., etc.: E.R. DuMont, 1901). 
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unusual and surprising, cannot after all be a miracle.563 For instance, the universal law 
states that water cannot be turned into wine. Jesus is claimed to have turned water into 
wine. The conclusion is: 
a. The statement ‘Water cannot be turned into wine’ is not a nature of law, or 
b. Jesus did not turn water into wine. 
John Stuart Mill gives a brief summary of what we have just attempted to explain. He 
writes: 
We cannot admit a proposition as a law of nature, and yet believe a 
fact in real contradiction to it. We must disbelieve the alleged fact, or 
believe we are mistaken in admitting the supposed law.564 
So far, we have seen how the Humean argument develops around the ontological 
aspects of miracles. Now we turn to a more recent argument developed by Everitt, 
Dawkins and others. 
5.6.2. Inexplicable miracles 
So far, we have seen that the theists built their argument from miracles on the basis of 
supernatural, or inexplicable incidents that have religious significance or have 
produced benefits, etc. Everitt argues that, on the basis of a lack of scientific 
explanation, certain events which were considered miraculous then do not constitute 
miracles now, simply because science can now explain them. For instance, it would 
have been seen as a miracle two centuries ago if someone had talked to another 
person on another continent. But now, developments in telecommunications and in 
                                                      
563 Hume, Selby-Bigge, and Nidditch, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding, and 
Concerning the Principles of Morals  at 115-16. 
564 See John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive : Being a Connected 
View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation (London [u.a.]: 
Longman, Green, 1930) at 185. 
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radio and satellite technologies easily explain how this is done. Everitt elaborates on 
this, and writes: 
Given the occurrence of any event which we would find now 
baffling, and which we could not now explain in scientific terms, 
how could we know that future developments of science would not 
show it was explicable after all. For primitive people who first 
witnessed the solar eclipse, the event might have been utterly 
unprecedented and mysterious. Yet we now know it is fully 
explicable in scientific terms.565 
Dawkins also dislikes the idea of calling scientifically inexplicable events miracles. 
For him, humankind should keep searching for scientific explanations for these 
phenomenons.566 For atheist philosophers, then, claiming that certain scientifically 
inexplicable events prove the existence of God is a very poor argument. 
5.6.3. Coincidence miracles 
Up to now, we have seen how sceptical philosophers objected to the occurrence of 
violation miracles and why they insist that what theists call miracle is not necessarily 
the work of God on the basis of its inexplicability. The third common sceptical view 
of miracle is that they may just be pure coincidence. R. F. Holland tells the story of 
the miraculous escape of a child from certain death. The child wanders on to a railway 
track, and there is a fast-approaching train whose driver cannot possibly see the child 
owing to a bend in the line. Just seconds before the train hits and kills the child, the 
train comes to a complete stop since the driver faints as a result of his heavy lunch. 
When he loses consciousness his hand ceases to exert pressure on the control lever; 
hence the auto-break system of the train is activated and stops the train.567 
                                                      
565 Everitt, The Non-Existence of God  at 124. 
566 Dawkins, The God Delusion  at 14. 
567 R. F. Holland, 'The Miraculous', American Philosophical Quarterly, 2/1 (1965), 43-51. 
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Everitt says that for the theist, this is an active act of God, a miracle, which proves 
there is a God. For the atheist, it is not a miracle because it is not a violation of a law 
of nature, and it is scientifically explicable. For this very reason, although it is called a 
miracle, it does not actually prove the existence of a supernatural being. It is entirely a 
matter of a chain of scientifically explicable events involving great coincidence. 
5.6.4. Nursi’s approach to miracles and his critique of the philosophers 
Nursi considers miracles as God’s alterations of some rules of the universe in order to 
support His messengers with their claim. With regards to incidents being inexplicable, 
Nursi does not go into a debate to argue whether an incident is explainable in terms of 
science or not. In Nursi’s opinion, even if an incident is scientifically explainable, this 
does not disprove it as miracle. For instance, when Moses parted the Red Sea, there 
were certainly some physical rules applying. Science might be able explain how the 
mechanics of this miracle worked. There might have been certain electro-magnetic 
forces causing the partition of the sea. Or when considering Jesus’s miracles, there 
might well be scientific explainations to them. However, for Nursi, what constitutes a 
miracle is the fact that these extraordinary events occurred upon the need or the 
request of God’s messengers. Therfore Nursi puts three conditions to call an event ‘a 
miracle’. It has to be performed by someone who is a prophet, it has to be completely 
extraordinary, and it has to be performed upon the need or the request of the prophet 
from God.568 
All these arguments assume that a miracle is one single extraordinary event like the 
ones mentioned above. However, Nursi’s exposition of the miraculousness of the 
Qur’ān is very different from the critics’ assumption of what constitutes a miracle. 
                                                      
568 Nursi, The Letters  at 389. 
Chapter 5: Nursi on Revelations (Waḥy) 
 
   222 
For instance, the continuous eloquence of the Qur’ān is not a one-off argument from 
miracles. Nursi persistently tries to demonstrate how the Qur’ān is written poetically 
without it losing any meaning throughout. Again, the critics’ arguments fail to 
succeed when Nursi shows the reader the aspect of the Qur’ān where extremely 
accurate and verifiable news is presented from the unseen future as well from not-yet-
discovered scientific facts.569 Modern critics of theism such as Mackie, Flew and 
Everitt do not produce any arguments against Nursi’s expositions. They simply 
reformulate what has been said by previous philosophers such as Hume, Voltaire and 
Copleston. This unique perspective of the argument from miracles to God’s existence 
put forward by Nursi, one might argue, is still standing firm as it has not been refuted 
yet. 
5.7. Problem of inconsistent revelations 
One of the most popular arguments used to refute theism is the argument from the 
problem of inconsistent revelations. The upshot of this atheistic argument is this 
question; if there is only one God who sends messengers to mankind, why are there so 
many different versions of scriptures? In other words, why do the Torah, Bible and 
the Qur’ān tell us different stories and why do they all sound inconsistent with each 
other? Proponents of this argument say that this situation leads us to two different 
conclusions. Either there is no God and all these scriptures are the artificial works of 
men, or there are different gods whose guidances to humankind are different and false. 
Although this argument looks sound at first, for Nursi it is groundless. The formation 
of these three scriptures has already been mentioned in the previous part of this 
                                                      
569 See Harun Yahya’s online resources at http://www.miraclesofthequran.com 
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chapter. It is important, once again, to state that most Jews and Christians reject the 
Qur’ān outright. Most of them assume that the Qur’ān is a book written by 
Muḥammad. Hence, it is not helpful to go into the details of their arguments. Nursi 
holds a clear and strong Qur’anic ground against this particular argument of atheist 
philosophy. Nursi approaches this argument by putting a few historical facts. First and 
foremost is the fact that none of the Holy Books except for the Qur’ān maintains its 
original forms of revelation. The current versions of the Holy Books today are the 
works of different individuals. For instance, the Bible exits in several versions 
produced by different people.570 Similarly, the Oral Torah consists of the traditional 
interpretations and amplifications handed down by word of mouth from generation to 
generation and now embodied in the Talmud and Midrash.571 Blenkinsopp explains 
that the written books (Torah) were a product of the Babylonian exilic period 
(c.600 BCE) and that they were completed by the Persian period (c.400 BCE).572 
Therefore, it would lead us into a wrong judgement to compare the current available 
versions of the Holy Books. Nursi’s position is such that he believes that only the 
Qur’ān is the genuine, truly preserved revelation; hence its words must be taken into 
account. The main message of God to mankind, Nursi articulates, has always been the 
                                                      
570 Some versions of the Bible:  
Septuagint – AD 250. Written in Greek  
Vulgate – AD 400. First version of the Bible, canonized at the Council of Carthage in AD 
400. Written in Latin.  
Luther’s German Bible – AD 1534.  
King James Version – AD 1611. This is the most widely used version; however, it contains a 
large number of errors, since none of the writers had an adequate understanding of Hebrew.  
Revised Standard Version – AD 1952. Literal translation into American English that used the 
earliest possible text.  
New International Version – 1960s–70s. This is a very good contemporary English version. 
Another good contemporary English version is the New King James Version (NKJV).  
Young’s Literal Translation is as close to the original as one can get, translated by Robert 
Young in AD 1898.  
571 Birnbaum, A Book of Jewish Concepts  at 630. 
572 Joseph Blenkinsopp, Treasures Old and New : Essays in the Theology of the Pentateuch 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans, 2004) at 1. 
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same. It is tawḥīd (the Oneness of God), resurrection, justice, and the moral conduct 
of life. Therefore, for Nursi, the argument from inconsistent revelation is groundless 
and invalid. If the Bible and the Torah had been kept in their original forms, they 
would have been teaching exactly what the Qur’ān teaches.  
In other words, Nursi maintains a position whereby he argues that although all of the 
previous scriptures revealed by God to different messengers contain the same 
messages (i.e. the unity of God, resurrection, justice and the moral conduct of life), 
certain parts of these previous scriptures have not been kept in their original forms,573 
and therefore the Qur’ān, the final revelation, was sent by God to agree with and 
strengthen the truly preserved parts of the previous scriptures and correct the 
corrupted parts.574 
5.8. Challenges to the Qur’ān 
Since its very first revelation, the Qur’ān has always fascinated believers and 
disbelievers alike. The Arabic-speaking people, who acknowledge the eloquence of 
the Qur’ān better than anyone else, have so far failed to take up the Qur’ān’s 
challenge, which is declared in Sūrat al-Baqarah (The Cow):  
                                                      
573 Nursi’s stand point on this is Qur’ān, 2:79: So woe to those who write the “scripture” with 
their own hands, then say, “This is from Allāh,” in order to exchange it for a small price. Woe 
to them for what their hands have written and woe to them for what they earn. 
574 In The Words, Nursi writes: “Indeed, the All-Wise Qur’an mentions through the tongue of 
one whom everyone agreed was both unlettered and trustworthy the important events and 
significant facts concerning the prophets from the time of Adam till the Era of Bliss (i.e. the 
time of the Prophet Muḥammad), in a way which, confirmed by scriptures like the Torah and 
the Bible, tells of them with the greatest power and seriousness. It concurs with the points on 
which the former Books were agreed, and decides between them on the points over which 
they differed, pointing out the truth of the matter.” 
See Nursi, The Words  at 181. 
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And if you are in doubt about what We have sent down upon Our 
Servant [Muḥammad], then produce a surah the like thereof and call 
upon your witnesses other than Allāh, if you should be truthful.”575 
So far, the Qur’ān has not been imitated nor have its contents been disproved 
successfully.  
However, there are several rejectionist arguments attempting to refute Prophet 
Muḥammad and the Qur’ān’s authenticity from a historical point of view. Wagner 
encapsulates these as follows:  
Polytheistic Arabs from Arabia began to assert themselves in 
southern Palestine in the late 630s and through 640s, slowly taking 
control of Palestine, Syria and Egypt by 643. During the period 643-
680, under Damascus-based Mu’awiyah, coins were struck that 
reflect an indeterminete monotheism that could fit Jews, Christians 
and other monotheists. The first coins mentioning Muḥammad 
appear in 691 … By 720–750 biographies of the ‘traditional’ 
Muḥammad appear. The first mention of ‘Book of Allah’ appears in 
752. Therefore, “Muḥammad is not a historical figure, and his 
biography is the product the 2nd century A.H. Muḥammad entered the 
official religion only ca. 71/690. The Qur’an is a late compilation; it 
was not canonized until the end of the 2nd century A.H, or perhaps 
early in the 3rd century. And Islam grew out of the need for Arab 
rulers to stabilize their new state. Later storytellers developed the 
traditions about Muḥammad the merchant from Mecca, using the 
name of a desert prophet named Mahmet who was linked to a 
Jewish-based Abrahamic messianic-apocalyptic monotheism.576 
Cook and Crone attempt to refute the Qur’ān on the basis of what they claim is a lack 
of archaeological evidence.577 Wansbrough argues that the current body of the Qur’ān 
came into existence long after the traditional account says it was revealed.578 Cook 
and Crone claim that entire story of Muḥammad and the Qur’ān is made up from 
Jewish tales. They argue that the Hagerens were disappointed by being rebuffed by 
                                                      
575 Qur’ān, 2:23. 
576 Wagner, Opening the Qur'an : Introducing Islam's Holy Book  at 426-27. 
577 Crone and Cook, Hagarism : The Making of the Islamic World  at 12-17. 
578 John Wansbrough was not mainly interested in proving or disproving the authenticity of 
the Qur’ān. He was mainly interested in how the Qur’ān as a scripture emerged. See John E. 
Wansbrough, Quranic Studies : Sources and Methods of Scriptural Interpretation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977) at xv. 
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the Jews and, after a period of positive relations with the Christians, decided to 
combine their religion of Abraham and Moses’ Pentateuch with a version of Christian 
messianism–apocalypticism (minus Christology) to elaborate a full-scale religion of 
Abraham. 579  In the scenario they construct, Crone and Cook point out the 
geographical and personal parallels between Islam and Judaism. They explain that 
Muḥammad was a construction of the Hagerens to replace Moses, and that the Qur’ān 
was the new and superior Pentateuch-Gospel that gave theological credibility to the 
new Arab state. Mecca was to replace Jerusalem, the Ka’bah became the Ismaelized 
Mount Moriah-Temple, Mount Hira was the new Sinai, Jāhiliyyah was the period of 
Egyptian bondage, the Hijrah was Exodus, the Medinan period was the shaping of the 
community in the wilderness, and the return to Mecca was the entry to the Promised 
Land.580 
Nursi would have argued against this scenario by stating that none of these points 
actually refutes his argument that the Qur’ān’s is a miracle. This is simply a 
hypothetical reconstruction of the historical facts of Islām, Muḥammad and the 
Qur’ān in parallel with the prior monotheistic religions. Whereas what Nursi 
demonstrates is the solid and testable qualities of the Qur’ān. 
Both Salman Rushdie and Taslima Nasrin follow a similar method to Cook and 
Crone’s in order to disparage the Qur’ān and Muḥammad. In The Satanic Verses,581 a 
book listed as a fiction, Rushdie tells a story of a prophet, Mahound, establishing a 
new religion in Jāhilī. Rushdie tells the reader how Mahound’s secretary, Salman, 
makes up verses none of which is noticed by Mahound. He also gives details of 
                                                      
579 Crone and Cook, Hagarism : The Making of the Islamic World  at 12-17. 
580 Ibid., at 3. 
581 See Salman Rushdie, The Satanic Verses (New York, N.Y.: Viking, 1989). 
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Mahound’s despicable way of life and his sexuality. Again, Nursi would have argued 
that neither Rushdie’s Satanic Verses nor Nasrin’s views on Muḥammad and the 
Qur’ān makes a credible theological or philosophical case against his argument.  
5.9. Conclusion 
This chapter has found out that Nursi takes the argument from miracles to a whole 
new level. Rather than following the classical argument that there is a Divine 
Scripture and hence there is Divinity, he goes to great lengths to convince his readers 
that the Qur’ān ought to be a Divine Revelation owing to its miraculous properties 
such as eloquence, comprehensiveness, reporting the unseen, fluency, style, 
summarization, etc. He presents a list of testable characteristics of the Qur’ān, which 
he believes furnish evidence of its divine origin. Reporting the unseen is perhaps the 
best testable aspect of the Qur’ān. For Nursi, the sceptics ought to take all the news of 
the unseen mentioned in the Qur’ān and cross-check in the light of recorded history. 
This is clearly the first and the easiest way to refute the Qur’ān should it be refutable. 
Nursi insists that there is no contradiction in the content of the Qur’ān to raise 
suspicion about its divine origin. In addition to this, the fact that its verses almost 
always rhyme with each other can be always checked and confirmed. This, Nursi 
claims, is miracle itself since it is almost impossible to maintain a poetic writing 
without losing the consistency and integrity of a voluminous text. 
The unique style of the Qur’ān, for Nursi, is another miraculous aspect of it. It sounds 
like a poem, but is not poetry. It tells us very accurately about past events, but it is not 
a history book. It tells us about scientific facts, but it is not a science book. It reports 
the unseen future, but it is not a soothsaying book. It is very easy to the eyes and ears, 
but it is not a simple book. All these things, Nursi believes, could only be due to its 
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divine origins. Therefore, Nursi concludes, miracles prove the existence of God; since 
the Qur’ān is a miracle it is the evidence of the existence of God, who revealed this 
Book to his messenger, Muḥammad. 
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CHAPTER 6: NURSI ON MORALITY AND CONSCIENCE 
6.1. Introduction 
The moral argument is a small but arguably very powerful argument to prove the 
existence of God. Traces of this argument can be seen as early as in Ancient Greek 
philosophy, in particular in the dilemma explored in Plato’s Euthyphro, which we 
shall be examining in this chapter in greater detail. The moral arguments for the 
existence of God have been embraced by many theists, such as John Locke, John 
Hick and Saīd Nursi. Nursi’s version focuses mainly on conscience (wijdān) and 
human primordial nature (fiṭrah). William Lane Craig formulates this argument in a 
more systematic fashion in his debates with atheists. 582 There are some lively 
exchanges between the theist theologian William L Craig and the evolutionary 
biologist Richard Dawkins which are worth noting in this chapter. 
The focal point of this chapter is Nursi’s approach to morality and conscience as 
proof of a Deity, and his response to atheistic arguments such as those concerning the 
problem of evil, the problem of Hell, the problem of free will, and the omnipotence 
paradox. 
6.2. Popular Line of Thought 
The argument from morality as a proof for a Deity comes in several different versions. 
The root of the current version in modern philosophy can arguably be attributed to 
Kant. Kant rejects all three previously mentioned arguments (i.e. the cosmological 
argument, the ontological argument and the teleological argument). He rejects the 
                                                      
582 See God Debate II: Harris vs Craig (2011). Notre Dame College of Arts and Letters: The 
Henkels Lecturer Series, Center for Philosophy of Religion and Institute for Scholarship in 
the Liberal Arts. 
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cosmological argument since it is purely based on an indeterminate experience.583 The 
ontological argument, according to Kant, is invalid because it is abstracted from all 
experience, and argues a priori from mere concepts.584 And he rejects the teleological 
argument, since he believes that it rest upon the ontological argument which he thinks 
is already invalid.585 However, Kant observes that it is a fact that people in all ages 
and at all times have always had a need to believe in a god. Shifting slightly into 
psychology from philosophy, he drew up a new argument for the existence of a god. 
This is rather a postulate than a proof. According to Kant, since God is a transcendent 
entity, His existence cannot be proven by pure or theoretical reasoning. Therefore, he 
removes the concept of God and religion in general from theoretical reason and places 
it in a new ground. He calls this new field the ‘ground of practical and moral 
reason’.586 He explains that people work towards their happiness in this life. This may 
be achieved by getting as close as possible to what he calls the summum bonum (the 
highest good). Now, there is a need for a Supreme Being with intelligence and will, 
who holds all the qualities and attributes of summum bonum, and it is He who sets the 
standards of the summum bonum. 587 In his article ‘The Existence of God as a 
Postulate of Practical Reason’, Kant concludes: 
… therefore the supreme cause of nature, which must be presupposed 
as a condition of the summum bonum, is a being which is the cause of 
nature by intelligence and will, consequently its author, that is 
God.588 
This claim clearly makes Kant a deist; since he accepts the necessity of the existence 
of a Supreme Lawgiver from whom morality and happiness could be obtained.  
                                                      
583 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956) at 
493.  
584 Ibid., at 569. 
585 Ibid., at 615. 
586 Ibid., at 117. 
587 Ibid., at 580. 
588 Ibid. 
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One of the most prominent modern advocates of the moral argument, William Lane 
Craig, formulates the argument as follows: 
If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist. 
Since objective moral values and duties do exist, therefore God 
exists.589  
According to Craig, this is a simple, straightforward proof of the God’s existence. The 
two premises of Craig’s argument could not be rejected even by evolutionist atheists. 
The postulate of the existence of moral values and duties is widely accepted by almost 
everybody. Atheists generally argue that there have to be moral values and duties to 
control our lives, but that morality does not require a moral lawgiver. They claim that 
one can be an atheist, yet hold high moral values.590 The problem here, it is argued, is 
that moral values without the Highest Law Giver become subjective, that is, they 
differ from people to people and from society to society. 591 However, the moral 
values that originated from God are objective: hence they do not change in time or 
place. The key concept here is the ‘objective/subjective’ distinction. Atheists do not 
reject moral values and obligations – they simply claim that they exist according to 
the opinion of an individual. Therefore, the moral values of an atheist are always 
‘subjective’. On this basis, an atheist should not confront a burglar who breaks into 
his house and steals his possessions since stealing is not wrong for the burglar. This 
simple scenario arguably creates a dilemma for any atheist. Some theists would claim 
                                                      
589 For Craig’s works, see his website at http://www.reasonablefaith.org 
590 Sam Harris, The Moral Landscape (London: Bantam, 2010). 
and Sam Harris, Ten Myths and Ten Truths about Atheism at 
http://www.samharris.org/site/full_text/10-myths-and-10-truths-about-atheism1, last accessed 
on 14 December 2013 
591 For instance, marriage is regarded as a sacred union between men and women in most 
societies. However, in some Arctic communities, visitors are encouraged to have intercourse 
with the host women to bear children with what they believe to be ‘fresh blood’. 
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that if there is no God, there is no objective right or wrong.592 Therefore, an atheist 
cannot judge anyone on the basis of any wrongdoing. Richard Dawkins has faced a 
similar dilemma recently. When the Enron executive Jeff Skilling claimed that 
Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene is his favourite book since it advocates evolutionist 
atheism, which claims that all people are animals and that there is no right or wrong, 
just pitiless indifference, in order to justify his action, Dawkins got furious.593 Craig 
believes that although Dawkins denies the existence of God, he is regularly in conflict 
with himself since he always tries to hold the higher moral ground.594 
Perhaps the moral argument is the hardest to refute for an atheist. Similarly, to 
Dawkins, Everitt seems to struggle handling this argument. The theist position on 
morality is that God is the creator of human beings; therefore, we humans owe him 
special duties. These duties are formulated by religions and display similar 
characteristics, such as worship, praying, fasting, giving to charity, etc. God is the 
life-giver and the maintainer of the universe. Life is the greatest gift that God gives us. 
Therefore, it is our duty to return His favour. Everitt makes an attempt to refute this 
theist position. In The non-existence of God, he writes: 
… the very idea of life being a gift is incoherent. If A is to make a 
gift to B, then both A and B must exist. So if the gift is meant to be 
the gift of life, to whom is the gift made? Either we exist already, in 
which case we already have what the gift is supposed to give us; or 
we do not yet exist, in which case there is no recipient for the alleged 
gift. Either way, the thought that life is a gift makes no sense.595 
                                                      
592 Craig holds this position in almost all his speeches and debates with atheists. For instance, 
see William Lane Craig, Antony Flew, and Stan W. Wallace, Does God Exist? : The Craig-
Flew Debate (Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003) at 11. 
593 For the full report and analysis of former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling’s defence, see Eric 
Michael Johnson review in the 24 September 2009 issue of Seed magazine at 
http://www.emory.edu/LIVING_LINKS/empathy/Reviewfiles/Seed.html 
594 See Craig’s lectures at http://www.reasonablefaith.org  
595 See Everitt, The Non-Existence of God  at 130. 
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Nursi would have argued against Everitt’s claim, since he does not believe in creation 
ex nihilo as Everitt implies. Nursi argues that man existed in God’s knowledge.596 
This argument of Everitt’s is very poor, even for an ordinary intelligence. We did not 
exist physically at all until our parents came together and started the parental 
biological process. The apparent cause of our coming into existence is our parents. 
But they are just the cause, not the creator. In other words, the Creator willed our 
existence and by means of our parents He granted us the gift of existence. One can 
make a promise of a gift to an unborn child. Similarly, God can obviously make a 
promise of a gift to His not-yet-come-into-existence subject, and this gift could easily 
be the gift of life and health.  
Everitt also claims that if such a God exists, He deserves resentment rather than 
gratitude considering the existence of pain and the sufferings inflicted on His 
creatures.597 This argument of Everitt’s is generally recognized in philosophy as the 
Problem of Evil, which is the focus of section 6.8, where the Nursian approach is 
discussed. 
Again, perhaps we should answer the best argument of secular intelligence with 
Nursi’s point of view.598 Clearly, from a Nursian perspective, what is missing from 
secular minds of such as Everitt’s, Flew’s and Dawkins’ is the fact that the cosmos 
                                                      
596 Nursi explains this around the concepts of imām-ı mübīn (the clear record) and kitāb-ı 
mübīn (the clear book) and lavh-ı mahv wa isbāt (the Tablet of Appearance and Dissolution) 
in The Letters at 363-364 
597 Everitt, The Non-Existence of God  at 130. 
598 Nursi repeatedly mentions the reasons of man’s creation in Risāle-i Nur. He explains that 
this life of ours is the second of three phases of our existence. The first phase is the pre-Earth 
phase, which is the universe of the souls. This current phase is the second phase, where we 
wear our physical bodies and are subjected to a test, i.e. the test of obedience to God’s orders 
and instructions given in the Holy Revelations through his Messengers. And the final phase of 
existence is the life in the Hereafter, where the souls will be either rewarded for their good 
practice in the world by means of Paradise or punished in Hell as a result of their bad 
behaviour in the world. See The Words, at 44-48, 132-142, 241-246 and 315-316 
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has an unseen component, which ontologically precedes the phenomenal world (i.e. 
the realm of existence before us). The secular minds simply start their analysis from 
the birth, or at best from the parental union. The Islamic position on this matter is as 
follows. God599 created souls and asked them ‘Am I not your Lord?’, They all 
confirmed Him being their Lord.’600 Since that moment, God gave them the gift of 
physical existence in this world. In this sense, Islamic thought concerning this 
particular aspect of morality is extremely compatible with the popular line of thought. 
Indeed, Muslims would argue that God created our souls, then our bodies with all 
their faculties, and sent us down to Earth. Therefore, we all owe him gratitude, which 
is following the moral values and duties He established in this world. 
Kant’s argument shows some parallels with those of Aquinas’. In the fourth of The 
Five Ways, Aquinas explains: 
There is a gradation to be found in things: some are better or worse 
than others. Predications of degree require reference to the 
“uttermost” case (e.g., a thing is said to be hotter according as it more 
nearly resembles that which is hottest). The maximum in any genus 
is the cause of all in that genus. Therefore there must also be 
something, which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, 
and every other perfection; and this we call God.601 
Among the critics of the moral argument, Sigmund Freud stands out noticeably, since 
he is not a philosopher but a psychologist. Freud made an attempt to explain the 
source of inspiration of objective moral values. He claims that there is no need for a 
Deity to underpin Kantian morality. According to Freud, there are three parts of the 
human psyche. These are id, ego and super-ego. It is the third part, i.e. super-ego, 
                                                      
599 Here God means the God of Islām, i.e. Allāh. 
600 Qur’ān, 7:171: And [mention] when your Lord took from the children of Adam – from 
their loins – their descendants and made them testify of themselves, [saying to them], “Am I 
not your Lord?” They said, “Yes, we have testified.” [This] – lest you should say on the day 
of Resurrection, “Indeed, we were of this unaware.” 
601 See St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (New York: Benziger Bros., 1947) at 14. 
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which is the moral component of the psyche. Therefore, all moral decisions and 
judgements are made within the human psyche, not set by a Deity.602 Daniel C. 
Dennett, like Freud, makes an attempt to explain consciousness, which is meant to be 
the source of morality. According to Dennett, consciousness is all about brain 
mechanics. It is the product of the random, algorithmic process of Darwinian natural 
selection.603 Dennett goes to great length to explain consciousness in terms of how 
brain mechanics work.604 Indeed, even the theists agree with Dennett’s cognitive 
explanation; however, for theists, it is neither a satisfactory explanation nor a proof of 
the non-existence of god.  
6.3. Human conscience (wijdān-ı bashar) as an evidence to God’s Existence 
Similar to Aquinas’s Five Ways, Nursi’s argument for the existence of God is 
fourfold. The fourth way of demonstrating that there is a Creator and Sustainer of life 
and the universe, according to Nursi, is the argument from primordial nature (fiṭrat-i 
zī shuʿūr) or conscience (wijdān).605 With regard to the issue of fiṭrah (human 
primordial nature), Nursi’s claim is that in a more general sense, all living things have 
certain natural tendencies, which he calls shariʿat-i fiṭriya. For example, a seed tends 
to germinate and grow into a plant in order to give fruit. Wherever it falls, it seeks 
moisture and light and pushes hard to root into the ground. An egg has a natural 
tendency to incubate and hatch into a new life. Even non-living things have their 
natural tendencies, such as water expanding as it gets below zero at the expense of 
breaking its steel container. These natural events occur not as a result of intelligent 
                                                      
602 See Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id (New York: Norton, 1961) at 51. 
603 See Daniel Clement Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea : Evolution and the Meanings of 
Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995). 
604 Dennett dedicates an entire book to explain this. See Daniel Clement Dennett, 
Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1991).  
605 See Nursi, Al-Mathnawi Al-Nuri  at 1368. 
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thinking on the part of the plants, animals and matter. But, in Nursi’s opinion, as part 
of the nature’s laws and instincts stemming from the Lawgiver, the creator of the 
universe.606 
Turning our attention from the universe to human, Nursi, like other Muslim scholars 
before him, explains that there are more than the commonly known five senses607 in 
every person as well as many other living things. Shifting into human psychology, 
Nursi explains that the sixth sense is the sense of direction or orientation (ḥiss-i 
sāiqah) and the seventh is the sense of motivation or desire to do things (ḥiss-i 
shāiqah).608 Ḥiss-i sāiqah, Nursi argues, almost always points us into the right 
direction. When we follow our instincts (i.e. our sense of direction), we are rarely 
disappointed. For example, our instincts tell us to help out someone in need even 
though there is no material reward. We all feel compassion in our heart when we see 
an injured animal or a crying child. This is due to what Nursi calls the sense of 
direction (ḥiss-i sāiqah), and the non-material reward of any positive behaviour as a 
result of this sense is what he calls sense of satisfaction or motivation (ḥiss-i shāiqah). 
These two senses, he claims, never lie and never guide us into any wrong.609 It is clear 
                                                      
606 See Chapter 3: Nursi on the Design Argument at 113-123 
607 These five senses are: hearing, sight, touch, smell and taste. 
608 See Nursi, Al-Mathnawi Al-Nuri  at 1371. Some of the other subtle faculties Nursi 
mentions in The Flashes at 641 are conscience, nerves, emotions, intellect, desires, power of 
animal appetites, power of anger, heart, spirit, inner heart, sense of premonition, and various 
motive and appetitive powers.  
609 One possible example of this physiological phenomenon is that of Oskar Schindler’s act 
during the Nazi Holocaust in Austria. In a well-presented Hollywood production, the world 
has watched a German businessman setting up a fake establishment and employing Jewish 
prisoners in order to save their lives. Clearly, there was no material gain for Schindler in this 
act; on the contrary, he exposed himself to Nazi wrath and risked his own life. His instincts 
simply told him that letting innocent women and children getting killed is wrong. Nursi 
would have argued that Schindler’s instincts (ḥiss-i sāiqah) directed him to an act of 
righteousness at the cost of risking his own life. The reward he got was personal satisfaction 
for doing what is instantly and naturally right, i.e. his sense of satisfaction (ḥiss-i shāiqah). 
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for Nursi that these two senses are the source of all good behaviour. In his al-
Mathnawī al-Nūriyah, Nursi writes: 
… human instinct (fiṭrah) and human conscience (wijdān) are two 
essential truths without which mankind would turn into immoral, 
despicable creatures. However, the order and harmony in the 
universe rejects this possibility.610 
Nursi, in line with mainstream theism, places God at the centre of morality. For him, 
God is the source of all positive behaviour and good conduct. Rejecting the existence 
and ever-present authority of the Creator would make the atheist a self-denier. His 
attitude would not actually change the fact that the universe and everything it contains 
are created, controlled, and maintained by Almighty God. Nursi describes the 
unbeliever as an ostrich.611 The myth suggests that ostriches bury their heads in sand 
when faced a danger. Their poor intelligence actually makes them think that if they 
cannot see the enemy, the enemy cannot see them either.612 Yet, Nursi argues this is 
not the case. Those who bury their heads in the sand, or close their eyes to the sun, do 
not make the sun non-existent; they simply turn their own world into darkness.613 
Human psychology is such that even though the mind may reject the existence of a 
Deity, conscience never forgets His presence.614  Wijdān, Nursi asserts, is where the 
visible universe and the unknown universe meet. In other words, wijdān is a tool to 
detect or feel what cannot be detected or felt by means of five common senses.  
                                                      
610 Nursi, Al-Mathnawi Al-Nuri  at 1371. 
611 Nursi, The Rays  at 964. 
612 Here, it is important to clarify that, according to the American Ostrich Association, 
ostriches do not actually bury their heads. It is a complete myth. However, Nursi is more 
interested in making his point through the ostrich analogy, even though the behaviour is not 
scientifically accurate. 
613 Nursi, The Rays  at 905. 
614 Nursi, Al-Mathnawi Al-Nuri  at 1371. 
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All previous arguments for the existence of God, discussed in this study, start off with 
intellect (aql). Aql is only one of the many tools that can help one attaining the 
knowledge of God. Some of the others, identified by Nursi, are ḥads (intuition), ilhām 
(inspiration), mayalān (tendency), ishtiyāq (desire), and ashq-ı ilāhi (divine love).  
 
Nursi claims that not only aql but also wijdān could assist one into understanding that 
there is God. Wijdān, according to Nursi, has four elements. These are will (irāde), 
mind (zihin), emotion (his), and the subtle inner faculties (latīfe-i Rabbaniye). These 
four elements of wijdān cannot be justified within the norms of the material world. 
Furthermore, he maintains that wijdān has two windows that open into accepting God. 
These windows are istinād (stand point) and istimdāt (source of help). Wijdān and 
soul both attract (jazba) are attracted to (injizāb) as magnet and iron dusts. Every soul 
needs a point to lean against in order to be stay up and needs some sort of source for 
Table 1: Four Constituents of Conscience and Their Purpose  
Wijdān  
(Conscience) 
irādah 
(will) 
ʿibādatullah 
(worshiping 
God) 
zihn 
(mind) 
Maʿrifatullāh 
(knowledge 
on God) 
his 
(emotion)
 
Muḥabatullāh 
(love of God) 
latife-i Rabbani 
(subtle inner 
faculties)   
Mushāhadatullah 
(witnessing God) 
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help since he or she is incapable of meeting all his or her personal, physical and 
spiritual needs. Nursi suggests that leaning point (istinād) and source of help 
(istimdāt) is God. 
 
In an analogy presented in The Words,615 Nursi tells the story of two servants. One 
was given ten pieces of gold, and the other was given 1,000 pieces of gold along with 
a note. The first servant goes to a shop and buys a dress with the ten pieces of gold. 
The second servant goes to the same shop and spends all 1,000 gold pieces on a 
similar dress, without reading the note given to him by his master. Obviously, Nursi 
remarks that the second servant, who received much more money than the first, was 
not meant to squander all this money on something really cheap. He should have read 
                                                      
615 This particular analogy appears twice in The Words, at 47 and 139 
Table 2: Some ways to attain the knowledge on God based on al-Mathnawī al-Nuriya  
aql (intellect) 
1. mayalān  
(tendency)  
2. ishtiyāq  
(desire)  
3. ashq-ı ilāhi  
(divine love) 
ḥads and ilhām 
(inspiration) 
GOD 
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the note given to him by his master to understand what he was meant to spend the 
money on.  
Nursi explains that the first ten pieces of gold are the tools, skills and intelligence 
given to all animals. The 1,000 gold pieces are the skills, tools and intelligence given 
to man. The little note represents the messages that God sent to humankind. Nursi 
concludes that human beings must read the note before spending the capital given to 
them. In other words, mankind is meant to read and understand the scriptures revealed 
through God’s prophets. 
6.4. Dilemma of the secular thought with regard to morality and conscience 
The atheist position so far has always been concerned with accepting or not accepting 
a Deity. Atheists such as Flew, Everitt and Mackie comfortably make their case 
against theistic arguments, sometimes on philosophical, sometimes on logical, and 
sometimes on scientific grounds. Their denial does not put them in a very awkward 
position. However, the moral argument has been formulated in such a fashion that 
deniers of it often find themself in a completely unjustified position. 
Sartre claims that the existence of God is not essential to conduct good behaviour. In 
Existentialism and Humanism, he writes: 
… It is nowhere written that ‘the good’ exists, that one must be 
honest, or must not lie …616 
To Sartre and to many atheists, the way out of this moral dilemma seems to be the 
refuge of existentialist humanism. Existentialism, which is embraced both by atheists 
like Sartre himself and by devout religious theists like Kierkegaard, became more 
                                                      
616 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism (London: Methuen, 2007) at 33-34. 
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popular after World War II.617 The upshot of Sartre’s philosophy is that everyone is 
responsible for his or her own life. You choose where you want to be. Freedom and 
personal choice are the essence of Sartre’s philosophy. Here comes the problem of 
subjectivity. The theist position on morality is that all moral laws come only from the 
Highest Lawgiver (i.e. God). This makes the set of duties and obligations ‘objective’. 
However, atheists, it is argued, can only rely on their own subjective judgement, 
which results in many different sets of moral values.618 
For example, one individual might see his happiness in the destruction of what he sees 
as ‘problem people’, as in the case of Nazi Germany. Or, as in the context of Stalin’s 
USSR, the communist regime is the ultimate authority which all citizens have to 
respect and fear. The problem of subjectivity creates happiness for a small group of 
people at the expense of the sufferings of much larger groups. It is well-documented 
that Stalin confiscated the land and property of millions of people in order to create 
common happiness for the entire country, a move which did not necessarily achieve 
its objective. The core problem was that the losers did not accept the ruling 
Communist Party as the source of moral authority. This resulted in resistance and 
consequent bloodshed. The recent history of the world is full of similar horror stories. 
In a BBC documentary entitled The Gathering, a rabbi tells us how the Ten 
Commandments were reversed during the Holocaust: ‘You shall murder’, ‘You shall 
steal’, ‘You shall commit adultery’.619 
For the theist, the strength of his or her argument derives from the fact that the source 
of all moral codes is God. Hence they are objective and universal.  
                                                      
617 For the religious existentialism, see Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard and Existentialism 
(Farnham, Surrey; Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2011). 
618 See Craig, Flew, and Wallace, Does God Exist? : The Craig-Flew Debate. 
619 The holocaust documentary is accessible through BBC archive at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/holocaust/5103.shtml  
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It is argued that the systems, which were based on Marxism (i.e. subjective moral 
values and duties), have all failed. Citizens were expected to fear the police and 
follow the laws. Nursi explains that the state then has to put one policeman in order to 
control one individual. He claims that believing in God can do better than a thousand 
policemen. In The Rays, Nursi writes: 
So I say: “Religion does not consist only of belief; its second half is 
righteous action. Is fear of imprisonment or being seen by a 
government detective sufficient to deter those who commit numerous 
grievous sins which poison society, like murder, adultery, theft, 
gambling, and drinking. If that was so, there would have to be a 
policeman or detective stationed permanently in every house, or at 
everyone’s side even, so that obdurate souls would restrain 
themselves from those filthy acts. Whereas, in respect of good deeds 
and belief, the Risāle-i Nur places a permanent immaterial 
‘prohibitor’ next to everyone. It easily saves them from bad deeds by 
recalling the prison of Hell and Divine wrath.620 
 Theists would argue that, where there is a high level of belief, there is less crime. 
Aymaz reported that during his travels in Sudan, he came across extremely poor 
Christian communities where, despite extreme poverty, there was absolutely no theft 
as it was against the community’s religious belief.621 However, the claim is quickly 
rejected by the atheist camp. In Breaking The Spell, Dennett gives some US statistics 
from which it is evident that the US prison population proportionally represents the 
public faith profile.622  This, according to Dennett, disproves the argument that 
religion is a source of good behaviour. 
6.5. Atheists’ Challenge to Nursi 
The main conflict between the atheist and the theist as regards morality is that both 
parties claim that they have better morality as a result of their faith. The theist claims 
                                                      
620 Nursi, The Rays  at 994. 
621 Abdullah Aymaz, Interview. Frankfurt. 11.01.2011. 
622 See Daniel Clement Dennett, Breaking the Spell : Religion as a Natural Phenomenon 
(New York: Penguin Books, 2007) at 279. 
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that God, the ultimate moral authority, is the moral compass for humanity. The atheist 
claims that there is no need for a moral compass (i.e. God or religion). Morality is not 
God-given but inherent in human beings. 623  In God is not great, Hitchens, a 
prominent atheist, asked how evil behaviour such as suicide bombings and 
circumcision (or FGM) could be reconciled with an all-good, all-loving and 
compassionate God. Hitchens argues, and this is the most common atheist challenge 
to the theist, that either what the theist calls God is a made-up concept or that He is 
not good but evil himself. The question can be narrowed down to this: ‘Which has 
done more evil – atheism or religion?’ 
Nursi counters by telling us that God created the good and the apparent evil.624 He 
then left humans to choose between them. Choosing the good might be hard, but 
would result in eternal happiness in Paradise. On the contrary, doing evil is easy, but 
would result in punishment in Hell.625 
The theists claim that the grim results of atheist regimes in terms of the pain and 
suffering of innocent human beings imply that the absence of God means no morality. 
The atheists tell us about the crimes committed against humanity by so-called 
religious people to imply that religion is evil itself. It has been a long-standing debate 
and therefore it is worth a closer examination. 
First of all, theists may argue that not all religious people behave according to their 
religion. For example, while Stalin was an atheist but a tyrannical dictator with the 
blood of millions on his hands, so was Saddam Hussein, who was supposed to be a 
                                                      
623 Sharpton, A. vs. Hitchens, C. debate on Morality, (7/5/2007), New York Public Library, 
FORA.tv 
624 See Chapter 6.8: The Problem of Evil at 237 
625 Nursi, The Letters  at 365. 
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religious person. There are many more examples of these types of religion versus 
non-religion atrocities. Nursi indicates that the conducting of the evil act is evil, rather 
than the act itself.626 It is the person who is responsible for his own behaviour. 
Secondly, what Hitchens highlights in his argument is not necessarily sourced from 
religion. For example, suicide bombings were first used by Dutch soldiers in 1661 in 
a war in Taiwan to avoid capture. The Prussian soldier Karl Klinke blew himself up in 
order to open a hole in Danish fortifications in 1864. Kamikaze dives were very 
common kinds of suicide mission among Japanese pilots in World War II. Recently, 
Tamil Tigers, Hamas, the PKK and the militia in Iraq used this method of warfare.627 
This act of desperation has been implemented by many as a last resort. It is 
remarkable to see that there is a wide range of diversity of faiths among these groups. 
For instance, Hamas is considered to be an Islamist group, whereas PKK holds a 
Marxist/Leninist ideology. So, here we see personal desperation rather than a 
mainstream religious teaching in action. It is also fair to note that some of these 
suicide bombers derive some of their motivations from religious leaders. However, 
speaking from the Muslim point of view, there is no hard evidence for the legitimacy 
of this type of suicide action from the two main sources of Islām, namely the Qur’ān 
and the tradition of the Prophet Muḥammad (sunnah). So, few Muslim scholars 
authorize this kind of act, as opposed to the great majority who clearly condemn 
them.628 Those who promotes suicide missions among Muslims, such as Zarein 
                                                      
626 Ibid. 
627 Robert Greenberger, Suicide Bombers (New York: Rosen Pub., 2007) at 4-12. 
628 One example of a modern Muslim scholar who considers suicide attacks a legitimate 
means of defence is Al-Qaradawi. See Abdelhadi, M. (2004), BBC World News Profile of 
Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi. BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3874893.stm 
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Ahmadzay, 629  base their argument on Qur’ān 9:111, Sūrat al-Tawbah (The 
Repentance), which reads: 
Indeed, Allāh has purchased from the believers their lives and their 
properties [in exchange] for that they will have Paradise. They fight 
in the cause of Allāh, so they kill and are killed. [It is] a true promise 
[binding] upon Him in the Torah and the Gospel and the Qur'ān. And 
who is truer to his covenant than Allāh? So rejoice in your 
transaction which you have contracted. And it is that which is the 
great attainment.630 
Opposing scholars, such as Fethullah Gülen, on the other hand, raise their argument 
from Qur’ān 2:195, Sūrat al-Baqarah (The Cow): 
And spend in the way of Allāh and do not throw [yourselves] with 
your [own] hands into destruction [by refraining]. And do good; 
indeed, Allāh loves the doers of good.631 
It is clear from these two positions that the holy texts are open to interpretation. 
Socio- political situations can easily affect the outcome of these interpretations. Gülen, 
who is among the second group of scholars, writes: ‘… religion does not approve of 
the killing of people in order to attain a goal.’632 Therefore, it is incorrect to conclude, 
as Hitchens does, that religion is the source of evil on the basis of a judgement of the 
acts of certain groups of people. Perhaps one needs to explore the correct ways of 
understanding Holy Scripture, and thereby understand the true meaning of it. 
The second most common challenge to the theist concerns the act of circumcision. 
Here, Jews, Muslims, and some Orthodox Churches in Africa are targeted equally, as 
it is religiously obligatory to carry out male circumcision. Hitchens portrays this ritual 
as a cruelty to children. He also claims that the act of circumcision is in conflict with 
                                                      
629 The terrorist who plotted a suicide attack on the New York subway. See the New York 
Times, 23 April 2010 at 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/zarein_ahmedzay_statement_when_he_ECm9fYgzMCu
q9JTvBApBjN 
630 Qur’ān, 9:111. 
631 Qur’ān, 2:195. 
632 Fethullah Gülen, 'Terror and Suicide Attacks', at 5 
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the design argument, since it implies imperfection in creation.633 Theists would argue 
that the imperfection part of his argument is fairly simple to refute. Humans 
instinctively work towards their personal comfort. For example, we dress up in winter 
to be protected from cold, or wear a hat in summer to avoid the damaging effects of 
the sunlight. We trim our hair, cut our nails or wash frequently to stay healthy. The 
act of circumcision is similar to one of the practices just mentioned. Although it is not 
ordered anywhere in the Qur’ān, the Prophet Muḥammad carried out circumcision 
and advised his followers to do the same. Therefore, the word sunnah (prophet 
Muḥammad’s tradition) is widely used in the Islamic world to describe circumcision. 
It is essentially owing to its medical benefits that circumcision has been carried out all 
around the world for centuries. There is evidence of Ancient Egyptians carrying out 
circumcision not on religious but on health grounds. It is a well-known medical fact 
that circumcision helps to reduce many diseases, including urinary tract infection634 
and HIV.635 Hitchens’ argument is therefore invalid on the grounds that not every 
painful act is immoral, provided that there are benefits entailed. Bathing babies is 
usually uncomfortable for them. However, it is medically advised by professionals to 
bathe babies to avoid hygiene-related diseases. The theist could then argue that 
Hitchens needs to argue against the bathing of babies, as this causes discomfort for 
them. Nursi sets out a general rule of judgement in similar situations. He writes: 
The lesser evil is acceptable for the greater good. If an evil which 
will lead to a greater good is abandoned so that a lesser evil should 
not be, a greater evil will then have been perpetrated.636 
                                                      
633 Sharpton, A. vs. Hitchens, C. debate on Morality, (7/5/2007), New York Public Library, 
FORA.tv 
634 Huang, Craig J. “Problems of the foreskin and glans penis” (abstract). Clinical Pediatric 
Emergency Medicine 10 (1): 56–9 (2009). 
635 Krieger, JN. “Male circumcision and HIV infection risk”, World Journal of Urology 
(2011). 
636 Nursi, The Letters  at 365. 
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On the issue of female genital mutilation (FGM), Hitchens seems to be either 
confused or ill-informed. This is mainly a cultural practice, not the obligation of any 
monotheistic religion. Hence, it is not considered in this study. 
6.6. Resurrection and life after death (ḥashr) 
Morality, with or without God, requires justice. If justice is not accomplished, 
injustice and consequent suffering become rampant. A torturer in a USSR prison 
famously told his political prisoner that he would get away with whatever he might do 
to him since he was not answerable to anyone in this life, and there is no afterlife 
anyway. Ivan Fyodorovitch in Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov implies that 
‘if there is no God, everything is permitted’.637 
Nursi places great importance on the concept of resurrection (ḥashr), as it is one of 
the major requirements of a God who, by definition, holds the ultimate best qualities, 
one of which is being just. He argues that resurrection after life is the only logical 
explanation of the apparent injustice in life. He argues that a just God ought to 
provide His subjects with justice. Since this justice is not apparent here in this life, 
Nursi claims that it is left to the Hereafter. In his works, Nursi refers to God as the 
Absolute Just (ʿĀdil-i Muṭlaq), and it is in his nature to give justice to His subjects 
eventually. The atheist point of view highlights the unfairness and lack of justice in 
this life to demean God. Either there is no God, or He is not capable of providing 
                                                      
637 The actual quote is: Ivan Fyodorovitch added in parenthesis that the whole natural law lies 
in that faith, and that if you were to destroy in mankind the belief in immortality, not only 
love but every living force maintaining the life of the world would at once be dried up. 
Moreover, nothing then would be immoral, everything would be lawful, even cannibalism. 
That’s not all. He ended by asserting that for every individual, like ourselves, who does not 
believe in God or immortality, the moral law of nature must immediately be changed into the 
exact contrary of the former religious law, and that egoism, even to crime, must become not 
only lawful but even recognised as the inevitable, the most rational, even honourable outcome 
of his position. 
See Dostoyevsky and Garnett, The Brothers Karamazov  at 134-35. 
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justice. A few popular examples of this are people with certain disabilities, apparent 
cruelty in the animal kingdom, and the unfair treatment of innocent people such as the 
victims of the Holocaust or of Pol Pot. 
Nursi believes that a logical demonstration of the existence of and necessity for a life 
after death (i.e. resurrection) decisively proves God’s existence and ‘breaks the 
backbone of atheism’.638 
The argument, where Nursi sets off to prove the logical necessity of resurrection 
(ḥashr) and life after death (akhirah), is based on a fairly easy-to-understand analogy 
via which he prefers to get his message across throughout Risāle-i Nur.639 Two 
travellers, one righteous and one a sceptic, reach a country with perfect order. They 
witness an apparent freedom and lack of instant punishment for any offence 
committed in that country. Then the philosophical dialogue begins between these two 
imaginary characters. In this dialogue, the righteous man represents the 
theist/religious point of view (i.e. Nursi’s own) and the sceptic represents the atheist 
point of view: 
The atheist: There are a lot of goods and property lying about, there 
does not seem to be anyone guarding them. So I shall help myself with 
whatever I fancy. 
The theist: I do not think all this wonderfully made country and its 
contents are unsupervised. There must be a Ruler and an Owner of all 
this property. 
                                                      
638 Şahiner, Bilinmeyen Taraflariyla Bediüzzaman Said Nursi: Kronolojik Hayati  at 298-99. 
639 Despite its massive philosophical worth, Nursi initially wrote this work in Barla, a small 
village, for the local people, who did not have a high level of education in 1926. 
Chapter 6: Nursi on Morality and Conscience 
 
   249 
The atheist: I cannot see a Ruler; therefore I do not believe His 
existence. Prove me of His existence. 
Nursi, then, speaks to the heart (conscience) and mind (intelligence) of his readers, 
and presents his case in a very logical fashion. 
First: The order and design requires an order-giver and a designer. There is no 
possibility of it coming into existence as result of random change. Fred Hoyle’s 
Boeing 747 example (also known as ‘the junk yard tornado’) is a well-known one. 
Asprin is a common popular medicine which consists of a certain percentage of 
certain chemical, organic and synthetic substances. If someone were to claim that 
Aspirin came into existence as a result of some random result of a maverick wind 
which spilt these chemicals and mixed them in exact proportions, this would be 
completely unfeasible to any intelligent mind, let alone the exact conditions (i.e. 
temperature, pressure and light) happening by chancee. Therefore, this perfect 
universe is the work of God who, by definition, has to be just. The lack of instant 
justice in this life could only imply that the Lord of the universe postpones it to a 
further time and place. That is akhirah (i.e. life after death). 
Second: The care and compassion evident in this world imply a Carer and the 
Compassionate. The example given of this is the excellent maintenance and care of all 
living things in this world. The Maker of this universe is compassionate, generous, 
and has great dignity. All these qualities require the rewarding of the righteous and 
the punishment of wrongdoers. Since this does not seem to happen here, it means it 
will happen later elsewhere, that is, on the Day of Judgement and in the Hereafter. 
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Third: All the wealth of this Earth is a small sample of the riches of its Owner. He 
displays some of them here in this world, retaining the originals elsewhere. Those 
who follow his moral codes in this life ought to be rewarded, and those who show 
disregard for his moral orders ought to be punished. This could only be achieved by 
resurrection. His subjects will be rewarded or punished according to their conduct in 
this world. 
Fourth: Justice requires pre-notifications of rules and laws. When entering a new 
country, travellers are informed about lawful and unlawful acts. For example, we are 
well-informed beforehand about the country’s legal requirements regarding speed 
limits, use of drugs and liquor, etc. They come either in the form of a written 
document, or a person explaining them. Similarly, the laws of this life are given to 
mankind in the form of holy scriptures and explained by the prophets. The Lord of the 
Universe is fair and would not punish anyone without prior notification. Therefore, 
the existence of the Books, i.e. the Gospels, the Torah and the Qur’ān, and of the 
prophets, i.e. Moses, Jesus and Muḥammad, is the indication of a Deity, the Day of 
Judgement and the Hereafter.  
In addition to these four points, Nursi presents one more piece of evidence from the 
Qur’ān. Sūrat al-Rūm (The Romans), 30:50 reads: 
So observe the effects of the mercy of Allah - how He gives life to 
the earth after its lifelessness. Indeed, that [same one] will give life to 
the dead, and He is over all things competent.640 
Therefore, Nursi concludes that eventhough there is no visible imminent justice in this 
life; all these arguments prove the existence of a Ruler and the existence of a great 
court whereby the evildoers are to be judged and punished accordingly. 
                                                      
640 Qur’ān, 30:50. 
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6.7. The Euthyphro Dilemma 
Whenever the subject of God or morality is discussed, there is one issue which always 
sits at the heart of the debate, that is, Plato’s Euthyphro dilemma. The gist of the 
problem is this: In The Life of Socrates, Plato tells us that Socrates’ prosecution for 
not being pious. Socrates meets Euthyphro, who is at the porch of the King Archon 
prosecuting his father for killing a servant, who is also accused of a murder. Socrates 
asks Euthyphro, who poses as a moral expert: “Is what is pious loved by God because 
it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?”641 In other words, ‘Does God command 
the good because it is good by its own nature, or is it good because it is commanded 
by God?’ This is one of the most popular arguments against the divine command 
theory, which holds that morality is essentially doing God’s will.  
In the field of modern philosophy and religion, there is a specific defence against this 
argument from the Christian point of view. However, I shall by pass these arguments 
and focus on Nursi’s point of view on this issue. I deliberately avoid using the term 
‘Islamic point of view’, since this dilemma has not been addressed identically within 
Islām by kalām scholars. There is a clear conflict between the Mu’tazilī way of 
interpretation and Nursi’s own, which is essentially the mainstream Sunni view.642 On 
the issue of what is good and why, the Mu’tazilite school of thought says: 
Actions and things for which a person is responsible are either, of 
themselves and in regard to the hereafter, good, and because of that 
good they were commanded, or they are bad, and because they are 
bad they were prohibited. That means, from the point of view of 
reality and the hereafter, the good and bad in things is dependent on 
the things themselves, and the Divine command and prohibition 
follows this.643 
This point of view is completely opposed by Nursi. In The Words, he writes: 
                                                      
641 Plato, Euthyphro, 9A-11B 
642 See Footnote 50 in Chapter One for ‘The Schools of Thoughts in Islām’. 
643 Nursi, The Words  at 113. 
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Almighty God orders a thing, and then it becomes good. He prohibits 
a thing, and then it becomes bad. That is, goodness becomes existent 
through command, and badness through prohibition. They look to the 
awareness of the one who performs the action, and are established 
according to that. And this good and bad is not in the apparent face 
and that which looks to this world, but in the face that looks to the 
hereafter.644 
The crucial point in Nursi’s argument is the fact that moral judgements of goodness 
and wickedness cannot be based on worldly criteria. In other words, what is good or 
bad can only be judged according to their results regarding the Hereafter. For example, 
Muslims, as well as the followers of some other religions, are enjoined to fast. The 
Islamic version of fasting is essentially abstaining from food, drink and sexual 
relations. The moral judgement on fasting is this: fasting is hard, since it causes 
extreme hunger and dehydration. There are some medical and social benefits in it. 
These worldly benefits are irrelevant. Fasting is good because it was ordered by God.  
Another example is giving to charity. It is hard, because the act of giving to charity 
takes from one’s wealth and reduces one’s assets. There are worldly social and 
physiological benefits in giving to charity, but they are irrelevant. Giving to charity is 
good because it is ordered by God. 
Farming pigs is easy and very profitable. They reproduce quickly and produce a lot of 
meat, which has worldly benefits in fighting poverty and famine. Despite these 
benefits, this act is bad, simply because it is prohibited by God. The same argument 
goes for intoxicating liquors. Ingesting alcohol might well help people to become 
cheerful. But drinking is bad simply because God willed so.  
It is indeed true that secular minds might find it very hard to digest this type of 
interpretation. For them, people are mere machines; there is no God, no resurrection, 
                                                      
644 Ibid. 
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no Hereafter, no morality.645 If achieving a task requires certain tools, and one lacks 
any of them, one is destined to fail. Nursi believes since atheists reject the certain 
components of life and existence, they find it very difficult to understand basic moral 
issues, and get bogged down in a basic dilemma like the Euthyphro dilemma. 
6.8. The Problem of Evil, Calamities and Tribulations 
One of the paramount arguments of the atheists against the existence of God is the 
problem of evil. Beginning with Epicurus of the Ancient Greece, John Stuart Mill, 
David Hume, Sam Harris and almost every atheist claim that the existence of evil 
conflicts with the existence of God. Hence, if there is a God, evil should not exist. 
Alternatively, if there is evil, it means there is no God. This issue has been tackled by 
many natural theologians for centuries. Nursi’s approach to this challenge is follows. 
Nursi declares that ‘the creation of evil is not evil itself. Conducting evil actions is 
evil.’646 What appears to be harsh and bad on the face of things might actually be 
beneficial and good in the end. Therefore, we have to look at the end-result to see the 
benefits of an action. For instance, war seems to be very negative and bad at first 
glance. In reality, wars are fought to avoid bigger troubles such as invasions, 
imprisonment or death. Lesser evil is acceptable for a greater good.647 If a nation 
evades wars and does not defend itself in order to avoid a lesser evil, it will almost 
certainly end up facing a bigger evil of losing property, land, and freedom. Therefore, 
it is wrong to imply that war is a bad thing. It is essential to compare the current 
required action and the possible consequences of avoidance. 
                                                      
645 For instance see Dawkins, The God Delusion. In this book, evolutionary biologist Prof 
Richard Dawkins argues that man is not much different from animals. 
646 Nursi, The Letters  at 365. 
647 Ibid. 
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Another example Nursi gives is the surgical removal of necrotic body tissues. At first, 
cutting and removing tissues from body seems very unpleasant, and disturbing. But it 
is a medical fact that necrotic tissues have to be removed from the body in order to 
avoid further, bigger damage.648 What initially seems to be evil is not evil after all. 
Rain and fire are another example. They are beneficial overall and good for mankind. 
If someone does not take precautions before rain comes and receive harm from it, he 
cannot claim that rain is bad. Or, if he puts his hand in the fire and burns himself, this 
does not mean fire is evil. Probably, it is more accurate to conclude that rain or fire is 
bad for this particular individual on this particular occasion as a result of his wrong 
action. 
Two aphorisms highlight Nursi’s dismissal of the problem of evil. ‘The creation of 
evil is not evil, the desire for or inclination towards evil, rather, is evil’, and ‘The 
lesser evil is acceptable for the greater good’.649 
Having negated the argument, Nursi goes on to attract our attention to another benefit 
of the existence of evil. In physics, contrasting qualities give us measurement, for 
example hot and cold, fast and slow, heavy and light. Similarly, in physiology, happy 
and sad, optimist and pessimist, good and bad are all measured and understood by 
their opposites. In other word, if there were no bad, there would be no point of 
reference from which to measure good, and so on. Everything is known by its 
opposite. Life in this world, Nursi argues, is all about trial and examination. If there 
had been no competition brought about through the existence of evil, there would 
                                                      
648 Necrosis is the death of body tissue. It occurs when there is not enough blood flowing to 
the tissue. Necrosis is not reversible. When substantial areas of tissue die owing to a lack of 
blood supply, the condition is called gangrene. Unless surgically removed, gangrene spreads 
to the other tissues. 
649 Nursi, The Letters  at 365. 
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have been no difference between people. Evil people would have been equal to good 
people. Since the creation of evil points to greater, universal results, it is false to 
assume that its existence is bad. 
Further to the problem of evil, Nursi also explains why people have no right to 
complain about the calamities and tribulations they face in life. Having established the 
existence and authority of God, Nursi seeks answers to these questions through the 
attributes of God. He reminds us that the sovereignty is His. He holds sway over His 
possessions as He wishes. For example, a skilled, rich tailor employs you as a model 
in return of a wage and the dress he makes. As part of the position you have, you are 
required to move around, stand up or sit down. The tailor wishes to make different 
applications in order to fashion the dress. Would you have a right to complain about 
this situation, considering the fact that you are a paid model? Similarly, Nursi reminds 
us that this life and body were given to us by the All-Glorious Maker without us 
paying anything for them. Therefore, He has got every right to manipulate his 
property in the way he wishes. Secondly, producing calamities and inflicting 
tribulations is the way by which God reveals His attributes.650 For example, the name 
al-Munʿim (The Nourisher) requires hunger, al-Fattāḥ (The Opener) requires stress 
and depression, al-Ghanī (The Rich One) requires poverty, al-Salām (The Source of 
Peace) requires distress, al-Walī (The Protecting Friend) requires insecurity, and so on. 
This approach to the problem of calamity and tribulation is quite original to Western 
philosophy, but not to kalām. 
                                                      
650 See Appendix 2 for the 99 names and attributes of God in Islām. 
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6.9. The problem of Hell 
The theist standpoint on justice is that evildoers will be punished in Hell for their bad 
deeds here on earth. There is an almost parallel concept of Paradise and Hell in every 
monotheistic religion, with only slight differences. The fact is that anyone who 
believes in the existence of God also believes in the existence of the Hereafter, and 
consequently in Heaven and Hell.  
The problem emerges from the fact that there is a God who is, by definition, 
omnipotent, omniscient and omni-benevolent, who possesses a place of eternal 
punishment. The omni-benevolent character of God obviously contradicts the 
existence of Hell. How can someone be all-loving and punisher at the same time? 
One of the most comprehensive studies on the problem of Hell was carried out by 
Jonathan Kvanvig. Kvanvig, a Christian theist, describes the Christian point of view 
on Hell, using the term ‘strong view of hell’. His strong view of Hell consists of four 
elements. These are: 
1. The Anti-Universalism Thesis: Some persons are consigned to Hell; 
2. The Existence Thesis: Hell is a place where people exist, if they are 
consigned there; 
3. The No Escape Thesis: There is no possibility of leaving Hell and nothing 
one can do, change, or become in order to get out of Hell, once one is 
consigned there; and 
4. The Retribution Thesis: The justification for Hell is retributive in nature, 
Hell being constituted to mete out punishment to those whose earthly lives and 
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behaviour warrant it.651 
Since Western philosophy develops mainly around the dominant Western faith of 
Christianity, most atheist arguments are based on Kvanvig’s Christian description of 
Hell. Although the concept of Hell exists among all monotheistic religions, there are 
certainly differences between the above-mentioned four aspects of Hell and the 
Islamic description of it.  
The Qur’ān mentions Hell in more than thirty different places.652 Hell is used as an 
ultimate deterrent for evil. In Sūrat Hūd, God vows: ‘But the word of your Lord is to 
be fulfilled that, "I will surely fill Hell with jinn and men all together."’653 There is a 
slight addition to the Sahih Translation in Yildirim’s version, where he translates ‘fill 
Hell with deserving jinn and men …’.654 Yildirim’s translation is better in terms of 
showing the consistency of justice and Hell. God clearly promises to punish those 
who deserve Hell. The Qur’ān threatens those who refuse to follow the divine 
instructions, thereby falling into sin. In terms of moral objectivity, the Islamic 
description of sin seems very feasible. There is not much room to object to the sins 
described in the Qur’ān.655 The chief of these sins is the associating of God with 
others (shirk). The Qur’ān tells, in Sūrat al-Mulk (The Sovereignty) [67:6], of the 
destination of disbelievers (mushrikūn): ‘And for those who disbelieved in their Lord 
is the punishment of Hell, and wretched is the destination.’656 
                                                      
651 Kvanvig, The Problem of Hell  at 25. 
652 On balance, the Qur’ān mentions Heaven (Paradise) in more than seventy places, that is, 
twice the mentions of Hell. The Qur’ān, therefore, seems to first encourage good deeds by 
showing the ultimate reward, and then threatens with the punishment. 
653 Qur’ān, 11:119. 
654 See Suat Yıldırım, Kur'an-I Hakim Ve Meali (Istanbul, 1998) at 234. 
655 See Appendix 6: Major Sins in Islām. 
656 Qur’ān, 67:6. 
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Nursi argues that the existence of Hell does not contradict the benevolence of God. 
On the contrary: the non-existence of Hell or the ultimate court of justice is 
contradictory to the qualities of God.  
The justice (‘Adālah) 
The first Nursian argument for the necessity of Hell is on the grounds of justice and 
fairness. Nursi asks his readers to imagine a mini-civilized society where the system 
runs perfectly, there is no crime and, therefore, no system of punishment. A criminal 
comes into this particular community and commits some serious crimes, totally 
disregarding the rules and laws everyone else abides by. The governor of this 
community has two options following the arrest of this criminal. The first is that he 
acts with the utmost love and compassion, and thinks that punishment of this 
individual runs counter to his loving nature. He then releases this criminal back into 
the community. Is this act right? How about the victims of the crimes? This is not an 
ethical dilemma. To Nursi, the answer is fairly straightforward. It is the duty of the 
governor to fulfil justice, protect the rights of the righteous, and punish the criminals. 
The truth from this metaphor is that life on earth is governed by God, and it is His 
duty to look after His servants. He had to realize a place of punishment (i.e. Hell); 
even he did not have it in the first place. 
The deterrent 
When people complain about the fear that Hell generates, Nursi tells what God 
intends with the creation of Hell:  
The Divine Mercy says to the fearful man: Come to me! Enter the 
door of repentance, then the existence of Hell will not frighten you, 
but make known completely the pleasures of Paradise, and avenge 
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you and all creatures whose rights have been transgressed, and give 
you enjoyment.’657  
Therefore, God encourages people to use their intelligence to avoid committing 
wrong and to do righteous acts. The existence of Hell also promotes self-control. 
People fear the heavy hand of the Judicial System and stay within what the law 
permits. We all know that if we exceed the speed limit we are penalized, or that if we 
steal we will be caught and sent to prison. Prison exists not principally for punishing 
people, but in order to encourage lawful behaviour. Similarly, Hell does not exist 
principally for punishing wrongdoers; rather, it exists to help people stop committing 
unlawful acts.  
Repentance (Tawbah) 
According to Nursi, another aspect of Hell is the establishment of the position of men 
and God. The fear of Hell helps people to approach God and seek help and refuge. 
God is clearly more forgiving than punishing. God created men having the nature of 
committing sins. However, His ultimate purpose is to make them understand that He 
is most powerful and that they are most needy and humble. The Qur’ān begins almost 
all its 114 verses with the name of Allah, who is al-Raḥmān (the most beneficent) and 
al-Raḥīm (the most compassionate), and it tells us repeatedly that God is most 
Forgiving (al-Ghafūr). All He wants is for people to think about and understand the 
meaning of life and the universe. Sūrat 'Āli `Imrān (Family of Imran) [3:191] reads: 
‘Who remember Allāh while standing or sitting or [lying] on their sides and give 
thought to the creation of the heavens and the earth, [saying], "Our Lord, You did not 
                                                      
657 Nursi, The Rays  at 965. 
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create this aimlessly; exalted are You [above such a thing]; then protect us from the 
punishment of the Fire.”’658 
The contrast 
Atheists argue that if God is all-loving, He should not punish anyone; on the contrary, 
He should place all his subjects in Paradise. According to Nursi, this argument is 
flawed. Every entity is measured against its opposite. In The Rays, Nursi explains: 
… the confrontation and interpenetration of good and evil in the 
universe, and pain and pleasure, light and darkness, heat and cold, 
beauty and ugliness, and guidance and misguidance are for a vast 
instance of wisdom. For if there was no evil, good would not be 
known. If there were no pain, pleasure would not be understood. 
Light without darkness would lack all importance. The degrees of 
heat are realized through cold. Through ugliness, a single instance of 
beauty becomes a thousand in-stances, and thousands of varying 
degrees of beauty come into existence. If there were no Hell, many of 
the pleasures of Paradise would remain concealed. By analogy with 
these, in one respect everything may be known through its opposite 
and a single truth produce numerous shoots and become numerous 
truths.659 
In short, according to Nursi, the existence of Hell is not only fair but also essential to 
reveal the true beauty of Paradise, the ultimate reward of good morality. 
In the light of the above arguments, Nursi’s justification of the existence of Hell is 
reasonably in line with Kvanvig’s fourth aspect of the strong view of Hell.660 
Retribution is the essential requirement of justice. God does not send people to Hell; 
instead, people choose to go there. The Qur’ān explains the position of God on the 
Day of Judgement (yawm al qiyāmah). It is similar to the position of a judge sitting in 
a courthouse. The accused are brought in front of him, and he examines the evidence. 
                                                      
658 Qur’ān, 3:191. 
659 Nursi, The Rays  at 967. 
660 4. The Retribution Thesis: The justification for Hell is retributive in nature, Hell being 
constituted in order to mete out punishment to those whose earthly lives and behaviour 
warrant it. 
Chapter 6: Nursi on Morality and Conscience 
 
   261 
If the evidence proves the criminality, he sends them to prison. Otherwise, he just 
releases them. In order to fulfil the justice He promised, God tells sinners “But stand 
apart today, you criminals”,661 and to the righteous He says: "Peace be upon you; you 
have become pure; so enter it to abide eternally therein …"662 
The third element of Kvanvig’s description663 is also in line with Nursi’s views. Our 
limited time of life on earth earns people either an eternal, pleasurable stay in Paradise 
or suffering in Hell. There is only one condition of eternal punishment, which is 
disbelief of God (shirk). The Islamic position on this issue is that if people die in 
belief with a great many sins, they are first sent to Hell to pay for their sins. Then, 
they will be sent to Paradise eventually. In Sūrat al-Baqara (The Cow), the Qur’ān 
tells us: “Yes, whoever earns evil and his sin has encompassed him – those are the 
companions of the Fire; they will abide therein eternally. But they who believe and do 
righteous deeds – those are the companions of Paradise; they will abide therein 
eternally.”664 
Here, the dilemma of justice emerges. How can boundless torment in an endless Hell 
in return for limited sins in a limited life be justice?665 An average person lives about 
eighty years. If we remove the period of childhood and very old age, he effectively 
lives about sixty years. He might well have committed sins in his life, but God tells us 
that the disbeliever will stay in hell-fire forever as a result of his action during this 
sixty years. This for the atheist surely does not sound fair. 
                                                      
661 Qur’ān, 36:59. 
662 Qur’ān, 39:73. 
663 The No Escape thesis: there is no possibility of leaving Hell and nothing one can do, 
change, or become in order to get out of Hell, once one is consigned there. 
664 Qur’ān, 2:81–82. 
665 Nursi, The Flashes  at 625. 
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There are two aspects of this claim. The first is that, as mentioned previously, sinners 
who believe in God suffer in Hell for a limited time until they are cleansed of their 
sins. The people who are mentioned in the verses above and in the question are the 
disbelievers. They are the ones who reject the existence of God, and therefore his 
authority. They also disregard the value of every single creature in the universe. Nursi 
explains that this kind of rejection and disregard is worse than murdering every 
creature. In a simple mathematical analogy, he explains that a single murder of a man 
results in some twenty-four years of prison despite the fact that the act of murder 
takes only a few seconds. The logic convinces us that the punishment of a crime, 
which takes only a few seconds, could last many years. On this basis, unbelief and 
misguidance are an infinite crime, and transgression against innumerable rights, and 
therefore deserve an infinite punishment.666 
6.10. Free Will versus Determinism 
One of the objections to punishment in Hell as retribution is the argument of 
predestination (qadar), or determinism. Predestination, which has been a very well-
debated issue in theology over the centuries, suggests that God created everything, 
including men, his mind and all his actions. For example, a murderer can argue that it 
was written in his destiny that he would adopt the act of killing. He claims that it was 
not his fault, but it was his destiny. Determinists also have the same defence. The 
doctrine of determinism claims that all events, including the actions of people, are 
determined as a product of a physical cause–effect chain. Therefore, people cannot be 
held morally responsible for their actions. Determinists receive a great deal of help 
                                                      
666 Ibid. 
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from science. Newton’s Laws of Motion 667  have been the Holy Grail of the 
determinist argument. Newton suggests that the universe is a clock which was wound 
up millions of years ago, and has been ticking ever since. In other words, everything 
which is going to happen has already been determined. Einstein believed that there is 
no room for randomness in the universe; everything is pre-planned and the universe is 
like a clock working on a mechanical system explained by Newton. He famously said 
“God does not play dice”; in other words, everything is part of a determined 
destiny.668 Dawkins, along with Dennett, Harris and Hitchens, who are known as the 
four horsemen of the ‘New Atheism’, embraces the idea of determinism. According to 
these evolutionary atheists, man is just a machine or animal with a slightly better 
evolved intelligence. Although they claim to be moral individuals, they reject 
morality as a product of consciousness. To them, behaviour cannot be chosen; they 
are just the products of some biochemical cognitive activities in the brain. Although 
some determinists, like Dennett, accept the compatibility of determinism with free 
                                                      
667 Newton’s first law states that every object will remain at rest or in uniform motion in a 
straight line unless compelled to change its state by the action of an external force. This is 
normally taken as the definition of inertia. The key point here is that if there is no net 
force acting on an object (if all the external forces cancel each other out), the object will 
maintain a constant velocity. If that velocity is zero, then the object remains at rest. If an 
external force is applied, the velocity will change because of the force. 
The second law explains how the velocity of an object changes when it is subjected to an 
external force. The law defines a force to be equal to change in momentum (mass times 
velocity) per change in time. Newton also developed the calculus of mathematics, and the 
“changes” expressed in the second law are most accurately defined in differential forms. 
(Calculus can also be used to determine the velocity and location variations experienced by an 
object subjected to an external force.) For an object with a constant mass m, the second law 
states that the force F is the product of an object's mass and its acceleration a: 
F = m * a 
For an external applied force, the change in velocity depends on the mass of the object. A 
force will cause a change in velocity; and likewise, a change in velocity will generate a force. 
The equation works both ways. 
The third law states that for every action (force) in nature there is an equal and opposite 
reaction. In other words, if object A exerts a force on object B, then object B also exerts an 
equal force on object A.  
668 For Einstein’s views on religion, see Haught, 2000 Years of Disbelief : Famous People 
with the Courage to Doubt  at 239-41. 
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will, radical atheists place themselves in an awkward position on the issue of morality. 
If all the actions we take are the product of Newtonian mechanics, how can anyone be 
held responsible for his actions?  
The determinists seem to narrow down their vision by looking solely at biochemical 
activities in the brain. Their view suggests that IBM’s Deeper Blue and Kasparov669 
are very similar machines, although the former is an electronically pre-programmed 
computer which simply checks millions of possible options and selects the optimum 
one while the latter is a biochemical organism possessing emotions, senses, mind and 
conscience. 
The first blow to mechanistic determinism came from Heisenberg, with his 
Uncertainty Principle. 670 The advent of modern physics (i.e. quantum theory) has 
changed a great many of the conceptions of classical physics. While classical physics 
argues the standard universal mechanics formulated by Galileo, Kepler and Newton, 
modern physics discovered that not everything is as it seems. The Uncertainty 
Principle states that it is impossible to know both the exact position and the exact 
velocity of an object at the same time. However, the effect is tiny and so is only 
noticeable on a subatomic scale. Leaving the physical and neurological aspect of 
destiny (qadar) and free will (juz’ī irāda, or juz’ī ikhtiyārī), Nursi brings a fresh 
approach to the concept. He maintains his position that this life is a place of testing, 
the result of which will lead people either to Paradise or to Hell. God is the ultimate 
                                                      
669 Garry Kasparov (1963–), Azerbaijani chess player; born Gary Weinstein. In 1985, at the 
age of 22, he defeated Anatoly Karpov to become the youngest-ever world chess champion. 
In 1997, he was beaten in a match with the IBM computer Deeper Blue, a loss that did not 
affect his world championship title. 
670 Werner Heisenberg (1901–76) was a German physicist who helped to formulate quantum 
mechanics at the beginning of the 20th century. He first presented the Heisenberg Uncertainty 
Principle in February 1927 in a letter to Wolfgang Pauli, and then published it later that year. 
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Governor of the Universe; however, He leaves people with free choice. In The Words, 
Nursi writes: 
… a believer attributes everything to Almighty God, even his actions 
and self, till finally the power of choice confronts him and he is not 
saved from obligation and responsibility. It [juz'ī irāda] tells him: 
“You are responsible and under obligation.” Then, so that he does 
not become proud due to the good things and perfections which issue 
from him, Divine Determining (qadar) confronts him, saying: 
“Know your limits; the one who does them is not you.” Yes, Divine 
Determining and the power of choice are at the final degrees of belief 
and Islām; the former has entered among the matters of belief to save 
the soul from pride, and latter, to save it from lack of 
responsibility.671 
This implies that the final decision is taken by man and that the physical 
consequences, as well as the action itself, are created by God. For example, a child 
sits on his father’s shoulders. He is incapable of climbing up a hill, but capable of 
asking his father to take him up to the mountain-top. His father has the strength and 
carries him to the summit, where the child gets cold and gets sick. So the child cannot 
blame anyone other than himself, since he chose to be taken there himself. He cannot 
take pride in reaching the summit, since it was his father who took him there. 
Similarly, man chooses his way between the good and the bad. Either way, God 
creates whatever man chooses. If bad comes from his decision, he can only blame 
himself. If good comes out of his decision, he cannot take pride of it, because it was 
God who created the goodness.672 
Acknowledging the Newtonian theory of cause and effect, Nursi objects to the Jabrī 
and Mu’tazilite point of view on divine determining. The Qur’ān says:  
                                                      
671 Nursi, The Words  at 204. 
672 Ibid., at 206. 
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Say, Never will we be struck except by what Allah has decreed for 
us; He is our protector. And upon Allah let the believers rely.673  
In other words, everything has already been determined by God. Whatever he planned 
comes into existence when the time comes. 
For example: a man gets shot with a gun by a gunman, and dies. The Jabrī school of 
thought says: “If the gunman had not fired the gun, the man still would have died” – 
that is, God is so powerful that He would have created the effect even without the 
necessary cause. Meanwhile the Mu’tazilite school of thought says: “If he had not 
fired it, he would not have died” – that is, God is completely dependent on the laws of 
classical physics: no cause means no effect. Dismissing both these views, Nursi 
explains that we do not know whether, if the gunman had not fired the gun, the man 
would have died.674 
In short, according to Nursi, man is morally responsible for and answerable for his 
actions. God is the creator of the actions and their results. With His eternal divine 
knowledge, He knows what your choice will be. But it is you who make the final 
decision with your free will. 
6.11. Problem of theological non-cognitivism  
Having presented his four ways of arguing for the existence of God, Nursi now faces 
one more challenge from the atheists, that is, the problem of theological non-
cognitivism. 
Theological non-cognitivism is another atheistic argument which states that the term 
‘god’ is unverifiable and cognitively meaningless. Michael Martin proposes one 
                                                      
673 Qur’ān, 9:51. 
674 Nursi, The Words  at 206. 
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version of this particular argument in his Atheism: A Philosophical Justification.675 
Perhaps a less elegant yet more striking question comes from an ordinary atheist. He 
says: ‘If there is a god, why does he not make himself seen to me and speak to me 
directly? Why is he confusing me with all these scriptures and messengers?’ To 
address this question, the following Nursian analogy may be helpful. Imagine that two 
students are preparing to sit the same examination. The first revises all the topics 
thoroughly and works hard towards the examination. The second student is given the 
set of questions which are going to be asked in the exam. On the day, they are given 
the questions. The first student sets down what he learned by his own hard work. The 
second student just copies the answers to the questions he has already been given. The 
result of this exam is inevitably to the advantage of the second student at the cost of 
total unfairness to the first student. Nursi’s logic in  Risāle-i Nur helps us understand 
that the element of test (sirr-i taklīf) is essential in life. Therefore, the difference 
between good and evil can become apparent. The simple, straightforward Nursian 
answer to this atheist claim is this. Man is different from the animals and angels. He is 
exposed to test, since the purpose of the intelligence given to him requires so. The 
animals and angels have steady levels in front of God, since they are not tested. The 
overall purpose of the creation of human beings with intelligence is that they 
investigate and find out the right way even though they are not given any books or 
messengers.676 However, God is fair and He always sends humankind a guide. To 
                                                      
675 See Part I of Michael Martin, Atheism : A Philosophical Justification (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1990). 
Also his extended essay of Positive Atheism and the Meaninglessness of Theism, 1999 
Michael Martin at http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/meaningless.html 
676 Ibn Tufayl’s work Hayy ibn Yaqzan is a good example of this self-investigation into the 
existence of a Maker. Ibn-i Tufayl creates a fictitious infant, resembling Robinson Crusoe, 
called Hayy in a deserted Pacific Ocean island. The infant has been fed and brought up by a 
female deer. When he reaches adulthood, Hayy questions the life and universe and 
successfully and convincingly concludes that there has to be a Maker. 
See Nursi, Risale-I Nur Külliyati 1  at 206. 
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Nursi, then, the intelligence and material given to humankind is sufficient for it to 
attain to the existence of God without Him revealing and speaking to individuals.677 
However, Nursi takes his argument further, and explains that prophets and scriptures 
(i.e. God’s speaking to humankind through the tools of prophets and revelation) are 
complementary pieces of the jigsaw puzzle that enable mankind to fully understand 
life and the universe. In The Words, Nursi likens this universe to a well-decorated, 
glamorous, artistic palace wherein the Creator exhibits His arts. Nursi also likens the 
prophets to the guides of this art exhibition, so that the visitors (i.e. human beings) 
can understand the true meanings of everything they see in this exhibition. Nursi then 
elucidates the purpose of this universe through the mouth of the prophet: 
By making this palace and displaying these things, our lord, who is 
the king of the palace, wants to make himself known to you. You 
therefore should recognize Him and try to get to know Him. And 
with these adornments He wants to make Himself loved by you. 
Also, He shows His love for you through these bounties that you see, 
so you should love Him too by obeying Him. And through these 
bounties and gifts which are to be seen He shows His compassion 
and kindness for you, so you should show your respect for Him by 
offering thanks. And through these works of His perfection He wants 
to display His transcendent beauty to you, so you should show your 
eagerness to see Him and gain His regard. And through placing a 
particular stamp and special seal and an inimitable signet on every 
one of these adorned works of art that you see, He wants to show that 
everything is particular to Him, and is the work of His own hand, and 
that He is single and unique and independent and removed. You 
therefore should recognize that He is single and alone, and without 
peer or like or match, and accept that He is such.678 
In other words, Nursi claims that God created human beings as different from animals, 
plants and angels in order to put them to test (sirr-i taklīf), to see how each individual 
perceives Him, and how He is reflected on every individual’s mirror.679 
                                                      
677 See Chapter 3: The teleological (design) argument, whereby Nursi claims that human 
intellect is a sufficient tool for understanding the existence of a Deity.  
678 Nursi, The Words  at 44. 
679 Nursi, The Letters  at 365. 
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6.12. Moral Nihilism and a Comparison Between the Sceptics and Nursi 
The eighteenth century saw a great change in European art, science, philosophy and 
many other fields thanks to the Enlightenment movement. The focal point of the 
intellectual enlightenment was to mobilize positive reason to reform society. The 
church was seen as one of the main obstacles to intellectual progress. Therefore, its 
influence had to be reduced. While doing this, intellectuals ventured into unexplored 
fields in order to solve society’s problems. The idea of atheism began to flourish. The 
misconduct of the church led many philosophers into thinking without a God. One of 
the key figures of the nineteenth century was Schopenhauer. He removed the idea of 
God from men’s lives, which inevitably pushed him to the doorstep of nihilism. 
Schopenhauer’s pessimism about life and the world influenced too many other 
intellectuals, such as Wagner and Nietzsche.680 When the concept of and faith in God 
and resurrection are removed, men find it extremely hard to justify morality and find 
meaning in life. If we do not believe anything, what is there to motivate us, what is 
there to give us values and duties, or, in other words, what is the point of life? 
Schopenhauer describes life as an “unpleasant business”.681 He rejected God outright, 
writing: 
Behind everything, there is not a God but the groundless and 
motiveless primordial urge to live, for which, however, we should 
not use ‘negative conceptions, void of content’, such as ‘absolutes’, 
‘infinites’ and ‘supersensibles’ – all really amounting to ‘cloud-
cuckoo-town’.682 
It is clear in his writings that he was one of the leading pessimists of his time. He sees 
man as a guideless being thrown into infinite space and infinite time, without any firm, 
                                                      
680 Hans KüNg, Does God Exist? : An Answer for Today (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 
1980) at 356. 
681 Ibid., at 359. 
682 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1966) at 377. 
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absolute where and when.683 To Schopenhauer, life is death from the very beginning, 
clamped down between fulfilled desires and boredom. Man is left with nothing but 
misery and the fear of death.684 
Although Schopenhauer’s godless philosophy pushes people towards a pessimistic 
worldview, and hence depression, it became a substitute for religion.685 Nietzsche 
admits, ‘it was atheism that led him to Schopenhauer’.686 Nietzsche’s rejection of God 
and God-based morality seems to be more a question of his physiological life-trauma 
than a new philosophical discovery. He was born into a vey religious Christian family, 
and was nicknamed ‘little pastor’ owing to his deep knowledge of Christianity at an 
early age. Nihilism, which is by definition the outright rejection of any authority, is 
associated with Nietzsche. He tells us the story of a madman who lit up a lantern in 
bright daylight and proclaimed the death of God. However, there needs to be solutions 
to the problems generated by killing God. His death is a great collapse. Desolate 
emptiness: the sea drunk up. A living space without prospect: the horizon wiped away. 
Unfathomable nothingness: the Earth unchained from the sun. For man himself, a 
desperate, aimless fall, which must tear him apart. The chaos of nihilism opens further 
apart. Is there still up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? 
Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night 
continually closing in on us?687 
Belief in God, Nursi argues, gives meaning to man’s life and becomes a source of 
purpose and morality. Nursi bases his arguments on the completely opposing view to 
                                                      
683 Ibid. 
684 Ibid. 
685 KüNg, Does God Exist? : An Answer for Today  at 357. 
686 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Walter Arnold Kaufmann, and Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, 
On the Genealogy of Morals (New York: Vintage Books, 1967) at 279. 
687 Fröchliche Wissenschaft III, at 127 
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nihilism. Like Schopenhauer, Nursi talks about primordial urge which only 
necessitates the existence of a deity. Nursi argues that among all creatures living on 
the planet, mankind is the only one who has got intelligence and conscience to think 
about the purpose of existence. In other words, mankind is the only species who has 
got morality and conscience. There are two possible answers to these questions. One 
is the version of the secular thinkers and philosophers who have tried to explain 
existence and the universe with the absence of God. The other version is that of 
Nursi’s, which is the explanation involving God (i.e. the theist version). 
Loren Eiseley, who wrote as part of personal contemplation, once said that man is the 
cosmic orphan. He is the only creature in the universe who asks, why?688 That is to 
say, he has got no owner, no minder or no carer. He is the accidental by-product of 
matter, time and chance. The materialist/atheist version of existence comes with its 
own problems. Rather than solving them, it creates more of them. There are three 
possible outcome of this view. First, life has no ultimate purpose. It is a total 
nothingness, and it is destined to perish. Existentialists, such as Sartre and Camus, 
reveal the dark side of this view. Camus describes man as like a rolling boulder. In his 
novel The Stranger, he emphasizes the fact that life has no meaning.689 Sartre 
describes man as being ‘like a boat without a rudder’.690 In one of Beckett’s plays, the 
audience is shown an empty stage with lots of rubbish for thirty seconds and the 
curtains are closed. Beckett wants to tell the audience that life is exactly like the 
empty, messy stage he has just shown. 
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689 Albert Camus and Matthew Ward, The Stranger (New York, NY: Vintage International, 
1989). 
690 Jean-Paul Sartre and Robert Denoon Cumming, The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre (New 
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The second outcome is that ‘life has no ultimate value’. As Dostoevsky tells his 
readers, ‘if there is no God, if there is no mortality, everything is permitted’.691 In this 
view, there is absolutely no difference between Stalin and Mother Teresa. There is no 
difference between the good and the evil. This is where one needs to touch the 
necessity of God’s existence in order to have objective moral rights and wrongs. 
Without God, whose values do we accept? Is it those presented by Hitler, or by Jesus? 
Sartre believes that there is no right or wrong. They are bare, valueless facts of 
existence. Is there any difference between the set of values where there exist 
brotherhood, love, equality, respect and self-sacrifice and the set where there exist 
war, oppression, crime, brutality and so on? If there is no God, there are no moral 
values of any of the qualities above. If there is no God, no resurrection, no afterlife, 
mankind is absolutely no different in value to the carnivores. We are all born, eat, 
drink, sleep, reproduce, and die. Once we complete our biological purpose, we all 
become fertilizers. There is no value in learning, teaching, working, giving to charity, 
and helping others, if the final destination is under the ground. According to the 
atheists, there are, of course, the values of working, wealth, and building the earth. 
But they are just part of a struggle of survival. Atheism gives us two options: either 
commit suicide or face the absurdity of life bravely and live on. Camus asks himself 
‘Is it really worth living?’ and he answers, ‘Recognise the absurdity and live in love’, 
which is completely contradictory. Sartre advises us: ‘Let’s pretend the universe has 
meaning.’ But it hasn’t. How is it possible to live life consistently, if there are no sets 
of objective moral values? In The Brothers Karamazov and Crime and Punishment, 
Dostoyevsky demonstrates that man cannot live without morality. We have already 
seen in the Nazi and Stalinist rules what kind of life awaits us should we remove God.  
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Nursi tells us the complete opposite. There is God, the Creator and the Sustainer of 
the universe. Thanks to Him, there are universal moral values and duties. Divine 
commandments constitute moral values. Life has a meaning and a purpose. Mankind 
has been created in the image of God; hence we have completely different qualities 
from those of other creatures. The purpose of life in this world is merely to earn a 
permanent life in the Hereafter. If a person fulfils God’s moral duties, he will be 
rewarded with eternal life in Paradise. If one follows the teachings of the Devil, he 
will be punished in hell-fire. Nursi also tells us that man is different from the animals, 
in the sense that he has got conscience, which causes him anguish should he do evil. 
Nursi believes he succeeds where the secular atheists fail. 
Out of these two possible views (i.e. the atheist’s and Nursi’s), one is more inclined 
towards Nursi’s. His views do not only make strong philosophical sense, but also give 
a great physiological advantage. Nursi implies that those who observe the secular 
atheist view are more likely to despair. Statistics shows that one of the main causes of 
death for young people in the USA is suicide.692 If there is no God, there is no reason 
for morality. This idea eventually leads its followers to nihilism, the consequences of 
which are not particularly cheerful. 
Nursi’s view, on the other hand, motivates individuals to live life according to the 
divine values, which are undoubtedly objective for everyone, even for atheists. The 
ultimate purpose of life is not to gather an infinite amount of money and wealth, but 
to help others. Death is not the end of life but the gate opening into permanent life. 
For every small good deed in this life, there is a reward. And for every small bad deed, 
there is punishment. 
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Blaise Pascal tells us that, out of theism and atheism, logic tells us to choose theism. 
He says, “We have nothing to lose, but infinity to gain.”693 Much in line with Pascal, 
Nursi resonates Hikam Ata’iyya who asked, ‘What does he who finds God lose? And 
what does he who loses Him find?’.694 Nursi then remarks, ‘the person who finds Him 
finds everything, while the person who fails to find Him, can find nothing. If he does 
find something, it will only bring him trouble.’695 
6.13. Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the basis of moral arguments in general and Nursi’s version 
in particular. The idea of the necessity of God’s existence expressed for the first time 
by Kant as a source of summum bonum, the highest good. Elaborating around two 
new terms, Kant argues that theoretical reason cannot prove the existence of God. 
Practical reasoning, on the other hand, can help one into believing in God since it is 
about what to do in life. To Kant, individuals need to endeavour after the highest good 
which is simply possible in this world only on the supposition of a supreme cause of 
nature. Therefore it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God. 
Craig, similar to Kant, claims that there are objective moral values and duties which 
ought to be generated owing to the supreme moral giver, that is God. Theists, in all 
Abrahamic religions, assert that God is essential in order to give humanity objective 
validity and act as the overriding authority.  
Nursi’s argument comes in two versions. Nursi’s first version of the moral argument 
is based on human conscience which he describes as primordial nature of human 
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beings. To Nursi, one can and should find out that there is God simply based on the 
intelligence and senses given to him. Further to what is already out there, Nursi 
introduces some new terminology such as the sense of direction or orientation (ḥiss-i 
sāiqah) and the sense of motivation or desire to do things (ḥiss-i shāiqah). 
Constructing his arguments on these two terms, he posits that the sources of these 
senses could only be the Supreme Maker of the universe. 
Nursi’s second version of the moral argument, one might argue, comes in the form of 
arguing for the existence of life after death. Nursi seems to be at pains with 
demonstrating how the lack of full justice in this life is actually an indication of the 
continuation of this life in a different format elsewhere. 
The analysis of Nursi’s Risāle-i Nur reveals that there is very little mention of human 
conscience as an evidence of God compared to his other arguments. However, great 
many sections of his work seem to be dedicated rather to defend the theistic position 
against various sceptic attracts. For instance, the contradiction between a loving God 
and the existence of evil and hell, question of free will and determinism are some of 
the issues he tackles in his writings. Nursi seems to be at pains with reconciling God 
and the existence of evil, calamities, tribulations and hell. To him these counter 
arguments is not a contradiction with the concept of God, they are, on the contrary, 
evidence of His necessity. 
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CHAPTER 7: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined the life and philosophy of one of the most influential 
twentieth-century Islamic scholars, Bediüzzaman Saīd Nursi, in order to examine his 
methods of arguing for the existence of God. Although Nursi never considered 
himself a philosopher and did not intend to write his corpus, Risāle-i Nur (Epistles of 
Light), as a philosophical work, the arguments he developed in his writings deserve to 
be examined among those produced by major philosophers. In this sense one could 
consider Nursi as a modern day mutakallim. 
Nursi believed that human happiness here in this life, as well as in the Hereafter, 
depends on belief in God. He insisted in his 1909 Court-Marshal Defence that Plato’s 
ideal Republic could be achieved only through the teachings of the Qur’ān – in other 
words, via a strong belief in the unity and oneness of God. Nursi always believed that 
the meaning of life and of human existence could only be understood through the 
Qur’anic injunctions and prophetic teachings. According to Nursi, the true believer 
could acquire such strength, thanks to his belief in God, that he could challenge all 
that the universe could ever throw at him. He partly demonstrated this strength in his 
83-year-long life largely spent in wars, in prisoner of war camps, in exile, and in 
prisons. Failure to attain the true knowledge of God (ma‘rifatullāh) could potentially 
drive people into despair, depression, and enormous mental and spiritual suffering. 
Upon close scrutiny, Saīd Nursi’s 6,000-page-long Risāle-i Nur, consisting of around 
twenty volumes, reveals that there are four distinctive arguments that Nursi develops 
in order to defend his version of theism. These four arguments (barāhin, single 
burhān) are the argument from the universe, which is similar to a version of the 
teleological argument (kitāb-ı kabīr-i kāināt); the prophethood argument (nubuwwah); 
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the argument from revelation or scriptures (waḥy); and the argument from human 
conscience or primordial nature (wijdān or fıṭrat-i bashar). Although none of these 
arguments is completely new in philosophy per se, Nursi elegantly elaborates these 
four themes to build a four-legged structure upon which he attempts to locate the 
existence of God as an indestructible idea. 
One may consider these four Nursian arguments as part of theistic tradition. In other 
words, those who to defend Abrahamic theism from an Islamic or monotheistic point 
of view may employ these four Nursian arguments. In this respect, at least two of 
these arguments (the teleological and moral arguments) could be employed not only 
by Muslims but also by Christians and Jews.  
Although Nursi never considered these arguments individually and independently 
from each other, for the sake of their systematic analysis in this thesis they have been 
studied individually in separate chapters. 
Having reviewed the historical background of atheism and theism in Chapter 1, and 
Saīd Nursi’s life and discourse in Chapter 2, I analysed the first of Nursi’s four ways 
of arguing for the existence of God, namely the ‘great book of the universe’ (kitāb-ı 
kabīr-i kāināt), in Chapter 3. The great book of the universe, Nursi argues, when read 
reveals the existence of its intelligent, all-powerful and magnificent designer. This 
particular argument is essentially what the Ancient Greeks called the teleological 
argument, or modern philosophy’s argument from design. Although Nursi, rather 
differently from other philosophers, calls it ‘the book of the universe’, the theme he 
builds up is similar to that constructed by his predecessors: the universe and 
everything it contains demonstrate purposefulness, which in turn can only imply the 
existence of an intelligent Maker. On every occasion on which Nursi defends this 
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argument, his analogy of a ‘king and his kingdom’ appears consistently. The upshot 
of this Nursian metaphor is that the universe is ultimately the kingdom of God, where 
He designs, creates and maintains His art in order to be seen and appreciated by 
humankind, whom He has blessed with reason and intellect. 
The book-of-the-universe argument, for Nursi, is a sufficient tool wherewith the 
human intellect can detect that there is an intelligent maker and maintainer of this 
world, life and cosmos in a wider sense, even without the tools of the prophetic 
teachings or the scriptures.  
Clearly, Nursi’s use of the design argument occurs most frequently throughout his 
Risāle-i Nur, not only because he primarily targets the average citizen, who does not 
necessarily hold any deep philosophical or scientific knowledge but also he imitates 
the method of the Qur’ān. Like William Paley, Saīd Nursi tells the ordinary reader (or 
listener in some cases) that a book requires the existence of an author to write it, a 
needle requires the existence of a needle-making craftsman to manufacture it, and 
similarly, this universe requires a Maker with infinite power, knowledge and intellect 
to design, create and sustain it. For Nursi, therefore, anyone with a little intelligence 
can be convinced by the design argument that nothing can come into existence by 
itself, by nature or by chance, three atheistic viewpoints which Nursi always seems to 
be at pains to refute. 
Nursi not only argues for the validity of his version of the design argument, but also 
tries to refute the counter-arguments of the atheists. In The Flashes, he tries to 
demolish the three possible atheist proposals regarding the origin of creation. The 
postulates Nursi tries to refute are: things create themselves (tashakkala bi nafsihi); 
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nature creates things (iqtaẓathu al-ṭabīʿah); and causes create things (aʿwjadathu al-
asbāb). 
In the bulk of Risāle-i Nur, Nursi targets, without mentioning the names, the 
philosophy of Ludwig Büchner’s materialism, Auguste Comte’s positivism and 
Charles Darwin’s evolutionism. This appears nowhere more evidently than in his 
Tabiat Risalesi (Treaties on Nature), where Nursi tackles the above-mentioned three 
main atheistic proposals for the origins of existence in the cosmos. He meticulously 
tries to refute the idea that science, logic and reason could possibly accept that natural 
causes create life without the interference or control of an intelligent being. This is 
partly what Darwin proposed as an explanation of the origins of life, and it has been 
embraced by many atheists, such as Bertrand Russell, Charles Darwin, Richard 
Dawkins and Daniel C. Dennett.  
For Nursi, ascribing the power of reason and intellect to mindless nature, causes and 
elements forming organisms is so absurd that were it so, all these entities ought to be 
cleverer than man. He tells the atheist that his propositions require ‘the ear of his 
donkey to be clever than himself’. 
The imagery and metaphors used by Nursi in his ‘New Saīd’ works (i.e. The Words, 
The Letters, The Flashes and The Rays), as well as in his transitional work Al-
Mathnawī al-Nūriyah, reflect the influence the Qur’ān had upon him. As Nursi 
indicated on countless occasions, he took full guidance from the Qur’ān and did not 
study anything other than it during his transitional life and the ‘New Saīd’ Era. This 
had a significant impact on his method of expressing his views. For Nursi, metaphors 
are the philosophy of the common people (ʿavām falsafasi) or like binoculars which 
bring further truth closer to people’s comprehension. 
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Another possible reason Nursi used this particular method could be the context in 
which Nursi wrote these pieces. The main body of Risāle-i Nur (i.e. the first five 
books listed above) were written during Nursi’s various Anatolian exiles, which 
started in Barla in 1926 and continued in Eskişehir, Kastamonu, Denizli, Emirdağ, 
Afyon and Isparta. During this period, Nursi’s first audience consisted of a few 
ordinary villagers of Barla. Therefore, Nursi might have been trying to speak to their 
hearts and minds using simple, universal and easy-to-understand analogies such as 
gardens, trees, seeds, plants, animals, etc. 
As his influence grew, Nursi began to gain new followers from various walks of life, 
including members of the Army. In addition to this, having nearly forty years of war 
experience, Nursi’s audience were well aware of matters of war and the military. 
Hence, military analogies started to appear in Nursi’s writings. 
The originality of Nursi’s design argument is that rather than connecting the artefact 
to a necessary designer, or as Paley puts, the watch requires the watchmaker, Nursi 
connects the artefact to a designer with certain characteristics. He, then, draws a 
picture of the Designer who has al-asma al-husna, in other words, he demonstrates 
the God described in the Qur’ān. This is what makes Nursi different from almost 
every other philosopher.  
Having built his theism from the ground up, Nursi proceeds from his ‘argument from 
the book of the universe’ to his second argument for the existence of God, that is, the 
institution of prophethood (nubuwwah), which was the focus of Chapter 4. Nursi 
suggests that the universe is like a palace built by God, who in turn wanted the secret 
of it to be understood better by mankind by means of explainers (i.e. the prophets). 
Without the prophets (anbiyā) and the revelations given to the prophets (waḥy), Nursi 
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asserts, mankind could, possibly, come to the conclusion that there is a Deity who 
creates and sustains the universe, but he could neither understand His qualities in full 
nor know what He really expects from humankind. This argument is expressed in 
certain parts of Risāle-i Nur by means of an analogy, where Nursi tells his readers that 
the visitor to a palace could guess that the property has an owner, but would not know 
the exact characteristics of that person or what he expects from his visitors without a 
guide or guidebook. Here, Nursi clearly refers to the prophets when he talks about 
‘guides’, and to revelation or the scriptures when he talks about guidebooks. 
Two types of tool become highly visible as Nursi argues for the authenticity of all 
prophets, especially the prophet Muḥammad, in Risāle-i Nur. Indeed, Nursi explains 
that the personal religious experiences (argument from religious experience, or ARE) 
of these individuals, supported by miracles (arguments from miracles) shown to them 
by God, ought to be accepted as genuine.  
According to Nursi, all prophets (anbiyā) and their books (kutub), including the 
prophet Muḥammad and the Qur’ān, have been sent by God to guide humanity to the 
truth. Therefore, the Nursian position implies that all prophets prior to prophet 
Muḥammad, no matter where, when, and to whom they were sent, essentially tried to 
spread the same message, that is, the unity of God (tawḥīd), the authenticity of their 
and previous prophets’ prophethood (nubuwwah), and life after death and resurrection 
(ḥashr).  
By way of a defence of the prophets’ religious experiences, the prophet Muḥammad’s 
in particular, Nursi applies a set of tests very similar to Richard Swinburne’s in order 
to investigate whether or not their experiences were genuine. He draws attention to 
the fact that, other than through minor mishaps, none of the prophets had ever been 
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proven unreliable. They have always been truthful, trustworthy and consistent. 
Therefore, Nursi suggests, all prophets ought to pass Swinburne’s first test, the 
‘reliability test’. 
Swinburne’s second test, namely ‘whether or not the claimant is under the influence 
[of intoxicants]’, is applied to the prophet Muḥammad, only to reveal that he never 
used alcohol or drugs in his life. Therefore, there is no possibility of his being under 
the influence of intoxicants that could invalidate his claims. 
The third test, ‘testing the physical conditions to have accurate perception’, is also 
applied. Although Nursi argues that there is no reason to doubt the prophet 
Muḥammad’s religious experience in terms of his having misperceptions or 
hallucinations, the atheist camp disagrees with him. Freud, for instance, makes a 
psychological analysis of Muḥammad’s having been an orphan for years prior to his 
claiming of religious experience, and implies that he was having hallucinations. Thus, 
according to Freud and the atheists, Muḥammad’s religious claims are false. Patricia 
Crone and Michael Cook reconstruct Muḥammad’s life story and religious experience 
(the Qur’ān and Islām in general) as a cheaper copy of previous religious lives and 
experiences such as those of Jesus or Moses, drawing parallels between the Islamic 
narration and the other religious narrations. 
However, the claims put forward by sceptics such as Freud, Cook and Crone are 
dismissed outright in Risāle-i Nur. Nursi claims that Muḥammad is either a deceitful 
master-charlatan or a genuine prophet of God. Since, according to Nursi, none can 
prove that he was a lying, cheating impostor who benefited from his status, he ought 
to be seen and accepted as the last true prophet of God. Indeed, Nursi underlines the 
fact that the historical records indicate that the prophet Muḥammad showed the 
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utmost integrity throughout his life, did not change his lifestyle for the better, and 
even suffered hardship because of his claims.  
Proving Muḥammad’s prophethood, according to Nursi, also automatically proves the 
prophethood of his predecessors such as Abraham, Moses and Jesus, since 
Muḥammad clearly indicates that he is the last in a chain of prophets (khāṭam al-
anbiyā) starting with Adam. 
The novel aspect of Nursi’s prophethood argument is that it is not only based on the 
miracles of Prophet Muḥammad but also based on the tests set to verify the claimants 
authenticity. There is no account that Nursi were aware of William James’s work on 
the ARE, yet his approach to prophethood is considerably new in the world of 
philosophy.  This might well be due to the fact that until Nursi’s time not many 
people so openly criticised Prophet Muhammad. Nursi’s argument to defend Prophet 
Muhammad’s prophethood is unprecedented not because of Nursi being an 
outstanding scholar but because of the fact that he was one of the earliest defenders of 
the critics. 
The concepts of prophethood and revelation or scripture are so closely knitted 
together that it is impossible to separate them. In Risāle-i Nur, these two are presented 
as two supporting legs of the same argument. For Nursi, Muḥammad is obsolete 
without the Qur’ān, and so is the Qur’ān without Muḥammad. A guide needs a 
guidebook to learn from in order to teach others. The Nursian explanation of the 
Muḥammad–Qur’ān duo is such that Muḥammad never made up anything from his 
own mind: he was given the Qur’ān to learn and to teach from.  
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Throughout Risāle-i Nur, Nursi tries to establish a logical link between the apparent 
design and the designer; message and the messenger. That is to say, the universe 
requires the existence of God which requires the Qur’ān which requires Prophet 
Muḥammad. Nursi, on two separate occasions, likens men to the servant who was 
given one thousand gold pieces and sent shopping with a little note given by his 
master as opposed to the other living things, especially animals who were given only 
ten pieces of gold without a note. Clearly, the little note given to men indicates the 
scriptures, particularly the Qur’ān. 
The challenge faced by Nursi at this point is how to prove that the note given to 
mankind (i.e. the scriptures, and the Qur’ān in particular) is genuine. This challenge 
leads Nursi to his third argument for the existence of God, which is the argument 
from revelations or scriptures (waḥy), the Qur’ān in particular, which was examined 
in Chapter 5. This Nursian approach to the revelations and scriptures is unique, in the 
sense that not many theologians have ever developed a methodology regarding this 
subject, as Nursi did. What Nursi does in Risāle-i Nur is that he closely scrutinizes 
whether the Qur’ān is the work of Muḥammad or a true revelation from God (waḥy-i 
ilāhi). Nursi systematically examines the properties of the Qur’ān to refute the thesis 
that it represents the poetic writings of Muḥammad. Certain aspects of the Qur’ān, 
Nursi asserts, could not possibly be the work of an illiterate shepherd turned merchant 
like Muḥammad. For instance, characteristics such as excellence in eloquence, 
coherence, harmony and comprehensiveness could not possibly have been attained by 
Muḥammad. Nursi explains that although Muḥammad was a very honest, trustworthy 
and reliable person, he was not a poet who was able to produce a work of poetry like 
the Qur’ān, where he could maintain superhuman eloquence in telling stories from the 
past, and report the unseen from the future without any inaccuracy, discrepancy or 
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wearisomeness. Besides, the verbal traditions concerning the prophet Muḥammad 
(aḥādith) reported in volumes such as al-Bukhāri, al-Muslim and Abū Dawūd 
demonstrate that, in his day-to-day conversations, he spoke ordinary Arabic, which is 
completely different from the speech of the Qur’ān. Therefore, Nursi suggests that the 
Qur’ān is the word of a different speaker (i.e. God) revealed to Muḥammad, who in 
turn spoke it to people. 
Nursi’s systematic exposition of the Qur’ān’s miraculousness in terms of eloquence, 
comprehensiveness and reporting of the unseen is his method of paving the way for 
the Qur’ān’s description of the nature of God, death, and life after death. Nursi 
implies that the irrefutable, wondrous and verifiable aspects of the Qur’ān oblige its 
readers to believe what it says about those other matters which cannot possibly be 
known by humankind or be verified by anyone other than God himself. For instance, 
the Qur’ān tells us about the Day of Judgement (al-qiyāmah), resurrection (ḥashr), 
and a rewarding life after death in Paradise (al-jannah), or retribution in Hell 
(jahannam). Nursi claims that, since parts of what the Qur’ān says about the past and 
the future have been verified, what it says about other matters, such as the ones 
mentioned above, must be true too.  
The predecessors of Nursi used the verses of the Qur’ān to demonstrate that there is 
God. However, Nursi scrutinizes the Qur’an in order to demonstrate that it is not the 
work of man but work of Deity. In this regard, Nursi’s approach to Qur’ān as an 
evidence for God’s existence is rather unprecedented. 
The fourth argument Nursi puts forward for the existence of God, which was 
discussed in Chapter 6, is that of human conscience or primordial nature (wijdān or 
fiṭrat-i bashar). Man, according to Nursi, is a small-scale mirror of God and His 
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attributes. If there had been no prophets or scriptures, man would still have been able 
to discover that there is a deity who possesses much greater power and intellect than 
himself.  
To explain how human conscience (wijdān-i bashar) proves the existence of God, 
Nursi introduces five senses that have never been acknowledged by materialist 
scientists in 5.3. In al-Mathnawī al-Nūriyah, Nursi gives brief particulars of these new 
five senses. On top of sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch he adds quwwa-i shā’iqah 
(sense of enthusiasm or longing for the truth), quwwa-i sāiqah (sense of drive or 
attraction towards the truth), ḥiss-i qabl al-wuqū (sense of forefeeling in the heart), 
ruyā-i ṣādiqah (genuine dreams), and kashf-i ṣaḥīḥ (genuine spiritual discovery). If 
mind (‘aql) forgets God, Nursi claims, human conscience, which consists of the 
further five senses mentioned above, never forgets God. Nursi explains that no senses 
in humans are without a corresponding entity. For instance, humans cannot develop a 
taste for something non-existent. Similarly, the sense of enthusiasm (shāiqah) and 
sense of drive (sāiqah) require some entity towards which humans are attracted or 
driven. This entity, for Nursi, is God. 
Another tool for achieving understanding of God is ‘the human I’ (anā), as Nursi calls 
it. This tool is extremely useful, yet also extremely dangerous. Nursi explains that anā 
is given to man in order for him to attain belief in the existence of God with His 
attributes, in comparison to his own limited power and intelligence. In Nursi’s words, 
anā is the key given by God to man so that he can unlock the hidden secrets or 
talisman of the universe (ṭılsım-ı kāināt). However, it might dangerously lead man 
into materialist atheism as well. When man considers himself intelligent and powerful, 
he imputes certain godly attributes to himself. When he fails to attain certain high 
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targets, he realizes that he is not actually fully capable. Hence, Nursi concludes, man 
understands that there ought to be someone much greater than him in terms of power 
and intellect, and that is God.  
Arguably, Nursi’s Treatise on Self (Anā Risālesi) in The Words is the epicentre of his 
thought, where his unique philosophy of life, universe and God can be seen clearly. 
Nursi builds his theism on three concepts. These are ‘the human I’ (anā), ‘the self-
referential meaning’ (mʿanà-i ismī) and ‘the other-indicative meaning’ (mʿanà-i ḥarfī) 
of life and the universe. 
Using the tool of ‘the human I’ (anā), which Nursi describes as ‘a unit of 
measurement to know the attributes and functions of the Deity’, man is meant to read 
life and the universe through the spectacles of their ‘other-indicative meaning’ (i.e. 
mʿanà-i ḥarfī). For instance, you look at a flower and say ‘How beautiful it is!’. This 
is seeing through the flower’s self-referential meaning. If you look at the same flower 
and say ‘How beautifully it has been made!’, this is seeing it through its other-
indicative meaning. For Nursi, everything has these two meanings. Man is meant to 
read everything, including his anā, through the other-indicative meaning, without 
rejecting the self-referential meaning. 
Failure to use the tool of anā properly by ignoring the other-indicative meaning of 
things, Nursi argues, leads man into materialist atheism. In other words, as was 
discussed in Chapter 3, man has to impute power and intellect to powerless and 
mindless objects in order to explain their existence. To counter this atheistic point of 
view, Nursi builds his philosophy on the linguistic deconstruction of the terms ‘self-
referential meaning’ (mʿanà-i ismī) and ‘other-indicative meaning’ (mʿanà-i ḥarfī). 
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The great book of the universe, Nursi explains, consists of an infinite number of 
letters which express the meanings of life and the cosmos. The letters (ḥurūf, single 
ḥarf) of this book are the individual readings of the ‘other-indicative meanings’ of 
infinite creations. None of these letters has a full meaning (mʿanà) on its own other 
than its self-referential meaning. Their meaning emerges fully, provided they are read 
through their ‘other-indicative meanings’. 
Point of view (naẓar) and intention (niyyah) are two additional concepts employed by 
Nursi. Naẓar, how one looks at things, is the tool which directly affects one’s 
perception of the universe. For instance, if one looks at scavengers consuming a 
carcass of a dead animal, depending on one’s point of view (i.e. naẓar) one might 
conclude either that a gross act is taking place or that a beautiful cleaning-up 
operation is under way. Similarly, man’s intention, or niyyah, affects the output of his 
actions. For example, if a horseman puts a post in the ground, to which to tie up his 
horse, and leaves it there for the benefit of other horsemen, but someone trips over it 
and gets hurt, he would still get the reward rather than blame, thanks to his initial 
good intention. Therefore, Nursi thinks naẓar and niyyah change the nature of things 
and actions. For that, man will always be rewarded in the eyes of God as long as he 
sees, thinks and acts through pragmatic naẓar and niyyah. 
The arguments for the existence of God propounded by some Ancient Greek and early 
Muslim philosophers (falāsifūn) have also been examined in this thesis. There are 
parallels between Nursi’s arguments and these philosophers’ in respect of the 
teleological and moral arguments. Undoubtedly, Nursi had been inspired by the 
Ancients such as Socrates and Plato, who are mentioned repeatedly throughout 
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Risāle-i Nur. Nursi seems to hold these philosophers in high regard and believe that 
they attained a certain level of knowledge of God (ma‘rifatullāh).  
Nursi argues that, among many routes leading man to the knowledge of God, the 
route of philosophy is the hardest one. In an analogy, Nursi likens this route to 
digging a tunnel underground to go from point A to point B. This route, he says, is the 
riskiest one, where many bright minds have failed to reach ma‘rifatullāh (knowledge 
of God) and have fallen into the arms of atheism or disbelief (kufr). For Nursi, 
Aristotle, and some Muslim philosophers influenced by Aristotle such as al-Fārābī 
and Ibn Sīnā, misjudged the nature and truth about anā and fell into a fatal error.  
Although Nursi is at ease with the cosmological and moral arguments developed by 
these philosophers, he is highly critical of their level of true knowledge of God. For 
Nursi, great minds such as al-Fārābī’s and Ibn Sīnā’s could only reach the level of 
belief of an ordinary believer. One potential explanation of this Nursian judgement 
could be that they seriously focused on philosophy, but ignored the tools of 
prophethood (nubuwwah) and holy revelation (waḥy-i ilāhi). An ordinary believer 
who follows the prophetic and Qur’ānic teachings might not necessarily have the 
cosmological and philosophical knowledge attained by al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, yet he 
might well be more aware of the nature and the will of God thanks to the teachings of 
the prophet and the Qur’ān. 
Nursi continues his criticism of the route of philosophy as a means of attaining true 
tawḥīd (oneness of God), especially the one adopted by the Mu‘tazilah such as al-
Kindī. There is no question about the Mu‘tazilah’s belief in the existence of God; 
however, Nursi raises concerns over their interpretations of God’s attributes. For 
instance, he fiercely criticizes the Mu‘tazilah’s for their claim that man is fully 
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responsible for his actions since man is the creator of his actions. For Nursi, this 
approach grossly undermines God’s continuous creation principle whereby God is 
believed to be the ultimate creator of the output of man’s free will. 
In other words, the route of philosophy, which only relies on knowledge and 
reasoning (‘aql), is almost always insufficient for attaining true understanding of the 
reality of the existence and nature of God. Nursi explains the hardship these 
philosophers faced in their ‘travel through an underground tunnel’, where many 
philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā were stranded and got 
lost. Nursi reports that he briefly travelled via the route of philosophy in the Old Saīd 
period, only to face the destiny of his predecessors. He explains that a light, 
symbolizing the Qur’ān, was given to him so that he could find the exit from that dark 
tunnel and come back into the light. 
Another obvious difference between Muslim philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā and al-
Fārābī and Saīd Nursi concerns the level of attainment required to understand God 
(ma‘rifatullāh). According to Nursi, kalām scholars could at best reach level three on 
the seven-level Nursian scale of ma‘rifatullāh. Nursi explains that the stages of 
ma‘rifatullāh are asar (the output of an act), fi‘il (the act), fā‘il (the one who acts), 
ism (the name of the actor), ṣifat (the attributes of the actor), shuūn (the various work 
of the actor), and finally Dhāt (the Actor, God or Allāh).  
According to Nursi, kalām arguments developed by Ibn Sīnā, al-Fārābī and the like 
started off from the output of an act (asar), which is the universe, and the observable 
acts (fi‘il). They therefore draw the conclusion that these arguments require someone 
(fā‘il) who carries out these acts. This person, for kalām scholars, must be the Prime 
Mover, Unmoved Mover or First Cause. In other words, kalām scholars base their 
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argument on ‘contingency and createdness’ (ḥudūth and imkān); hence they only 
reach to the existence of a Necessary Being (Wājib-al wujūd). However, in order to 
attain full knowledge of the Dhāt of this deity, one needs to move to steps four, five 
and six on the scale. For Nursi, these steps are only taken thanks to the help of 
prophethood and revelations. In Nursi’s mind, what makes his arguments in Risāle-i 
Nur superior to the ones developed by the kalām scholars is the fact that Risāle-i Nur 
helps one to complete this seven-step climb to attain true knowledge of Dhāt (God) or 
ma‘rifatullāh (true knowledge of God). 
Nursi clearly constructs his philosophy not only on reason and knowledge (‘aql), like 
the kalām scholars, but also on heart (qalb) and on the Qur’anic teachings (waḥy), like 
the Sufis. For Nursi, neither the route of qalb and waḥy adopted by the Sufis nor the 
route of ‘aql used by kalām scholars is sufficient on its own. This is why Nursi claims 
that neither philosophers nor Sufis are on the right path. If reason and knowledge 
(‘aql) form one wing and heart and revelation (qalb and waḥy) the other, getting 
airborne without having them both would be an extremely hard task.  
It appears it the chronology of Nursi that he initially used wijdān argument in the Old 
Saīd period. Especially brief appearance of wijdān can be seen in his 1911 Damascus 
Sermon. Few years later, wijdān argument reappears in al-Mathnawi al-Nuri again 
but extremely briefly. All in all, Risāle-i Nur dedicates only a few pages to elaborate 
around wijdān as opposed to many hundreds for the other three arguments especially 
the teleological argument. The Second Saīd period sees not wijdān argument but 
mainly the teleological argument. The reason, one might argue, could be that the 
transition from The Ottoman Empire into the new secular Turkish Republic 
necessitated the use of intellect and reason rather than spiritual elements. It appears 
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that Nursi delicately avoided wijdān argument in the secular period in order to avoid 
being discredited outright on the basis that he, unlike the defenders of the new regime, 
invokes unverifiable elements. 
It could be argued that Nursi systematically tries to merge reason and knowledge 
(‘aql) with heart and revelation (qalb and waḥy) in his Risāle-i Nur. He starts off with 
the teleological argument, which speaks directly to the mind, explaining that science, 
knowledge and reasoning could not possibly accept creation through natural forces, 
self-creation or pure luck alone. They require the existence of an Intelligent Creator. 
However, reason and knowledge could at best reach the conclusion that there must be 
a deity, without knowing his true nature and wishes. This is when Nursi brings 
forward his second and third arguments, that is, prophethood (nubuwwah) and 
revelation (waḥy). For Nursi, these two are essential for understanding what kind of 
being this Deity is and what exactly He expects from humankind. 
Unlike most kalām scholars, al-Ghazzālī seems to have achieved this mind–heart 
balance. Hence, Nursi regards him highly and respects his authority. As was discussed 
in Chapter 1, al-Ghazzālī, a dominant character who also appears in Nursi’s work in 
opposition to other Muslim philosophers such as al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, was more a 
mystic than a philosopher. Perhaps one reason Nursi considers himself more in 
alliance with al-Ghazzālī might be their common hostility towards the Mu‘tazilah 
school of thought. Al-Ghazālī followed the Ash’arite school of thought, as did Nursi. 
Therefore, their views on God’s essence and attributes are very similar. 
Although Nursi seems to have inspired many Muslim scholars, especially in Turkey, 
there is no strong evidence of his influence on modern Western intellectuals. In terms 
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of methodology, however, Nursi’s way of arguing for his version of theism looks 
similar to the methods of Richard Swinburne and William L. Craig. 
Swinburne, a contemporary academic and Christian apologist, works on Christian 
theism. In line with Thomas Aquinas’s, his theism is not greatly different from the 
Nursian version of Islamic theism exposed in Risāle-i Nur. Although Swinburne 
employs almost all known theistic arguments, he specializes in the argument from 
religious experience (ARE) and the arguments from miracles. As was discussed in 
Chapter 4, the authenticity test of a religious experience developed by Swinburne 
seems to have been applied by Nursi in his Risāle-i Nur many years prior to 
Swinburne’s introduction of it. 
Craig takes a more proactive route to preach his theism, using similar arguments to 
Nursi’s. As opposed to Nursi’s text-based teaching, Craig’s is more speech-plus-text-
oriented. For instance, in his academic debates, the cosmological argument, especially 
the kalām cosmological argument, is the argument Craig employs the most. His moral 
argument, though not identical to Nursi’s, is probably his second most common 
argument. On the use of prophethood and revelation Nursi and Craig differ. Nursi 
dedicates the bulk of his writings to try to prove the authenticity of the prophet 
Muḥammad and the Qur’ān, whereas Craig refers to Jesus and the Bible a great deal 
without trying to prove their authenticity.  
Alvin Plantinga, another influential Professor of Christian theology, differs from 
Nursi in terms of the theistic argument he focuses on. Among other Christian 
apologists such as Charles Hartshorne and Norman Malcolm, Plantinga is mainly 
interested in a modern version of St Anselm’s ontological argument, which he tries to 
develop into a ‘modal logic’ version. In spite of being the first line of defence for 
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Abrahamic theism, the ontological argument is almost completely ignored by Nursi, 
perhaps because he is more of a scholar who wishes to deal with verifiable theories. 
Despite a traditional rivalry between Jews, Christians and Muslims, Nursi does not try 
to underline the differences, but rather highlights the common ground that all 
Abrahamic religions hold. That is to say, Nursi is keen on forming a common front 
with Jews, Christians and Muslims to defend Abrahamic theism and reduce the 
damage caused by aggressive atheism. Although he occasionally displays distaste for 
the aggressive, imperialist behaviour of the Christian West, especially during World 
War I, he later makes it clear that the Abrahamic religions need to join forces to 
defend the oneness (tawḥīd) of God. 
In this sense, Nursi’s three arguments – the teleological, the prophethood-based and 
the moral – are, it may be argued, easily transferable to the Jewish and Christian 
contexts. However, the Nursian defence of the revelation of the Qur’ān to the prophet 
Muḥammad is difficult to transfer to the Old and New Testaments. 
Saīd Nursi’s four ways of arguing for the existence of God are clearly not original in 
light of the history of theism. Yet, in bringing them together to form a fool proof, 
fourfold argument and in constructing thereby a unique theism from the ground up, 
Nursi shows that he is another shield for the defence of Abrahamic theism. 
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Appendix 1: Chronology and Diagram of the Risāle-i Nur Collection 
 
A. Chronology of the Risāle-i Nur Collection 
 
1877 Saīd Nursi was born 
1892 Nicknamed ‘Bediüzzaman’ (wonder of the ages) 
1911 Hutbe-i Şamiye, (Damascus Sermon) 
Muḥākamāt (Reasoning) published 
1913 Mûnāẓarāt (Debates) published 
1916 He began writing al-Isharat al-I’jāz (Signs of Miraculousness) 
1919-1921 Small treaties Tuluât, Sunūhat, Lemaāt, Ishārāt and Hutuvat-i Sitte written 
1920-1921 Collapse of the Ottoman Empire, emergence of Republic of Turkey.  
Beginning of New Saīd Era. 
1923 al-Mathnawī al-‘Arabī al-Nūrī translated into Turkish. 
1926 Writing of Risāle-i Nur begun in exile in Barla. 
1926-1929 
The Words. 
1929-1932 
The Letters. 
1932-1934 
The Flashes. 
1936-1940 Majority of The Rays written. 
1948 Writing of Risāle-i Nur completed. 
1950 First democratically elected government came to power.  
Beginning of The Third Saīd Era. 
1956 Risāle-i Nur is printed in Latin alphabet.  
1960 Saīd Nursi dies. 
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B. Diagram of the Risāle-i Nur Collection 
The Words (Sözler)    
1st Word 
   
. 
   
. 
   
. 
   
33rd  Word >>>becomes The Letters (Mektūbat)   
 
1st Letter 
  
 
. 
  
 
. 
  
 
. 
  
 27th Letter >>>>becomes 
(Barla-Kastamonu and 
Emirdağ Lâhikası)  
 
. 
  
 
. 
  
 
30th Letter >>>>becomes 
 
(al-Ishārāt al-I’jāz)  
 31st Letter >>>>becomes 
 
The Flashes (Lem’alar)  
 
. 1st Flash 
 
 
33rd Letter . 
 
  
. 
 
  
. 
 
  31st Flash >>>>becomes 
 
The Rays  (Şualar) 
  
. 1st Ray 
  33rd Flash (al-Mathnawī 
al-Nūriyah) 
 
. 
   
. 
   
. 
   
15th Ray 
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Appendix 2: Names and Attributes of God in Islām  
  
Names in 
Transliterations 
Meaning Names in 
Transliterations 
Meaning 
Allāh The God. The only 
one Almighty. He 
alone is worthy of 
worship. 
Al-Mubdī The Originator. He 
who creates all 
creatures initially 
without matter or 
model. 
Al-‘Adl The Just. He who is 
Equitable. 
Al-Mughnī The Enricher. The 
Sufficer. 
Al-Ākhir The Last. Al-Muhaymin The Guardian. He who 
watches over and 
protects all things. 
(Helper in Peril) 
al-‘Afuw The Pardoner. He 
who pardons all who 
sincerely repents. 
Al-Muḥsī The Appraiser. He 
who knows the 
number of every single 
thing in existence, 
even to infinity. 
al-‘Alīm The Knower of All. He 
who has full 
knowledge of all 
things. 
al-Mu'īd The Restorer. He who 
recreates His creatures 
after He has 
annihilated them. 
al-Aḥad The One. The only 
one. 
al-Muʿizz The Bestower of 
Honours. He who 
confers honour and 
dignity. 
al-Awwal The First. al-Mujīb The Responder to 
Prayer. He who grants 
the wishes who 
appeals to him. 
al-ʿAzīz The Mighty and 
Strong. 
al-Munʿīm The Nourisher. He 
who gives every 
creature its sustenance. 
al-ʿAzīm The Magnificent. The 
Most High. He who is 
Most Splendid. 
al-Muqaddim The Expediter. He who 
brings forward 
whatever He wills 
(Forewarner). 
al-Badī’ The Incomparable. He 
who is without model 
or match, and who 
brings into being 
worlds of amazing 
wonder. 
al-Muqsīt The Equitable One. He 
who does everything 
with proper balance 
and harmony. 
al-Bā'ith The Resurrector. He 
who brings the dead 
al-Muqtadir The Creator of All 
Power. He who 
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to life, and raises 
them from their 
tombs. 
disposes at His will 
even of the strongest 
and mightiest of His 
creatures. 
al-Bāqī The Everlasting 
One. Eternal (in the 
future). 
al-Mumīt The Taker of Life. He 
who creates the death 
of a living creature. 
al-Bāri’ The Maker of 
Order (Skilled 
Worker). O Evolver 
who created all things 
so that each whole 
and its parts are in 
perfect conformity 
and harmony. 
al-Muntaqīm The Avenger. He who 
justly inflicts upon 
wrongdoers the 
punishment they 
deserve. 
al-Barr Source of all 
Goodness. He who 
treats His servants 
tolerantly, and whose 
goodness and 
kindness are very 
great indeed. 
al-Muṣawwir The Shaper of 
Beauty. He who 
designs all things, 
giving each its 
particular form and 
character (Sculptor). 
al-Baṣīr 
 
The All-Seeing. To 
those who invoke this 
Name one hundred 
times between the 
obligatory and 
customary prayers in 
Friday congregation, 
Allah grants esteem in 
the eyes of others. 
al-Mutaʿāli The Supreme One. He 
is exalted in every 
respect, far beyond 
anything the mind 
could possibly 
attribute to His 
creatures. 
al-Bāsiṭ The 
Reliever (Uncloser). 
He who releases, 
letting things expand. 
al-Mutakabbir The Majestic. He who 
demonstrates His 
greatness in all things 
and in all ways. 
al-Bāṭin The Hidden One. He 
who is hidden, 
concealed. 
al-Mudhill The Humiliator. He 
who degrades and 
abases. 
al-Dhārr The Distresser. The 
Creator of the 
Harmful. He who 
creates things that 
cause pain and injury. 
An-Nāfi’ The Creator of 
Good. He who creates 
things that yields 
advantages and 
benefit. 
al-Fattāh The Opener. He who 
opens the solution to 
all problems and 
makes things easy. 
al-Nūr The Light. He who 
gives light to all the 
worlds, who 
illuminates the faces, 
minds and hearts of 
His servants. 
al-Ghaffār The Forgiving. He 
who is always ready 
to forgive. 
al-Qābiḍ The Constrictor. He 
who constricts and 
restricts. 
al-Ghafūr The Forgiver and 
Hider of Faults. 
al-Qādir The All-Powerful. He 
who is Able to do what 
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He wills as He wills 
(Providence). 
al-Ghanī The Rich One. He 
who is infinitely rich 
and completely 
Independent. 
al-Qahhār The Subduer. He who 
dominates all things, 
and prevails upon 
them to do whatever 
He wills (Dominant). 
al-Hādī The Guide. He who 
provides guidance. 
al-Qawī The Most Strong. The 
Possessor of All 
Strength. 
al-Ḥāfiẓ The Preserver. He 
who guards all 
creatures in every 
detail. 
al-Qayyūm The Self-Existing 
One. He who 
maintains the heavens, 
the earth, and 
everything that exists. 
al-Ḥayy The Ever Living 
One. The living who 
knows all things and 
whose strength is 
sufficient for 
everything. 
al-Quddūs The Pure One. He who 
is free from all errors. 
al-Ḥakīm The Perfectly 
Wise. He whose every 
command and action 
is pure wisdom. 
al-Rāfi’ The Exalter. He who 
raises up. 
al-Ḥakam The Judge. He who 
judges and makes 
right prevails. 
al-Raḥīm The All 
Compassionate. He 
who acts with extreme 
kindness. 
al-ʿAliyyu The Highest. The 
Exalted. 
al-Raḥmān The All Merciful. He 
who wills goodness 
and mercy for all His 
creatures. 
al-Ḥalīm The Forbearing. He 
who is Most Clement. 
al-Raqīb The Watchful One. 
al-Ḥamīd The Praiseworthy. All 
praise belongs to 
Him, and who alone 
do the tongues of all 
creation laud. 
al-Rashīd The Righteous 
Teacher. He who 
moves all things in 
accordance with His 
eternal plan, bringing 
them without error and 
with order and wisdom 
to their ultimate 
destiny (Unerring). 
al-Ḥaqq The Truth. He 
who’s being endures 
unchangingly. 
al-Ra'ūf The Kind. He who is 
very compassionate 
(Indulgent). 
al-Ḥasīb The Accounter. He 
who knows every 
detail. 
al-Razzāq The Sustainer. He who 
provides all things 
useful to His creatures. 
al-Jabbār The Compelling. He 
who repairs all broken 
thing, and completes 
that which is 
as-Ṣabūr The Patient One. He 
who is characterized 
by infinite patience. 
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incomplete. 
al-Jalīl The Glorious. He who 
is Lord of Majesty 
and Grandeur. 
al-Salām The Source of 
Peace. He who frees 
His servants from all 
danger. 
al-Jāmi’ The Gatherer. He 
who brings together 
what He wills, when 
He wills, where He 
wills. 
al-Ṣamad The Eternal. He who is 
the only recourse for 
the ending of need and 
the removal of 
affliction. 
al-Kabīr The Greatest. He who 
supremely great. al-Samīʿu 
The Hearer of 
All. Allah takes care of 
all the needs of those 
who invoke this 
glorious Name one 
hundred times. 
al-Karīm The Generous. He 
whose generosity is 
most abundant. 
al-Shāhid The Witness. He who 
is present everywhere 
and observes all 
things. 
al-Khabīr The All Aware. He 
who has the 
knowledge of inner 
and most secret 
aspects of all things. 
al-Shakūr The Rewarder of 
Thankfulness. He who 
gratefully rewards 
good deeds 
(Appreciator). 
al-Khāfiḍ The Abaser. He who 
brings down, 
diminishes. 
al-Tawwāb The Acceptor to 
Repentance. He who is 
ever ready to accept 
repentance and to 
forgive sins 
(Relenting). 
al-Khāliq The Creator. He who 
brings from non-being 
into being, creating all 
things in such a way 
that He determines 
their existence and the 
conditions and events 
they are to 
experience. 
al-Wakīl The Trustee/ 
Guardian. He who 
manages the affairs of 
those who duly 
commit them to His 
charge, and who looks 
after them better than 
they could themselves. 
al-Laṭīf The Subtle One. He 
who knows the 
minutest subtleties of 
all things. 
al-Wālī 
 
The Protecting 
Friend. He who is a 
nearest friend to His 
good servants. 
al-Majīd The Majestic One. He 
whose glory is most 
great and most high. 
al-Wahhāb The Giver of All. He 
who constantly 
bestows blessings of 
every kind. 
al-Majīd The Glorious. He, 
whose dignity and 
glory are most great, 
and whose generosity 
and munificence are 
bountiful. 
al-Wāḥid The Unique. He who is 
Single, absolutely 
without partner or 
equal in His Essence, 
Attributes, Actions, 
Names and Decrees. 
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al-Mālik The Absolute 
Ruler. The Ruler of 
the entire universe 
(King of Kings). 
al-Wājid The Finder. He who 
finds what He wishes 
when He wishes 
(Perceiving). 
Mālik-ul-Mulk The Owner of All. The 
King of the Kingdom. 
al-Wadūd The Loving One. He 
who loves His good 
servants, and bestows 
his compassion upon 
them. 
al-Māni' The Preventer of 
Harm. The 
Withholder. 
Al-Wālī The Governor. The 
Protecting Friend. He 
who administers this 
vast universe and all 
its passing phenomena. 
al-Mu’min The Inspirer of 
Faith. He who awakes 
the light of faith in 
our hearts. 
al-Wāsʿi The All 
Comprehending. He 
who has limitless 
capacity and 
abundance. 
al-Matīn The Firm. He who is 
very steadfast. 
al-Wārith The Inheritor of 
All. He who is the Real 
Owner of all riches. 
Al-Muhyi The Giver of Life. He 
who confers life, 
gives vitality, revives. 
Az-Zāhir The Manifest One. He 
who is Evident. 
al-Mu'akhkhir The Delayer. He who 
sets back or delays 
whatever He wills. 
Zul-Jalāli- 
Wal-Ikrām 
The Lord of Majesty 
and Bounty. He who 
possesses both 
greatness and gracious 
magnanimity. 
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Appendix 3: Elements in the Human Body 
 
Percentage of 
Body Weight Element Usage 
65% Oxygen 
This element is obviously the most important element in the 
human body. Oxygen atoms are present in water, which is the 
compound most common in the body, and other compounds that 
make up tissues. It is also found in the blood and lungs owing to 
respiration. 
18.6% Carbon 
Carbon is found in every organic molecule in the body, as well 
as the waste product of respiration (carbon dioxide). It is 
typically ingested in food that is eaten. 
9.7% Hydrogen Hydrogen is found in all water molecules in the body as well as many other compounds making up the various tissues. 
3.2% Nitrogen 
Nitrogen is very common in proteins and organic compounds. It 
is also present in the lungs owing to its abundance in the 
atmosphere. 
1.8% Calcium 
Calcium is a primary component of the skeletal system, 
including the teeth. It is also found in the nervous system, 
muscles, and the blood. 
1.0% Phosphorus This element is common in the bones and teeth, as well as nucleic acids. 
0.4% Potassium Potassium is found in the muscles, nerves, and certain tissues. 
0.2% Sodium Sodium is excreted in sweat, but is also found in muscles and nerves. 
0.2% Chlorine Chlorine is present in the skin and facilitates water absorption by the cells. 
0.06% Magnesium Magnesium serves as a cofactor for various enzymes in the body. 
0.04% Sulphur Sulphur is present in many amino acids and proteins. 
0.007% Iron Iron is found mostly in the blood since it facilitates the transportation of oxygen. 
0.0002% Iodine Iodine is found in certain hormones in the thyroid gland. 
 
Source: Lenntech BV  
Rotterdamseweg 402 M 2629 HH Delft, The Netherlands  
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Appendix 4: Marriages of the Prophet Muḥammad (571-632) in Chronological 
Order 
 
 Name of wife Wife’s age 
Muḥammad’s 
age Date Notes 
1 
Khādījah b. al-
Khuwaylid 
 
40 25 595 CE 
Marriage lasted 25 years 
until her death. She gave 
birth to 6 children: Abd 
Allāh (M), Qāsim (M), 
Zaynab (F), Ruqiyyah (F), 
Fāṭimah (F), and Umm 
Kulthūm (F) 
2 
Sawdah b. Zamʿah 
 
53 or 55 53 623 CE She was the only wife for three years 
3 
ʿĀishah b. Abī Bakr 
 
7 to 13 or 
17 
(Disputed) 
53 623 CE Only virgin wife 
4 
Ḥafṣah b. ʿUmar 
 
20 55 625 CE She was a widow 
5 
Zaynab b. Khuzayma 
 
50 56 625-626 CE 
She died within eight 
months of marriage owing 
to illness 
6 
Hind b. Abī Umayya 
(Umm Salamah) 
 
65 56 626 CE 
Married after the death of 
Zaynab. Umm Salamah 
had 3 children from her 
previous marriage 
7 
Rayḥānah b. Zayd 
 
? 56 626 CE She was a Jew from Bani Qurayzah tribe 
8 
Zaynab b. Jaḥsh 
 
34 56 626 CE She was a widow 
9 
Juwayriyya b. Ḥārith 
 
20 58 628 CE 
She was captured as a 
slave, freed and married 
to Muḥammad 
10 
Ṣafiyyah b. Ḥuyay Ibn 
Akhtab 
 
20 58 629 CE She was a Jew captured from Bani Nadīr 
11 Ramlah b. Abī Sufyān 
(Umm Ḥabībah)  
55 58 
629 CE 
 
She was the daughter of 
the leader of Quraysh 
tribe in Mecca 
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12 Māriyah al-Qibṭiyyah 
 
? 57 628 CE Gift from Byzantine ruler 
Muqawqis. Mother of 
Ibrāhim who died during 
infancy. 
13 Maymūna b. al-Ḥārith 
 
36 60 630 She had two children 
from her previous 
marriage. 
 
Owing to differences between the Islamic and Gregorian calendars, some ages and dates are 
estimates.  
 
Source: Lings, M. (1983) Muḥammad: His Life Based on the Earliest Sources (New York: 
Inner Traditions International). 
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Appendix 5: The names and characteristics of the prophets mentioned in the 
Qur'ān 
 
Qur'ān, 4:163–165 
 
163: Lo! We inspire thee (Muḥammad) as We inspired Noah and the prophets after 
him, as We inspired Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob and the tribes, 
and Jesus and Job and Jonah and Aaron and Solomon, and as we imparted 
unto David the Psalms; 
164: And messengers We have mentioned unto thee before and messengers We have 
not mentioned unto thee; and Allah spake directly unto Moses; 
165 Messengers of good cheer and off warning, in order that mankind might have no 
argument against Allah after the messengers. Allah was ever Mighty, Wise. 
 
Qur'ān, 6:84–86 
 
84: And We bestowed upon him Isaac and Jacob; each of them We guided; and Noah 
did We guide aforetime; and of his seed (We guided) David and Solomon and Job 
and Joseph and Moses and Aaron. Thus do We reward the good. 
85: And Zachariah and John and Jesus and Elias. Each one (of them) was of the 
righteous. 
86: And Ishmael and Elisha and Jonah and Lot. Each one of them did We prefer 
above (Our) creatures, 
 
Qur'ān, 21:85–88 
 
85: And (mention) Ishmael, and Idris (Enoch), and Dhul-Kifl (Ezekiel). All were of 
the steadfast. 
86: And We brought them in unto Our mercy. Lo! they are among the righteous. 
87: And (mention) Dhun Nun (Jonah), when he went off in anger and deemed that We 
had no power over him, but he cried out in the darkness, saying: There is no God save 
Thee. Be Thou glorified! I have been a wrong-doer. 
88: Then We heard his prayer and saved him from the anguish. Thus We save 
believers. 
 
Qur'ān, 7:73 
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And to (the tribe of) Thamud (We sent) their brother Salih. He said: O my people! 
Serve Allah. Ye have no other God save Him. A wonder from your Lord hath come 
unto you. Lo! this is the camel of Allah, a token unto you; so let her feed in Allah's 
earth, and touch her not with hurt lest painful torment seize you. 
 
Qur'ān, 26:123–125 
 
123: (The tribe of) Aad denied the messengers (of Allah), 
124: When their brother Hud said unto them: Will ye not ward off (evil)? 
125: Lo! I am a faithful messenger unto you, 
 
Qur'ān, 7:85 
 
To the Madyan people We sent Shu'aib one of their own brethren: he said: "O my 
people! worship Allah; Ye have no other god but Him. Now hath come unto you a 
clear (sign) from your Lord! Give just measure and weight nor withhold from the 
people the things that are their due; and do no mischief on the earth after it has been 
set in order: that will be best for you if ye have faith. 
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Appendix 6: Major Sins (Al- Kaba'ir) in Islām deduced from the Qur’ān and the 
Hadīth  
 
1. Associating partners with Allāh (Shirk) 
2. Committing murder (Qur’ān, 25: 68) 
3. Performing Sorcery (Qur’ān, 2: 102) 
4. Not performing the Prayers (Qur’ān, 19: 59) 
5. Withholding Zakah (Charity) (Qur’ān, 3: 180) 
6. Breaking the fast of Ramadān or not fasting in that month without a valid excuse 
7. Not performing the pilgrimage when one has the ability to do so 
8. Disobeying one's parents (Qur’ān, 17: 23) 
9. Cutting off the ties of relationships (Qur’ān, 47: 22) 
10. Committing adultery or fornication (Qur’ān, 17: 30) 
11. Committing sodomy 
12. Taking or paying interest (Qur’ān, 2: 275) 
13. Devouring the wealth of orphans (Qur’ān, 4:10) 
14. Forging statements concerning Allāh or forging hadīth (Qur’ān, 39: 60) 
15. Fleeing from battle (Qur’ān, 8: 16) 
16. Wrongdoing, deception or oppression on the part of the ruler (Qur’ān, 26: 42) 
17. Being arrogant, boastful or vain (Qur’ān, 16: 23) 
18. Giving false testimony (Qur’ān, 25: 72) 
19. Drinking alcoholic beverages (Qur’ān, 5: 90) 
20. Gambling (Qur’ān, 5: 90) 
21. Slandering innocent women (Qur’ān, 24: 23) 
22. Misappropriating something from booty (Qur’ān, 3:161) 
23. Stealing (Qur’ān, 5:38) 
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24. Committing highway robbery (Qur’ān, 5: 33) 
25. Making a false oath 
26. Committing oppression (Qur’ān, 26: 277) 
27. Levying illegal taxes 
28. Consuming forbidden wealth or taking it by any means (Qur’ān, 2: 188) 
29. Committing suicide (Qur’ān, 4: 29) 
30. Being a perpetual liar (Qur’ān, 3: 61) 
31. Ruling by laws other than the laws of Islām (Qur’ān, 5: 44) 
32. Engaging in bribery (Qur’ān, 2: 188) 
33. Women appearing like men and vice versa 
34. Being a dayyouth (A dayyouth is one who approves of the indecency of his 
womenfolk and who is void of jealousy, or the pimp who facilitates indecency 
between two people.) 
35. Marrying for the purpose of making a woman allowable for another (Qur’ān, 2) 
36. Not keeping clean from the remains of urine 
37. Acting for show (Qur’ān, 107: 4-6) 
38. Acquiring knowledge only for worldly gain or concealing knowledge (Qur’ān, 2: 
160) 
39. Breaching trusts (Qur’ān, 8: 27) 
40. Reminding people of one's kindness (Qur’ān, 2: 27) 
41. Denying predestination (Qur’ān, 54: 49) 
42. Eavesdropping on other's private conversation (Qur’ān, 54: 12) 
43. Spreading harmful tales (Qur’ān, 54: 10) 
44. Cursing others 
45. Not fulfilling one's promises 
46. Believing in what soothsayers and astrologers say 
47. A wife being rebellious to her husband (Qur’ān, 4: 34) 
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48. Putting pictures of beings with souls on clothing, curtains, rocks and any other 
items 
49. Striking oneself, wailing, tearing one's clothing, pulling one's hair and similar 
deeds as a form of mourning 
50. Committing injustice (Qur’ān, 42: 42) 
51. Being overbearing or taking advantage of the weak, slaves, wives or animals 
52. Harming neighbours 
53. Harming and abusing Muslims (Qur’ān, 33: 58) 
54. Wearing one’s clothes too long (i.e. below the ankles) 
55. Harming the slaves of Allāh 
56. Men wearing silk and gold 
57. The running away of a slave 
58. Sacrificing animals for other than Allāh 
59. Claiming that somebody is one's father while the claimant knows it is not true 
60. Arguing or quarrelling for show and not seeking the truth 
61. Not allowing excess water to flow to others 
62. Not measuring weights properly (Qur’ān, 83: 1-3) 
63. Thinking that one is safe from Allāh's planning (Qur’ān, 7: 99) 
64. Eating carrion, blood or pork meat (Qur’ān, 6: 145) 
65. Not praying in the congregation and praying by oneself without a valid excuse 
66. Continually not performing the Friday prayers and congregational prayers without 
any valid excuse 
67. Harming others by manipulating one's bequests (Qur’ān, 4: 12) 
68. Being deceitful or deceptive (Qur’ān, 35: 43) 
69. Spying on Muslims and pointing out their secrets (Qur’ān, 68: 11) 
70. Abusing or reviling anyone about the Companions of the Prophet Muḥammad 
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Appendix 7: Nursi’s exposition of The Qur’ān’s Miraculousness 
(Outline of The Twenty-fifth Word) 
Evidence Group I: 
1st Ray: This is the eloquence of the Qur’ān (balāghah) 
1.a. by means of poetic eloquence 
First: There is a wonderful eloquence and purity of style in the 
Qur’ān’s word-order (jazālah) 
Second: This is the wonderful eloquence in its meaning. (ma’nà) 
Third: This is the wonderful uniqueness of its style (ʿuslūb) 
Fourth: This is the wonderful eloquence in its wording; that is, in the 
words employed (faṣāḥah) 
Fifth: This is the excellence in its manner of exposition; that is to say, 
the superiority, conciseness, and grandeur. (barāah) 
i. eloquence in encouragement and urging (targhīb wa tashwīq) 
ii. eloquence in  deterring and threatening(tarhīb wa takdīr) 
iii. eloquence in  praising (madḥ) 
iv. eloquence in censure and restraint (dhamm wa zajr) 
v.  eloquence  proof and demonstration (ithbāt) 
vi.  eloquence  in guidance (irshād) 
vii. eloquence in  making understood and silencing in argument (ifhām wa ilzām) 
2nd Ray: This is the Qur’ān’s extraordinary comprehensiveness (jāmiʿiyyah) 
a. the comprehensiveness in the words (lafẓ) 
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b. the extraordinary comprehensiveness in its meaning (ma’nà) 
c. the extraordinary comprehensiveness in its knowledge (ʿilm) 
d. the extraordinary comprehensiveness of the subjects it puts forward 
(mabāḥis) 
e. the wonderful comprehensiveness of the Qur’ān’s style and conciseness. 
(ʿuslūb) 
3rd Ray: These are the Qur’ān’s [a] giving news of the Unseen (ikhbār-i ghaybī), [b] 
preserving its youth in every age (shabābah), and [c] being appropriate to every level 
of person (muwāfakah). 
a.i. its telling about the past, one part of the Unseen 
a.ii. its giving news of the future 
a. iii. its giving news of the Divine truths, cosmic truths, and the matters of the 
hereafter 
b.i. the Qur’ān’s youth  
c.i.  It is as though the All-Wise Qur’ān is every century turned directly 
towards all the classes of humanity, and addresses each particularly 
Evidence Group II: 
1. Its pleasant fluency (salāsah), a superior correctness, a firm mutual solidarity 
(tasānud), and compact proportionateness (tanāsub), powerful co-operation between 
the sentences and parts (taʿāwun), and an elevated harmony between the verses and 
their aims (tajāwub). 
2. Its unique style in the summaries and Most Beautiful Divine Names, which it 
shows at the ends of its verses (fadhlakah)  
Evidence Group III. 
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1. Its Miraculous Expositions (ʿijāz) 
2. Its superiority of its wisdom over the human philosophy 
3. Its degree of the wisdom and science – before Qur’anic wisdom – of the purified 
scholars, the saints, and the enlightened among philosophers 
 
Source: Risāle-i Nur Külliyatı, and eRisale.com 
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Appendix 8: Chronology of the Prophet Muḥammad’s Life 
Time Line of Some Important Events in the Prophet Muḥammad’s Life 
 
570 C.E. Muḥammad is born in Mecca 
 
595 C.E. Muḥammad marries Khadija, who later becomes the first 
Muslim 
 
610 C.E. Muḥammad receives what he comes to believe is his first visitation 
from the angel Gabriel and revelation from Allāh 
 
613 C.E. Muḥammad begins preaching Islām publicly in Mecca 
 
615 C.E. Friction with the Quraysh causes some Muslims to leave Arabia 
for Abyssinia 
 
619 C.E.  Khadija dies 
 
620 C.E. The Night Journey (Isrā wa al-Mi’rāj) Prophet Muḥammad is carried from 
Mecca to Jerusalem and then travels to the heavens and meets the previous prophets 
(Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, etc).  
 
622 C.E. The Hijra: Muḥammad and the Muslims flee from Mecca to Medina 
 
624 C.E. The Nakhla raid. These raids were not solely designed to exact revenge from 
the people who had rejected the Prophet who had arisen among them. They served a 
key economic purpose, keeping the Muslim movement solvent. 
 
624 C.E.  The Battle of Badr: the Muslims overcome great odds to defeat the pagan 
Meccans 
 
624 C.E.  Muḥammad and the Muslims besiege the Jewish Qaynuqa 
tribe and exile them from Medina 
 
625 C.E.  The Battle of Uhud: the pagan Meccans defeat the Muslims 
 
625 C.E.  Siege and exile from Medina of the Jewish Nadir tribe 
 
627 C.E. The Battle of the Trench: the Jewish Qurayzah tribe betrays 
Muḥammad 
627 C.E. The Execution the males of the Qurayzah tribe and 
enslaves the women and children by Sa’d Ibn Mutab 
 
628 C.E.  Muḥammad concludes the Treaty of Hudaybiyya with the 
pagan Meccans 
 
628 C.E.  Prophet Muḥammad and the Muslims besiege the Khaybar oasis and 
exile the Jews from it.  
 
630 C.E.  Muḥammad and the Muslims conquer Mecca 
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630 C.E.  The Muslims prevail in the Battle of Hunayn and conquer 
Ta'if; Muḥammad becomes the ruler of Arabia 
 
631 C.E.  The Arabian tribes remaining outside Islamic rule accept 
Islam 
 
631 C.E. the expedition to Tabuk 
 
632 C.E.  Muḥammad dies in Medina on June 8, 632 CE 
 
 
Source: Lings, Martin. 1983. Muhammad: his life based on the earliest sources. New 
York: Inner Traditions International. 
and 
Haylamaz, Reşit. 2008. Gönül tahtımızın eşsiz sultanı: Efendimiz (sallallahu aleyhi ve 
sellem). Istanbul: Muştu. 
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Appendix 9: Nursi’s exposition of the Miracles of the Prophet Muḥammad 
(Map of the Nineteenth Letter) 
 
 
FIRST SIGN 
Argues that Muḥammad has the highest personal qualities. 
 
SECOND SIGN 
Argues that Muḥammad’s miracles are admitted by his enemies. 
 
THIRD SIGN 
Demonstrates two groups of wonders. First are the pre-prophetic era paranormal 
events, i.e. irhāsāt such as dying of the majusi’s fire and drying up of Siwah Lake. 
Second group is the wonders during his prophethood which are explored in the 
following signs. 
 
FOURTH SIGN 
Demonstrates how Muḥammad reported the unseen truths concerning the Godhead, 
the universe, and the hereafter, as well as his correct predictions about his 
Companions, his Family and his community. 
 
FIFTH SIGN 
Demonstrates examples of Hadiths concerning the matters of the Unseen. 
 
SIXTH SIGN 
Reports further specific future events such as the capture of Cyprus, conquest of 
Constantinople and some political events. 
 
SEVENTH SIGN 
Reports miracles that relate to the increase in food. 
 
EIGHTH SIGN 
Describes miracles which were manifested in connection with water 
 
NINTH SIGN 
Narrates incidents where trees obeyed Muḥammad’s orders, and moving from their 
places to come to him. 
 
TENTH SIGN 
Corroborating the miracles concerning trees and reported in the form of ‘consensus,’ 
is the miracle of the moaning of the pole 
 
ELEVENTH SIGN 
Describes how rocks and mountains among lifeless creatures demonstrated prophetic 
miracles. 
 
TWELFTH SIGN 
Gives further three examples that are related to the Eleventh Sign. 
 
THIRTEENTH SIGN 
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Reports incidents where the sick and the wounded being healed through Muḥammad’s 
blessed breath. 
 
FOURTEENTH SIGN 
Demonstrates the wonders manifested as a result of his prayers. 
 
FIFTEENTH SIGN 
Demonstrates miracles where animals, the dead, the jinn, and the angels recognized 
Muḥammad and affirmed his prophethood. 
 
SIXTEENTH SIGN 
Elaborates pre-prophetic paranormal events (irhāsāt) which are already mentioned in 
the third sign. Here Nursi specially focuses on the mentioning of Muḥammad in the 
previous scriptures such as the Torah, the Bible, the Psalms of David. 
 
SEVENTEENTH SIGN 
Muḥammad’s own self. That is, the elevated moral virtues brought together in his 
person, which as friend and foe agreed was in all respects of the very highest degree. 
 
EIGHTEENTH SIGN 
This is the All-Wise Qur’ān, which comprises hundreds of evidences of Muḥammad’s 
prophethood, and forty aspects of whose own miraculousness have been proven. The 
Twenty-Fifth Word (See Appendix 7) has explained concisely and proved those forty 
aspects in its approximately one hundred and fifty pages. 
 
NINETEENTH SIGN 
Further describes the correctness, truthfulness and integrity of Muḥammad. 
 
Source: Risāle-i Nur Collection and eRisale.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
   324 
 
Appendix 10: Outline of Kalām Cosmological Arguments 
 
Ibn Sīnā Al-Fārābī Al-Ghazzālī Ibn Rushd 
1.Definitions: 
a. Contingent being: a being 
composed of essence and 
existence, which therefore 
requires an existential cause. 
b. Necessary being: a being not 
composed of essence and 
existence, which therefore does 
not require an existential cause. 
2. Every being is either 
contingent or necessary. 
3. If it is necessary, then a 
necessary being exists. 
4.If it is contingent, then a 
necessary being exists. 
a. A contingent being requires an 
existential cause. 
b. If this cause is also a 
contingent being, then an 
existential causal series is 
formed. 
c. An existential causal series 
cannot be infinite. 
i. An infinite series has no first 
cause. 
ii. Therefore, there would be no 
cause of existence. 
iii. Therefore, contingent beings 
could not exist. 
iv. But this is absurd. 
d. Therefore, the existential 
causal series must terminate in a 
necessary being. 
5. Therefore, a necessary being 
exists 
2. Definitions: 
a. Every being has either a 
reason for its existence or no 
reason for its existence. 
b. A being which has a reason 
for its existence is contingent, 
both before it exists and after it 
exists. 
i. Because its actually coming to 
exist does not remove the 
contingent nature of its 
existence. 
c. A being which has no reason 
for its existence is necessary. 
2. Every being is either 
contingent or necessary.  
3. If it is necessary, then a 
necessary being exists. 
4. If it is contingent, then a 
necessary being exists because: 
a. A contingent being cannot 
come into existence without a 
reason. 
b. If this reason is also 
contingent, then there is a series 
of contingent beings linked 
together. 
c. Such series cannot be infinite 
i. Because then there would be 
no being at all 
a. Because the being in question 
could come into existence only if 
it were preceded by an infinite 
succession of beings, which is 
absurd. 
d. Therefore, the series terminate 
in a necessary being. 
5. Therefore, a necessary being 
exits. 
1.Everything that begins to exist 
requires a cause for its existence. 
2. The world began to exit. 
a. There are temporal phenomena 
in the world. 
b. These are preceded by other 
temporal phenomena. 
c. The series of temporal 
phenomena cannot regress 
infinitely. 
i. An actually existing infinite 
series involves various 
absurdities. 
d. Therefore, the series of 
temporal phenomena must have 
had a beginning. 
3. Therefore, the world has a 
cause for its origin: its Creator 
1. Possible beings must be 
caused. 
2. There cannot be an infinite 
series of possible beings each 
caused by another because: 
a. In an infinite series there is no 
cause. 
b. So the possible being would 
be uncaused. 
c. But this contradicts (1): 
Possible beings must be caused. 
3. Therefore, the series must end 
in a necessary cause, which is 
either caused or uncaused. 
4. There cannot be an infinite 
series of caused necessary causes 
because: 
a. In an infinite regress there is 
no cause. 
b. So caused necessary causes 
would not be caused. 
c. But this is self-contradictory. 
5. Therefore, the series must 
end in an uncaused necessary 
cause, which is the necessary 
being. 
 
 
 
 
 
